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"Alexander the Great": for more than twenty-three centuries his name has inspired 
the deeds of men; within a lifespan of only thirty-two years, he conquered the largest and 
richest empire the western world had ever seen, and in so doing achieved a measure of 
immortality that few others ever have. 
Alexander's real genius was two-fold: firstly the capacity to modify a relatively 
small parcel of strategies and tactics to meet the needs of every situation, every enemy 
and every type of terrain that he encountered. Secondly, it was his ability to inspire men 
to ever greater achievements: his men showed repeatedly that they would do almost 
anything for their king and only finally said `no more' when they had reached the very 
ends of the earth in India. 
The life of Alexander is a remarkable nexus of events that is virtually unparalleled 
in history. Alexander was, perhaps, the finest military mind the world had yet seen; 
coupled with this was his inheritance from his father of one of the greatest armies of the 
ancient world. Had Alexander been born in less auspicious circumstances, we can only 
imagine how very different history would have been. These two factors - genius and 
circumstance - combined to enable the Macedonians to create, in less than a decade, an 
empire that spanned the known world. Alexander's achievements are legendary and 
worthy of study. 
Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest in the career and character of 
Alexander, culminating in the release of the recent Hollywood movie, and it is not 
difficult to see why: almost every page in his career is filled with great battles and heroic 
deeds. Alexander possessed a spirit for adventure and conquest, a need to achieve more 
than anyone had before, that drove him to the ends of the earth, only finally being 
defeated by his early and untimely death in Babylon. 
I count myself as one of those who are utterly fascinated by his career, and 
undertook this thesis entirely out of personal interest and with the intention of immersing 
myself in the sources, learning what I could, and hopefully adding some small amount to 
existing scholarship on the subject. 
Modem works on Alexander are not difficult to find; books are being published 
on the subject at a staggering rate, although they are of vastly differing quality. Books 
that specifically focus on military history are, however, another matter. The study of 
fighting is, unfortunately, no longer fashionable; it is somewhat appropriate and 
satisfying that I complete this work exactly 50 years after Fuller wrote his "generalship". 
Modem historians have tended to focus more on the wider context of warfare, and on 
Alexander's character. There is nothing wrong with this approach, but it is the study of 
strategy and tactics that has always been of particular interest to me. I believe firmly that 
there is still considerable academic worth in attempting to re-construct Alexander's great 
battles and sieges with the intention of making a determination of exactly how he 
managed to conquer most of the known world in little over a decade. 
6 
The relative lack of modem works on Alexander's military career is, rather 
perversely, good for the student of military history; it forces one to rely heavily upon the 
surviving ancient sources. A considerable amount of tactical and strategic information is 
contained within the pages of those surviving sources, much of it frequently missed by 
historians whose primary focus lies elsewhere. 
This thesis is intended to be an examination of the whole of Alexander's career: it 
includes a reconstruction of every set-piece battle and significant siege of his career, and 
omits those campaigns for which we have no information (usually very minor affairs 
against hill tribesmen for example). During this thesis, I shall tentatively present a 
number of new theories and narratives that I hope will solve some of the problems in 
Alexander scholarship; for example the issue of the divergent source traditions for the 
battle of the Granicus River. 
It is also important to note, however, what this thesis is not: it is not primarily an 
examination of sources, although source criticism is present where it is needed for the 
military discussion. It is also not an examination of the army of Alexander; this was done 
in my MA thesis entitled "The Army of Alexander the Great", and in my forthcoming 
book of the same title due for publication within a few weeks of the submission of this 
thesis: I take the results of that examination for granted within this work. 
Alexander's career will be examined chronologically, rather than thematically; 
both approaches were considered in depth, but I believe a chronological approach gives 
us the best view of any developments within Alexander's strategic thinking, which is, in 
itself, a fascinating subject for discussion. Several assumptions should be considered 
when reading this thesis: firstly that all dates are BC unless otherwise stated, secondly 
that the stade is the Olympic stade equating to 192m; this is a common assumption by 
modem scholars in the field. Quotations from ancient writers are taken from the modem 
translations by I. Scott-Kilvert (Plutarch), J. Yardley (Curtius), A. De Selincourt (Arrian: 
references to Arrian without further specification are to his Anabasis), C. Bradford 
Welles (Diodorus) and W. Heckel & J. Yardley (Justin). Two final things need to be said, 
it was my original intention to number the footnotes starting anew for each chapter; a 




One of the very first issues that any historian, ancient or modem, must address is 
source analysis. How can we separate later invention from the original contemporary 
source; how can we overcome the bias in any source; how can we reconstruct events from 
disparate accounts; and of particular interest to military historians (and indeed this thesis), 
how can we reconstruct a battle narrative without the benefit of modern communication? 
It is the intention of this opening chapter to answer these questions and essentially to set 
out the methodological approach taken in this thesis to the sources and source analysis. ' 
The survival of source material makes any study of ancient history difficult, but 
there are specific issues regarding the Alexander sources that make the study of this 
period particularly challenging. At first sight, for the career of Alexander, we are blessed 
with surviving source material. There are two full-length histories of his reign by Arrian 
and Curtius, 2 a biography by Plutarch, two books of Justin's epitome of Pompeius 
Trogus, an entire book of Diodorus and significant sections of Strabo; 3 along with these 
there are some interesting passages in Polybius. This apparent embarrassment of source 
material is extremely misleading; however, as they are all of late date, the earliest 
(Diodorus) being late lst century BC. Strabo, shortly afterwards, wrote in the late 
Augustan period, Curtius was probably late 1St century AD, 4 with Plutarch and Arrian 
writing some time in the second. Pompeius Trogus wrote under Augustus; the date of 
Justin's epitome is disputed but is either 3`d or 4th century. 5 The issue of the transmission 
of accurate information is particularly acute, therefore, in the Alexander historians. 6 
Despite there being a great number of works written on Alexander during his life, 
and shortly afterwards, no contemporary source survives in anything more than 
fragmentary form. Of the fragments that remain, the most are from a relatively small 
group of historians, namely: Callisthenes, Aristobulus, Chares, Cleitarchus, Nearchus, 
Onesicritus, and Ptolemy. 7 All of these primary sources present problems: despite their 
loss, the fact that they were used to such a degree by those sources who do survive means 
they cast a long shadow indeed over all later scholarship. We also do not really know the 
main thrust of these primary sources: some may have concentrated on military matters, 
on geography, 8 or on the king's character etc; we simply do not know with any certainty. 
We can, however, reasonably speculate that Ptolemy, for example, would have taken care 
to give himself a leading role in his work, but even this is speculation given the lack of 
surviving material. Further to the abundant but limited source material, there are very few 
1A still useful discussion of these issues is Whatley, 1964 (written in 1920). 
2 The latter of which contains some significant lacunae. 
3 Bosworth, 2003b, 7. 
° Cf. Bosworth, 2004 rejects the identification with the Curtius Rufus of Tacitus Annals 11.20-1. 
5 Bosworth, 2003b, 7. 
6 Accurate both in the sense of the provision of an historical narrative, and narratives that were true to the 
original source. Bosworth, 2003 argues (against McKechnie, 1999) that the ancient historians followed 
their sources faithfully and did not irresponsibly add material. 
7 Worthington, 2003,1. 
8 For the importance of knowledge of geography and topography in reconstructing ancient battles see 
Whatley, 1964,123-4. 
surviving inscriptions; numismatic evidence is sparse, 9 but there are a few references in 
contemporary orators like Demosthenes. '0 
Of the now lost primary contemporary sources, the first to be written was perhaps 
Anaximenes' work `On Alexander' 1 written during Alexander's life, as was 
Callisthenes' `Deeds of Alexander' which covered the period at least down to late 331 
(the latest datable fragments describe Gaugamela) and was only cut short by the author's 
killing in 327 by Alexander. 12 Alexander's death brought a wealth of material written by 
senior commanders. Onesicritus and Nearchus wrote soon after the king's death, and 
Ptolemy wrote before 283 (the date of his own death) but probably fairly close to it. 13 
Aristobulus composed his history at some point after the battle of Ipsus in 301; 
contemporary with Cleitarchus' work which was the most widely read on the subject in 
the ancient world. '4 
There were also many pamphlets published on Alexander after his death, 
including a treatise on the deaths of Alexander and Hephaestion by Ephippus and the 
works of a more formal reporting nature like the stathmoi of the Royal surveyors and the 
Ephemerides which was allegedly compiled by Eumenes. 15 These primary sources 
provided a rich and wide-ranging pool from which the surviving tradition was able to 
draw. Modem historians have always felt a tremendous temptation to trace their effect 
upon the extant tradition by using the surviving fragments. The method has been to 
analyse the surviving fragments and attempt to trace bias and other characteristics whilst 
simultaneously trying to identify these in the surviving tradition. 16 The approach can be 
very enlightening when we have some other verifiable evidence that a particular 
fragmentary historian was used by a secondary source, as is the case with Arrian for 
example, '7 but when the identification is speculative then it often leaves more questions 
than answers. 
The major problem with this approach to Alexander historiography is that we 
have very little opportunity to examine a large section of primary source against the 
secondary tradition. One of the rare instances where we can do this is with Nearchus' 
account of his voyage from India to Susa which forms the narrative base for the second 
half of Arrian's Indica. 18 To act as a control sample we also have large sections of Strabo 
where Nearchus was also the primary source. A similar exercise can be conducted with 
Aristobulus, although less successfully as we do not have as much surviving material 
9 Dahmen, 2007. 
10 Demosthenes 18.270; Aeschines 3.133,3.160-164,3.165; Dinarchus 1.34. cf. Worthington, 2003,6. 11 The surviving fragments are too sparse to support any conclusion as to its aim or tone (or indeed its 
quality). Bosworth, 2003b, 14. 
' Pearson, 1960,22-49; Badian, 1964,251-2. 
13 Cf. p142 n. 255. 
14 Badian, 1965c, 1-8; Bosworth, 2003b, 7. 
's Bosworth, 1988b, ch. 7. 
16 Bosworth, 2003b, 8. 
17 Arrian preface 1 where he explicitly names his sources, and his (somewhat naive) reasons for their 
selection. 
18 Arrian Indica 18-42. 
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from him to work with. 19 More often than not this approach is very difficult due to the 
lack of surviving material, and the tangential material often preserved. 
Many secondary authors were very selective in citing their sources and only tend 
to do so either when they are in disagreement or when the validity of what they are 
quoting is in question and they are seeking to try to remove any blame from themselves 
for inaccurate information. As a result of this, when sources are named it is usually where 
they were likely incorrect; material that was sober and informative would simply be 
copied without citation or comment. 20 
Callisthenes demonstrates the above point very well: we may reasonably expect 
the first historian of Alexander to have been very widely used by secondary historians, 
but there are only around twelve citations of his Deeds of Alexander. Many of the 
surviving references are only loosely linked with the narrative that we can assume he 
would have provided (as the official court historian); the largest group are regarding the 
mythology of Asia Minor, as reported by Strabo. 21 Of the remainder of the surviving 
fragmentary material of Callisthenes there are two longer sections, preserved by Polybius, 
which are crucial, and concern Callisthenes' narrative of the battle of Issus. Polybius uses 
the first section, citing his source in order to prove (in his eyes at least) the incompetence 
of Callisthenes as an historian. The two sections primarily deal with troop numbers, and 
the inaccuracy of the description of the topography of the plain. 22 There are undoubted 
problems with Callisthenes' account: the eulogistic approach to Alexander is not helpful 
(and one of the reasons he does not survive). 23 The secondary sources are far from perfect 
in their approach to the primary material as Polybius demonstrates here. Polybius tends to 
assume that all of Alexander's infantry were pezhetairoi and that they were as rigid and 
inflexible as the Macedonian phalanx had become in his own day. 24 Despite the failings 
of Callisthenes (albeit hardly proved by Polybius), Polybius' detailed criticisms have 
proved the basis for a number of reconstructions of the site of the battle of Issus. 
25 
The second of the two major fragments concerns Alexander's visit to Siwah, and 
is used by Strabo. The sections where Callisthenes is used are highlighted by Strabo26 to 
demonstrate that Callisthenes was an arch-flatterer. 27 Strabo was not here attempting to 
give a full narrative from Callisthenes, merely to use him to provide a flattering view of 
Alexander (having ravens act as guides to help him find the oasis for example). The 
implicit criticism of Callisthenes for providing an unashamedly flattering picture28 of 
19 Bosworth, 1988b, ch. 2. 
20 Bosworth, 2003b, 8. 
21 Bosworth, 2003b, 8. 
22 Polybius 12.17.1-22.7; cf. Walbank, 1967,364ff. 
23 Polybius 12.18.2ff (on troop numbers); 18.11-12 (on how the difficulties of the terrain enhanced the 
Macedonian achievement). Cf. Bosworth, 2003b, 8-14. 
24 Polybius 12.19.1-4,21.2-10 (pezhetairoi numbers); 20.6-8,22.4 (rigidity of phalanx). Cf. Bosworth, 
2003b, 9-14. 
u Bosworth, 1976,25-32. 
26 Strabo 17.1.43 (814) = FGrH 124 F 14a. Cf. Pearson, 1960,33-6; Bosworth, 1977a, 68-75. 
27 Bosworth, 2003b, 9. 
28 It was noted above that sources are often cited when they say something demonstrably incorrect and the 
author wishes to distance himself from the comment; this is another example of that tendency. 
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Alexander is echoed by Plutarch, who also related the story of the ravens, although this 
time without citation. 29 Strabo's narrative of the Siwah episode culminates in the 
statement that Alexander was indeed the son of Zeus, a theme no doubt also coming from 
Callisthenes' work. 
This section of Callisthenes was widely cited and used to demonstrate the belief 
that he was little more than a flatterer of Alexander. Several other fragments also appear 
to show this theme (unsurprising in a historian who was writing under the watchful eye of 
the king himself). Plutarch notes Alexander's prayer to Zeus in similar flattering terms. 30 
Polybius'31 criticisms of Callisthenes show that he preserved some very detailed 
material that would have been especially useful to the military historian. There is some 
good detail on troop numbers and movements which, coming as they did from an eye 
witness, have a high likelihood of being accurate and correct. This potentially useful 
material is not what we have citations for, however; he is frequently only quoted in the 
context of the eulogistic and bizarre. 32 Having said this, simply because we do not have a 
citation in a particular passage does not mean that he was not the ultimate source (an 
argument that can be applied to any primary source who is cited); absence of evidence is 
not evidence of absence after all. We should be wary, however, of attributing too much 
material to Callisthenes, as its attribution is almost always speculative and based upon 
assumptions. Whilst Callisthenes may not have been the most widely read of the 
contemporary Alexander historians, he certainly influenced the early tradition. 
The source problems are even more acute with Cleitarchus. It appears that 
Cleitarchus was a very popular historian, especially during the Roman period, and was 
probably the most popular of the primary historians of Alexander. In total, Jacoby accepts 
thirty-six fragments as being authentic; unfortunately all of them deal with minor and 
trivial matters. 33 These fragments are mostly preserved by Aelian and deal with the fauna 
of India, 34 and by Strabo who criticises Cleitarchus for errors in his geographical and 
topographical descriptions of Asia, 35 again illustrating that citations are frequently used in 
order to discredit an historian and remove blame for errors from the secondary source. Of 
the remaining fragments "Demetrius focuses on his stylistic impropriety (F 14), Curtius 
Rufus on exaggeration and invention (F 24-5), Cicero on Rhetorical mendacity (F 34). 
The general impression conveyed by the fragments alone is therefore far from 
favourable". 36 These fragments, considered in isolation, tend to suggest that Cleitarchus 
was prone to exaggeration and therefore not a reliable source; if this is correct then it has 
a significant effect on Alexander scholarship as he was so widely read. We must 
remember three vital points, however; the first is that, as far as we know, Cleitarchus was 
not an eye witness to the events he describes and we must, therefore, consider who his 
29 Plutarch Alex. 27.4 = FGrH 124 F 14b. 30 Plutarch Alex. 33.1 = FGrH 124 F 36. Cf. Bosworth, 1977a, 57-60. 
31 Polybius 12.19.1-2,5-6,20.1. 
32 Bosworth, 2003b, 9. 
33 Bosworth, 2003b, 10. 
34 FGrH 137 F 18-19,21-2. 
35 FGrH 137 F 13,16. 
36 Bosworth, 2003b, 10. 
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ultimate source may have been. In all likelihood he had several primary sources himself; 
probably Callisthenes, Onesicritus and Nearchus were major providers of information for 
Cleitarchus, as were the large number of Macedonian veterans in Alexandria at the time 
of his writing. Secondly we do not have enough surviving material to be able to condemn 
Cleitarchus absolutely: the fragments may well be unrepresentative. The final point 
follows from that: as noted above, primary sources are only usually cited in order to 
discredit them and make the secondary author seem more authoritative. This tendency 
would lead directly to only negative material being preserved and therefore a conclusion 
based upon this material is dangerous. 37 Following this, however, we can say that there 
was evidently a fair amount of negative and sensationalist material in Cleitarchus; 
otherwise later historians would have used a different primary source in order to prove 
the point they wished to make. 
The general impression conveyed by fragmentary material may well be accurate, 
but it is unlikely to tell the whole story. If, for example, we were to have citations in 
Athenaeus and Plutarch's On the Malice of Herodotus, we would come to the same 
conclusion about the father of history as some do of Cleitarchus (and Callisthenes); that 
his history was filled with malice and trivialities and bias. It would certainly be true to 
say that such things exist within Herodotus, but not that it is the main thrust of His 
work. 38 
In order to make a proper judgement of Cleitarchus, more data are required. 
Modem source analysis has convincingly established that large sections of both Diodorus 
and Curtius are so similar that the only realistic conclusion is that they derived from the 
same primary source. The same material is also detectable in both Justin and the extant 
sections of the Metz Epitome. A common tradition has long been recognised and the term 
`vulgate', 39 albeit unsatisfactory because of its negative assumption, has been applied to 
this tradition. 4° It would be entirely incorrect to conclude, however, that a historian from 
the vulgate tradition never used a primary source from outside of that tradition, e. g. 
Ptolemy or Aristobulus: Plutarch, for example, frequently uses sources that are clearly 
different from the vulgate and therefore cannot always be considered to be part of that 
tradition. 41 As Bosworth notes, the term vulgate does not imply a single primary source, 
but rather suggests a shared tradition. 2 
Having said this, however, that shared tradition probably had a single stronger 
voice than the rest, namely Cleitarchus. The key passage in indicating this is Curtius 
9.8.15, which refers to Cleitarchus as his source for the number of Indians killed during 
the Sambus campaign: 43 
37 For a condemnation of Cleitarchus see Tarn, 1948,54-5; Hammond, 1983,25-7. 
38 Bosworth, 2003b, 10. 
39 Bosworth, 2003b, 10. 
40 Hammond, 1983,2 for a criticism of the term. 
41 Hamilton, 1969, xlix-lii; Hammond, 1983,170 n. 5. 
42 Bosworth, 2003b, It. 
43 Curtius 9.8.15 = FGrH 137 F25. 
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According to Cleitarchus, 80,000 Indians 
were slaughtered in this area and many 
captives auctioned off as slaves. 
The passage of Curtius/Cleitarchus is clearly the source as the equivalent passage 
of Diodorus: 44 
Next he ravaged the kingdom of Sambus. He enslaved the 
population of most of the cities and, after destroying the 
cities, killed more than eight thousand of the natives. He 
inflicted a similar disaster upon the tribe of the Brahmins, 
as they are called; the survivors came supplicating him 
with branches in their hands, and punishing the most 
guilty he forgave the rest. King Sambus fled with thirty 
elephants into the country beyond the Indus and escaped. 
The two accounts probably come from the same source, and Curtius tells us 
explicitly that that source is Cleitarchus (although interestingly again citing his source 
when the information being given seems unbelievable, 80,000 dead Indians). Whilst this 
does not prove that the rest of the shared tradition of the vulgate also originates with 
Cleitarchus, it is a strong indication that at least some of it does. This is supported by 
what we know of Diodorus, that he generally used a single source for several charters 
and only switched sources when he came to the end of his primary source's work. 4 For 
Diodorus book seventeen, there are no real digressions, no discussion of the history of 
Persia or the west, and no digressions on geography or natural history. This further 
indicates that Diodorus was using a single source for book seventeen, as digressions 
would likely have come from another source, and therefore the idea of Cleitarchus being 
the primary source for the vulgate is further strengthened. 
Arrian's history has generally and rightly been refarded as the finest of the 
surviving narratives of the career of Alexander the Great. 6 His text is unique in the 
ancient world in that he specifically gives us information about his use of sources: 47 in his 
Preface, he identifies both his sources and his reasons for using them as his primary 
sources. Arrian's reasons for selecting his sources are often considered naive, 8 and I 
believe this is a perfectly correct judgment, but we must first examine his reasoning in 
more depth. 
43 Diodorus 17.102.5-7. 
as Bosworth, 2003b, 11. 
46 Rhodes, 2006,348. 
47 Bosworth, 1980,16. 
48 Rhodes, 2006,348. Billows, 2000,305 even goes to the extent of stating "his choice of Ptolemy and 
Aristobulus as his main sources, for which he is so often praised, should in fact be a source of criticism: it 
is very likely that he could have produced a better, more balanced account had he relied on Callisthenes, 
Hieronymus, and perhaps Duris or Diyllus, reserving the memoirs of Ptolemy and Aristobulus for 
supplemental usage". 
13 
Arrian opens his history by telling us that: 49 
Wherever Ptolemy and Aristobulus in their histories 
of Alexander, the son of Philip, have given the same 
account, I have followed it on the assumption of its 
accuracy; where their facts differ I have chosen what I 
feel to be the more probable and interesting. 
Bosworth notes that this statement of intent would seem to imply that Ptolemy 
and Aristobulus were considered to be of equal weight by Arrian; this is demonstrably 
not the case, however . 
50 At 6.2.4 Arrian calls Ptolemy "my principal source"; and for 
Arrian, therefore, there was evidently a clear hierarchy of quality with regard to his 
sources: Ptolemy, Aristobulus, and then the rest 51 Ptolemy is clearly Arrian's main 
narrative source, and some passages are probably verbatim extracts, such as the narrative 
of the Danubian campaign. 52 Whilst we can clearly see Ptolemy in the text of Arrian, 
Aristobulus' contribution is more difficult to assess. Strasburger and Komemann both 
attempted a speculative analysis; but the surviving fragments of Aristobulus, coupled 
with the relative lack of direct citations in Arrian, mean that they were both essentially 
attempting an analysis of Aristobulus' influence based upon a general opinion of how 
Aristobulus wrote from insufficient primary material 53 
Whilst Ptolemy and Aristobulus were Arrian's primary sources, confirmed by 
repeated citations of their work, Arrian also uses Nearchus extensively from book six 
onwards: there is also geographical material taken from Eratosthenes. In Arrian's follow- 
up work to his Anabasis, the Indika, he is no less coy in citing his sources; in the latter 
work he explicitly cites Eratosthenes, Megasthenes and Nearchus as his sources. 54 In 
terms of the quality of sources chosen, Arrian was wise indeed. Ptolemy, Nearchus and 
Aristobulus were all eye witnesses to the events they described and the first two were 
leading figures within the command structure of the army. 
The quality of the primary source material used by Arrian and others is of 
fundamental importance to modern historians; the major part of what we have to work 
with is the literary material that survives from the ancient world, but can it be trusted? 
Arrian has long been thought of as the most reliable of the surviving sources, as noted 
above. This is because he used sources that were present at all of the major events that he 
covers in his work. Even on occasions where Ptolemy, for example, may have been away 
on expedition, his other sources were probably not. Upon his return, Ptolemy, as a senior 
commander, would also no doubt have been briefed as to events that occurred during his 
absence from camp in what were surely regular meetings of the senior staff. We have 
evidence of such meetings in the numerous councils of war that took place before every 
49 Arrian 1, preface. 
50 Bosworth, 1980,16. 
S1 For examples of Ptolemy and Aristobulus being considered as better sources, see Arrian 5.7.1; 7.15.6. 
52 Arrian 1.1.4; cf. 1.4.6; Bosworth, 1980,16. 
53 Strasburger, 1934; Kornemann, 1935; cf. Pearson, 1960,1951t, Bosworth, 1980,16. 
54 Bosworth, 2003b, 13. 
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major battle of Alexander's career55 (with the exception of the Hydaspes), and we can 
assume that plans were discussed in some detail at these meetings, ensuring that all 
commanders were kept informed of events on the campaign, even those outside of their 
immediate sphere of influence. Arrian tells us that before Gaugamela: 56 
Past the crest of the ridge, just as he was beginning the 
descent, Alexander had his first sight of the enemy, about 
four miles away. He gave the order to halt, and sent for 
his officers - his personal staff, generals, squadron 
commanders, and officers of the allied and mercenary 
contingents - to consult upon the plan of action. 
We can clearly see from the text of Arrian that even rather minor figures within 
the command structure were present, ilarchs and commanders of the allied and mercenary 
contingents for example. 
This information transfer is of fundamental importance to the surviving material 
that we have. It means that those secondary sources that used individuals like Ptolemy, 
Aristobulus and Nearchus who were eye witnesses and present at senior meetings should 
carry considerable weight with us. I would go as far as to say that our general disposition 
should be to accept what they say, except where there is an evident aberration, (as with 
the Persian troop numbers at Gaugamela where Arrian notes 40,000 cavalry and 
1,000,000 infantry), or where we can demonstrate that another source provides superior 
information. 
It is difficult, and fundamentally foolish, of an historian to make a carte blanche 
claim that any given historian is always right and another always wrong; but there are 
some generalisations that we can make, however. With regard to topography we can 
reasonably assume that those who were present, or who were using a source that was 
present, are more likely to preserve the most accurate information. My general stance, 
therefore, is to believe Arrian where there is a discrepancy with the Vulgate and his 
account is credible. I do not completely reject the latter tradition, however, as there no 
doubt are times when Arrian is not correct and the Vulgate topography fits better with the 
surviving narratives. 
With regard to troop numbers, Whatley argued that we have three main options: 57 
1. Accept what the sources tell us 
2. Argue from military probability 
3. Deduce numbers from our knowledge of the command structure of the army 
To Whatley's list I believe that we can add a 4`h: in certain circumstances we can 
argue for numbers based upon the known available terrain, i. e. at Issus where the plain is 
ss For example, Gaugamela: Arrian 3.9.3-4; Curtius 4.13.3-10. 
56 Arrian 3.9.3-4. 
57 Whatley, 1964,127. 
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of a specific size. My general approach is to reject option one as the sources frequently 
give us very different troop numbers (this option would be available for periods where we 
only have one source). Option two is a strong theme throughout the thesis; both in terms 
of numbers and tactical reconstructions. At the Granicus, for example, I think the most 
militarily probable theory, based upon what we know of Alexander's tactics elsewhere, 
and the fact that we have to completely different accounts, is that both are correct and 
need to be reconciled into a single coherent theory, as I have tried to do. Option three is 
possible on occasions, particularly with regard to the pezhetairoi. We know there were 
1500 men per taxis, so if three taxeis are mentioned we can reasonably assume that 4500 
heavy infantry were present. This argument hardly ever works for the Persian order of 
battle as we have less general knowledge of the command structure. My own option four 
is applicable in some instances: for example the only reason we know there were 3000 
hypaspists is that their three taxeis take up the same frontage as two taxeis of pezhetairoi, 
who we know with some certainty comprised 1500 men each. 
We can also say that sources who provide a more detailed analysis based upon 
primary eye witness testimony are also more likely to be accurate and trustworthy than 
those who are more cursory and rely on poorer quality primary sources. These are 
arguments essentially for placing a fair degree of trust in Arrian, but all historians, both 
modem and ancient, are prone to bias; it is inevitable and a fact of human nature. As 
historians we must be constantly aware of this tendency which frequently manifests itself 
in literary invention of later writers. An example of this can be seen in the attitudes to 
Parmenio. Parmenio, along with his son Philotas, was executed on the orders of 
Alexander; an act whose origins probably lay in Alexander's growing isolation and 
mistrust of those around him, particularly those who were not his contemporaries. 
Parmenio is sometimes presented as the wise old general acting as a foil to the 
youthful exuberance of Alexander, but more often, particularly by Arrian, as being overly 
cautious and lacking the same heroic vision as the king. There are five instances in Arrian 
where Alexander considers (however briefly) and then rejects the advice of Parmenio 58 
The first is a dialogue that occurred at the Granicus: what ensued is only reported in 
Arrian and Plutarch, 59 a debate between Alexander and Parmenio as to the best course of 
action. Parmenio apparently advised waiting until the morning; he believed the Persians, 
who were greatly inferior in infantry, 60 would withdraw and the Macedonians could get 
across the river unopposed the following morning. He also, apparently, emphasised the 
difficulties of the terrain. Both sources have Parmenio's advice being rejected out of hand 
by Alexander. 
This is part of a much used, and often discussed, device of (particularly) Arrian to 
have the overly cautious Parmenio's advice rejected by the bold and heroic Alexander. 
S$ The others being 1.18.6-9 at Miletus; 2.25.2-3 at the Euphrates; 3.10.1-2 at Gaugamela and 3.18.12; at 
Persepolis. 
59 Arrian 1.13.2; Plutarch, Alex. 16.1. 
60 Arrian 1.13.2; emphasising Persian inferiority in infantry, despite claiming they had 20,000 at 1.14.4, 
more than the Macedonian 12,000 (excluding allies and mercenaries that is). Davis, 1964,37; sees 
Parmenio's advice as being perfectly sound. 
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Diodorus has no such debate, but his account of the battle is as if the advice were acted 
upon. We must note, as argued below pp. 51-2, that Ptolemy was fighting in roughly the 
same area as Alexander, the right wing, and so Ptolemy was probably also glorifying his 
own role in the battle, as well as that of the king, and not simply criticising Parmenio. 61 
He may also simply have had less knowledge of events on the left, and have chosen to 
concentrate on events that he was directly involved in. At the Granicus, Callisthenes was 
Arrian's source for at least the debate with Parmenio. 62 Callisthenes is known to have 
been hostile to Parmenio and is probably the source for all five of the dialogues between 
Alexander and the old general that show him as being overly cautious, set against 
Alexander's youthful heroism. 
Before the siege of Halicarnassus began in earnest, we have another debate 
between Parmenio and Alexander as to the wisdom of offering a naval battle. This is 
significantly different from the other such debates: 63 here Alexander is portrayed as the 
pragmatic and cautious party, in opposition to Parmenio's rash and impetuous suggestion. 
Lane Fox64 considered Parmenio's advice, if it was ever in fact offered, as being 
impossibly foolhardy. It is perhaps unwise to pass judgment on Parmenio at this point as 
we have no indication as to exactly what plan he proposed, although it would probably 
have been more sophisticated than simply a battle between all available forces. 65 
At Gaugamela, Parmenio is treated favourably by Diodorus, 66 a fact which 
presents a number of problems. This treatment decreases the likelihood67 that he was 
influenced by the negative sentiment in Callisthenes 68 Devine69 argued that the 
prominent place of the Thessalian cavalry in both Diodorus and Plutarch suggests a 
commonality of sources; but I think it more likely that, in the absence of specific 
passages that are obviously from the same source, their prominent role in both was 
simply a reflection of actual events; that is to say that they in fact did have a significant 
role in the battle. This commonality of source has been seen as a reflection of the pan- 
Hellenic nature of Callisthenes; but the prominent role of Parmenio, and not just of the 
Thessalians, calls this into question. Devine70 goes on to argue for an as yet unidentified 
common source, despite Hammond's71 confidence that the common source is in fact 
61 Badian, 1977,274-5, shows that Arrian concentrated on the heroic picture of Alexander, and that his 
source for this was probably Callisthenes. Indeed he goes further and states (275) that Callisthenes was the 
only eye witness to the battle, although then immediately contradicts himself at 275, n. 16, by saying that 
Ptolemy was also there but only in a junior capacity; more on this important detail later. Badian also adds 
that we can get nothing from Arrian's account about any part of the battle not involving Alexander (286). 
62 Contra Hammond, 1996,40 believes that Arrian largely followed Ptolemy and Plutarch largely followed 
Aristobulus. 
63 Arian 1.13.2 (Granicus), 2.25.2-3 (Euphrates), 3.10.1-2 (Gaugamela) and 3.18.12 (Persepolis). 
64 Lane Fox, 1973,132. 
65 Bosworth, 1980,138. 
66 Devine, 1986,89. 
67 But does not eliminate it as in Devine, 1986,89. 
68 Hammond, 1980,138 cites Cleitarchus as Diodorus' major source here, noting the vivid portrayal of both 
authors. 
69 Devine, 1986,89. 
70 Devine, 1986,90. 
71 Hammond, 1983,20-27; 51; 173 n. 11. 
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Cleitarchus. The incident of the call for help by Parmenio, just after Alexander began the 
pursuit of Darius, 72 is also interesting. Again, it shows no malice towards Parmenio at all, 
but simply presents a picture of the Thessalians in genuine difficulty asking for help. 
Diodorus, in common with Arrian, simply presents Alexander's response without 
comment, unlike Plutarch and Curtius who note Alexander's frustration. Interestingly, 
along with Diodorus' attributing no blame to Parmenio for this incident, he also attributes 
no blame to Alexander. 73 Diodorus' account is far less useful than Curtius or Arrian, but 
surely deserves more than to be called "childish and worthless" by Hammond. 4 
Reconstructing the Battle 
In order to reconstruct an ancient battle properly we must first analyse the quality 
of our source material and ask how did ancient writers, even eye witnesses to any given 
event, know what was happening across the entire battlefield? Firstly, we can reasonably 
assume that an eye witness participant in a battle would have a reasonable degree of 
knowledge of what was occurring in his sector of the battle, particularly if he was a 
commander such as Ptolemy. Whether he would have had great knowledge of the rest of 
the battlefield is another question entirely. Greece and Persia were areas in the ancient 
world (and indeed the modem world) where precipitation was sparse, and the ground was 
generally dusty. One can only imagine the amount of dust that would have been thrown 
up by tens of thousands of men and horses marching toward, and then ultimately 
engaging in battle 75 This dust, over a frontage of sometimes several miles, would have 
led to considerable confusion on the battlefield and likely would have made it very 
difficult indeed for a commander to guide the situation as it evolved once battle 
commenced. The main exception to this was the battle of the Hydaspes, which was 
fought during the wet season in India when dust would not have been an issue. 76 Coupled 
with this lack of visibility would have been the overwhelming noise of the clash of arms 
once battle commenced: it would have been all but impossible for a commander's voice 
to be heard from any distance. 77 Signals could have been used on occasion, but where 
visibility was particularly poor, a system of runners would have been employed to pass 
messages and to ensure that Alexander (and other senior commanders) could keep track 
of the situation. 78 We have a hint of this at Gaugamela where a runner was sent to 
Alexander by Parmenio to ask for assistance. 
Given these difficulties, coupled of course with no modern communication 
devices, how could Ptolemy have known what was occurring in other sectors of the 
battle, and how can we rely on eye witness testimony if it was by necessity of 
circumstance limited? I believe that information regarding the battle as a whole would 
have been disseminated in a number of ways. Before the battle was ever fought, probably 
the night before (or maybe earlier) a council of war would generally have been held (the 
'Z Or perhaps just before the pursuit began. 
73 Devine, 1986,90. 
74 Hammond, 1980,138. 
'S Hanson, 2005,143-4. 
76 The Hydaspes will be discussed in more detail later. 
" Hanson, 2005,143-4. 
78 For more discussion, see below p. 20. 
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probable exception being the Hydaspes). 79 In this council, the battle plan would have 
been laid out before all of the senior commanders. Details would have been discussed as 
to what was expected in each sector, the role each unit was expected to perform and what 
the anticipated Persian response would have been. Alexander would have discussed with 
his commanders what he expected the Persian dispositions to be and their reactions in 
terms of reorganisation if they chose a different formation. Discussions would have 
occurred as to the best tactics for winning the battle, how the Persians were to be lured 
out of their anticipated defensive dispositions etc. The commanders would also have 
discussed how they expected the battle to progress, and where they were aiming the 
breakthrough to occur, essentially planning for how victory was to be achieved. These 
would have been discussions, not lectures, but we should be in no doubt that Alexander 
would have been the leading figure. Following this council, the commanders would have 
reported back to the units under their command what was expected of them. It is likely 
that many commanders may not have provided their subordinates with a full picture of 
the coming battle - they didn't need it -just their own sector. 
Some of our eye witnesses would have been present at these councils and we can, 
I think, reasonably assume that their testimony as to what occurred in the opening phases 
of a battle is reliable: Alexander's movement to his right before Gaugamela for example. 
The Persian response would also have been visible, as they were stationary when 
Alexander arrived and would therefore not have been shrouded in dust. It is also true that 
most of the Persian movements (up to any general assault) at all of the first three set- 
piece battles would have been visible, and therefore likely to have been accurately 
recorded, as they were always in a defensive position when Alexander arrived and 
therefore not cloaked in dust. The difficulty of observation and therefore accurate 
recording of information only really arises once the main battle was joined. 
Once battle was joined, observation was limited. This is the source of the two 
separate accounts we have of the Granicus; Ptolemy80 described the battle that he 
participated in and had little direct knowledge of the dry land battle of Diodorus. 81 We 
must remember in this regard that Ptolemy was a fairly junior figure at the Granicus and 
probably not invited to the council of war held before that battle. Ptolemy's commander 
evidently did not feed back to him anything on the second column that crossed the river 
at night. Ptolemy was also here no doubt glorifying his own place on the battle by only 
describing his sector; he probably hoped this would distract the reader from the 
knowledge that he was a rather junior commander in 334. In later narratives, Ptolemy 
would have felt no such compulsion as he was of a senior rank and did not have to `hide' 
his previously lowly position. 
Once the clash of arms had begun it would have been far more difficult for any 
eye witness to have observed, and therefore later transmitted, accurate information; this 
would have occurred in a number of ways. It seems to me likely that, following the 
principle of a council of war before a battle, a similar meeting would have occurred 
79 Discussed in more detail on pp 14-15. 
80 Mrian 1.13-16. 
81 Diodorus 17.19-21. 
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afterwards. This would have been to discuss the battle, tactics that had worked, where 
they would need to be amended for the future, the performance of units and sub- 
commanders and an analysis of the Persian forces along similar lines. This would have 
been along similar lines to modern management `close-out' or `lessons learned' meetings 
following a project. We have no direct evidence of such meetings occurring, but I think it 
likely. We also have no real evidence of many meetings between Alexander and his 
senior commanders, but again, using the inherent probability argument, it is hard to 
conceive that such meetings did not happen on a regular basis. These meetings would 
have been invaluable in the transmission of information regarding what had occurred in 
each sector to all of the senior commanders, and the likes of Ptolemy would have gained 
a reasonable amount of their information from such meetings. The fact that his account of 
the Granicus focuses only upon his own sector, and the remainder of his battle narratives 
on the whole battlefield, support of this, as he was a minor figure at the Granicus (as 
noted above) and therefore would not have been present at the post-battle meeting. 
During the battle a measure of information would have been transferred to and 
from commanders to each other and the king by runners. These would have been 
messengers charged with carrying information across the confused battlefield. This would 
have included information on what was occurring in neighbouring sectors of the 
battlefield to the commander in question. This information transfer would have been vital 
to coordinate attacks against the Persians, and to modify a defensive posture when a 
Persian attack was larger than expected such as the Persian attack against the Macedonian 
right flank guard at Gaugamela. It would not have been possible in a council of war to 
say exactly when or where a breakthrough would have been achieved, merely where it 
was anticipated. These runners would have carried the news of a breakthrough to all the 
relevant parties enabling a coherent battle plan to be maintained (and indeed modified as 
required). These men would have probably been on horseback and were a human 
equivalent to radios on a modern battlefield. 8 These men are known at Gaugamela when 
Parmenio sent a, much debated, message to Alexander asking for help. This is one of the 
few times such men are mentioned, but this is not at all surprising as they were generally 
background figures only mentioned when they are of vital importance to the narrative, as 
at Gaugamela. 3 
General Approach 
It is not always possible to separate later literary invention from what was 
recorded as eye witness testimony by the likes of Ptolemy, Aristobulus and Callisthenes, 
or indeed to always identify bias; but by judiciously studying the material that survives, 
and closely comparing the various accounts, as I have tried to do in reconstructing 
Alexander's battle narratives, I believe that it is possible to still reach a core of reliable 
testimony. 
82 Cf p. 18. 
83 All of our sources agree that a message was sent: Arrian 3.15.1; Curtius 4.16.2; Diodorus 17.60.7; 
Plutarch Alex. 33.9. Contra Rhodes, 2006,364; see ch. 6 on the Gaugamela campaign for full discussion. 
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It may seem logical that the reconstruction of a battle narrative should come only 
after the core of factual events has been established; but I do not believe this should 
always be the case. Some core events can only be established as the battle narrative 
develops: in this case, the principle of inherent military probability is a powerful one. 
This concept was first suggested by Burne in his work on the Agincourt campaign, but I 
think it is relevant and applicably to all periods of history, and is certainly becoming 
more widely used. 84 Essentially this principle states that when attempting to reconstruct 
an ancient battle we should try and put ourselves in the position of the commander, albeit 
briefly, and consider the most likely action. This will be partly based upon the tactics 
demonstrated in other encounters, and bears great fruit with the career of Alexander as he 
was such a successful recycler of tactics and strategies. By using this principle we can 
reasonably speculate that Arrian, for example, may be correct in some elements of his 
narrative, Curtius etc. in others. This principle should be used as a last resort when other, 
more academically rigorous methods have failed, as we have two separate and 
incompatible pictures of events, or with points of fine detail. We should recognise, 
however, that history is very far from an exact science and we can ultimately do no better 
than make our best efforts in any ancient reconstruction. 
An example of the application of the principle of inherent military probability is 
during the siege of Gaza, where Plutarch85 states that a bird became entangled in the 
cords of a torsion catapult. 86 Curtius'87 account, on the other hand, has a rather different 
theme: he claims that the bird landed on the nearest siege tower and that its wings became 
stuck to the surface, a surface that had been smeared with pitch and sulphur. There is 
certainly a measure of later literary invention occurring here, as both are good `tales' and 
one might expect this kind of story in Plurarch and Curtius. These stories should not be so 
easily dismissed, however: we do know that Alexander possessed torsion catapults by this 
time, and that strings of sinew provided the propulsive force; the invention probably lies 
in the fact that a bird could become entangled within them given what we know of the 
design of such torsion engines. Even when invention can be identified, therefore, a 
measure of fact can be gleaned. The more interesting text, however, is that of Curtius. A 
siege tower being smeared in pitch and sulphur initially makes no sense and one might 
reasonably assume a mistake or invention and dismiss the account out of hand; this would 
be wrong however. The question must be asked why a siege tower would be smeared 
with pitch and sulphur. These chemicals were highly flammable and not at all what we 
would expect to coat the surface of a siege engine of any kind. Instead of dismissing the 
account without discussion, however, we should first examine if it could have a basis in 
fact. There is an historical precedent for the use of these chemicals by the Spartans at 
Plataea during the siege of that city in 429.88 The fact that the Spartans also used a 
circumvallation, just like Alexander at Gaza, suggests that instead of invention or error, 
Alexander was using the earlier siege as something of a model for the current siege. 
84 Burne, 1956. 
8 Plutarch Alex. 25.4. 
86 Marsden, 1971. 
87 Curtius 4.6.11. 
88 Thucydides 2.77. 
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Taken together with Thucydides, description of the use of fire at Delium 424/389 we can 
demonstrate, I think, by using the principle of inherent military probability that 
Alexander was trying to repeat an historically successful tactic, rather than the sources 
making a mistake or inventing material in order to provide a more lurid account. 
I have tried to argue that the first phases of any ancient battle have been reliably 
recorded and transmitted to us (albeit with some errors and discrepancies); the main 
problem arises once the `fog of war' has descended upon the battlefield. This essentially 
happens when both sides clash and an individual combatant loses his ability to see across 
the whole battlefield. A core of reliable material can still, I believe, be recovered via the 
post-battle councils I suggested, as well as through general discussions and gossip of the 
participants. It is true to say, however, that the narratives of the opening stages of the 
battle are probably more reliable. This can be supported by the fact that the clash of arms 
part of a battle is often very briefly described in our sources; frequently the battle 
narrative jumps from Alexander (usually) being hard pressed and in the thick of the 
action to breaking decisively through the Persian lines. The lack of detail is generally 
because the sources had less information to impart. At the Granicus, for example, in one 
sentence of Arrian Alexander is fighting in the river bed, in almost the next sentence he is 
on dry land and in the process of winning the battle. The fact that the narratives of these 
later stages of battle frequently focus on Alexander is because the primary sources were 
not, by that time in the battle, relying upon their own eyes, but on later accounts that 
would have contained a certain amount of bias. 
We have, in many ways, a far greater difficulty with regard to the Persians; our 
primary sources obviously did not have access to Darius' councils of war, or to any of the 
other Persian sources of information (with the exception of Gaugamela where we have a 
lot of material, probably ultimately gleaned from their battle plans recovered after the 
Persian defeat). This is one of the reasons why our sources focus on the Macedonians and 
they could only speculate upon Persian tactics based upon their dispositions and initial 
movements, both of which could have been easily observed. From Darius' initial attack 
against the Macedonian right at Gaugamela, for example, we can reasonably judge that 
his tactic was to prevent the Macedonians gaining the foothills which would obviate his 
chariots and great superiority in heavy cavalry. 
This thesis generally focuses upon battle tactics, rather than the strategy of an 
entire campaign (the work count limit precluded the detailed study of both). I have not 
ignored strategy completely, however, but have included a detailed examination of 
Alexander's campaign strategy when it directly impinges upon his battle tactics. This 
occurred, for example, at Issus when Alexander's desire to fight an essentially defensive 
battle and to lure the Persians into the narrow plain had a direct impact on tactics. 
This general approach was taken partly because there is far less academic material 
on Alexander's battle tactics than on questions of strategy and I believe that a full scale 
academic study is long overdue. On a more personal level, it is also a subject area that I 
find fascinating. The approach can be considered narrow, but I believe that a study of 
89 Thucydides 4.100 
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tactics is of no lesser academic value than one primarily of strategy, and there was (and 
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Campaigns in Europe: 335-4 
Alexander's early campaigns in Europe, before he set off upon his war of 
conquest, offer us some fascinating insights into the evolution of a number of key tactics 
that were to be developed into what can be considered hallmarks in later campaigns. The 
early campaigns are only recorded in any depth by Arrian; 90 Strabo and Diodorus offer 
little that can be added 91 Arrian's source for this whole section is not difficult to 
establish; he makes one explicit reference to Ptolemy, 92 and it is likely that he used 
Ptolemy for the whole campaign. The account of the embassies from the Celts and others 
in Arrian, 93 also deriving from Ptolemy, is very similar to that in Strabo. 94 
In the spring of 335 Alexander began his Balkan campaign: the death of Philip II 
had been followed by general unrest on Macedonia's northern border, 95 and it would have 
been immediately apparent to Alexander that he could not embark on a Persian 
expedition until his homeland was secure. The initial part of this campaign was against 
the "Triballi and Illyrians". 96 The Triballians apparently occupied the plain to the south of 
the Danube, in what was to become the Roman province of Moesia; they probably also 
extended some way to the east in the direction of the Black Sea. 97 The Illyrians are a little 
more difficult to locate: those to the north-west of Macedonia did not revolt until the end 
of the Danubian campaign, 98 nor were they the Autariatae, the peoples to the west of the 
Triballi, as Alexander apparently was not even aware of their existence until 335.99 The 
term is probably used by Arrian in a general sense to refer to those tribes to the north 
west of Macedonia; thus the rebelling Illyrians were in fact not rebelling at the time 
Alexander began his campaign, and the terminology and chronology have become 
confused in Arrian. The Illyrian and Triballian campaign is therefore, with hindsight by 
Arrian (or indeed Ptolemy), that which Alexander did achieve, but it is not in fact what he 
initially set out to achieve. 
90 Arrian 1.1.4-1.9.8, The Illyrian campaign to the fall of Thebes. 
91 Strabo 7.3.8f, ß Diodorus 17.8.1ff. Curtius' account does not survive. 
92 Arrian 1.2.7. 
93 Arrian 1.4.6. 
94 Bosworth, 1980,51, believes that this whole section is taken directly from Ptolemy and I see no reason to 
dissent. Papazoglu, 1978,25, n. 39, and Pearson, 1960,205f, also take this line: contra Hammond, 1974,77, 
who sees both Ptolemy and Aristobulus as Arrian's sources for this section. 
95 Arrian 1.1.4; Diodorus 17.3.5; Ashley, 1998,166. 
96 Arrian 1.1.4. 
97 Bosworth, 1980,52; Papazoglu, 1978,25f; for some general information on the Triballians and their 
(little known) history. 
98 Arrian 1.1.5. 
91 Arrian, 1.5.3; Bosworth, 1980,52. 
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Mt. Haemus 
Alexander initially set off for the territory of the free Thracians. It is likely that he 
set off east from Pella, turning north at Amphipolis and marching past Philippiloo and Mt. 
Orbelus on his left. 1°' From here it was a ten-day march to the Haemus range. 102 The 
length of march is one of the numerous indicators that I will note throughout this chapter 
that show that this was by no means a whirlwind campaign: it is around 115km from 
Philippi to the Haemus range; ten days is a fairly leisurely pace. 103 Exactly which pass the 
Thracians were occupying is also in doubt: Bosworth104 opts for the Trojan pass, noting 
that it does seem to have been more frequented in antiquity, also that it is closer to 
Philippopolis, the Shipka pass being some 16km to the east. 05 This assumes of course 
that Alexander marched through Philippopolis and not through Philippi to its west as I 
believe. The march from Philippi to the Shipka pass would certainly have been longer 
than that to the Trojan pass, but the length of march (ten days) could indicate that 
Alexander did in fact take the longer route and met the Thracians in the Shipka pass. 106 
The incident in the pass was, in reality, an extremely minor affair but is worthy of 
discussion because of Alexander's response to a unique problem. 107 The Thracians had 
gathered in the pass with the intention of using their wagons as a defensive palisade, with 
the secondary idea of sending them crashing down upon the advancing Macedonians. 
108 
Bloedow109 points out the problems of Arrian's logic here: if the wagons were to be used 
defensively, this would be as the Macedonians reached the top of the pass; if, however, 
they were to be used as projectiles then this would have to occur as the Macedonians 
were still some distance away, therefore removing the possibility of them being used 
defensively. Milns11° tried to solve this problem by suggesting that the defensive 
formation was to trick the Macedonians into attacking: this is possible but I suspect that 
Alexander would have attacked even if he knew what was in the mind of the Thracians, 
10° Apparently this was the less famous of the two cities bearing that name; see Papazoglu, 1978,29-30. 
101 Ashley, 1998,167-8, suggests that Alexander headed east from Amphipolis and only turned north after 
crossing the Nestos River, then heading to Philippopolis. Wilcken, 1932,67, takes a similar line. This does 
not allow for passing Mt. Orbelus and Philippi on his left as explicitly stated in Arrian 1.1.5. Bosworth 
1980,54, sees Mt. Orbelus as being much like Mt. Haemus, that is to say referring to an entire range rather 
than an individual mountain. 
102 Arrian 1.1.5. 
103 Ashley, 1998,168 notes 20miles (32km) but a glance at Barrington suggests closer to 115km. see p. 31 
for a possible reason for the leisurely pace. 
104 Bosworth, 1980,54; see also Ashley, 1998,168; Bosworth, 1988,29; Hammond, 1980b, 46. 
105 Ashley, 1998,168. 
106 Wilcken, 1932,67; and Hamilton, 1969,46; support the Shipka pass as the location of the encounter. 
Bloedow, 1996,120; notes that the Shipka pass is at a height of 2437m and the Trojan pass at 1051m, 
perhaps further indicating the Shipka pass is the correct location, being higher and perhaps, therefore, more 
defensible. 
107 Arrian 1.1.7-1.1.9; the stratagem of the Thracians and Alexander's response to it recur in Polyaenus, 
4.3.11. The only real difference between the accounts of Arrian and Polyaenus is that the later makes the 
wagons heavy laden, probably to make the Thracian plan, and Alexander's response, more impressive. 
Hammond, 1996,37, argues that the two accounts have the same source due to their striking similarities. 
106 Arrian 1.1.7. 
109 Bloedow, 1996,120f. 
110 Milns, 1968,36. 
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and Arrian does indeed imply exactly that; that Alexander had guessed what the 
Thracians' intentions were, given his ordered countermeasures to his troops. "' 
Hammond' 2 argued that they in fact intended to do both, that a defensive palisade had 
been organised behind the wagons that were to be sent down the slope: it is difficult to 
imagine, first of all, how the Thracians physically got so many wagons into the pass 
where space must have been very limited; and, of course, this is not how Arrian describes 
proceedings. 
Arrian leaves us in no doubt that the wagons were used as projectiles, but exactly 
how is far less clear. He constantly refers to them in the plural: ' 13 is this intended to mean 
that several were sent down simultaneously, side by side as it were, or should it be taken 
to mean one after the other? The presumed narrowness of the pass would tend to preclude 
the former, and therefore we should accept that several wagons were sent down the slope 
consecutively. Bloedow raised a further problem: 114 wagons travelling down a rocky 
slope' 15 would not travel in a straight line for very long, even if their steering 
mechanisms were fixed in place. It would seem that the only way for the wagons to have 
been used effectively as weapons is if they were in fact manned, to ensure that they 
actually reached the Macedonians without harmlessly crashing into the walls of the pass; 
although none of our sources make any mention of drivers in the wagons. 
Alexander's countermeasures are, of course, the most interesting part of this 
encounter. Arrian116 tells us that he instructed those of his troops who were able to break 
ranks and allow the carts to pass through, "? and where space prevented this they were to 
lie prone and cover their bodies with interlocking shields. 1'8 It is difficult to imagine how 
these Macedonian troops could have been lying prone and still have held their shields in 
an interlocking position. Bosworth suggested that the front rank were prone, with the 
second rank standing over them with interlocking shields, forming something of a ramp; 
this is even more difficult to envisage. 119 
The answer could lie in an examination of Macedonian equipment. Since the 
sarissa required the use of both hands in order to wield it, the infantryman could only 
carry a small shield suspended from the neck and covering his left shoulder. 
120 
Asclepiodotus'Z' is our only source for the diameter and shape of the shield: he tells us 
º'º Arrian 1.1.7. 
112 Hammond, 1988,35. 
113 Arrian 1.1.7; 1.1.8; 1.1.9; see also Bloedow, 1996,121. 
114 Bloedow, 1996,121. 
ºº3 There would not have been time for the defenders to clear the slope of all debris and foliage. 
º6 Arrian 1.1.7-9. 
117 A precursor to the strategy used successfully at Gaugamela to defeat Darius' chariots. 
ºº8 Sekunda, 1984,27, uses this incident to argue that the Macedonian heavy infantry would have been 
equipped with a large shield; contra English, 2008,32ff. 
ºº Bosworth, 1980,56-7, does in fact admit that "It is hard to see how this manoeuvre could have been 
carried out as effectively as described ". 
120 Asclepiodotus Tact. 5; Aelian Tact. 12. Griffith, 1981,161, points out that, although the shields were 
small, they were very stout. Anderson, 1970,133,306, also noted this, quoting Arrian 1.1.9 in support of 
his argument. 
12º Asclepiodotus Tact. 5. 
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that the Macedonian shield was made of bronze and that it was eight palms in width and 
not too hollow. There seems little doubt that the Greek palm equated to 7.6cm, 122 so the 
shield was 61cm in diameter. The diameter of hoplite shields excavated at Olympia 
ranged from 78.7 to 99.8cm. 123 Markle124 proposed that the sarissa would not have been 
the only weapon employed by the heavy infantry; he believed that they did not use it at 
the Granicus or at Issus, and that infantry that accompanied Alexander on operations that 
required speed and endurance would also not have carried the sarissa and small shield. He 
argued that at these times, they would be equipped as regular hoplites, with a spear and 
hoplite shield. 125 If it is the case that regular hoplite shields were, on occasion, 12 used by 
the Macedonian heavy infantry, then lying prone on the ground with the large shield 
covering the head and torso seems plausible, and whilst no fatalities were reported by 
Arrian, one can only guess at the numbers of broken limbs that would have resulted. 127 
Peuce Island 
Once Alexander had crossed the Haemus range he continued in a northerly 
direction into the lands of the Triballians, 128 arriving at the River Lyginus, three days 
march from the Danube. The River Lyginus makes this one appearance in history and its 
location cannot be identified with any certainty, 129 other than to say that it was located 
south of the Danube and probably fairly close to it, given Alexander's apparently slow 
march on the campaign to this point. Arrian 130 then tells us that Syrmus, king of the 
Triballians, had known of Alexander's movements for some time and had evacuated a 
part of his army, along with the non-combatants, to Peuce Island. The rest of the 
Triballian army circled in behind Alexander, taking up a position on the River Lyginus, 
after Alexander had continued to march north. There are several points of interest here: 
122 Markle, 1977,326. 
123 Lorimer, 1947,76, n. 3. 
i24 Markle, 1978,483-497. 
u Markle, 1978,493. 
126 It should be noted that there is no evidence that Philip or Alexander ever ordered the production of large 
numbers of hoplite panoplies for the heavy infantry: Manti, 1994,88. The expense alone would have been 
prohibitive, especially early in Alexander's reign when we know that gold was scarce. If Markle is correct 
that the Macedonians were not always equipped with the sarissa then two possibilities present themselves: 
either thousands of panoplies of armour (shields, spear etc. ) were made and transported all across Asia 
(which I do not believe) or only spears were transported (the logistics of this would have been relatively 
simple, certainly compared to transporting full panoplies of hoplite equipment. If this is the case then 
during the set-piece battles where the sarissa was not used the Macedonians would have been equipped in 
the same way in terms of defensive equipment, and would have carried a hoplite spear. During occasions 
where hoplite shields were required and the mercenaries and allies were not employed (e. g. here) the 
shields could have been commandeered and returned after use. Thousands of panoplies would not have 
been required as not all of the heavy infantry would have been able to operate in such a limited space as in 
this pass. 
127 If this theory is correct, and I suspect that on occasion the pezhetairoi were equipped as regular hoplites, 
I would add that the sarissa was unlikely to have been used at the Hydaspes either, given the difficult night 
time river crossing. 
128 Arrian 1.2.1. 
129 Bosworth, 1980,56; Papazoglu, 1978,30-31; although Green, 1991,127 seems more confident 
identifying it as the River Yantra and Hammond, 1980b, 46 identifies it with the Rositsa. 130 Sian 1.2.2. 
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firstly Syrmus shows an impressive appreciation of the need for military intelligence in 
an age when it was often very limited. 13 1 The second is the location of Peuce Island: 132 
this has consistently eluded scholars; there was an island of that name in the Danube 
delta; Strabo mentions it: 133 but there is no evidence, other than the name of the island, 
that Alexander went anywhere near the Danube delta. 134 Papazoglu identifies two 
possible solutions: '35 
1. The island that Alexander unsuccessfully attacked is the famous Peuce at the 
mouth of the Danube. 
2. The island is some other island, located some considerable distance to the west 
and falsely identified with Peuce by one of our sources. 
Most scholars have dismissed the idea that Arrian is describing the island at the 
mouth of the Danube, and I would agree: the implications of a march by Alexander to the 
mouth of the Danube would surely have warranted a mention in our sources; besides the 
Peuce Island in the delta would have been within the territory of the Scythian king Ateas, 
with whom the Triballians had been at war, and sending the non-combatants there would 
not have been wise. 136 We are left only with the knowledge that the island was some way 
upstream at an indeterminate location; it cannot be identified with any of the resent resent 
islands in the Danube due to its changes of course over the last few hundred years. 
p7 
Upon learning that the Triballians had taken up a position on his lines of supply 
and communication, Alexander retraced his steps138 back to the River Lyginus where he 
had camped the previous evening. Alexander's arrival apparently caught the Triballi 
unprepared, 139 at which point they made for the protection of a wooded glen close to the 
river. Alexander deployed his heavy infantry in column, a very curious formation but 
probably intended not to strike fear into the light-armed Triballi, so as to ensure they 
would not retreat before they were defeated in battle. If the heavy infantry, probably, 
12,000 of them, were arrayed in the usual battle order it is unlikely the Triballians would 
have met them where they were strongest, on a wide open plain. 
131 See, for example, Alexander's failure to appreciate the location of Darius before the battle of Issus, or 
his failure to realise his position had been turned here. 
132 Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, 1988,35 notes that Peuce Island can be translated as Pine Tree 
Island. Green, 1991,127 notes that this was the island where Darius I had built a pontoon bridge in 514-13 
to cross the Danube. 
133 Strabo 7.3.15; the passage ultimately derives from Ptolemy: Bosworth, 1980,57. 
134 Indeed the territory of the Triballi was some distance to the west of the delta: cf. Papazoglu, 1978,31ff, 
for a fuller discussion of the Triballi tribal areas. 
3s Papazoglu, 1978,32, after first dismissing the possibility that there were two islands of the same name. 
136 Bosworth, 1980,57. 
137 Ashley, 1998,168; Bosworth, 1980,57; Papazoglu, 1978,32. 
138 The Macedonians showed no signs of distress or panic at their lines of supply and communication being 
severed, the same in fact as occurred before the battle of Issus. 139 Arrian 1.2.2. 
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Deployed in front of Alexander's heavy infantry were the archers and slingers 
with orders to advance "at the double and discharge their missiles in the hope of drawing 
the enemy from the shelter of the wood into open ground". '4° 
This is the first instance of a strategy that Alexander was to re-apply at every 
opportunity; Devine calls it a "pawn sacrifice" but incorrectly claims that it was first 
employed at the Granicus. 141 As usual the strategy worked to draw the enemy on to a 
battlefield of Alexander's choosing. Once the enemy had been drawn out of the woods 
Philotas attacked the right wing with the "cavalry from upper Macedonia", 142 with 
Heraclides and Sopolis deployed to attack the left with the cavalry from Bottiaea and 
Amphipolis. 143 Alexander was with the heavy infantry in the centre, presumably with the 
hypaspists but we are not explicitly told this. Arrian tells us that the Triballians were 
holding their own until the heavy infantry joined the battle, at which time the cavalry also 
attacked, having settled for "shooting"144 at the enemy before this, although as Bosworth 
points out shooting here is likely to refer to a general sense of using the lance from a 
distance. 145 This is obviously a reference to projectile weapons of some sort, but should 
not be taken to indicate the Companion Cavalry being equipped as horse archers; this is 
probably a reference to throwing javelins from horseback. Bosworth146 dismisses this 
idea by noting that the Companion Cavalry only carried a single sarissa, and no 
secondary weapons, as illustrated by Alexander's reaction to having broken his sarissa at 
the Granicus. l 7 It is at least possible that in this encounter Alexander intended the 
cavalry to harass the enemy until he was in a position to engage himself, at which point 
the cavalry were to attack as normal. It is unlikely that Alexander would have wanted to 
win the battle before he had even had a chance to engage the enemy personally. Whatever 
the truth, the Triballi were quickly routed, 3,000 being killed. 148 
Alexander then marched north, reaching the Danube three days after the battle, '49 
arriving at a prearranged rendezvous with part of the fleet. The fleet must have been 
dispatched from Macedonia at the outset of the campaign and this probably explains why 
Alexander's pace was so leisurely; he wanted to give his navy time to arrive. He then 
manned the ships and attempted to force a landing on Peuce Island, where the remaining 
Triballians and Thracians had taken refuge, but the areas suitable for landing were either 
too heavily defended or else too steep to disembark troops; the strong current was also a 
significant factor. After failure to land, Alexander decided to cross the Danube and 
140 Arrian 1.2.2. 
141 Devine, 1988,3. 
142 Arrian 1.2.3; Bosworth, 1980,57, notes that Philotas, later commander of all of the Companion Cavalry, 
is here only given a portion of them: this limited command recurs in Illyria, (Arrian 1.5.9) and there is no 
evidence of his promotion before the crossing of the Hellespont, (Diodorus, 17.17.4). 
143 Both men are mentioned at 11archs at Gaugamela (Arrian 3.11.8) but are otherwise fairly obscure, 
Bosworth, 1980,58; for Heraclides and Sopolis see Heckel, 1992,348 and 351 respectively. 
144 Arrian 1.2.6 likely uses the term akontismos generally, rather than referring to horse archers. 
145 Bosworth, 1980,58. 
146 Bosworth, 1980,59f. 
147 flan 1.15.6. 
148 flan 1.2.7. 
149 
. rrian 1.3.3. 
31 
campaign against the Getae instead. 150 This defeat by natural barrier, as it were, is 
extremely unusual; we can only speculate that if this incident had occurred later in 
Alexander's life he would not have given up so easily. 
Getae 
On the north bank of the Danube a large force of Getae had gathered, 4,000 
cavalry and 10,000 infantry according to Arrian. '5' Alexander ordered tents to be filled 
with hay and all available water-borne transport to be used to ferry troops over the river 
during the night. 152 Using this device Alexander ferried 1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry 
across the river. Alexander began by having his heavy infantry use their spears to flatten 
the grain, thus partially creating the battlefield upon which he wanted to fight. Once on 
the open plain the infantry took up their usual central location with Alexander and the 
cavalry on the right. 153 The Getae broke quickly after a rapid cavalry charge timed to 
coincide with an infantry advance on an extended front. Arrian tells us the Getae were 
badly shaken by Alexander's crossing of the Danube with such a large force during the 
night, by his rapid attack, and the "fearful sight of the phalanx advancing upon them in a 
solid mass". 154 
It is precisely this fearful reaction that Alexander had wanted to avoid in the 
earlier battle against the Triballians; there he advanced in a narrow column, here on a 
wide front; the difference of effect is evident. The Getae fled to their city some distance 
away, but this was quickly sacked. Upon the return to the Danube Alexander received the 
surrender of Syrmus and the Triballians on Peuce Island. 
The timing of the campaign against the Getae is of interest: we know Alexander 
set off from Amphipolis in early April, the crossing of the Danube and the campaign 
against the Getae did not occur until around June, and Thebes was not sacked until 
October. 155 Thus this part of the campaign took around two months; the entire Balkan 
campaign took only four months. Alexander seemed to be in no hurry at all, unlike many 
of his later operations. 
Upon re-crossing the Danube, Alexander received information that Cleitus, son of 
Bardylis, was in revolt and had been joined by Glaucias of the Taulantians, and further 
'50 Arrian 1.3.4. 
15' Arrian 1.3.5. 
152 Hay-filled tents being used as makeshift rafts occurs again at the crossing of the Oxus in 329 (Arrian 
3.29.4), and has a precedent in Xenophon Anabasis 1.5.10. Night-time river crossings were to become 
relatively commonplace during Alexander's career. 
153 Arrian 1.4.2; notes "spears" not "sarissas", this is another possible example of Alexander's heavy 
infantry equipped as standard hoplites. It was probably easier to carry a spear on a makeshift raft than it 
would have been a sarissa. 
154 Sian 1.4.2. 
155 Hammond, 1974,80. We know the crossing of the Danube was in June as Arrian 1.4.1, tells us the 
"grain stood high" and needed to be flattened by the infantry. 
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that the Autariatae were planning to attack Alexander whilst on the march. 156 Alexander, 
seeking allies, set off for his long-time friend Langarus of the Agrianes. 
Pellium 
We know nothing of the meeting with Langarus, other than that the Agrianian 
king offered to deal with the Autariatae himself, 157 and he must have been successful, as 
they do not appear again. The campaign against Pellium took around two months: we do 
not know how all of this time was spent, but a considerable delay with Langarus is 
likely. 158 Hammond, '59 citing a fragmentary papyrus text, notes an advance expedition 
commanded by Philotas, sent out by Alexander whilst he was negotiating with Langarus. 
This expedition is not mentioned in Arrian and is a rare event before 331, after which the 
nature of the combat made such a strategy necessary. Hammond160 notes that Alexander 
would have been eminently familiar with the territory he was about to invade, given his 
service as a royal page under Philip on his Illyrian campaign. This is doubtful, however, 
given that Arrian tells us he had not even heard of the Autariatae until 335.161 
Much of the Macedonian field army was with Alexander at this time. This had left 
Macedonia's western borders open to ravaging by the Illyrians, which was their 
traditional tactic. 162 From the territory of the Agrianians Alexander marched most likely 
via the modern Prilep, intersecting with the Crna (Erigon) River around the city of 
Topolcani, then followed the river south towards Flörina163 and the central Lyncestis 
plain. This was also the route taken by the Roman consul P. Sulpicius Galba in 200.164 
156 Arrian 1.5.1; Bosworth, 1980,65-6, locates the Paeones north of Macedonia between the Axius and 
Strymon Rivers, with the Agrianes occupying the north-eastern area on Paeonia. Cleitus probably ruled the 
Dardani between the modem Drin (the longest river in Albania, highlighted on the left of fig. 3 below) and 
Crna Rivers (the ancient Thracian Erigon River, meaning Black River, which runs through much of the 
south and west of modem Macedonia). This area was on (ancient) Macedonia's northern border; Hammond 
and Walbank, 1988,40, note that this area is in modern Kosovo; they also note that the Taulantians were 
located around Tirana. Bosworth, 1980,66, mistakenly places them around Epidamnus. Hammond, 1974, 
78, locates the Autariatae to the north of Albania. 
157 Arrian 1.5.1; he did so with considerable success, 1.5.3. 158 Although Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, 1988,39, sees the delay occurring before Alexander 
set off for Langanis. 
159 Hammond, 1987,38. 
160 Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, 1988,41. The only other two instances of secondary missions 
before 331 were both in 334 when Alexander was at Ephesus. Parmenio was sent with 5,200 troops to 
accept the surrender of the cities of Magnesia and Tralles, whilst at the same time Alcimachus was 
dispatched with a similar number to the Aetolian and Ionian cities still loyal to the Persians; Arrian 1.18.1. 
161 Arrian 1.1.4. Bosworth, 1980,52. 
162 Curtius 3.10.9. 
163 Arrian 1.5.5. 
164 Livy 31.39.3-6. Bosworth, 1980,68, has Alexander take this route; contra Hammond, 1974,78, n. 29, 
and Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, 1988,40-1, has Alexander march south-west via Astibus to 
Stobi, near the confluence of the Axius and Erigon, then via Prilep and the Monastir gap into Lyncus. This 
route, if taken, was a result of Alexander's mistaken guess that Cleitus and Glaucias were marching south 
to the plain of Koritsa. Finding this area secure, Alexander then marched north-west to Pellium. The 
problem is that this has him travelling some distance from the Erigon River. The only information provided 




Upon arriving at Pellium Alexander made camp' 65 by the River Eordiacus with 
the intention of assaulting the city the following morning. ' 66 Cleitus had taken up a 
position both inside of the city and on the heights that ringed it to the northeast and south 
east; 167 not quite with the ability to surround the Macedonians on every side as Arrian 
suggests. '68 The following morning Alexander advanced towards the town and forced 
those troops in the hills to withdraw to the city after an extremely brief encounter. 
Alexander then chose to blockade the city by building a circumvallation around it. 169 This 
165 Pellium was likely just south of Flörina. Hammond, 1974,79, locates the camp site around lkm from 
the city. giving him access to the plain of Poloske for pasturing his horses. 
'66 Arian 1.5.5. 
167 Hammond, 1974,79. 
168 Arrian 1.5.5. 
169 Arrian 1.5.8. 
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Figure 3: Alexander's route to the area of Pellium overlaid upon a modern map of the region. 
strongly indicates either that the city was inaccessible for traditional siege equipment, or 
that he did not have his full siege train with him at this time; although he certainly had 
some catapults with him a few days later, see below. The following day Glaucias arrived 
with the Taulantians, apparently a large force, 170 leaving Alexander in a very exposed 
position. He could not press the attack on the city for fear the Taulantians would attack 
his flanks, and he could not attack this new much larger force for fear of a sortie from the 
city. If Alexander knew of the imminent arrival of Glaucias, then to advance upon the 
city was a significant tactical mistake; if he did not, then Philotas' mission was a singular 
failure and is an example of the generally poor quality of military intelligence in ancient 
warfare. '71 
Alexander, now isolated and apparently with supplies running low, 12 dispatched 
Philotas with some cavalry and the baggage train to forage, probably in the plain of 
Korce, 8km north-west of Pellium. 173 This was an enormous and foolish risk on the part 
of Alexander; Glaucias could, if not for a timely intervention by Alexander, have 
destroyed Alexander's baggage train and many of his best cavalrymen. The fact that the 
expedition occurred at all shows how very low on supplies the Macedonians were at this 
point. 174 
Alexander could not simply withdraw from the area: this would have involved 
crossing any one of a number of narrow passes175 with the result that the rear of his 
column would be badly exposed to attack. His solution was to mesmerise the Dardanians 
and Taulantians with a magnificent display of parade ground drill. The heavy infantry 
were drawn up with a "depth of 120 files", 76 which would have given a frontage of 100 
men. '77 There are two movements described in Arrian: 178 the first involved the use of a 
spearhead or wedge formation. 179 This involved a march towards the "first hills", 
presumably those to the north occupied by the Taulantians: This manoeuvre was 
conducted in absolute silence. 180 Hammond'8suggested that this not only resulted in a 
withdrawal of the Taulantians from the northern hills, but encouraged the Dardanians in 
the southern hills to attack Alexander's flanks. The heavy infantry, en masse, then turned 
170 Arrian 1.5.8. 
"1 Kern, 1999,202, describes Alexander's position between the Dardanians in the city and the Taulantians 
in the hills as an "embarrassing situation". Cf. Pritchett, 1974,127-33. 
172 Arrian 1.5.10. Hammond, 1974,80, notes that the campaign took place in late July after the harvest and 
after the sheep had been moved to highland pastures. 
13 Hammond, 1974,80; although Bosworth, 1980,70, believes there is too little known about the 
topography of the area to form a solid conclusion: in Hammond's defence, his views were formed after a 
visit to the area. 
14 This is one of the very few instances in Alexander's entire career that we hear of poor control of 
loistics, as impressive a part of Alexander's generalship as any other. 
17' Hammond, 1974,81; Hammond in Hammond and Walbank, 1988,42, believes the pass chosen was the 
modern Gryke e Ujkut, the ancient Wolf's Pass; cf. Ashley, 1998,42. 
16 Arrian 1.6.1. 
177 Devine, 1983,213; Hammond, 1974,82, this assumes 12,000 troops consisting of 9,000 heavy infantry 
and 3,000 hypaspists, as at the crossing of the Hellespont, see Diodorus 17.17.4. 
178 Arrian 1.6.2-4. 
19 Hammond, 1974,83; Devine, 1983,213. 
180 Sian 1.6.3-4. 
181 Hammond, 1974,83. 
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about 180 degrees and raised a battle cry that was enough to rout the Dardanians. Arrian 
describes the manoeuvre: "to turn now to the right and again to the left the line of 
interlocking pikes". 182 
Thus, describing the two movements, Bosworth' 83 sensibly notes that each 
infantryman was fenced in by six sarissas from the ranks behind, so they must have first 
raised their sarissas into a vertical position, then turned and lowered them. 
The Macedonians then made for the pass, sending the hypaspists and Companion 
Cavalry ahead to clear the way. 184 They moved through the pass with the River Eordaicus 
on their left; once through, the hypaspists and heavy infantry turned to their left and 
began to ford the river on to safer ground, covered by the Agrianians and archers who 
were 2,000 strong and commanded by Alexander. 18 Upon seeing Alexander's main 
forces crossing the river the Taulantians made to attack, but the retreat was covered by 
archers in mid stream and arrow-throwing catapults. 186 The Macedonians then marched a 
few miles from the pass, camped, sent out scouting parties and waited for three days. The 
scouts reported that the Dardanians and Taulantians were so convinced that Alexander 
had fled their territory that they had not constructed any kind of defences around their 
camp, and had posted no sentries. 187 Upon hearing this Alexander returned to the River 
Eordaicus, crossed it during the night with the Agrianians, archers and the taxeis of 
Perdiccas and Coenus, 188 and engaged the Illyrians whilst they were apparently still in 
their beds, 189 killing and capturing many and routing the rest completely; the city of 
Pellium fell soon afterwards. 90 
Balkan Campaign: Conclusions 
Alexander's Balkan campaign provides us with the first opportunity to examine 
Alexander's generalship without the safety net of Philip, or even of Parmenio, who was 
with the advance force in Asia Minor. The campaign is worthy of praise, but was not 
ist Arrian 1.6.2-4. 
183 Bosworth, 1980,71. 
184 Sian 1.6.5; this passage is one of the few that depict the Companion Cavalry as using shields; in all 
likelihood they did not use them frequently, only when there was an expectation of fighting on foot, see 
Bosworth, 1980,72. 
185 Sian 1.6.6; At the Hellespont (Diodorus 17.17.4) there were only 1,000 total Agrianians and archers, 
the rest probably temporarily borrowed from Langarus, the Agrianian king, given his proximity. 
186 Arrian 1.6.8. Fuller, 1958,226, mistakenly records this as "the first recorded use of catapults as field 
artillery", catapults were in fact first used against Philip II by Onomarchus of Phocis in 354, see Polyaenus 
2.38.2. 
187 Arrian 1.6.9; provisions must again have been scarce as he appears to have abandoned his baggage train 
to the Illyrians. 
188 Although Arrian 1.6.9 uses the singular taxis rather than the plural taxeis it does seem clear that he is 
referring to the taxeis commanded by Perdiccas and Coenus (cf. Bosworth, 1980,73), not a single body 
commanded by both as Hammond seems to think: Hammond, 1974,85. 
189 There is an interesting contrast here between this night attack, and the subsequent slaughter of the 
enemy in their beds, and Alexander's response to Parmenio at Gaugamela when Parmenio suggested a 
similar night attack; Alexander responded "I will not demean myself by stealing victory like a thief. 
Alexander must defeat his enemies openly and honestly". Arrian 3.9.6. 
190 Arrian 1.6.9-11. 
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without significant mistakes. Bum's assertion that "there is no trace of development in 
Alexander's generalship; in this twenty-first year of his age he is completely mature"191 is 
certainly an exaggeration. 
This campaign lasted four months: much of that time was spent travelling in what 
can only be described a sedate pace from one minor battle to the next. During this first 
campaign, Alexander shows none of the rapidity of movement that was to become 
synonymous with Macedonian campaign in later years. He also shows a significant lack 
of appreciation of the need for military intelligence in allowing the Triballi to circle in 
behind him before the Peuce Island encounter, but evidently learns from this mistake by 
dispatching Philotas to gather intelligence before the Pellium campaign, perhaps with 
limited success. His final mistake was in allowing himself to become trapped in the plain 
outside Pellium; we can only speculate that in later years he would have left a column to 
besiege Pellium whilst he set off to defeat the Taulantians on ground of his own 
choosing, rather than allowing them to link up. 
In this campaign we do see the beginnings of a number of strategies that recur 
repeatedly in Alexander's career: first of all his constant intent of drawing the enemy on 
to terrain of his choosing, to fight on his terms as far as possible, illustrated by his use of 
light armed troops to draw the Triballians out of their wooded glen onto a plain: and 
again with the Getae, flattening the grain fields creating a plain. His inexperience as a 
siege commander is apparent at Pellium, but even here we see him devising a unique 
strategy, as with the shield device in the Haemus Mountains, and executing it perfectly to 
extricate himself from a very difficult situation. 
If the intention of this campaign was to pacify Macedonia's northern borders, then 
it was a spectacular success; the area remained trouble-free throughout his reign. Further 
to this the treaties imposed by Alexander specified that they were to provide troops for 
the Persian campaign. 192 These peoples were sometimes assumed to be little more than 
hostages, but played a significant role on secondary missions and as garrison troops, 
allowing the Macedonian field army to stay intact. 
Any doubts that the siege of Pellium had raised about Alexander's abilities as a 
siege commander were to be quickly and completely erased by his capture of one of 
Greece's greatest cities, Thebes. '93 
191 Burn, 1947,55. 
192 There were 7,000 troops from the Balkans at the Hellespont, Diodorus 17.17.4. 
193 Kern, 1999,202; and indeed his spectacular successes in Asia, prompting Lane Fox, 1973,137, to note: 
"it was as a stormer of cities that [Alexander] left his most vigorous impression", conducting as he did 
more than twenty sieges. Keegan, 1987,72, lists them as: Thebes (335), Miletus and Halicarnassus (334), 
Tyre and Gaza (332), six separate sieges in north-eastern Persia (329), The Sogdian Rock and the Rock of 
Chorienes (328), The Rock of Aornus, Ora and an Aspasian city (327-6), Sangala, Multan and an unnamed 
Mallian city (326) and three Brahmin cities (325). 
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Thebes 
If the Balkan campaign was conducted at a relatively sedate pace, the march to 
Thebes was its antithesis; Alexander covered an astonishing 390km in thirteen days, 194 
catching the Thebans completely by surprise, and in doing so preventing the possibility of 
the rebellion spreading beyond the walls of Thebes. 195 
When Alexander arrived he found the Macedonian garrison on the Cadmea under 
siege from the Thebans. 196 He immediately made camp, giving the Thebans a "period of 
grace, in case they should repent of their bad decisions and send an embassy to him". 197 
Keegan 198 sees this as Alexander giving the "peace party" a chance to prevail, but I think 
Bosworth'99 is correct in suggesting that the pause was to rest his troops after such a 
lengthy forced march, and to construct siege engines, since those he had would probably 
have been left behind. The Thebans were not in a conciliatory mood, however; many of 
the defenders sallied out against Alexander but were easily repulsed. Alexander now 
moved his camp to the south side of the city, closer to the Cadmea, yet still did not attack. 
Arrian tells us that Alexander was still keen to win Theban friendship, 200 but this almost 
certainly comes from Ptolemy, 201 who made every effort, as we shall see later, to 
exonerate Alexander from any responsibility for the city's destruction. 
Arrian 202 tells us that Perdiccas, commander of a taxis of heavy infantry, led an 
assault upon the city without having first received orders from Alexander. He broke 
through the Theban lines, followed by Amyntas' taxis, but they were partially driven 
back by the defenders, Perdiccas being wounded and carried from the field during the 
initial stages of this engagement. It was only upon seeing this danger that Alexander 
brought up the rest of the army and broke into, and subsequently destroyed, the city. 
203 
The account of Arrian (which is to say Ptolemy in this case) differs significantly from 
that of Diodorus, 204 who has Perdiccas acting under orders from Alexander and entering 
the city through an unguarded postern gate only after Alexander's Theban allies had first 
assaulted the city. 205 
194 Keegan, 1987,72; Kern, 1999,203. Ashley, 1998,176, notes 300 miles (482km) for a march rate of 37kmpd. 
195 Arrian 1.7.4; Alexander apparently feared the rebellion spreading as a real possibility. '96 Arrian 1.7.10; the Thebans had invested the Cadmea with a double stockade, exactly as he did at 
Sangala in India in 326. 
197 Arrian 1.7.7. Diodorus 17.9.4, has a similar pause before hostilities began, as does Plutarch, Alex. 11. 198 Keegan, 1987,73. 
19' Bosworth, 1980,78. 
200 Arrian 1.7.8-11. 
201 Given that Ptolemy is explicitly named as the source a few lines later at Arian 1.8.1. Bosworth, 1980, 
80, is in no doubt that this whole section is taken from Ptolemy. 
202 Arrian 1.8.1. 
203 Arrian 1.8.3-8. 
204 Diodorus 17.12.3; Polyaenus 4.3.12, is different still, having a concealed force under Antipater enter the 
city; see Hammond, 1996,38. 
205 It is hard to believe that the Thebans would have left a gateway unguarded whilst under siege. 
Hammond, 1996,38; sees both Diodorus' and Plutarch's source for the Theban campaign as being 
Cleitarchus, making the account even less likely. 
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Macedonian losses were significant, 500 dead, but Theban losses far worse, 7,000 
dead and 30,000 sold into slavery, bringing Alexander a much needed injection of 440 
talents. 206 
The two versions both have the same end result, the destruction of Thebes; but 
occur along very different lines. Ptolemy was clearly attempting to remove any blame for 
the city's destruction from Alexander; understandable given the sometimes apologetic 
nature of his history coupled with the revulsion that it caused in the rest of Greece. His 
account is not as anti-Perdiccas as some have argued however. Perdiccas and Ptolemy 
were later rivals and it is all too easy to put the blame upon Perdiccas' shoulders, but 
Ptolemy states quite clearly that Perdiccas was wounded during the assault on the second 
palisade and took no further part in the battle; he can, therefore, not be blamed for the 
atrocities that were committed later. 207 Ptolemy's account is so obviously apologetic, 
however, that I believe Diodorus to be the more reliable on this occasion. The siege 
began with Alexander ordering a general assault and Perdiccas only broke through after 
receiving orders to attack an unguarded postern gate. 
Historians have argued for centuries on the question of the destruction of Thebes, 
and what Alexander hoped to achieve. It can be argued that he desired to cause such fear 
amongst the southern Greek states that they would not dare to repeat the mistake of 
Thebes in openly rebelling against Macedonian control. Historians who would argue for 
this hypothesis would also likely argue that Alexander hoped that with one excessively 
violent act he would prevent his being delayed in Greece by having to put down many 
minor rebellions. Alexander was certainly keen to continue the invasion of Persia that his 
father had tentatively begun in 336. It is true that the destruction of Thebes did cow the 
Greeks into cooperation for some years, and that the members of the League of Corinth 
generally ignored the revolt of Agis the Spartan in 331 (Sparta was not part of the League 
and was therefore outside of Alexander's empire). It would also be true to argue that 
Alexander seemed desperately short of money during the early part of his reign, and the 
440 talents were a very welcome boost to his empty coffers. The mistake usually made 
when considering the fate of Thebes, I believe, is to assume premeditation. It is a truism 
in the ancient word that `to the victor goes the spoils'; after almost every city fell, women 
would have been brutalised, slaughter and looting would have been endemic and was 
almost impossible for any commander to stop and it is not surprising that in that 
environment fires could be started as part of the general looting. The Macedonians were 
also taking out their frustrations on Thebes after a difficult Balkan campaign, and the 
failure to loot Pellium, followed by a difficult forced march into central Greece. This 
would have been magnified by the presence, as noted above, of a number of troops from 
cities that were traditionally the hated enemy of Thebes, decades of rivalry and repression 
would have also bubbled to the surface. 
Whilst I would argue that the destruction of Thebes was probably accidental and 
not the result of policy on the part of Alexander, he may not have been altogether 
206 Diodorus 17.14.4; Green, 1991,149, equates this to 88 drachmae a head. 
207 Errington, 1969,237; cf. Roisman, 1984,376-80. 
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disappointed by the result. He got his psychological impact on the remaining Greek city 
states, received a much needed cash injection (or perhaps `fiscal stimulus' as we may say 
these days) whilst remaining relatively free of direct blame, essentially a win win for the 
young king. Whilst the Greeks were cowed by the act, they certainly appeared to blame 
Alexander for the destruction of Thebes; the act, deliberate or otherwise, meant that 
Alexander would never be truly accepted by the Greeks, particularly the Athenians. He 
had proved himself to be a barbarian by perpetrating such an act, although I would note 
again that the Athenians did not join Agis' revolt in 331; the fear of a repeat of the fate of 
Thebes was still strong even five years after the event. 
Errington208 essentially accused Ptolemy of deliberately altering events to make 
Perdiccas responsible for the destruction of the city. Perdiccas and Ptolemy were rivals in 
the period after Alexander's death, Perdiccas invaded Egypt in 320 but was killed by his 
own sub-commanders soon after. '" Thus if Ptolemy's history had been written around 
this time we can imagine a political reason for such an act on the part of Ptolemy. None, 
however, of the potential dates for Ptolemy's history are this early, which reduces 
Ptolemy's potential political justification for attacking Perdiccas. Besides this general 
point, Ptolemy explicitly tells us that Perdiccas was wounded in the initial stages of the 
combat and was removed from the field, taking no further part at all; any bias in 
Ptolemy's account is not anti-Perdiccas but is in fact pro-Alexander. `10 Ptolemy has 
Alexander giving the Thebans every chance to surrender and essentially blames them for 
their fate. I see no reason, therefore, to dismiss Arrian's account on the grounds of bias 
against one of the protagonists; Ptolemy could easily be blamed, however, for wishing to 
shift blame away from Alexander for an event that shocked the whole of the Greek world. 
`Ö8 Errington. 1969.237- 
, 0') Roisman. 1984.380. 
2"o Roisman. 1984.376. 
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Figure 4: Alexander's final assault on Thebes came from the south, their most vulnerable point. 
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Chapter 2 
The Battle of the Granicus River: 334 
The battle of the Granicus River is, as Hammond notes: 211 "the most puzzling of 
Alexander's battles". The problems themselves are threefold: military, literary and 
topographical; each of these will be dealt with separately as each must be understood in 
order to interpret this battle. It would seem logical that an understanding of the terrain 
should be our starting point, as this forms the backdrop to the tactics of both sides. 
Topography 
The identification of the Granicus212 with the river now called the Kocabas Cay 
seems all but certain: 213 Strabo's214 statement that it flows between the Aesopus and the 
Priapus215 leaves little room for doubt. 216 The exact location of the battlefield is a little 
more difficult to pinpoint. Arrian is the only source that provides us with any relevant 
information: he states that the Persians were encamped at Zelea217 when they received the 
news of Alexander's crossing into Asia; 218 at that point they advanced to the Granicus 
and took up a defensive position. Plutarch refers to the location as being the "Gates of 
Asia". 219 Persian tactics will be discussed further later; suffice it to say that positioning 
themselves close to their permanent base at Zelea and the main supply port at Cyzicus 
was a sound if unimaginative strategy. 
Our sources are at best vague on the topography of the battlefield itself. Arrian 
tells us very little, only that river was obviously deep in many places and that "the banks 
were very high and, in places, almost sheer"; 22 he also tells us that the Greek mercenary 
infantry employed by the Persians, were positioned throughout the whole battle on higher 
211 Hammond, 1980,73. 
212 Foss, 1977,495 points out that the name of the river has been the subject of considerable change in 
recent times. In the 10 and early 20th centuries the lower course of the river was called the Biga Cay, after 
the market town and administrative centre of Biga. The upper course of the river, including its many 
tributaries, all bore different names. Until relatively recent times it was common practice in Turkey to name 
a river after the most important town that it flowed through and Foss speculates that this may also have 
been the case in antiquity. 
213 Foss, 1977,495; Hammond, 1980,76ff, Bosworth 1980,114. 
214 Strabo 587. 
215 The Aesopus is now the Gonen Cay, Foss, 1977,495. The Priapus flows past the town of Karabiga, 
Foss, 1977,495; cf. Foss in Barrington, 2000,52 A4, who identifies the Priapus with the modem Karabiga. 
216 This assumes that the identifications by Foss of the Aesopus and Priapus are correct; the general location 
of the Granicus, however, does seem universally accepted. 
217 Foss, 1977,496, and in Barrington, 2000,52 B4, identifies Zelea with the modem town of Sari Koy, 
west of the Aesopus, Hammond, 1980,76, on the other hand equates it with Gonen; the important fact is 
that Zelea was perhaps 20-30km east of the Granicus. 
218 Arrian 1.12.8-10 
219 Plutarch Alex, 16.1, now known as the Dimetoka gap. Foss in Barrington, 2000,52 B4, identifies 
Snicus with the modem Belkiz Kale. 
Arrian 1.13.4. 
42 
ground some way behind the river. 221 Plutarch describes this higher ground as "a 
ridge"222 and Diodorus says they were stationed on "the last slope of the hills"; 23 
implying that although this area was higher than the plain it was hardly precipitous. 
Hammond believes that the distance between the foothills where the infantry were 
stationed and the riverbank "cannot have been less than 100m". 224 As will hopefully 
become clear later in this chapter, it seems likely that the distance was considerably more 
than that. Bosworth points out225 that the foothills are more like 1.5-2km east of the river, 
although Janke226 reported a series of low undulations beginning 300-400 m from the 
river, and extending several km to the east. 227 
On his visit to the site of the battle in 1976, Hammond noticed the growth of a 
considerable amount of vegetation along the banks of the river. 228 It can be reasonably 
assumed that no such vegetation existed in 334, as the Persian commanders saw 
Alexander's army clearly. We also know that Alexander's army advanced into and out of 
the river in something like a continuous line, making the presence of vegetation in any 
quantity highly unlikely. 
The modem river is around 20m wide and the alluvial soil at the top of the river banks in June is sandy to a shallow depth. Further down the riverbank the soil becomes a 
firm clay, and the riverbed itself is hard clay. The banks are up to 5 or 6m229 high, and of 
varying degrees of inclination, sometimes quite steep, although Janke reported gravel 
beds in places that provide a relatively gentle sloping path down to the river on both 
banks. 23 Badian notes it as being characteristic of the quality of our sources that these 
gravel beds are nowhere mentioned in them. 231 Below the confluence with the River 
Biga, the river channel is up to 40m wide, and would therefore have presented Alexander 
with a far more difficult crossing if he had chosen that area. 
In June, the time of Alexander's crossing, Hammond describes the river as being 
"very peaceful", hardly the raging torrent described by Plutarch, 232 which "swept men 
from their feet and surged about them". To his credit, Arrian makes no such claim; he 
clearly did not picture the river as a major obstacle: the pull of the current is only 
mentioned in passing233 with no real implication that it caused trouble. On this occasion 
221 Arrian 1.14.4. 
222 Plutarch Alex, 16.3. 
223 Diodorus 17.19.2. 
224 Hammond, 1980,76. 
225 Bosworth, 1980,119. 
226 Janke, 1904,139-40; Judeich, 1908,384 n. 2, also noted these mounds. 
227 Bosworth, 1980,120, notes that these undulations rise only around 3m above the level of the plain; 
although these seem small they are in the right location for the last stand of the mercenaries as we shall see. 
228 The description of the modem river is from Hammond, 1980,77f. 
229 Bosworth, 1980,117,119, notes vertical clay banks of only 3-4m high: whichever is the more accurate 
figure both would present very great difficulty to mounted troops crossing the river. 
' Janke, 1904,138; Badian, 1977,281f Bosworth, 1980,117. These gravel beds are instrumental to 
understanding Alexander's tactics and the progress of the battle. 
231 Badian, 1977,281. 
232 Plutarch Alex. 16.3. 
233 Arrian 14.7. 
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Arrian, who is as interested as anyone in the heroic image of Alexander, does not 
exaggerate the difficulty of the terrain in order to make Alexander's achievements more 
impressive. 
The assumption that a modern river runs along the same course as its ancient 
equivalent is always dangerous, and in the case of the Granicus there is some academic 
dispute in this regard. Kiepert, 234 after visiting the region in 1843, proposed that it has 
indeed changed its course since antiquity; he proposed that the Granicus had flowed into 
the marshy lake of Ece Gol. 235 This would locate the battlefield some way to the west of 
the present course of the Kocabas Cay. This theory has been conclusively refuted by 
Janke, 236 who examined the site and noted a ridge lying between the lake and the river, 
indicating that the river could never have flowed into the lake. After his examination of 
the site, Hammond237 proposed that the ancient river actually ran around lkm to the east 
of its current location, although this would seem to leave very little distance between the 
river and the foothills, perhaps too little for all the stages of the battle to have unfolded 
effectively. Foss238 argued that the river has not changed its course since antiquity; he 
points to the remains of a Roman bridge below Biga as an indication of this. To some 
extent the question is academic: the river could have been located perhaps 0.5km239 to the 
east or a little more to the west of its current location without seriously affecting the 
topography of the site. There would still be a plain to the west of the river and one to the 
east, with foothills further to the east. The balance of probability would seem to suggest 
that either the river was a little to the west of its current location or, more likely, its 
course has not changed since antiquity. 240 
Alexander's Route to the Granicus 
We can make a reasonable assessment as to which route Alexander took by 
examining closely the text of Arrian 241 Arrian tells us that from Troy Alexander marched 
to Arisbe, 242 where the army had initially gathered after crossing the Hellespont. 
However, it is far from clear if the army stayed there during Alexander's sojourn at Troy 
or if they accompanied him. From Arisbe Alexander moved to Percote, and the following 
day passed Lampsacus243 and halted on the river Practius. Percote is known from 
234 Kiepert, 1887,263ff. 
235 The lake of Ece Gol is nowhere mentioned in ancient sources; Foss, 1977,500. 
236 Janke, 1904,137f; Judeich, 1908 385ff, Hammond 1980,78, n. 15. 
237 Hammond, 1980,78. 
238 Foss, 1977,500, concedes that the river may have changed course in areas closer to the coast but not in 
the area under consideration. 
239 Any more than this would be difficult to accept. 
240 Badian, 1980,282, following Foss, 1977,500, takes this line, that the course has not changed. 
241 Arrian 1.12.6-7; see also Bosworth, 1980,107-109. 
242 "Arisbe was located 7-8km due east of Abydus in an undulating plain well suited to accommodate a 
large army", Bosworth, 1980,107; cf. Leaf, 1923,109 
243 Alexander passed by Lampsacus on his second day's march, apparently not stopping or entering the city. 
This sheds no light at all on the story from Pausanias 6.18.2-4, that Alexander had decided to destroy 
Lampsacus for Medism but was persuaded against this course of action by Anaximenes, himself a 
Lampsacene. Badian, 1966,63 n. 32, suggested that Lampsacus was prepared to resist Alexander; this is 
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Xenophon 244 to have been a harbour city and was associated with the river Practius in 
Homer. 245 Bosworth246 identifies the Practius River with the modem Bergaz Cay, and 
therefore Percote should be located towards its mouth; being a port; he goes on to identify 
the modem village of Bergaz as the ancient town of Percote. If he is right, then Percote 
was located around 10km along the coast from Arisbe. The theory of Janke, 247 that 
Alexander moved inland from Lampsacus, has been refuted by Bosworth as being based 
upon an incorrect emendation of the text of Arrian by Freinsheim in 1648.248 Arrian 
clearly states that once Alexander passed Lampsacus he halted at the river Practius. 249 
This cannot be the case, as we have already shown that the Practius was the river with 
Percote at its head that Alexander passed the previous day. Of the only two solutions one 
would be that Alexander passed Percote and marched to Lampsacus, whereupon he 
turned around and marched back to Percote where he turned inland. 250 The only other 
option, a far more plausible one at that, is that Arrian mistakenly uses that name Practius 
when he in fact means another river entirely. If we therefore accept that Arrian made a 
mistake, as Bosworth does, 251 then we need to locate a river beyond Lampsacus which 
flows into the Propontis; the only possible option is the river Paesus. 
The text of Arrian would therefore suggest that Alexander marched along the 
coast road until somewhere just after the river Paesus, where he turned inland, crossed the 
Kerner Cay, and marched on to the plain so that he could arrive at the Granicus in a 
virtually deployed state. This route has the advantage of being quick and avoiding the 
rough terrain of the coast around Parion; it also enabled Alexander to approach the 
Granicus fully prepared for battle 
Sources 
An understanding of this battle is seriously undermined by our principal 
sources 252 giving two entirely different and seemingly irreconcilable accounts of events. 
The main discrepancies can be found within the accounts of Diodorus and Arrian. 
extremely unlikely, however, given that Alexander did not stop to capture the city, and he is highly unlikely 
to have left an enemy stronghold in his rear so close to an expected encounter with a sizeable Persian army. 
244 Xen. Hell. 5.1.25. 
245 Homer, Iliad, 2.835. 
246 Bosworth, 1980,107. 
247 Janke, 1904,137,, x. This is the theory that Foss, 1977,497 followed. 
248 Bosworth, 1980,108 states that "There is, however, an intractable difficulty. Arrian says explicitly that 
the river discharges into the Propontis - `between the Hellespont and the Euxine'. If the emendation 
(Praktiöi for prosaktiöi) is accepted, we must ccredit Arrian with a glaring error. Freinsheim's emendation 
should therefore be rejected and with it the theory that Alexander's inland turn from Lampsacus". 
249 Arnan 1.12.6. 
250 This would essentially be the theory of Janke and Foss (noted above) who believe that Alexander moved 
inland at Lampsacus or Percote/Practius, towards the Granicus. 
251 Bosworth, 1980,108. 
252 Diodorus 17.19-21; Arrian 1.13-16; Plutarch Alex. 16; Justin 11.6.8-13. 
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Diodorus' Account and its Major Problems 
Diodorus' account begins with Alexander learning of the concentration of Persian 
forces; "he advanced rapidly and encamped opposite the enemy, so that the Granicus 
flowed between them". At this time the Persians were "resting on high ground", 253 and 
made no attempt to occupy the bank itself, their tactic being to fall upon the Macedonians 
just after they crossed the river. 254 This would have the significant benefit of the Persians 
maintaining their greatest advantage, that of a cavalry charge that would have been 
negated if they were stationed on the edge of the bank itself. Badian255 points out that 
Judeich256 deserves credit for recognising, almost 100 years ago, that commanders who 
are coming from a 200 year tradition of using cavalry as their principal arm should not be 
accused of ignorance by modem historians when it comes to matters of their use. Both 
Badian and Judeich agree with Diodorus that it is eminently sensible for the Persian 
cavalry to have been held back somewhat from the riverbank. 
It is at this point that the real difficulties begin with Diodorus: at dawn Alexander 
"boldly brought his army across the river and deployed in good order before they could 
stop him". 257 This raises at least two problems, first that the battle took place at dawn258 
and second, it would have taken several hours to cross even a very minor river and deploy 
perhaps 17,000 troops; 259 it is inconceivable that the Persians would make no move to 
stop the Macedonians. It was, after all (according to Diodorus), their plan to drive the 
Macedonians back into the river, as will be demonstrated later; if this was their intended 
tactic then they likely would allow some Macedonian cavalry across before they launched 
their counter-attack, but surely not the entire army. 
The Persians began their counter moves by deploying their "mass of horsemen all 
along the front of the Macedonians". 260 This would have led to a novel, and perhaps 
unique arrangement of forces; two lines of cavalry opposing each other with the infantry 
stationed behind. Although generally this would make little tactical sense, here it is 
reasonable as Alexander crossed the Granicus first with his cavalry, and the Persians 
wished to oppose the Macedonian cavalry with their own. 261 
253 Diodorus 17.19.1-2; with the infantry presumably behind them. 
254 For a discussion of Persian tactics see pp. 34-5. 
255 Badian, 1977,284; this argument, that the Persians were set back from the river, runs contrary to 
Hammond, 1980,81 n. 22, and Harl, 1997,309, who argue that the Persians' being lined up along the river 
bank was entirely sensible, given their tactics, see later. Badian also points out, to his credit, although to the 
significant detriment to his argument at this point, that a Persian cavalry line set up to defend a river 
crossing would not have been unique, they did so at the battle of the Centrites river; Badian, 1977,277 
n. 24; Xenophon. Anab. 4.3. 
256 Judeich, 1908,372-97. 
257 Diodorus 17.19.3. 
258 As compared to the evening in Arrian's account: see later. 
19 Perhaps 9,000 heavy infantry, 3,000 hypaspists, 4,000 cavalry and 1,000 Agrianians and archers. This 
would be the primarily Macedonian core of the army. 
260 Diodorus 17.19.4. 
261 And no doubt wanted the glory of killing Alexander to fall to one of their own, rather than to one Greek 
mercenary infantry. 
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Diodorus then gives us the Persian order of battle. 262 Memnon of Rhodes and 
Arsamenes (=Arsames), satrap of Cilicia, 263 held the Persian left wing, each commanding 
his own cavalry. 264 Next to them was Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, 
commanding the Paphlagonian cavalry. Then came Spithrobates (=Spithridates), satrap of 
Lydia and Ionia, 265 at the head of the Hyrcanian cavalry. Rheomithres held the Persian 
right wing and was in command of 1,000 Medes, 2,000 Bactrians and 2,000 other 
unspecified cavalry. 266 We are also told that the centre of the Persian line was occupied 
by "other national contingents" who were "numerous and picked for their valour, .27 In 
total there were 10,000 Persian cavalry and around 100,000 infantry, although these, of 
course, were withheld from the main battle. 268 
The battle was then joined and seems to have proceeded in a highly stylized 
manner with the Thessalians and Parmenio defending on the left, whilst Alexander 
pressed the attack on the right with the Companion Cavalry. This is exactly the same as 
the descriptions of the other set-piece battles that Alexander fought and is, to say the 
least, suspicious. In Diodorus' account the climactic moment of the battle came when 
Spithrobates gathered around himself a "large body"269 of Persians and charged into the 
Macedonian lines towards Alexander, who turned to meet the new threat. 
What follows is virtually an Homeric-style description of single combat between, 
initially, Alexander and Spithrobates. Spithrobates threw his javelin with such force that 
it pierced Alexander's shield and lodged in his breastplate. The javelin was then 
apparently shaken loose as it "dangled" from his arm; this requires some discussion. If 
the javelin was dangling from Alexander's breastplate270 then it must have passed 
completely through his shield. For this to have happened it must have been thrown with 
more force than seems possible for any individual to achieve, let alone one mounted on 
horseback where it would have been impossible to plant one's feet or pivot the body in 
order to achieve the maximum velocity; further to this, it is far from clear if Macedonian 
cavalry carried shields at all 271 The passage that follows is highly rhetorical and clearly 
262 Which Arrian fails to do. 
263 Diodorus 17.19.5, calls this man Arsamenes; he is called Arsames in Curtius 3.4.3, and Arrian 2.4.5. 
264 This is extremely puzzling for two reasons: firstly Memnon of Rhodes is usually thought of as being the 
commander of the Greek mercenary infantry, yet here he is in the Persian front line commanding a 
contingent of cavalry. Secondly the cavalry are described as "his own cavalry"; this could imply that the 
cavalry in question were Greek mercenaries, which the Persians were not supposed to have. 
265 Diodorus tells us that Spithridates was satrap of Ionia only: Arrian 1.12.8, tells us he was satrap of both 
Lydia and Ionia. 
266 Arrian adds the names of Petines and Niphates, which Diodorus omits. 
267 Both quotes are from Diodorus 17.19.5; he fails to tell us which province these contingents were from, 
how numerous they were or who their commanders were. 
268 Justin 11.6.11, gives the Persian total strength at 600,000, whilst Arrian 1.14.4, lists 20,000 cavalry and 
20,000 infantry. I will argue later in this chapter that Ar Ian's figures are more realistic, although still 
probably too high: it is sufficient to note at this point that Diodorus gives a surprisingly low estimate for the 
strength of the Persian cavalry. 
269 Diodorus 17.20.1; apparently this large body was only 40 strong. 
270 The javelin apparently did not pierce the skin and caused no injury to Alexander. 271 The Alexander mosaic from the House of the Faun in Pompeii clearly shows Alexander without a shield. 
Interpretation of this mosaic is controversial; it has been thought to represent the battle of Issus but may in 
fact be Gaugamela. Polybius 6.25, clearly states that Greek (by Polybius' time synonymous with 
48 
designed to add to Alexander's heroism, "ranks in both armies cried out at the superlative 
display of prowess". 272 
It is in this passage that we see Alexander killing Spithrobates and his brother 
Rhosaces, splitting Alexander's helmet and then having his arm severed by Cleitus as he 
prepared to deliver the coup de grace. 17.21.1-3 is then even more rhetorical than the 
previous passage; Alexander is presented as almost single-handedly defeating the cream 
of the Persian cavalry, killing Atizyes, Pharnaces and Mithrobuzanes in the process 273 
After the loss of many of their commanders, the Persian cavalry then seem to have fled 
leaving the "foot soldiers to engage one another". Persian casualties are given as more 
than 10,000 infantry and not less than 2,000 cavalry with 20,000 prisoners taken. 274 
Diodorus also tells us that Alexander won the palm for bravery and was regarded as the 
chief author of the victory; more significantly the Thessalians were also honoured after 
having "won a great reputation for valour because of the skilful handling of their 
squadrons and their unmatched fighting quality". 275 This last point is most significant as 
will become apparent in the final section of this chapter. 
Arrian's Account and its Maior Problems 
Alexander approached the Granicus in "battle order", 276 his infantry massed into 
two groups277 with cavalry protecting both wings and a very large reconnaissance party 
totalling around 1,400 troops scouting the Persian positions. 278 The scouts reported to 
Alexander that the Persians had taken up a position on the far bank of the river, 279 
whereupon Alexander made preparations for an immediate attack. At this point we have 
Macedonian in such matters) cavalry did use shields, and that the Romans adopted Greek practice in this 
matter. Arrian 1.6.5; 4.23.2, on the other hand states that Macedonian cavalry only used shields when they 
expected to fight on foot. 
272 Diodorus 17.20.5. 
273 Diodorus also has Atizyes falling at Issus. Arrian 1.16.3 has a much longer list of Persian noble 
casualties. 
274 Diodorus 17.21.5-6; Plutarch Alex. 16.7 (following Aristobulus; Bosworth 1980 124), gives Persian 
losses at 2,500 cavalry and 20,000 infantry; Arrian 1.16.2, gives only 1,000 cavalry whilst almost all of the 
infantry were killed. 
275 Diodorus 17.21.4. 
276 Arrian 1.13.2. 
277 No further information is given about these two groups of infantry, but it would be reasonable to 
conclude that they consisted of one group containing the Macedonian heavy infantry and hypaspists, and 
the other consisting of all of the mercenary and allied infantry. These two groups would have been roughly 
the same size and it is probably that the allied troops were stationed behind the Macedonians forming 
something of a reserve phalanx, as they do not appear in any accounts of the battle and therefore were 
almost certainly not stationed along side the Macedonians. 
278 Arrian tells us of two scouting parties, both of which were of significant size. At 1.12.7, the first was 
commanded by Amyntas son of Arrabaeus (more on him later) and consisted of an He of Companion 
Cavalry commanded by Socrates, and 4 ilae if light cavalry. The second (1.13.2) was commanded by 
Hegelochus; this scouting party consisted of all of the lancers (prodromoi, numbering 900; see Diodorus 
17.17.4) and 500 light troops. Amyntas' scouting party must have rejoined the main body of the army just 
before this time. Bosworth, 1980,114, seems to suggest that there was in fact only one scouting party but 
that Aristobulus had it commanded by Hegelochus and Ptolemy by Amyntas, Arrian interpreting them as 
two separate scouting parties. 
279 Interestingly not some distance back from the riverbank, but along the riverbank. 
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Arrian presenting us with the first of five dialogues where Alexander is seen rejecting the 
advice of Parmenio280 Parmenio's advice essentially was to avoid an immediate frontal 
attack, but instead to wait until dawn. He argues that the Persians being so inferior in 
infantry would not dare to remain at the river's edge throughout the night but would 
withdraw, which would enable the Macedonians to cross unopposed the following 
morning. 281 Parmenio is also made to argue that the river was obviously deep and the 
banks steep and almost sheer in places making a crossing extremely difficult. 282 
Alexander dismissively rejects Parmenio's proffered advice. 
This is a most intriguing passage: not only is it the first of a series of occasions 
where Parmenio is presented as the over-cautious older general whose advice is rejected 
by the young dynamic and heroic Alexander, it is also advice that is unreported but 
essentially accepted in Diodorus' account. Alexander does attack the following morning 
and does get across the river before the Persians can form up to oppose him (see above). 
Bosworth believes that there can only be two explanations: 28 
1. Diodorus is wrong; this is certainly the prevailing view amongst historians. 284 
Badian even goes so far as to say that "Diodorus cannot be followed at all"; 285 this 
seems to be to be far too extreme a position. 
2. Arrian is wrong; this view also has its adherents, although fewer in number. 286 
A third possibility exists in my opinion, that both traditions contain part of the 
story, and thus it is unwise to reject either completely; more on this later. 
After rejecting Parmenio's advice Alexander proceeds to deploy his troops and 
Arrian gives us the Macedonian order of battle, 287 first from the extreme right to the 
280 Arrian 1.13.2; the others being 1.18.6-9 at Miletus; 2.25.2-3 at the Euphrates; 3.10.1-2 at Gaugamela 
and 3.18.12; at Persepolis. 
281 Essentially Parmenio was proposing exactly what Diodorus tells us actually occurred. 
282 Arrian 1.13.2; Plutarch Alex. 16.3, also reports this discussion, but more briefly; also including Parmenio 
raising the issue of the lateness of the day as a reason for postponing the attack, a theme not in Arrian's 
account. Brunt, 1963,27 n. 3, argues that both Plutarch and Arrian drew upon Aristobulus but excerpted 
him slightly differently; Bosworth, 1980,115, suggests that if they drew upon different sources it is most 
likely that Arrian used Aristobulus. 
283 Bosworth, 1980,115. 
284 For example: Judeich, 1908,394-5 n. 1; Davis, 1964,40-2; Badian, 1977,272-4; Hammond, 1980,80- 
89; Bosworth, 1988,41; Ashley, 1998,187-202; Heckel, 2002,36; Strauss, 2003,153-4. 
285 Badian, 1977,272-4. 
286 For example: Lehmann, 1911,243 and Lane Fox, 1973,121-2. Green, 1991,489-512, has a rather 
different interpretation; he at first believed that Alexander fought Arrian's battle across the river and lost, 
and followed this by fighting Diodorus' battle and gained victory. This is an extremely clever theory, and, 
although I do not agree with it, my own reconstruction of the battle was inspired by it. I note, however, that 
in the preface to the 1991 edition of his book (updating the 1974 work), Green rejects the theory, stating 
that "new studies have convinced me that I was flat wrong". Whilst I think the theory was incorrect, I have 
adapted it into what I believe to be a very plausible reconstruction of 
287 Arrian 1.14.1; From left to right it is first the Thessalians (Calas), the allied cavalry (Philip) and the 
Thracian cavalry (Agathon), Parmenio having also been sent to the left wing (Arrian 1.14.1). Then came 
the heavy infantry taxis of Craterus, Meleager, Philip, Amyntas, Coenus and Perdicas. The hypaspists 
(Nicanor) were to the right of these and on the extreme right of the formation came the Companions 
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centre, then from the extreme left to the centre. The Persians are depicted as positioning 
their cavalry, undoubtedly their strength, along the bank "on a very broad front". Harl 
assumes that they were drawn up 8 deep, based upon Polybius' assumptions of the 
Persian dispositions at Issus the following year. This would result in 20,000 cavalry 
occupying a 4.5km frontage'288 with the infantry being drawn up "in the rear". 289 This 
positioning of the Persian cavalry along the banks of the river is one of the greatest 
problems with Arrian's account of the battle: it is sometimes resolved, as in Badian '290 
by 
suggesting that they were in fact stationed a few hundred metres back from the river 
banks. That they were stationed "on the bank parallel to the river" is stated quite 
explicitly by Arrian; any attempt to move them on to the plain, according to Hammond, 
"runs counter to the texts". 291 Harl, however, explains this unusual alignment by noting 
that the Persian cavalry at this time were in fact light cavalry, suited for using javelins 
and sabres, not at all heavily armed, and thus not suited for a charge against the 
Macedonian Companion Cavalry. 292 It is also worth noting that, given the Persian 
intention to use missile weapons against the Macedonians, coupled with the inevitability 
that the Macedonian cavalry charge would be broken by the river and the steep eastern 
banks, there was in fact little danger to the Persian cavalry; their defensive position was 
quite strong. 
The initial attack was on the extreme right of the Macedonian formation: 
Alexander ordered Amyntas into the river with the Paeonians, advanced scouts 
(Paeonians and Prodromoi) and one taxis of infantry, we are not told which. Preceding 
this attack, however, was Ptolemy, son of Philip, with Socrates' ile. 293 The command 
structure here is difficult to understand; Bosworth294 is of the view that the He of Socrates 
is detached from the overall command of Amyntas and is in fact under Ptolemy, a man 
who is otherwise unknown. This would mean that Ptolemy was a temporary commander 
deputising for Socrates, but Socrates himself is mentioned just a few lines later. 295 
Bosworth goes on to suggest that this Ptolemy, just like Amyntas, may have been a senior 
commander attached to no specific unit but able to take up any command that was 
necessary, but the small size of the command would suggest that its commander would 
not be a senior individual2.96 Berve identifies this Ptolemy with the bodyguard who was 
later to die at Halicarnassus whilst commanding a force of hypaspists and light 
(Philotas), the Paeonians, Prodromol and Socrates' lie of cavalry. The archers and Agrianians were also on the right in an ill-defined position. See Ashley, 1998,194, for a useful depiction of the dispositions of both 
armies. No mention is made in Arrian of the allied infantry or mercenaries. 288 Harl 1997,310 including n. 21. Hammond, 1980,83-4, suggests the Macedonian front occupied 2.5 
km's, 1.5km for the infantry with each wing taking up 500m. This assumes that he infantry were 8 men 
deep, as they were at Issus (Polybius 12.19.6; 21.8). 
289 Arrian 1.14.4. 
290 Badian, 1977,283f, see also Judeich, 1908,389, who was first to suggest this. 291 Arrian 1.14.4, for the Persian cavalry dispositions; cf. Hammond, 1980,81, for the counter argument to 
Badian, 1977,283f. 
292 Harl, 1997,309; he further comments (309 n. 20) that they were re-equipped as heavy cavalry before the 
battle of Gaugamela. See also Diodorus 17.52.1; and Curtius 4.9.3-4. 
293 Arrian 1.14.6. The figure of Ptolemy here will be key to my theory in the final part of this chapter. 294 Bosworth, 1980,120. 
295 Arrian 1.15.1. 
296 Bosworth, 1980,120. 
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infantry. 297 If we take Berve's lead and assume that this Ptolemy was not the otherwise 
unknown son of Philip, but was in fact Ptolemy, son of Lagus298 (unlike Berve's 
suggestion)299, then we could be some small way towards understanding this battle. A 
fuller explanation is given in my tentative new theory presented at the end of this chapter. 
The infantry taxis mentioned above is also unusual. Berve300 and Badian3o' both 
identified it with a chiliarchy of hypaspists, but it is widely known that the term taxis is 
elastic and was often used to describe any infantry unit, even light infantry. 302 With this 
in mind, and noting the proximity of the archers and Agrianians, it is likely that one of 
these two groups was the taxis in question; both of which were eminently more suited to 
this type of action than the heavy infantry. Harl assumed this unit of infantry to be the 
heavy infantry taxis stationed immediately to the left of the hypaspists, that of Perdiccas. 
This makes little sense, however, as it would mean the troops stationed on the extreme 
right were advancing whilst the hypaspists, who were better suited for this kind of action, 
remained stationary; and Perdiccas' unit, to the left of the hypaspists, was attacking 
upstream to the right, across the path of any potential assault by the hypaspists. This 
would have the effect of removing Alexander's best infantry from the battle. 303 
It would seem from Arrian304 that almost immediately after the Amyntas/Socrates 
attack was launched, Alexander himself charged into the river. Arrian also tells us that 
Alexander kept his line oblique to the pull of the current to prevent a flank attack and to 
ensure as solid a front as possible as they emerged from the water. The banks were steep 
in places, 305 and only easily climbed where the gravel beds descend to the river on either 
side. It is unlikely that any two of these gravel beds faced each other so a diagonal 
crossing was forced upon Alexander. The text reads as though the army filtered over the 
river in something of a continuous line, moving towards the right. But the Greek seems to 
translate as "in the direction the stream drew them", which is to say downstream, to the 
left. 306 
What ensued was vicious hand-to-hand combat in which the Macedonian troops 
seem to have suffered badly from a "continuous volley of missiles from the Persians" and 
also from the disadvantages of the terrain. The lead troops were forced back towards the 
riverbed and into Alexander and the Companion Cavalry still struggling to get up one of 
297 Berve, 1926,1.22.4-7 
298 The historian, and Arrian's primary source. 299 To clarify, Berve believed that this Ptolemy was not the son of Philip; I have gone further by positively 
suggesting that he was in fact the famous historian, Ptolemy son of Lagus: contra Heckel, 2005,234 has 
this as a Ptolemy other than the famous historian. 
300 Berve, 1926,2.336. 
301 Badian, 1977,289. 
302 For example at Arrian 6.8.7. 
303 Hart, 1997,317-8: an interesting visual depiction of this can be seen on Hart's maps 320-321. 
304 Arrian 1.14.7. 
305 Hammond, 1980,77, states that the banks are now 5-6m high, and the channel 20m wide (although on 
80 he contradicts this by stating that in 1976 the channel was 40m), the actual river nearer 4-5m wide. 
306 Bosworth, 1980,121. Hammond, 1980,75, argues for a movement upstream and to the right, but a few 
lines later on p. 75 and again on p. 84 he does seem to accept the movement was downstream and to the left. 
A leftward movement does seem the more acceptable. 
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the gravel slopes; this should have caused massive confusion amongst the Macedonians, 
but almost instantly Arrian transfers his battle narrative from the riverbanks to dry land 
using the phrase "a moment later he was in the thick of it, charging at the head of his men 
straight for the spot where the Persian commanders stood". 307 This is, to say the least, 
difficult to accept. Equally strange is Arrian's assertion that "things soon turned in favour 
of Alexander's men" largely due to their experience and their superior weapons. 
As the Macedonians were gaining the upper hand, Mithridates308 gathered 
together a group of Persians and charged at Alexander. As in Diodorus, Rhoesaces sliced 
off part of Alexander's helmet; however, in Arrian, Rhoesaces is killed by Alexander and 
it is Spithridates who lost his arm to Cleitus as he raised it for a critical blow against the 
king. This part of the battle is so confused in our sources that we shall never be able to 
get at the true sequence of events, or even the Persian nobles involved. 309 
Almost as soon as this encounter was over, the Persians broke, first in the 
centre310 and then on both wings. Persian cavalry losses were limited to 1,000 as 
Alexander turned his attention to the mercenaries. In a most unsavoury incident 
Alexander had them surrounded and massacred. 311 The annihilation of the mercenaries is 
not mentioned in Diodorus. Plutarch, 312 on the other hand, in an entirely more plausible 
passage has them suing for peace and being angrily rejected by Alexander before a very 
bloody battle ensues in which the Macedonians sustain their heaviest casualties. 313 
Plutarch's account314 of the battle is very similar to that of Arrian, and is clearly 
derived from the same source. This source is usually assumed to be a combination of 
Aristobulus and Ptolemy, although I shall argue later for Ptolemy being the main source 
for this tradition. The main difference from Arrian's account is that Plutarch seriously 
exaggerates the difficulties of the terrain faced by Alexander; saying for example that the 
Macedonians were "swept off their feet" by the fast flowing river. Badian describes 
Plutarch's account as "rhetorically inflated and has no other independent value" 
315 
Similarly little can be taken from Justin, 316 and Curtius' account of the battle is lost. 
307 Arrian 1.15.3. 
308 Arrian 1.15.7: only Arrian describes Mithridates' role in the battle. 
309 Bosworth, 1980,123. 
310 This is odd as the attack was clearly launched on the Macedonian right wing. 
311 Arrian 1.16.2. 
312 Plutarch Alex. 16.13-14. 
313 Arrian lastly gives a more substantial list of Persian dead than does Diodorus; it includes: - Niphates, 
Petines, Spithridates (Satrap of Lydia), Mithrubazanes (satrap of Cappadocia), Mithridates (son-in-law of 
Darius), Arbupales (son of Darius and grandson of Artaxerxes II), Pharnuces (brother of Darius' wife and 
otherwise unknown) and Omares (commander of the Greek mercenaries). Arsites escaped to Phrygia where 
he killed himself, apparently feeling responsible for the defeat. 
314 Plutarch Alex. 16. 
}'s Badian, 1977,271, n. 2. 
316 Justin 6.10-12. 
53 
The Battle 
In this final section I aim to examine and discuss three main issues: why the battle 
was fought at the Granicus; what strategies were employed by both sides; and finally to 
present a tentative new theory of the battle. 
We should begin with a discussion of the Persian strategy. Arrian 317 tells us that 
the Persian army was encamped at Zelea when they received news of Alexander's 
crossing into Asia. A debate apparently ensued as to what their best course of action 
would be. Memnon318 advocated a policy of avoiding battle, of withdrawal before the 
advancing Macedonians and destroying all of the crops and towns in his path, whilst at 
the same time using their superior fleet to carry the war into Greece. Arsites argued 
vehemently against this strategy, refusing to allow any homes within his satrapy to be 
burned; in this "the other commanders supported him". 19 A scorched earth policy would 
not have been unthinkable for the Persians; they had done it before and would so again. 320 
Most historians have seen this rejection of Memnon's strategy as being the product of 
"command by a committees321 and have seen this as the Persians' biggest weakness. 
Badian, I think rightly, argued that it was Arsites that was in sole command of the Persian 
forces, the battle was being fought within his satrapy; it was he who rejected Memnon's 
strategy and it was he who, after the defeat, committed suicide for fear that he would be 
blamed for the defeat. 322 
Many historians seem to see Memnon's strategy as being sound, and rejected for 
essentially unsound non-military reasons. This, I believe, is also the wrong view: if 
Memnon's strategy had been implemented and much of Arsites' satrapy had been burned, 
Alexander would have felt no overwhelming compulsion to follow the Persian army 
through this devastated territory; he felt no such obligation to follow the Persians after 
Issus. He could have easily turned south and encouraged a general Ionian revolt against 
Persian rule. The Ionian cities had a long history of revolting from Persian rule and, as 
Davis points out, 323 they would have felt a natural sympathy with other Greeks. 
'" Arrian 1.12.8; Bosworth, 1980,111-2, gives brief biographies of some of the major Persian 
commanders. 
318 Memnon was Greek but had been related to the Persian noble Artabazus, by marriage, since before 362; 
after Artabazus revolted from Artaxerxes in 359/8 he spent some time in exile at Philip's court and was 
thus well placed to offer advice on the Macedonians: Bosworth, 1980,112-3. Hari, 1997,306, believes that 
Memnon was a rival to Arsites and not a spokesman for the Greeks; this is probably how he saw himself, 
but it is doubtful if the Persians saw him in those terms. 
319 Arrian 1.12.9-10; Hari, 1997,306, suggested that the Persians perhaps did not fully trust Memnon, 
despite his Persian noble connections; Ashley, 1998,190, comments that it may not have escaped the 
attention of the Persians that Memnon's estates near Abydos had been left untouched by Alexander. 
320 Bosworth, 1980,113, the Persians had employed such a strategy against Agesilaus half a century before, 
Davis, 1964,35; contra Schachermeyr, 1973,141-2, who sees the Persian Empire as a feudal system and 
has the Persian commanders reject Memnon's plan because it was simply unthinkable. 
321 Devine, 1988,7; Hari, 1997,306. 
322 Badian, 1977,283; Bosworth, 1980,113, notes that Arsites' son, Mithropastes, was exiled to the Persian 
Gulf after the battle (Nearchus, FGrH 133 F 27-8) and therefore Darius perhaps did blame Arsites for the 
defeat. 
323 Davis, 1964,36. 
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We should also note that, although Memnon had experience of the Macedonians, 
both from his time in exile at the court of Philip, and from his two years of relatively 
successful campaigning against the expeditionary force, the Persian nobles lacked this 
experience. To them Alexander was not yet the semi-divine world conqueror that he was 
to become; he was in fact no more than a beardless youth. Retreat, even if it were 
tactically sound, would have seemed like cowardice to Darius, whom the Persian 
commanders undoubtedly did know and probably feared despite him being relatively new 
to the throne himself. 324 
The Persian commanders would also have felt that their great superiority in 
cavalry would have given them a significant tactical advantage, in terms of 
manoeuvrability, over the Macedonians. Arsites, therefore, had good reasons for not 
wishing to withdraw, but he also had positive reasons for wishing to engage the 
Macedonians and to drive them from Asia Minor. 
Once the decision to fight had been made, only the location remained. It is usually 
accepted that the Persians chose the location well 25 As has already been noted the 
eastern bank of the Granicus was steeper than the western, around 4-5m in places, and, 
although the river was not deep, it was sufficient to break up and seriously disrupt a 
cavalry charge. 326 Also, given that the Persian cavalry were lightly armed and equipped, 
they would have been at a greater tactical disadvantage if they had faced the Macedonian 
heavy cavalry on flat terrain; they were better suited to throwing their javelins and to 
using their greater mobility against the Macedonians as they struggled to emerge from the 
river. Devine is being a little unkind when he describes the Persian strategy as "basically 
sound though unimaginative". 327 
The Persians arrived at the battle site and occupied the eastern bank at an 
unknown time, but before Alexander arrived: the only real chronology that we have is 
that the battle was fought in May. 328 What ensued upon Alexander's arrival is only 
reported in Arrian and Plutarch, 329 a debate between Alexander and Parmenio as to the 
best course of action. Parmenio apparently advised waiting until the morning. Both 
sources have Parmenio's advice being rejected out of hand by Alexander. Diodorus330 on 
the other hand has no such debate, but the account of the battle is as if the advice were 
324 Davis, 1964,36. 
" Hammond, 1980b, 68; Devine, 1988,7; Davis, 1964,36. 
326 Plutarch Alex. 16.2. 
327 Devine, 1988,7. 
328 Plutarch Alex. 16.1, has the battle fought in the month of Daesius (May-June); Badian, 1977,280, claims 
early May; Janke, 1904,140, established a hundred years ago that the river was shallow and easily fordable 
at that time of year, Foss' 1977 observations agree. 
329 Badian, 1977,281, suggests the possible presence of vegetation along the river bank that would have 
obscured the Macedonians' view of the Persian dispositions: Harl, 1997,310; sensibly points out, however, 
that any vegetation would have been cut down by the Persians within a day to build camp and provide fuel 
for their camp fires. See also above. Arrian 1.13.2; Plutarch, Alex. 16.1. 
330 Diodorus 17.17.19, it is interesting to note that one of the few historians who use the Diodorus version 
of the battle, Lane Fox, 1973,121, actually denies the debate occurred, even though this version is 
essentially based upon the advice being acted upon 
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acted upon. I believe that such a debate probably did occur, but either way the battle itself 
did not take place until the following morning. The Arrian version clearly comes out of a 
desire to reflect as much glory as possible upon his subject; we should not forget a point 
that I shall return to later, that Ptolemy was fighting in roughly the same area as 
Alexander, the right wing, and so Ptolemy was probably also glorifying his own role in 
the battle, as well as that of the king. 331 
It is at this point that I seriously diverge from most modern accounts of the battle. 
During the night, I propose that the army was divided in two; Parmenio was detached 
from the main body of the army, marched downstream a few kilometres, forded the river, 
which as noted was only 4-5m wide and not deep, and by the morning was in a position 
to fight a land battle such as that described by Diodorus. 332 Devine describes this 
possibility as being "no great hardship", but he rejects the idea of a secondary column on 
wholly unsatisfactory grounds; claiming that Alexander wanted to destroy the Persian 
cavalry and such a manoeuvre would have resulted in a Persian withdrawal. 333 I do not 
see a withdrawal as a realistic option for the Persian nobility; as noted earlier, they were 
(in the eyes of Darius) faced by nothing more than a beardless youth; withdrawal would 
have looked like cowardice. 
It is difficult to determine exactly which units Parmenio would have taken with 
him: we can certainly speculate with reasonable certainty that the Thessalian cavalry 334 
were under his command; Diodorus335 tells us that they won "a great reputation for 
valour" during the fighting and the Arrian version of the battle simply does not allow for 
this 336 It is likely that along with the Thessalians were the Greek allied cavalry under 
Philic, and the Odrysian cavalry under Agathon. 337 These additional units totalled 900 
men, 38 and thus Parmenio commanded 2,700 cavalry. The main problem lies in the 
question of infantry; the taxeis of Meleager and Philip were also under Parmenio's 
overall command. 33 Alexander and Parmenio would have been aware from the scouting 
reports the previous evening, and from the evidence of their own eyes, what the Persian 
dispositions were; and Parmenio would have had a good idea as to the Persian strength in 
Greek mercenaries, given that this was his third campaigning season in Asia Minor. 
Although their numbers were small, around 5,000, cavalry traditionally do not fare well 
331 Badian, 1977,274-5, shows that Arrian concentrated on the heroic picture of Alexander, and that his 
source for this was probably Callisthenes. Indeed he goes further and states (275) that Callisthenes was the 
only eye witness to the battle, although then immediately contradicts himself at 275, n. 16, by saying that 
Ptolemy was also there but only in a junior capacity; more on this important detail later. Badian also adds 
that we can get nothing from Arrian's account about any part of the battle not involving Alexander (286). 
332 This would be something similar, only far less arduous, to what occurred at the Hydaspes in 327. 
333 Devine, 1988,8. 
334 1,800 strong and commanded by Calas, Arrian 1.14.3, confirmed by Diodorus at the crossing of the 
Hellespont 17.17.4; cf. Heckel, 1992,355-7, who notes that Calas had been with the expeditionary force 
since 336 (Diodorus 17.7.10; cf. Polyaenus 5.44.5). 
335 Diodorus 17.21.4. 
336 The Thessalians, and indeed seemingly everyone outside of the immediate vicinity of Alexander, were 
ignored. 
3' Arrian 1.14.3; cf. Heckel, 1992,358-61. 
338 Diodorus 17.17.4; Bosworth, 1980,119. 
339 Arrian 1.14.3; Devine, 1988,5-6. 
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in a direct charge against heavy infantry; some infantry support on the side of the 
Macedonians is, therefore, likely. We are told by Plutarch that at some point "the 
Macedonian phalanx crossed the river and the infantry of both sides joined the battle" Sao 
This could be a garbled account of the taxeis of Meleager and Philip engaging the Greek 
mercenary infantry. Parmenio's force therefore probably consisted of 2,700 cavalry and 
3,000 infantry. 
Physically getting such a small force across a relatively minor river would have 
been no great achievement, certainly not when compared to the later, and very similar, 
crossing in force of the Hydaspes. 34' The Persian response upon learning of the 
Macedonian manoeuvre was, in fact, to do very little; their cavalry remained in place to 
oppose Alexander's crossing; the Greek mercenaries also seem not to have responded, 
other than probably wheeling to face Parmenio, they did not surrender their advantageous 
position on high ground behind the Persian front lines. This lack of movement on the part 
of the Greek mercenaries is one of the things Alexander would have been trying to 
achieve, to fix them in place so they could not interfere with what he always expected to 
be the decisive point of the battle, his attack across the river with the Companion Cavalry. 
Some time early in the morning Alexander began his first encounter with the 
Persians in a very limited way. The first wave consisted only of Socrates' ile, seemingly 
under the command of Ptolemy, followed by Amyntas who appears to have been in 
overall charge of this assault, commanding his prodromoi and Paeonian cavalry and one 
unspecified taxis of infantry. 342 I have already noted above that this infantry taxis is 
interesting: Berve and Badian343 believed it was a unit of hypaspists and Har13 believed 
it was Perdiccas' taxis of heavy infantry, but this is unlikely; given the elasticity of the 
term, it was more probably the Agrianians or perhaps the archers (or both) who were 
actually stationed on the right in front of Alexander's cavalry that formed part of the 
initial attack. '5 
That this initial attack occurred is not in doubt, 346 but why did it involve so few 
troops? The answer is simply that it was never intended to force a crossing of the river; 
the idea was to feign an attack, encourage the Persians to expend their javelins, and then 
retreat in seeming disarray, virtually forcing the Persians to charge into the river bed after 
the fleeing Macedonians, 347 thus relinquishing their valuable defensive position. It is at 
first glance a little surprising that a cavalry unit as valuable as Socrates' He was sacrificed 
in this manner, but Alexander had to persuade the Persians that a full-scale assault was 
under way, involving himself and the Companion Cavalry. 348 If an ile of Companions had 
not been used the Persians might not have taken the bait. 
340 Plutarch Alex. 16.4. 
341 Arrian 5.10.1: 
342 Arrian 1.14.6; Bosworth, 1980,120. 
347 Berve, 1926,2.336; Badian, 1977,289. 
344 Hari, 1997,306. 
345 This is, sensibly, the line taken by Bosworth, 1980,120. 
346 Unless you reject completely Arrian's version as Lane Fox, 1973,122, does. 'a' See Hanson, 1989,180-84, for the victors' desire and instinct to pursue the vanquished. 
348 Devine, 1988,13. 
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After the initial assault had begun, but before its retreat, Alexander and the 
remaining ile of Companions entered the riverbed. Alexander's movements in the 
riverbed are a cause of considerable confusion. He moved his troops obliquely, that is to 
say to left or right rather than straight across; this would essentially have been accepting 
another piece of Parmenio's advice, that Alexander ran the risk of exiting the stream in 
column if he did not cross obliquely. This oblique movement was partly designed to 
extend the Macedonian frontage so that as many troops as possible could emerge 
simultaneously at the appropriate time from the 100m wide gravel beds reported b1 
Foss 3`19 The direction of the movement, however, is the problem, as noted earlier. 3 
NO 
Arrian's text351 does clearly state that the movement was "in the direction the stream 
drew them", 352 and thus was indeed downstream and to the left. 
As the advance force was retreating in seeming disarray, with the Persians sensing 
victory and in pursuit, Alexander with his usual consummate timing attacked the 
disordered Persians from their left; this is why the text of Arrian with the downstream 
movement seems more reliable than Polyaenus' movement away from the battle. 
Bosworth353 sees Arrian as being unreliable at this point, he sees a retreating advance 
force causing "immense confusion" in the river bed, but we should remember that 
Alexander entered the river probably a few hundred metres upstream of where the 
Socrates attack took place, so Socrates' retreat was not into Alexander's advance; 
Alexander was moving downstream towards Socrates and not following on behind him. 
This attack by Alexander is, as I hope to demonstrate throughout this thesis, one of 
Alexander's hallmark strategies, attacking an enemy from more than one direction; he 
does this during virtually every successful battle and siege throughout his career. 
The battle in the riverbed was brief and vicious, with the combat quickly being 
transferred to the bank. Har1354 is probably right in that this phase of the battle the defeat 
of the Persian cavalry came quickly; he estimates no more than twenty minutes of 
fighting. Whilst we can never of course be sure of the exact timescale, a short battle is the 
most likely. The Persians would probably have fled quickly after seeing several of their 
leading commanders slain in quick succession. 355 
349 Foss, 1977,485, ßj, Polybius, 12.18.4, estimate that each cavalry trooper required 0.91 m in close 
formation, Badian, 1977,282, n. 39, calculates that a 100m gravel slope could accommodate 100 cavalry 
troops. 
350 Polyaenus Strat. 4.3.16. Hammond, 1980,75, translates Arrian 1.14.7 as "continually extending his 
formation at an angle where the stream was pulling", but agrees with Polyaenus that this was upstream and 
to the right: this makes little sense; anything in the stream that was being pulled by the current would surely 
have been pulled downstream and to the left. Hammond does concede at 1980,76, that the purpose of this 
manoeuvre escapes him; this is no doubt because he misunderstands the manoeuvre itself. 
351 Arrian 1.14.7. 
352 Bosworth, 1980,122; Devine, 1988,13, also believes that the movement was to the left, claiming Arrian 
is more reliable than Polyaenus on this point. 
353 Bosworth, 1980,122. 
354 Hari, 1997,305; Badian, 1977,290, adds that all of the Persian missiles would have been expended 
against Socrates' attack, thus making Alexander's task a little easier. 3I have discussed the details of this part of the battle in the section on Arrian above; nothing more needs 
saying at this point. 
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After the Persian cavalry broke, Plutarch356 tells us of an engagement between the 
Macedonian heavy infantry and some native Persian infantry, which did not last long. 
These Persians are something of a mystery; they are not mentioned in Diodorus' Persian 
order of battle. 357 Badian argued that some native infantry are to be expected and that 
they played the role of a tactical reserve358 stationed behind the cavalry, showing shrewd 
planning and a sound strategy from the Persians. 359 The main problem is that the text of 
Arrian360 does seem to imply quite clearly that the light infantry were Greek, fighting on 
the side of Alexander and intermingled with his cavalry. 361 Badian's point about 
expecting some Persian infantry is reasonable, but not conclusive. Simply because we 
expect something does not make it so. 
Persian cavalry casualties were low, around 1,000 in Arrian, 2,000 in Diodorus or 
2,500 in Plutarch. 362 Persian casualties were low because Alexander now turned his 
attention to the Greek mercenaries who had been fighting against Parmenio's Thessalians 
and two heavy infantry taxeis. The extra troops' joining the battle was decisive; the 
Greeks were surrounded and annihilated. 363 Plutarch364 tells us of a lengthy battle against 
the mercenaries, and in this could be preserving a hint of the earlier battle against 
Parmenio that Alexander joined after the defeat of the cavalry. 
To sum up, I envisage Parmenio and the troops under his command being 
detached during the night, marching upstream a few miles and crossing so that at dawn 
the following day he was in a position to attack the Greek mercenaries, or whoever the 
Persians sent to oppose him, thus fighting the Diodorus `dry land' battle. Alexander 
attacked across the river and routed the Persian cavalry, thus fighting the Arrian river 
crossing; the fight against the mercenaries lasted the longer and was still being ongoing 
when Alexander had routed the Persian cavalry; he thus did not pursue them but turned 
his attention to the mercenaries, destroying them at a heavy cost to his Macedonians. The 
idea of Alexander using a flanking strategy at every opportunity is again demonstrated 
here on a grand scale. 
Why Two Accounts? 
We should end this chapter by discussing why each of our sources only gave a 
part of the whole, starting with Arrian. Badian 365 suggests that Callisthenes may have 
356 Plutarch Alex. 16.12; Hamilton, 1969,41 argued that the Persians had no native infantry at all. 
357 Diodorus 17.19.4. 
358 Badian, 1977,185, n. 36; n. 46, argued this is also what occurred at Centrites in 401. 
359 Badian, 1977,292. 
360 Arrian 1.16.1. 
361 Bosworth, 1980,124; Devine also sees them as Hamippoi, light infantry who fought alongside cavalry. 
362 AXian 1.16.2; Diodorus 17.21.6; Plutarch Alex. 16.15 (following Aristobulus). 
363 man 1.16.2; Devine, 1988,9, argues that the Greek mercenaries must have been few in number, 
probably no more than 5,000, as the Macedonians would not have been capable of surrounding any more 
than this. 
364 Plutarch Alex. 16.13-14; Bosworth, 1980,124-5. 
365 Badian, 1977,275. 
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been the only source to have produced an eyewitness account, 366 and we can be 
reasonably sure that Callisthenes was Arrian's source for at least the debate with 
Parmenio. 367 Callisthenes is known to have been hostile to Parmenio and is probably the 
source of the five dialogues between Alexander and the old general that show him as 
being overly cautious against Alexander's youthful heroism. We also know that Arrian 
used Aristobulus, and Bosworth says that he was used frequently between 1.12.8 and 
1.14.4.368 Arrian, of course, also used Ptolemy: key to Ptolemy's account of the battle is 
his location, if I am correct that the Ptolemy son of Philip mentioned by Arrian 369 is a 
mistake, 370 either by Arrian of one of his many sources, and this was in fact Ptolemy son 
of Lagus, then his location precludes him from having any great knowledge of any part of 
the battlefield other than the area where he fought . 
371 Badian372 seems to dismiss the 
importance of Ptolemy's account of the Granicus given that he was only a junior officer 
at the time, but it is precisely this "junior capacity" (along with his location) that led to 
Arrian's account that ignored the part of the battle in which he was not a participant, i. e. 
that fought on dry land by the Thessalians. He would also not have access to any 
meetings that would have taken place between Alexander and the senior commanders that 
would have given him any knowledge of events. Further to this, by emphasising the 
assault across the river he is glorifying not only Alexander's part in the battle, but his 
own as well. 373 
We know so far, then, that Arrian used Callisthenes, Aristobulus and Ptolemy. We 
also know that Polyaenus'374 account clearly did not have the same source as did that of 
Diodorus, given the manoeuvre in the riverbed; Hammond believes that Polyaenus' 
source is "almost certainly Cleitarchus". 375 Hammond has, 376 however, also stated that 
Diodorus' source is most likely to be Cleitarchus, and both statements cannot be true. If 
Polyaenus' source was Cleitarchus, then the question of who Diodorus' source was for 
this part of his narrative is probably insoluble: Pearson notes that there are over twenty 
distinct names of contemporary sources on Alexander listed by Jacoby, 377 and we do not 
have enough information to narrow it down. I think it likely that Diodorus' source was in 
366 Although he confusingly concedes, 1977,275 n. 16, that Ptolemy was also present. 
367 Contra Hammond, 1996,40, believes that Arrian largely followed Ptolemy and Plutarch largely 
followed Aristobulus. 
36S Bosworth, 1980,115. Cf. pp. 16-17 above. 
369 Arrian 1.14.6. 
370 There are a number of mistakes preserved within Arrian's account of the Macedonian order of battle. 
Socrates is omitted as commander of his own ile, only to appear in exactly that capacity a few lines later at 
1.15.1. Philip the taxiarch is mentioned twice, as is Craterus. And given that there is also a second Philip, 
commander of the allied Greek cavalry (1.14.3), it is not beyond the realms of possibility that Arrian may 
have made another mistake by making this Ptolemy son of Philip. 
371 Even if the Ptolemy in question was not the historian, it is still likely that he was stationed with the 
Companion Cavalry on the right and would still have had little or no knowledge of the rest of the battle. 
372 Badian, 1977,275, n. 16. 
373 Pearson, 1960,204 notes that Ptolemy did like to emphasize his own involvement in events and further 
(200) that he actually leaves events out that he did not participate in and thus had no knowledge of; he does 
not describe the bridge over the Indus for example. 
374 Hammond, 1996,39. 
375 Diodorus 17.19.3ff. Hammond, 1996,16f, 23f, 26. 
376 Hammond, 1983,20ff. 
377 Pearson, 1960,22. 
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fact Cleitarchus and that Polyaenus was perhaps using Ptolemy or Aristobulus, either of 
whom would have resulted in a similar narrative to that of Arrian. The fact that 
Cleitarchus was living in Alexandria under the rule of Ptolemy does not preclude him 
from having written an account that was less flattering of Ptolemy than he would have 
liked, especially if Pearson378 is right that Cleitarchus published after Ptolemy's death. 
In summary then, Arrian's river crossing was to be found in Ptolemy, Aristobulus 
and Callisthenes, as well as Polyaenus, 379 Diodorus' account of a dry land battle was 
found probably only in Cleitarchus. 




































































































































































































Miletus and Halicarnassus: 334 
Miletus 
The location of Miletus presented Alexander with a significant logistical problem: 
it was a coastal city and also located on a peninsula jutting into the Latmian gulf . 
380 
Arrian implies that the city was essentially divided into two separate areas, an inner and 
outer city. It would seem that the inner city was protected by a wall, but over time 
Miletus had outgrown this area and had spilled over the wall; the area of the outer city 
was abandoned without a fight by the Milesians, implying that it was relatively 
indefensible 381 The Persian commander, Hegesistratus, was supported by a Persian fleet 
numbering 400 warships; 382 his initial offer of submission was withdrawn upon sighting 
the fleet off Halicarnassus. However large the Persian fleet was, they arrived too late, and 
as a result had to take up a position off Mt. Mycale. Nicanor, commander of Alexander's 
Greek fleet of 160 ships, 38 had arrived three days before the Persians and anchored his 
vessels off the Milesian coast at the island of Lade; in the process transporting "the 
Tluacians and about 4,000 other mercenaries to the island" 384 
At this time Alexander had only a small part of his army with him, no more than 
around 10,000, consisting of the "remainder of the infantry, the archers, the Agrianians, 
the Thracian horse, the agema of the Companions and three others in addition". 385 We 
know of two expeditions sent out at Ephesus, one commanded by Parmenio and the other 
by Alcimachus, totalling around 10,000 men; 386 this leaves the hypaspists, 2,000 heavy 
infantry, four of the eight ilai of Companion Cavalry, the prodromoi and the Illyrian 
allies and mercenaries unaccounted for, perhaps 15-20,000 troops in all. It would seem 
that Alexander had a number of other expeditionary columns active at this time, of which 
we know nothing, unless Arrian's figures are defective. 387 
Before the siege began in earnest we have a debate between Parmenio and 
Alexander as to the wisdom of offering a naval battle. This is significantly different from 
the other such debates: 388 here Alexander is portrayed as the pragmatic party in 
opposition to Parmenio's rash and impetuous suggestion. Lane Fox389 considered 
Parmenio's advice, if it was ever in fact offered, as being impossibly foolhardy. It is 
380 Bosworth, 1980,136. Today the ruins of Miletus lie some 10km from the sea, this is due to the mouth of 
the Maeander River has silted up over the centuries. 381 Arrian 1.18.3. 
382 As against Alexander's 160, Arrian 1.18.5. 
383 Hammond, 1992,39. 
384 Arrian 1.18.7. 
385 Arrian 1.18.3 
386 Arrian 1.18.1. 
387 Bosworth, 1980,136. 
388 Arrian 1.13.2 (Granicus), 2.25.2-3 (Euphrates), 3.10.1-2 (Gaugamela) and 3.18.12 (Persepolis). 
389 Lane Fox, 1973,132. 
65 
perhaps unwise to pass judgment on Parmenio at this point as we have no indication as to 
exactly what plan he proposed, although it would probably have been more sophisticated 
than a simply battle between all available forces. '`'° Alexander's fleet was outnumbered 
400/2? 0'"1 but it is probable that he rejected the idea, not out of fear of Persian numerical 
superiority but because he had no experience of naval warfare: a defeat would have 
been disastrous in Greece. '`' and his fleet's present position at Lade meant the capture of 
tiletus xý ould he much easier than if the Persians could be re-supplied by sea. 
Figure 9: Miletus and the island of Lade, instrumental in Alexander's blockade of the city. 
Bosworth. 1990.139. 
Hammond. 1992.39. points out that Alexander possessed two fleets, 160 ships provided by the League 
of Corinth. (the "Greek fleet") commanded by Nicanor, and a Macedonian fleet of 60 ships commanded by 






The proposal of Glaucippus to make Miletus a free city was rejected by 
Alexander: 39 he could do no other; his objective was to remove the Persian fleet as a 
threat, and leaving a port for it to use would have been unacceptable. Diodorus395 tells us 
of a period of combat before the siege engines were brought up, during which the 
besieged easily defended themselves; although there is no hint of this in Arrian, it is quite 
possible that the siege train was late in arriving or took time to assemble. 
By land Alexander supervised the use of the siege engines, and in a very short 
time had knocked down part of the walls, at which point a joint assault was made by land 
and sea and the city was captured relatively easily. 396 Arrian gives a very truncated 
picture of the siege, concentrating on the final day or so and ignoring the earlier 
unsuccessful attacks mentioned by Diodorus. The strategy employed by Alexander of 
attacking the enemy from more than one direction simultaneously was used again here 
and will be repeated constantly throughout his career. 
The capture of Miletus should have made it clear to Alexander that the possession 
of a relatively powerful fleet, even one half the size of that of the Persians, could have a 
major impact even if he was not willing to offer a naval battle, making Alexander's 
subsequent decision to disband it all the more puzzling. Arrian gives us five reasons: 397 
1. Lack of money398 
2. The Persian navy was far superior to his own. 
3. Alexander was unwilling to risk any losses, in ships or men, in a naval 
engagement. 
4. Alexander believed that he no longer needed a fleet as he was now "master of the 
continent" 
5. He intended to defeat the Persian navy on land by depriving it of its ports. 
Lack of money is the reason most commonly accepted by modem historians as the 
major factor in Alexander's decision; it is also one of only two reasons cited by 
Diodorus 399 This conclusion is flawed for two reasons, though. Firstly the fleet was 
supplied by the member states of the League of Corinth; it is therefore reasonable to 
assume that the cost of their upkeep would also fall on these states and not on Alexander. 
The fleet would, effectively, have cost him almost nothing to maintain, although we 
should bear in mind that if the allies were bearing the cost then they might have become 
restive if forced to serve for longer than they expected (tying into the disloyalty issue 
below). Secondly, Alexander should not have been short of funds at this point. Just a few 
months later at Gordium, during the winter of 334/3, Alexander invested 500 talents on 
394 Arrian 1.19.1. 
395 Diodorus 17.22.2. 
396 Arrian 1.19.2-4. 
397 Arrian 1.20.1. The following section relies heavily on Bosworth, 1980,141ff. 
398 See Serrati, 2007,463-4, for a general discussion on the state of the Macedonian treasury at the time of 
Alexander's accession. 
399 Diodorus 17.22.5, the other being that he believed his troops would fight all the harder if deprived of 
any means of escape. 
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raising a new fleet and 600 talents were allotted to pay for the upkeep of garrisons on the 
Greek mainland. 400 There seems no reason why Alexander's financial position should 
have improved so drastically in just a few short months. 
Arrian is correct to say that the Persian fleet was superior to Alexander's, both in 
numbers and quality. This is not a reason to demobilise the fleet, however, as this would 
leave the islands and the mainland defenceless. Miletus had also shown Alexander that a 
fleet was tactically useful, even if he did not offer a naval battle to the Persians. This lack 
of quality and numbers would be more of an argument for increasing investment in the 
fleet, rather than ridding himself of it. 
Points two and three are certainly linked, Alexander was unwilling to offer a 
naval battle because of the potential ramifications. If he had chosen a naval battle, his 
strategy would almost certainly have involved a heavy reliance on marines, most likely 
the hypaspists, and he could not risk their loss as they were a vital component of the land 
campaign. Any defeat could also have caused political unrest back in Greece too. 
The suggestion by Arrian that Alexander did not need a fleet, as he already 
controlled the whole continent, is extraordinary and demonstrably untrue. Even if we take 
Arrian to be referring to Asia Minor, rather than the whole of Asia, then it still was 
nowhere near true. Besides, as Bosworth points out, 401 there was now nothing stopping 
the Persians from attacking Alexander's forces in the rear, which in fact they did at 
Tenedos 402 This was a tactic that should have been employed far more effectively than it 
ever was by the Persians. 
This strategy of defeating the Persian navy on land is famous, and on the surface, 
fairly sound. In the ancient world, warships could not carry any great quantity of supplies 
and so had to dock at a friendly port every night to re-supply with food and fresh water. It 
is also true that this strategy ultimately worked; the Persian fleet did collapse as 
Alexander captured key cities on the Phoenician coast, but the strategy had at least two 
serious flaws. The first was that a competent commander, as Memnon surely was, had a 
free hand to act as he wished in the Aegean, to overrun all of the islands and carry the 
fight to the mainland, where several states would more than likely have revolted given the 
opportunity. Secondly it does not take any account of the fact that a significant portion of 
the Persian fleet was from Cyprus, which would theoretically have been unaffected by 
Alexander's strategy; although these ships would still have needed mainland ports in 
order to operate, they would still be loyal to the Persians and able to harass Alexander's 
supply lines. Alexander essentially relied upon luck to overcome these two problems, 
which was uncharacteristic. His planning was usually far more meticulous than this and 
his strategies were well thought out; which leads me to conclude that his decision here 
was not a purely tactical or strategic one, but something else. 
'0° Curtius 3.1.19-20. 
401 Bosworth, 1980,142. 
402 Arrian 2.2.3. 
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If the decision to disband the fleet was not taken on military grounds, nor was it 
forced upon him by lack of funds or any of the other reasons Arrian gives, why did he 
make this decision? I suspect that the truth lies in something that Arrian comes close to 
mentioning. He points out that any loss in battle could lead to disaffection and potential 
rebellion at home, bringing up the question of loyalty. The allied troops with the army 
were loyal to Alexander, although this could have been because of a fear of reprisals at 
home if they were not. It could also have been because of the presence of thousands of 
heavily armed, battle-hardened Macedonians. The fleet, of course, would very quickly 
have been far away from the location of the king or the army, Alexander's personality 
and influence would have had far less of an impact on them and the opportunity for 
disloyalty would have been exponentially greater and far easier to act upon. They would 
also have had a motive for disloyalty if they were serving at their own expense. The fact 
that he retained the twenty Athenian vessels403 is an indication that he wanted to try to 
retain some specifically Athenian hostages'404 but 160 total vessels was too great a risk. 
We should also note here, as earlier, that Alexander in fact possessed two fleets, 
that of the League of Corinth which was now disbanded, and that from Macedonia 
numbering 60 ships 405 Hammond406 notes that there is no possibility of Alexander having 
dismissed all of his fleet as he needed to maintain control of the Hellespont to maintain 
his own lines of supply and communication with Macedonia, but also to keep open the 
corn-route from the Black Sea which was essential to the Greek states and especially 
Athens. 407 
Halicamassus 
In accordance with his new policy of defeating the Persian navy on land, 
Alexander now set off for Halicamassus; Memnon and the survivors from the Granicus, 
as well as Ephialtes the Athenian, had gathered there to oppose the Macedonian advance. 
Together with this, the Persian fleet was anchored in the harbour, 408 ensuring that it 
would be a simple matter to re-supply the city. The city itself was exceptionally strong, 
possessing three citadels; the original acropolis to the north-west, Salmacis to the south- 
west and the Island of Zephyria to the south 409 The circuit of the walls followed the 
natural topography and incorporated a salient in the north-eastern corner; 410 outside the 
walls was a moat, 30 cubits wide and 15 deep. 4 Aeneas Tacticus tells us the primary 
purpose of such a moat was to prevent mining operations 412 
403 Diodorus 17.22.5. 
404 Green, 1991,157, notes that all Alexander ever got from Athens were these 20 vessels along with 200 
cavalry; these 20 vessels and their crew, then, were important hostages against the good behaviour of 
Athens. 
405 Cf. p. 66, fn. 391. 
406 Hammond, 1992,38, n. 31. 
407 Atkinson, 1980,92, notes a few ships mentioned by Curtius 3.1.19 at the Hellespont. 
408 Arrian 1.20.2-3; Diodours 17.23.4ff. 
409 Arian 1.20.3; Strabo 14.2.17; cf. Bosworth, 1980,143-4. 
""Bosworth, 1980,144. 
41 Arrian 1.20.8. Ashley, 1998,206; equates this to 14m wide and 7m deep, it position is illustrated in fig. 
10p. 70. 











Figure 10: Diagram of Halicarnassus illustrating the defensive moat and Alexander's camp. 
Once Alexander arrived at the city he made camp around half a mile to the east 
near a bay that could be used by supply ships bringing in food, water and the siege 
train; 413 although this would not have occurred frequently given the presence of the 
Persian fleet. An initial reconnaissance mission towards the city was met with a sortie by 
the defenders, and a barrage of missile fire from artillery pieces stationed along the walls 
and towers. 14 Given his current lack of a siege train, which he had left behind at Miletus, 
he moved to the west of Halicarnassus to assault the ciV of Myndus, believing that its 
capture would make the siege of Halicarnassus easier. 
41 Alexander was also under the 
impression that the city would be given over to him by traitors within; this did not occur, 
leaving him exposed between Halicarnassus and Myndus, without a siege train, but with 
significant number of troops. 16 Without any artillery pieces Alexander's only choice was 
to attempt to undermine the walls, the first time in his career he had attempted such a 
413 Kern, 1999,204. 
414 Sian 1.20.4; not mentioned in Diodorus. 
'15 Arrian 1.20.5f. Bosworth, 1980,144, notes Myndus was at least 16km west of Halicarnassus and its 
capture could not have seriously helped the Macedonians. 
416 Arrlan 1.205, states Alexander had with him the Companion Cavalry, three taxeis of heavy infantry and 
the Agrianians and archers. This suggests that at least one of the secondary columns sent out at Ephesus 
had returned. 
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tactic; it was partially successful, bringing down one tower, 417 but reinforcements brought 
from Halicarnassus by sea ended the brief encounter418 with Alexander returniný to 
Halicarnassus to find his siege train had eluded the Persian navy and arrived by sea. at 
The siege now began in earnest with the Macedonians attempting to fill in the 
moat, with the aid of mobile sheds constructed specially, 420 to facilitate the approach of 
the siege towers and rams to the walls 421 Two towers and a section of the walls 
collapsed422 and the defenders responded by launching an unsuccessful night sortie to 
bum the siege towers 423 Perhaps the following night, two drunken solders from 
Perdiccas' taxis made some kind of approach to the city, and were killed by missile fire 
from the defenders, some of whom began shooting at the rest of the encamped 
Macedonians. Perdiccas ordered more troops to join the fray, as did Memnon, and 
considerable confusion ensued. Arrian tells us that Alexander could have broken into the 
city at this point but sounded the withdrawal . 
424 The Diodorus425 version of events is 
considerably briefer, and whilst Arrian represents it as an almost total success with the 
city coming close to falling, Diodorus has it as an unqualified defeat 426 
The following day the defenders made another sortie, burning the mantlets427 and 
one of the siege towers before being driven back to the city, when Alexander brought up 
reinforcements. A few days later, as Alexander brought his engines up to assault the inner 
curtain wall that had been constructed after the collapse of the outer wall, Memnon 
organised yet another sally, this time in two parts. Firstly some defenders428 attacked 
towards the siege engines and those manning them. As Memnon apparently planned, this 
drew in more of the Macedonians, at which point he made his second attack from the 
Tripylon gate429 and fell upon the flank of the Macedonians. The attacks were supported 
by a 45m tower constructed by Memnon and filled with archers, javelin-throwers and 
artillery pieces. Considerable damage was done to the siege equipment but eventually the 
Macedonians got the upper hand, the city again came close to falling but again Alexander 
failed to press the attack. 430 Arrian presents this sortie by the defenders as being 
something of a failure: the Macedonians drove them back easily and doused the fires they 
set, quickly. 431 Diodorus' version is rather different: the Macedonians had much the 
worse of the fighting and the day was only saved by some of Philip's veterans joining the 
417 Arrian 1.20.6-7. 
418 Arrian 1.20.7. The Myndus episode is not mentioned in Diodorus; the early part of the siege in Diodorus 
is represented as a continuous series of unsuccessful assaults on the walls. 
4'9 Green, 1991,196; Kern, 1999,206. 
420 Diodorus 17.24.4. These were the so called mantlets mentioned below. 
421 Marsden, 1969,101. Arrian 1.20.8; Diodorus 17.24.5. 
422 Diodorus, 17.24.5; Arrian 1.21.4. 
423 Diodorus, 17.24.5; Arrian 1.20.9-10. 
424 Arrian 1.21.4. 
4' Diodorus 17.25.5-6. 
426 Bosworth, 1980,145. 
427 The defensive screens mentioned above, cf. Polybius 9.41.3. 
428 Diodorus 17.26.1-27.4 has the first led by Ephialtes the Athenian. 
429 Arnan 1.22.1-4. 
430 flan 1.22.7. 
431 man 1.22.1-2. 
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battle and killing Ephialtes in the process 432 These tactics employed by Memnon are very 
reminiscent of Alexander's tactics throughout his career; drawing an enemy onto ground 
of his choosing and then launching a flanking attack. 
After this sortie Memnon decided to abandon the main part of the city and 
concentrate his forces in the two citadels that were still in Persian hands 433 Alexander 
then left Ptolemy, 434 along with 200 cavalry and 3,000 mercenaries, to complete the 
capture of the remainder of the city whilst he headed to Gordium. 435 
Conclusion 
There are two separate accounts of Halicarnassus, those of Diodorus and Arrian. 
Diodorus certainly presents this campaign as the least impressive of Alexander's career, 
although Arrian is less negative. Even in Arrian, however, Halicarnassus is far from an 
overwhelming success; still we find the undisciplined soldiers of Perdiccas' taxis and still 
we find Alexander being taken by surprise by Ephialtes' sortie, as well as the lack of 
protection for his siege engines and towers. Innovation throughout the whole siege was 
typically a reaction to the actions of Memnon and Ephialtes in both traditions 436 Whilst it 
is true that he was, to a point, successful, he only captured part of the city and did not 
deprive the Persian navy of its base; that was ultimately left to Ptolemy. In contrast to 
Alexander's shortcomings, Memnon and Ephialtes showed themselves to be commanders 
of the highest order. Memnon successfully sealed breaches in the walls where they 
occurred, he constructed a huge tower from which to shower the attackers with missiles 
and he conducted a series of sorties that always had Alexander on the back foot whilst 
Ephialtes led the first sortie with distinction. With hindsight Alexander was certainly 
successful in the capture of Halicarnassus, and it did not take too long, for which he 
should be congratulated; we can also say that he learned tough lessons from his mistakes 
here that he was to put into practice during later sieges (i. e. Tyre and Gaza). We can also 
say that Alexander was certainly lucky Memnon died when he did. 
432 Diodorus 17.26.5-7. 
433 Arrian 1.23.1; although Diodorus 17.25.5, has most of the defenders evacuating to Cos. 
434 This was not the famous son of Lagus, the historian; but another rather more obscure individual. 
435 Sian 1.23.6. 
436 Ashley, 1998,210. 
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Chapter 4 
The Campaign of Issus: 333, 
Introduction 
It is the intention of this thesis to discuss, where appropriate, questions of strategy 
as well as tactics. The campaign of Issus presents us with an excellent opportunity to 
examine the strategies employed by both participants in the lead up to the battle. In order 
to fully appreciate these strategies, however, we must first discuss the topography of the 
region. 
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Figure 11: Alexander's early campaigns. 
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General Topography of Cilicia437 
Cilicia is encircled on three sides by mountain ranges, and on the fourth is the sea, 
making access to the central plain difficult if opposed. To the north and west is the 
Taurus range which forms the boundary with Cappadocia, Lycaonia and Pamphylia. 
There are four significant passes through the Taurus and northern Amanus mountains. 
West of Issus lies the Kara Kapu pass, and to the north the Kalekoy pass through the 
Taurus Mountains. North-east of the Kalekoy pass lies the Hasanbayli pass and just to the 
north of this is the Bahce pass over the Amanus Mountains. To the east of the central 
plain lies the Amanus range, which forms an almost impenetrable barrier, given the 
scarcity of passes. At the southern end of the plain are the "other gates" which Parmenio 
was sent to occupy (see below). These "other gates" consist of the Merkes Su, a pass 
between the mountains and the sea through which runs a river of the same name. The 
Pillar of Jonah lies immediately to the south of this and the Beilan pass lies 16km south- 
east of Iskanderun, 438 and leads over the high central areas of the Amanus mountains 
leading away from the coast 439 The plain of Cilicia was `-`proverbially fertile""° and was 
a major contributor to the Achaemenid treasury. The fertility of the plain, along with the 
proximity to the sea, meant that Alexander would not have to worry about his supply 
lines for a little while. "' 
Initial Movements - Alexander 
After an advance of 50 stadia in a single day, 442 Alexander conducted a daring 
night march which forced passage through the so called "Cilician Gates", 443 probably the 
modem Kalekoy pass . 
444 Alexander then entered Cilicia, 445 which was to become his base 
of operations for the next several months. After forcing the pass, Alexander arrived at 
Tarsus before Arsames, the Persian commander of the region. Apparently Alexander had 
feared that Arsames would institute a scorched earth policy such as had been advocated 
by Memnon before the Granicus. 446 After failing to secure Tarsus, however, Arsames 
437 Much of the topographical information is taken from Devine, 1985a, 26. 
438 A little to the east of the Pillar of Jonah. 
439 For an interesting modern account of the region see Stark, 1958,3-13. 
440 Bosworth, 1988,55. 
441 This assumes that some ships were maintained by Alexander when he' disbanded the majority of his 
fleet, as argued in ch. 2 above (p. 65-69). 
442 Curtius 3.4.1-2, from the camp of Cyrus, where Alexander had paused, to the Cilician Gates was 
apparently 50 stadia. 
3 Arrian 2.4.3-4: the defenders evidently fled as soon as the advance was detected. 
44° Although Munson, 1972,402, argues for a pass known as the Kulek-Bogazi, almost certainly the same 
V ss, leading from Cappadocia to Cilicia and being the direct route from Ancyra. 
Probably around the end of May, assuming no earlier delay at Gordium or Ancyra. We know he reunited 
the army at Gordium around the end of April and it would seem that the journey from Gordium to Tarsus 
would not take more than a month. Given that the battle occurred at the end of October/ beginning of 
November, this leaves five months that Alexander spent in Cilicia; again, as in the Balkans, this was no 
l htning campaign. Cf. Munson, 1972,404. 
Arrian 2.4.5; Curtius 3.4.3. Arsames had been one of the Persian commanders at the Granicus: cf. Green 
1991,221. 
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appears to have withdrawn from the region entirely, with little or no damage being 
caused. ` 47 
Whilst at Tarsus Alexander fell seriously ill: the result of a swim in the freezing 
waters of the Cyndus River. ` 48 The illness apparently incapacitated him for several 
weeks, and was only cured after Philip the Acarnanianý49 administered a drastic purge, 
despite a letter of warning from Parmenio that Philip had been bribed to poison 
Alexander. The historicity of the letter has been questioned by Berve450 on the grounds 
that, according to Arrian's narrative, Parmenio was still in camp at the time. Bosworth45' 
suggests, probably correctly, that Parmenio had already been sent south to occupy the 
passes out of Cilicia (see below). In fact, the army had probably been divided as it passed 
through the Cilician Gates, Alexander taking a small contingent to Tarsus with Parmenio 
taking most of the rest south. There would have been little opportunity after the forcing of 
the pass to have organised such a division, especially if Alexander's illness was as serious 
as seems to be indicated in our sources. 452 The exact chronology of Parmenio's mission is 
difficult, but important in understanding the overall strategy of the campaign. Diodorus453 
tells us that he was sent out as news was received that Darius was only a few days away. 
This sim4ply cannot be true, as it would seem that Parmenio spent several weeks, perhaps 
a month, 5 in Cilicia before returning to Castabalum to report to Alexander. 
Once Alexander had recovered his health, after an unspecified delay, he marched 
south-west to Anchialus and Soli, where he levied a fine of 200 silver talents upon the 
inhabitants for their loyalty to Persia. Whilst at Soli Alexander took three taxeis of heavy 
infantry, the Agrianians and archers, and conducted a seven-day campaign against hill 
tribesmen in the so called "Rough Cilicia" region: 455 Alexander at this point was 
evidently not worried about the location of Darius. Upon his return to Soli, 456 he further 
447 Withdrawn - although Arrian used the term "fled" rather pejoratively 2.4.6. Arian 2.4.6; Curtius 3.4.14, 
states that the Persian defenders were in the process of burning the city as Alexander's light armed troops 
arrived, the fires being quickly extinguished. 
448 Plutarch Alex. 19.2-9; Diodorus 17.31.4-6; Curtius 3.5.1-6; Justin 9.8.3-9; Arrian 2.4.7-11. 
449 Bosworth, 1988,55. Arrian 2.4.8, makes it clear that Philip was a Companion and had a military as well 
as a medical background cf. Bosworth, 1980,191. Curtius 3.6.1 adds that he had been a boyhood friend of 
Alexander. 
450 Berve, 1926,2.388. 
451 Bosworth, 1980,191. 
452 An indication of the seriousness of the illness can perhaps be taken from the flight of Harpalus. Intrigues 
between the leading generals would have been rife at this time and it is entirely possible that Harpalus fled 
in fear for his life in the event of Alexander's death, The fact that Harpalus lived in the Megarid for nearly a 
year apparently without fear of extradition, and the fact that he was welcomed back by Alexander without 
punishment indicates that he probably committed no crime. Contra, Badian, 1960,245-6, who believed that 
Alexander relieved Harpalus in order to divide the administration of the treasury between two people, much 
as he did with command of the Companion Cavalry after the death of Philotas, although this was in a later 
period, after Alexander had become somewhat paranoid and feared one person having that much power 
again. Lane Fox, 1973,164 with 519; 411 with 542, proposed that Harpalus was on a "secret mission" to 
watch the political situation in Greece. Cf. Green, 1991,222 
453 Diodorus 17.32.2. 
454 Curtius 3.7.5-7; Arrian 2.6.1. 
455 Arrian 2.5.5-6. 
456 Where he heard of the fall of the final two citadels of Halicarnassus., Arrian 2.5.7. 
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divided the army: 457 Philotas, with the cavalry, was sent on to the river Pyramus, through 
the Aleian plain; 458 Alexander himself marched to Magarsus with the hypaspists and the 
agema of Companions. Magarsus submitted without incident; 459 Alexander then marched 
north-east to Mallus. It was while Alexander was encamped at Mallus that he received 
news that Darius was two days march away at Sochi. 460 Before we discuss the immediate 
and future strategy of the two armies we must solidify the timeline and discuss the 
general topography of the region. 
We know that Parmenio was sent south, before Alexander occupied Tarsus, to 
capture the Issus plain and the passes leading out of Cilicia to the south, specifically the 
Pillar of Jonah and the Beilan Pass: 461 but we must now establish the timeline for Darius' 
arrival at Sochi and his occupation of the aforementioned southern passes. This is no easy 
task given that none of our sources actually synchronise Alexander's movements with 
those of Darius. We know from Curtius that the Persian contingents from the furthest 
parts of the empire were not summoned because of Darius' great haste. No source gives a 
date for Darius' march from Babylon, but Curtius462 mentions that Darius only decided to 
fight in person once news was received of Memnon's death. We know that Memnon died 
whilst besieging Mytilene; 463 this is likely to have been mid summer 333,464 and we 
should allow until the end of July for news to reach Darius at Babylon 465 Darius had to 
cover around 966km466 from Babylon to Sochi. We have no data on the Persian rate of 
march, but we do know that Alexander's whole army marched from Babylon to Susa467 at 
a rate of 19.8kmpd. 468 If Darius marched at the same rate this would mean covering 
966km in 49 days. Darius' army was, however, rather larger and vastly more encumbered 
than Alexander's; 469 thus if we should assume a slower march rate of, say, 15kmpd 
Darius' army would cover the ground to Sochi in 64 days, or approximately two 
months 470 If Darius marched out immediately upon hearing of the death of Memnon, 
therefore, he would have arrived at Sochi at approximately the end of September. 
457 Much of which was with Parmenio in the region of Issus at this time. 
458 Arrian 2.5.8. 
459 Interestingly Mallus was not fined, unlike Soli, no doubt because it was in a strategically far more 
sensitive area. 
460 Arrian 2.6.1. 
461 Lonsdale, 2007,80-1, argues that Alexander's dominant strategic concern was to prevent the Persians 
from using their fleet to land troops in the rear of his army: this is surely not the case as the Persians were 
inland, rather than on the coast, and this tactic was not a major part of Persian warfare. The theory is, I 
believe, the result of applying modern tactical thinking to the ancient world, an unsound practice. 
462 Curtius 3.2.1-9. 
463 Arrian 2.1.3; although Diodorus 17.29.4 places his death after the capture of Mytilene. 
464 Bosworth, 1988,53. 
465 A reasonably short period of time, but plausible, given that news could be carried by sea to the 
Phoenician coast, and then quickly by land to Babylon. 
466 Murison, 1972,406. 
467 Similar terrain than from Babylon to Sochi. 
468 Arrian 3.16.7, for Alexander's march rates table see Engels, 1978,153. kmpd = km per day. 
469 Darius had with him part of the royal treasury, his own family, his harem as well as many thousands of 
camp followers; Curtius 3.3.8-28. 
470 Two months is also the time calculated by Devine, 1985a, 27. 
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Using the end of September as the time of Darius' arrival at Sochi we can 
continue the process begun earlier and further establish the Macedonian timeline. We 
know that the battle occurred on the sixth day after Alexander received news that Darius 
was at Sochi 471 Beloch472 argued that Alexander's campaign in south-west Cilicia lasted 
around one month, from the time he left Tarsus, until he heard of Darius' presence at 
Sochi. This, however, leaves four months unaccounted for on the part of the 
Macedonians. Murison473 proposed two possible solutions to this problem: either that 
Alexander's illness was far more serious than we know, and his recovery period was in 
fact a period of several months; or that Alexander paused at Gordium for longer than we 
had previously believed, no doubt being worried about the progress of Persian operations 
in the Aegean. The reality is probably some combination of the two, at this stage 
Alexander seems not to have been in a hurry. 
Location of Key Sites 
It is important and interesting to note that the locations of a number of key 
locations mentioned so frequently in the sources are far from certain. The exact locations 
of Issus and Myriandrus are uncertain, and the location of Sochi is entirely unknown. We 
can make certain assumptions, however. Issus was probably very near the head of the 
gulf, it is also probably quite close to the river across which the battle was fought: 474 in 
both Curtius and Arrian475 it is the first place reached by Darius after crossing the 
Kalekoy Pass and arriving on Alexander's lines of communication. It can be reasonably 
assumed, therefore, that Issus lies directly south of the pass, on the coast. It is also 
probably quite close to the Pinarus River, given the name of the ensuing battle. 76 The 
most useful piece of source evidence for the location of Issus comes from Xenophon; 477 
he states that the distance between Issus and the "Gates between Cilicia and Syria" is five 
parasangs. With one parasang as 30 Stades, this gives a total of 150 stades or 26.15km. 478 
Barrington's location of Issus seems reasonable. 79 
The locations of Myriandrus and Sochi are more problematic. Myriandrus can be 
assumed to be on the coast, as Alexander dispatched a ship from there upon hearing of 
Darius in his rear. 480 Barrington's location is again reasonable 481 An approximate 
location of Sochi first involves an identification of the pass known as the "Syrian Gates". 
We already know that Parmenio was sent south with half of the army to capture and 
471 Calculated from Arrian 2.6.1-2,2.7.1-2,2.8.1ff. Day one Alexander at Mallus hears Darius is at Sochi. 
Day two Alexander set out. Day three Alexander passed "the gates" and arrived at Myriandrus. Day four 
bad weather. Day five news Darius behind Alexander. Day six the battle was fought. cf. Murison, 1972 
404. More detail will follow on the later movements of the two armies. 
472 Beloch, 1923,3.2.326. 
473 Munson, 1972,405. 
474 The main possibilities for the river are only 11km apart. 
475 Curtius 3.8.13-14. Arrian 2.7.1. 
476 Assuming the battle was fought across the Pinarus River. Murison, 1972,406. 
47 Xen. Anab. 1.4.3-4. 
478 Murison, 1972,406, equates 150 stades to 16.25 miles. 
479 Barrington, 67, C3. Map is by P. L. Gatier and T. Sinclair. 
480 Arrian 2.7.2. 
481 Barrington, 67, C3. Map is by P. L. Gatier and T. Sinclair. 
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guard the "other gates which divide the land of the Cilician from that of the 
Assyrians". 82 There are two passes to the south of the Issus plain that fit this general 
description, referred to by modem scholars as the Pillar of Jonah and the Beilan Pass 483 
The Pillar of Jonah is a narrow coastal defile about 9.66km south of Iskanderon. 484 The 
Beilan Pass leads across the Amanus Mountains and away from the coast (today this pass 
carries the main road between Iskanderon, Antioch and Aleppo); the Beilan pass is 
around 14.5km south-east of Iskanderon. Arrian's narrative is extremely vague about 
these passes, and we can conclude that he in fact knew of only one of them. He states at 
2.6.1 that Darius was encamped at Sochi, two days march from the Syrian Gates; at 2.6.2 
he tells us that Alexander passed the "gates" and made camp at Myriandrus. 485 As the 
Beilan pass is south-east of the presumed approximate location of Myriandrus then the 
pass referred to in Arrian must be the Pillar of Jonah. 
The strategic decisions of both sides were greatly affected, not only by the passes 
to the south of Issus, but by those to the north-east as well. When Darius took the 
decision to move north and circle in behind Alexander, he had to cross the Amanus 
Mountains somewhere. The modem road and rail network in the region probably gives us 
some important pointers as to where these passes were. There are a large number of 
narrow "sheep tracks"486 over the Amanus range, but only two passes large enough to 
take an army through in relatively short time and in good order; these are the Hasanbeyli 
Pass and the Bahce Pass. 87 The Hasanbeyli Pass, the more southerly of the two, carries 
the modem road over the mountains, whilst the Bahce Pass carries the Baghdad 
railway. 488 Both of these passes are at a height of around 1,200m; 489 we do not know 
which pass Darius used, and it could easily have been either one (or likely both to get 
such a large force across the mountains quickly). To reach the plain of Issus, Darius must 
have also moved through a smaller pass, the Kalekoy Pass, to cross the eastern spur of the 
Misis Dag and the western spur of the Gavur Dag ranges. This is a relatively minor range 
of mountains by the standards of the region, but significant enough to have diverted the 
modem road and rail links from Adana and Ceyhan to Iskanderon, through the Kalekoy 
Pass. Most modem authorities associate the Kalekoy pass with the Amanid Gates, 490 
largely because of a reference in CurtiuS 491 I am more convinced, however, by 
Atkinson's assertion that the pass in question was the Toprakkale Pass, as the Amanid 
Gates would surely lead over the Amanus range as Murison notes 492 
482 Sian 2.5.1. 
483 Pillar of Jonah - Barrington, 67, C3. The Pass is today called the Kilikiai Pass. Beilan Pass - Barrington, 
67, C4. The Pass is today called the Syriai Pass. 
484 Murison, 1972,407, quotes 6 miles. Barrington, 67, C3. Iskanderon probably equates to the ancient 
town of Alexandria ad Issum. 
485 Whose precise location is not known, but, as concluded earlier, it appears to have been on the coast 
given Alexander dispatching of a ship. 
86 Murison, 1972,408. 
487 Detail of the minor tracks across the Amanus range can be found in Janke, 1904,34-6. 
488 Janke, 1904,34-6, for a full description of the passes themselves. 
489 C. 4000ft. 
'90 Curtius 3.8.18; Polybius 12.17.2 and Arrian 2.7.1 all state that Darius approached Issus via the Amanid 
Gates. 
491 Curtius 3.8.13. 
492 Atkinson, 1980,196. Murison, 1972,408. 
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Some key distance data are also critical; the most important being those from 
Mallus to Myriandrus, which Alexander covered in a reported two days; 493 and from 
Sochi to Issus, and then to the Pinarus River; a distance that Darius covered in an 
unspecified length of time. The distance between Mallus and Myriandrus is impossible 
to know with any degree of certainty, given that the precise location of both is uncertain. 
The general location of both can be approximated from the ancient evidence and a 
distance of around 120km seems reasonable. 494 Alexander was, therefore, clearly moving 
with considerable alacrity when he covered this distance in 48 hours 495 Sochi to Issus, 
the route travelled by Darius, would also be around 120km; two passes496 would also 
have to be crossed en route, however. Given that Darius had sent his baggage train south 
to Damascus, only the most mobile elements of the army remained; but given the passes 
that needed to be traversed, we can perhaps assume 72 hours or so for this distance. The 
Pinarus River is only around 8km from Issus, so this last stage of the journey would not 
have taken the Persians long at all. 
Initial Movements - Darius 
When Darius arrived at Sochi, he was in an ideal position to take advantage of his 
superior numbers. This was a battle site of his own choosing, consisting of wide open, 
level ground; a position that would have allowed him to encircle the much smaller 
Macedonian army. 497 Why would Darius abandon such an ideal position in order to fight 
a battle in a narrow, hilly plain enclosed on all sides by natural barriers? The sources are 
almost unanimous in their assertion that Darius grew impatient at Alexander's refusal to 
come to him, 498 delays that were in fact due to Alexander's illness and his campaign in 
south-west Cilicia. The delays caused Darius to conclude that Alexander would not come 
to meet him; Curtius even has Darius describe Alexander as a coward, 499 and advance 
despite the best advice of Amyntas, his Greek mercenary commander. Arrian tells us that 
the worst counsel prevailed, telling Darius what he wanted to hear. 500 Curtius gives us a 
rather different version of events at the Persian court at this time. He describes a debate 
not with Amyntas as in Arrian, but with Thymondas, son of Mentor. 50' The subject of the 
debate, according to Curtius, was whether or not to divide the army; a theme that appears 
in neither Arrian nor Plutarch. Curtius and Diodorus502 both describe an earlier debate in 
493 Arrian 2.6.2. 
494 Murison, 1972,409. 
495 This figure has been much debated (and often rejected! ), particularly among German scholars at around 
the turn of the last century: cf. Bauer, 1899,123. Dittberner, 1908,79, argued for three days whilst 
Domaszewski, 1925,60-61, and Judeich, 1929,360 n. 2, both proposed four days. Arrian's figure could 
well be correct, however, given the parallel example of Messena's corps in 1797, cited in Fuller, 1958,156, 
n. 1. 
496 The Hasanbeyli and the Beilan passes, both around 1,200m. 497 Although that, in itself, would not have guaranteed victory, given that this is what occurred at 
Gaugamela and Darius was still defeated. 
498 Sian, 2.6.3-7; Plutarch Alex 20.1-2; Diodorus 17.32.3. 
499 Curtius 3.8.10-11; cf. Plutarch Alex. 19.1; Diodorus 17.32.3. 
500 Arrian 2.6.3. 
sot Curtius 3.3.1. 
502 Curtius 3.2.10-19. Diodorus 17.30.2-3. 
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Babylon, in which the Athenian mercenary, Charidemus, advocated such a division of 
forces, and was executed for his overzealousness. Bosworth503 argues that the debate on a 
division of forces is better placed in Babylon, not at Sochi, and Curtius airing the debate 
with Thymondas as the leading protagonist is anachronistic. This argument does not work 
terribly well geographically. If the army was to have been divided at Babylon, the two 
elements would have had to travel virtually the same 966km route to arrive in the region: 
a division of forces, if such a thing was to happen, would have been far more logically 
undertaken at Sochi where one half could head south-west, the other north, to trap 
Alexander in a pincer in Cilicia. 504 
Several modern authorities have defended Darius' strategy of advancing into 
Cilicia. Fuller, following Tarn, for example, states that Darius' assumption that 
Alexander would not leave Cilicia was entirely reasonable "because the Taurus range 
. would make a nearly 
impregnable eastern frontier for the Macedonian empire' sos 
It could never have been Alexander's intention to end his campaign in Cilicia, 
however, as this would have left a "front" of over 1,500km with an enemy that had not 
been defeated in battle, and who could bring almost limitless reserves against him, given 
enough time. Tam argued that Darius "had waited some time, and had concluded that 
Alexander, of whose illness he was ignorant, meant to halt in Cilicia". 506 Tam's theory 
should be rejected on the grounds that it would have been foolish for Alexander to have 
halted in Cilicia, for the above reason, and a grave mistake for Darius to have assumed 
that he would. Fuller followed Tam's argument without critical analysis. 507 Wilckensos 
follows Curtius' general theme that Alexander was afraid of Darius; and that this was the 
cause of his delay in Cilicia. He also suggests that it was Alexander's perceived fear of 
Darius' that led the latter to move into Cilicia in order to seek him out. 
The key factor in Darius' decision to advance into Cilicia was, perhaps, 
knowledge of Alexander's illness. Plutarch tells us that Darius had no knowledge of it, 
and Tarn accepted that. 509 Curtius tells us that he did know, but his timing is impossible 
as he then goes on to tell us that news of the illness made him march to the Euphrates as 
swiftly as his heavily burdened army would allow. This must be a mistake of Curtius, 
Alexander could not have fallen ill as early as this, i. e. several weeks before Darius even 
reached Sochi. s'o McQueen and Atkinson think Curtius simply invented Darius' 
knowledge; but Darius' move into Cilicia suggests that Darius did know, thouuh not as 
early as Curtius claims (although I can not say why Plutarch thought otherwise). 11 
503 Bosworth, 1980,202. 
5°4 Atkinson, 1980,116f, seems to accept the Thymondas debate, but argues his role in the ensuing battle 
was probably less than Curtius implies. 
505 Fuller, 1958,98. 
506 Tarn, 1948,1.24. 
507 Fuller, 1958,98. 
508 Wilcken, 1932,100. 
109 Plutarch Alex. 19.1-2. Tarn, 1948,1.24. 
510 Curtius 3.7.1. Cf. Murison, 1972,410. 
511 McQueen, 1967,29. Atkinson, 1980,170. 
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Darius was in a strong position at Sochi, a position that was suited to his 
superiority in numbers and especially in cavalry so why would he suddenly abandon it to 
enter Cilicia? The very fact that he did this (it was partly down to logistics too) I believe 
suggests that Curtius is correct and that Darius knew of Alexander's illness and was 
attempting to gain a major tactical advantage by advancing while the Macedonians were 
effectively leaderless. If Alexander's illness turned out to be fatal, then Darius would 
encounter a leaderless enemy, which could easily be driven from Persian territory. By the 
time he reached Issus, he would have learned that Alexander had recovered, so he tried to 
make the best of his mistake and selected the most suitable place in Cilicia to fight a set 
piece battle. Thus Darius' decision to march into Cilicia was sound, only failing because 
the news of Alexander's illness was out of date by the time it reached him. On this 
interpretation, Curtius is right to hold that Darius knew of Alexander's illness, but is 
wrong regarding the timing. 
This argument is, I believe, supported by the fact that, whilst at Sochi, Darius sent 
his baggage train 320km south to Damascus. 512 This is beyond doubt given that it is in all 
of our sources; 513 the decision was no doubt taken to make the Persian host more mobile, 
so that it could cross the northern passes quickly and come to terms with the 
Macedonians whilst they were disadvantaged by Alexander's illness or death. 
Final Stages of the Prelude to Battle 
The whole question of the actions of both sides in the days leading up to the 
battle, rests largely upon whether Darius knew of Alexander's illness. His delay at Sochi 
potentially suggests that he did not have early knowledge, but once he found out he chose 
to move. Much of the best analysis of the days leading up to the battle has been 
conducted in German, towards the beginning of the last century. It is necessary at this 
point to examine the work of three key scholars, Beloch, Miltner and Judeich. s 14 
Beloch argued that, until the time he arrived at Mallus, Alexander knew nothing at 
all of Darius' movements. If he did know, then he would not have undertaken his 
campaign in south-west Cilicia. He goes on to argue that at the same time as Alexander 
arrived at Mallus, Darius arrived at Sochi. 515 He further notes that Alexander must have 
travelled to Myriandrus with only his cavalry, given that he covered the ground in only 
48 hours 516 Beloch then seizes upon a single line in Curtius517 that has Alexander wait 
for the enemy in the mountain passes as proof that Alexander used the storm simply as an 
excuse not to advance to Sochi, claiming that he had no intention of moving out of 
Cilicia. He then goes on to postulate that the only reason Darius advanced was that 
Alexander "had not done him the favour of descending on to the plain". He also believes 
that Darius remained at Sochi for some considerable length of time. Since Alexander 
512 C. 200 miles. 
513 Diodorus 17.32.3; Curtius 3.8.12; Plutarch Alex. 20.6; Arrian 2.11.9-10. 
514 As summarised in Munson, 1972,411ff. 
515 Beloch, 1923, vol. 2,362. 
516Arrian 2.6.2. 
517 Curtius 3.7.8-10. 
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marched from Mallus immediately upon hearing of Darius' arrival at Sochi, he must have 
arrived at Myriandrus while Darius was still at Sochi, the latter's advance coming a little 
later. On this reading, Darius was not close behind Alexander at Issus and the report that 
the two armies missed each other in the night is "absurd. "518 
Beloch also argues that Darius arrived at Sochi in late August, and the battle was 
fought in late September; meaning that the two armies faced each other across the Beilan 
pass for around one month before the battle. After this stalemate, according to Beloch, 
Darius divided his army, taking the more mobile elements north, across the Amanid gates 
with the intention of forcing a battle. He cites Aeschines' speech Against Ctesiphon in 
support: Aeschines states: 519 
when Darius came down to the coast with all his 
forces and Alexander was penned up in Cilicia 
lacking all resources, as you yourself said, and was, 
according to your account, on the point of being 
trampled underfoot by the Persian cavalry. 
Beloch argues that there must have been a stalemate of the kind he envisions, 
lasting some time, in order for such an account to have gained widespread acceptance 
520 only three years after the battle 
Munson describes Beloch's theory as "perversely ingenious"; 521 its main problem 
is that it rests on one key, yet entirely unsupported, piece of evidence; namely that 
Alexander arrived at Mallus at the same times 2 as Darius arrived at Sochi. Beloch's 
theory can be rejected after a close examination of Curtius: Alexander made the decision 
to wait in the narrows523 of the mountains whilst at Issus; and he did not move south 
towards the Pillar of Jonah until the same night Darius came to the Amanid gates. 
The Aeschines passage could also easily be interpreted differently, if we see it as 
representing the general position at that instant; i. e. Alexander had been at Tarsus for 
some time, and Darius had delayed at Sochi. Demosthenes, whose hostility to Alexander 
is well known, could have used these simple facts to argue for Alexander being penned 
up in Cilicia: the point about the Persian cavalry is also one that Demosthenes would be 
likely to have made. 
Neither Curtius nor Aeschines support Beloch; his theory also falls down upon 
examination of a passage of Callisthenes, preserved in Polybius. Callisthenes states 
that: 524 
518 Beloch, 1923, vol. 2,364 (both quotes) 
519 Aeschines Against Ctesiphon, 164. The speech was delivered in 330, only three years after the battle. In 
this section of the speech the orator is addressing Demosthenes. 
520 Beloch, 1923, vol. 2,365. 
521 Murison, 1972,413. 
522 Or at least with a very small time lag either way. 
52' Curtius 3.7.8-10. Curtius is the only source to have Alexander making this decision. 
521 polybius 12.17.2-3 
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Alexander had already made his way through the 
narrows and the so called `Gates of Cilicia', 5 5 while 
Darius, making use of the passage through the so called 
`Amanid Gates', had come down into Cilicia with his 
army. Learning from the natives that Alexander was 
heading in the direction of Syria, he followed, and as he 
drew near to the narrows camped by the River Pinarus. 
In the words of Callisthenes, Darius and Alexander could not have faced each 
other across the Beilan pass for a month prior to battle. Beloch's theory, whilst 
interesting, is not supported by the sources. 
Franz Miltner526 uses Alexander's well-known strategy of conquering the Persian 
fleet by land, 527 along with Alexander's fears of events in the Aegean that made him 
hasten to the coasts of Cilicia and Syria/Phoenicia, as the basis for his theory. Miltner 
believes, simply, that it was the sea ports of the eastern Mediterranean that were 
Alexander's prime targets in late 333, not Darius. With this goal in mind, Alexander is 
thought to have moved along the coast of the Gulf of Issus to Myriandrus, which Miltner 
sees as being 16km south of the Beilan Pass. 528 Miltner believes that Alexander had no 
intention of moving to meet Darius; if he had, then it would have been easier to move 
across one of the northern passes and advance to Sochi from the north, 529 rather than 
travel through Cilicia. The northern passes, then, were left deliberately unguarded by 
Alexander as a means of enticing Darius into Cilicia. Once Parmenio sent news to 
Alexander that Darius was moving north, 530 Alexander hastened south from Mallus, past 
Issus, to avoid the army being cut in half. In support of his theory that Darius was not 
Alexander's target, he lays considerable stress upon the wording of Arrian . 
531 He 
interprets the text of Arrian at this point to say "as though in the direction of Darius"; but 
this interpretation is heavily criticised by Bosworth and Hamilton, 532 who claim that 
Arrian never uses "uk &P to indicate a feint. 
Murison533 dismisses Miltner on three counts: firstly there is no evidence at all of 
a coastal route from central Cilicia to south of the Beilan Pass; 534 the only evidence we 
have in the sources for a route south across this range is the Beilan Pass and the Pillar of 
Jonah. Secondly, he claims Miltner is overly subtle in his interpretation of the language 
525 This must be a reference to the Pillar of Jonah. 
526 Miltner, 1933,69-78. 
527 Arrian 1.19.3. 
528 Miltner, 1933,71-3. 
529 This, of course, assumes that Alexander was aware of the northern passes, which is far from certain. 
530 Parmenio was stationed at the Beilan pass at this time, not far from the Persian position at Sochi. 
531 Arrian 2.6.2. 
532 Bosworth, 1980,201. Hamilton, 1956,26ff. 
533 Munson, 1972,416-17. 
534 This is far from a fatal flaw: a trip inland and across the Beilan Pass would not have taken too much 
longer, and certainly would not have delayed Alexander sufficiently for Darius to move from Sochi to catch 
him as he crossed through the pass. 
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of Arrian, which really does not support his theory. Finally, Munson claims that 
Miltner's theory falls down on its inherent improbability: that Alexander would choose to 
avoid a battle that he knew he would have to fight at some point; and that the only result 
of this manoeuvre would be to place the Persians directly across his lines of 
communication and supply. Despite Murison's dismissal, Miltner's theory has some 
merit; namely that he has Alexander essentially attempting to draw Darius onto ground of 
his choosing, as Alexander so often does. With some modifications, I believe Miltner's 
theory can be used to understand the actions of both sides in the lead up to the battle. 
Judeich suggested that in the spring of 333 Alexander left Gordium and travelled 
eastwards, along the Royal Road that led from Sardes to Susa. Alexander's sudden 
change of direction, towards Cilicia, was due to intelligence he received that Darius was 
approaching Cilicia from a more southerly route 535 Darius, on the other hand, upon 
arriving at Sochi took pains to conceal his position and straddled the approaches to all of 
the Amanus crossing points with small detachments. Darius' aim was that he would gain 
exact intelligence of Alexander's position and movements so that he could strike at the 
exact time and place to give him the greatest chance of victory. 536 Judeich's analysis 
forgets two key points: firstly that Alexander's intelligence system537 was, by modern 
standards, poor; thus it is unlikely that he would have had such advanced knowledge of 
Darius' movements. Secondly Alexander's stated strategy of defeating the Persian fleet 
on land538 meant a move into Cilicia, and then south, was essential. This inevitable move 
south by Alexander was evidently anticipated by Darius, given his move to Sochi; for he 
ordered the Greek mercenaries that had formerly been under the command of Memnon to 
land at Tripolis in Phoenicia. 539 Sochi was an excellent position for Darius to occupy as it 
allowed easy access to Phoenicia, if Alexander chose to move south, and similarly easy 
routes to the north if he chose to strike inland. 
Judeich's theory continues with Alexander dividing his army at Tarsus and 
sending Parmenio south54° to dislodge the Persians from the Beilan Pass and the Pillar of 
Jonah, and to occupy them in anticipation of Alexander's move south. This would have 
given Darius a clear indication of the future direction of Alexander's army, given that 
Darius' troops occupying the northern pass were apparently left unmolested. The Persian 
plan, according to Judeich, had been to fall upon the Macedonians as they emerged from 
whichever pass they took to cross the Amanus Mountains. A new plan was then 
formulated whereby the Macedonians would be allowed to cross the Amanus range 
whilst the Persians cut off their lines of supply and communication by moving through 
the northern passes. Darius would then be able to follow Alexander south, forcing him on 
to the plain of Sochi where his superior numbers could be most effectively used. 54' 
Wilcken and Hamilton542 both follow this element of Darius' strategy, as interpreted by 
535 Judeich, 1929,355-361. 
536 Judeich, 1929,357, this is not supported by the sources, but would have been tactically very sensible. 
137 Marsden, 1964,2- 
538 Arrian 1.19.3. 
539 flan 2.2.1-13.2-3; cf. Curtius 3.8.1. 
5' Curtius 3.7.7. 
541 Judeich, 1929,358. 
542 Wilcken, 1932,101; Hamilton, 1969 on Plutarch Alex 20.5. 
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Judeich. Thus Darius moved across the northern passes and paused at the pass of Kalekoy 
to allow Alexander to move south before following; 543 arriving at Issus not long after 
Alexander had left. Alexander was fortuitously delayed by a storm whilst at Myriandrus; 
however, this allowed intelligence of Darius' movements to reach him in time to turn 
around and face the Persians on ground advantageous to him. 544 
This theory is, like many others, very interesting in places; particularly the evident 
concentration on the reconnaissance capabilities of the two armies, an area which we 
must understand if we are fully to appreciate the movements of both sides. It seems likely 
that Alexander had no direct knowledge of the location of Darius until Parmenio's 
leading elements made contact with him, as they occupied the southern passes. We know 
that Alexander sent Parmenio south, with around half of the army, while he was at 
Tarsus; 545 before he moved south west towards Soli. Beloch546 calculated that it was 
around one month from Alexander's leaving Tarsus to his arrival at Mallus, where he 
received news of Darius' location. Judeich believed that Parmenio's advance was rapid, 
taking no more than four or five days to reach the southern passes, where he sat and 
waited for new orders. 547 Dittberner reminds us that, given the size of Parmenio's force, it 
is highly unlikely that reconnaissance and the occupation of the passes were his only 
objectives 548 He was almost certainly charged with securing the area for the 
Macedonians, which would have required some delays. Munson is no doubt right in 
assuming that Parmenio's advance through Cilicia was slow and cautious, given his 
ignorance of the location of the Persians initially, and his presumed secondary objectives 
of securing central Cilicia. This slow progress of Parmenio and his forces is implied by 
Arrian, and Bosworth549 points out that Arrian's claim that Darius' baggage train reached 
Damascus before the battle implies considerable delay between Darius' reaching Sochi 
sso and the battle itself; thus there was no need for Parmenio to hurry. 
We can presume, then, that Alexander was reasonably well informed of Darius' 
movements from Parmenio; but what of Darius' intelligence? The inhabitants of the 
region of Cilicia were not Greek, and thus had no particular reason to welcome 
Alexander. Both Diodorus and Curtius55' tell us that the locals were not enthusiastic 
about Alexander's presence and were loyal to the Great King. Arrian552 also takes this 
... Murison, 1972,418-19. 
544 A strategy that this thesis will aim to demonstrate was a recurring theme on the part of Alexander. 
545 Sian 2.5.1. 
546 Beloch, 1923, vol. 3,362, this seems a reasonable enough figure given the time Alexander spent at Soli. 
547 Judeich, 1929,358, n. 2. 
548 Dittberner, 1908,75-76. 
549 Arrian 2.6.1; Bosworth, 1980,200. 
550 Judeich, 1929,356, sees the Persians as deliberately `leaking' information about the position of Darius 
to the Macedonian advanced guard after the Persians had set off north. This seems to be to apply a modern 
`disinformation' technique to the ancient world and I do not believe it justified; it is certainly not supported 
by the sources. 
5 
71 
Diodorus 17.32.4; Curtius 3.8.24. 
552 Arrian 2.5.5. 
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line, telling us that Alexander fined the inhabitants of Soli553 200 silver talents because of 
their continued inclination towards the Persian cause. Persian supporters in Soli could 
easily have travelled by boat to the Orontes River to report Alexander's activities to 
Darius. Coastal towns no doubt had a significant fishing fleet; 554 we know that Alexander 
had no difficulty in finding a ship at Myriandrus to verify Darius' position behind him. 555 
From Darius' point of view at Sochi, he would have known that Alexander was 
conducting a campaign with part of his force in `Rough' Cilicia. He would also have 
learned from the guards he had posted at the southern passes that Parmenio had moved 
south to occupy those passes, also with a considerable force. From the guards he probably 
posted at the northern passes, 556 he would have received no information about troop 
movements on the part of the Macedonians. These three key pieces of information would 
have led Darius to conclude that Alexander's forces were divided roughly in two; and 
that, if he acted quickly, he had an opportunity to drive a wedge between them. 557 It is 
entirely likely, therefore, that Darius intended to cut the Macedonian army in half and 
deal with the two separate elements individually. 558 If this strategy of Darius is correct, 
the only way it had a chance of success is if he marched with the utmost speed. The 
theory is supported by two pieces of evidence: first that Darius dispatched his baggage 
train south to Damascus; this would have been the part of the army that would most 
encumber him and prevent a lightning march. Secondly, Plutarch559 tells us of Darius 
making a night march, the march in which the two armies passed each other during the 
hours of darkness 560 
Bosworth561 points out two other motivations for Darius' movements: the first, 
that Darius was a "military hero in his own right", and thus would not be prepared to wait 
too long for a numerically inferior opponent. This is a reasonable enough theory, but if 
Darius was a reasonably talented commander then he would have realised that his best 
chance of success was on a wide open plain, such as he chose initially, and then chose 
again at Gaugamela. Bosworth's second point is perhaps more important: Darius may 
have been running short of supplies. The grand army had been in the field for some 
months, crossing land that was not overly fertile; Alexander, on the other hand, could 
553 Soli had been founded by Rhodians around 700, and as a result Bosworth calls the city Greek. By the 
fourth century, however, the city was thoroughly Persian, being a major population centre and the minting 
centre for the satrapal coinage of Pharnabazus, Tiribazus and Mazaeus: Bosworth, 1980,195. 
551 Murison, 1972,420. 
555 Sian 3.7.3. 
556 That Darius posted guards at the northern passes is supposition, but reasonable supposition. 
557 Meson, 1972,420. 
558 Munson, 1972,419-23; contra Bosworth, 1980,200-1, who argues that there is no evidence that the 
Macedonian army was divided. But this cannot be the case, as we explicitly know that Parmenio was sent 
to occupy the southern passes with around half the army, and Alexander was campaigning in `Rough 
Cilicia' with the other half. 
559 Plutarch Alex, 20.3. 
560 The story of the two armies missing each other narrowly during the night is very dubious; as noted in fn. 
565 the armies were separated by 48km and a mountain range. The idea of the Persians making a night 
march need not be automatically rejected. 
51' Bosworth, 1988,59. 
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easily be supplied from the sea. 562 Darius therefore took this opportunity to bring an end 
to the perceived stalemate 563 
Once Darius' decision had been made, he had to move with extreme haste. It was 
imperative, if the plan was to succeed, that he reach the plain of Issus via the Kalekoy 
Pass before Alexander reached it via the Kara Kacu Pass: this need for haste is precisely 
why Plutarch5M has Darius making a night march. 65 
Plutarch566 gives us a piece of information which tends to be ignored, but perhaps 
supports the theory of Darius attempting to catch Alexander unawares; he states "During 
the night they missed one another and both turned back". 567 We have already noted that 
both armies conducted a night march, and we will see Alexander turning his army 
around; but apparently Darius also tried to turn back. Plutarch goes on to say "Darius was 
no less eager to extricate his forces from the mountain passes and regain his former 
camping ground in the plain". 568 
These passages from Plutarch would tend to support the theory that Darius 
intended to drive a wedge between the two elements of Alexander's army; 569 realising 
that he had been too slow, however, he wished to recover his former position at Sochi, 
but was unable as Alexander brought him to battle rapidly from that point. Darius' 
innovative strategy had failed, perhaps only by a few hours. 
Darius took out his frustration at failing to split the Macedonians in two, upon the 
Macedonian field hospital at Issus, mutilating those whom Alexander had left behind. 570 
Realising that he could not safely retreat to Sochi by retracing his steps, lest he be 
surprised by the Macedonians whilst unprepared for battle, and also that Alexander lay to 
his south, thus restricting his movement in that direction, Darius set about finding the 
most suitable place to conduct a battle. He would have also realised at this point that, 
despite the failure of his strategy, he still lay in a very good position, across the lines of 
supply and communication of the Macedonians. With this in mind, the day after the 
562 However, Bosworth fails to note that Alexander had supposedly disbanded most of his fleet (Arrian 
20.1), making the kind of supply he envisions difficult. As argued above, however, Alexander may have 
disbanded only a small fraction of his fleet in 334. Alexander's being supplied by sea also assumes that his 
supply ships did not encounter resistance from the Persian navy, most of which was engaged on the coast of 
Asia Minor and the Aegean Islands, rather than supporting the Persian land operations, as may have been 
expected 
563 Curtius 3.8, adds that Darius intended all along to give battle in Cilicia; this can only be true if he 
intended to offer two separate battles, one with each half of the Macedonian army. 
564 Plutarch Alex. 20.3. 
565 Hamilton, 1969,51, notes that Plutarch perhaps envisaged the two armies marching close by each other 
and missing each other during the night; the routes of the two armies, however, lay some 48km apart and 
were separated by the Amanus Mountains. It is no surprise at all, therefore, that neither knew of the other's 
movements. 
166 Plutarch Alex. 20.3. 
567 My italics added for emphasis. 
568 Plutarch Alex. 20.4. 
569 Noting Bosworth's objection that there is no evidence in the sources of the army being divided in two; 
Bosworth, 1980,200-1. 
570 Arrian 2.7.1. 
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massacre, Darius moved south from Issus and made preparations on the banks of the 
Pinarus River. Upon hearing Darius was at Issus, Alexander dispatched a part of the 
Companions and a ship from Myriandrus to verify the report; that done he simply turned 
his army around and made for the river: this is a fine example of the discipline of the 
Macedonian army. 571 
Before going on to discuss the battle itself, there is one final element of the 
preliminary movements of the protagonists that we must examine: why did Alexander 
move south of the pillar of Jonah? why did he not remain in the plain of Issus to await 
Darius? In the sources we have, as we did at the Granicus, two entirely different accounts 
of Alexander's strategy. Arrian presents the campaign as purely offensive. Curtius, on the 
other hand, has Alexander adopting a defensive posture, essentially on the advice of 
Parmenio, just prior to the battle. 72 On this reading, we have two mutually incompatible 
accounts, but this is only if the account of Arrian is misinterpreted. Arrian presents 
Alexander as moving to Myriandrus, at which point he would move to engage Darius at 
Sochi. Curtius, likewise, has Alexander move south of the Pillar of Jonah, out of the plain 
of Issus and into the much smaller area573 enclosed by mountains and passes on all sides: 
specifically the Pillar of Jonah to the north and the Beilan Pass to the east. 
Arrian tells us: 574 
He (Alexander) at once called a meeting of his staff and 
told them this important news (that Darius was still at 
Sochi). They urged unanimously an immediate advance. 
Alexander thanked them and dismissed the meeting, and 
on the following day moved forward with the evident 
intention of attack. Two days later he took up a position 
at Myriandrus, and during the night there was a storm of 
such violent wind and rain that he was compelled to 
remain where he was, with no chance of breaking camp. 
There are several problems: firstly, if Alexander intended to move against Darius 
at Sochi, why would he continue south-west to Myriandrus after passing the Pillar of 
Jonah? why not travel south-east to the Beilan pass? The storm that caused the delay is 
also puzzling; there is no hint of a storm in any of the other sources, and no hint in Arrian 
that the storm delayed the progress of the Persians, who had to cover in excess of 
130km575 from Sochi to Issus via the northern passes in a very short period of time. 
Beloch576 was the first to suggest that the storm was an apologetic fiction577 used by 
Arrian to delay Alexander and allow Darius to appear behind him, essentially covering up 
the fact that Alexander was conducting a defensive campaign, as presented in Curtius. 
5" Arrian 2.7.2. 
572 Devine, 1985,25. 
573 The plain of Myriandrus. 
574 Arrian 2.6.2. 
575 Bosworth, 1980,201. 
576 Beloch, 1923, vol. 2.263. 
577 Supported by Bosworth, 1980,201. 
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Alexander in fact had no intention of being drawn into a battle on Darius' terms. As in 
almost all of his campaigns, the battle was to be fought on ground of Alexander's 
choosing. Alexander, therefore, moved towards Myriandrus because it was far more 
defensible than the Issus plain; it was far smaller, and Myriandrus was closer to the key 
passes to the east and west than Issus was to the passes to the north and south. A camp at 
Myriandrus, therefore, could easily defend the plain. 
Plain of Issus 
Correctly identifying the location of the Pinarus River is important but not critical 
to our understanding the battle. The rivers in that region appear similar enough that 
whichever one is correct, the battle would have occurred along more or less the same 
lines; an attempt must still be made, however, at a correct identification. 578 Poly biUS, 579 
whilst criticising the account of Callisthenes, gives us the most detailed description of the 
battlefield. Callisthenes tells us that the plain of the battlefield was fourteen stades from 
the coast to the foothills of the Amanus Mountains, and that the river flowed at right 
angles to both 580 Callisthenes also tells us that the river was difficult to cross, possessing 
precipitous banks along the whole of its length. Bosworth notes that elsewhere in his text 
Polybius581 tells us that Alexander was 100 stades from Darius when he learned of the 
latter's presence in the plain. Devine further noted Callisthenes' statement that Alexander 
made an approach march of 40 stades in extended order. 582 CurtiUS583 adds the 
information that on the approach march to the battle, Alexander reoccupied the coastal 
ravines known as the Cilician Gates, usually referred to here as the Pillar of Jonah. 
Diodorus also gives us an approach march of 30 stades, and unhelpfully adds that 
Alexander pursued Darius for 200 stades after the battle. 584 Historians have drawn three 
conclusions from these data as to the identification of the Pinarus River. One of the 
earliest concerted attempts to identify the river was by Delbrück; 585 he associated the 
river with the modem Payas. The Payas runs about 20km north of Iskanderun; 586 it also 
fulfils the criteria of possessing steep banks, and the plain upon which it sits is narrow, 
approximately 4km wide. 587 The Payas hypothesis was, however, strongly attacked by 
Janke in his meticulous study. 588 Janke carefully estimated the distances between the key 
rivers in the plain, and his proposed (and probably incorrect) site for Myriandrus, which 
he locates close to the modem Iskanderon. 589 Janke attacked the Payas theory on two 
578 Although the attempt is always ultimately futile, given the frequent changes in the courses of the rivers 
in that region over the centuries. 
579 Polybius 12.17.4-5. 
580 Which is to say it flowed down from the foothills and directly towards the sea. 
581 Bosworth, 1980,203. Polybius 12.19.4. 
592 Devine, 1985b, 42. Polybius 12.20.1. 
583 Curtius 3.8.23. 
584 Diodorus 17.37.1-2. 
585 Delbriick, 1920,185; Translated into English by Renfrew, 1975,191-209, all future references to 
Delbrück's work will be to this translation of the text. 
586 Bosworth, 1980,203. 
587 Corresponding approximately with Callisthenes' stated width of 14 stades. 
588 Janke, 1910,137f. 
589 Janke's location of Myriandrus is probably incorrect because, as noted by Devine, 1985b, 42, Xenophon 
(Anabasis 1.4.6) locates Myriandrus five parasangs (c. 150 Stades) south of the Cilician Gates. 
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main grounds, the first that there is no room for the 40 stade approach march made by 
Alexander and described in Callisthenes; 590 40 stades south of the Payas would place 
Alexander still well within the coastal defiles of the Cilician Gates, an area that he had 
cleared by the time the march began. 
Janke's second objection was that at no point along the banks of the Payas does 
the topography allow for the cavalry charge mentioned in Arrian. 591 In suggesting a site 
himself, Janke592 chooses to ignore the distance values given in the sources in favour of 
what would seem to be an almost entirely topoiraphically based theory; his suggested 
river is the Deli Cay, 11km north of the Payas. 59 This river does indeed fit many of the 
topographical criteria; it is suitable for Arrian's cavalry charge and the banks are 
generally not steep and easily negotiable by infantry. 594 The ground south of the river 
would also allow the 40 stade595 approach march. This cannot be the river, however, as it 
is 31km north of Iskanderon which itself is no doubt situated well to the north of the 
ancient Myriandrus, if Xenophon is in any way reliable. 596 The Deli Cay, moreover, does 
not correspond to Callisthenes' description of the river; its banks are far too smooth. A 
certain positive identification can never be reached, but we should make one final note; 
none of our sources describe the Pinarus as the largest river in the Issus plain and 
therefore other, lesser streams need to be considered. Bosworth, 597 following Kromayer, 
notes the Kuru Cay, 3km north of the Payas, fits the description of having precipitous 
banks in places, but also being suitable for a cavalry charge in others. Stark, 598 
independently of Kromeyer, arrived at the same conclusion after travelling through the 
region; but any conclusion based on modem topography is flawed, as noted above, given 
the shifting positions of the rivers in question. 
The Battle of Issus 
Once Darius had advanced to the plain of Issus, taking up a position at the Pinarus 
River, Arrian presents us with a picture of Alexander being shocked and not believing in 
his scouting reports. When the reality of these reports had been established, Alexander 
made a speech, as he frequently did, to exhort the troops before advancing. 599 The 
historicity of the speech, as with all of the other pre-battle speeches, has been much 
discussed 600 Tarn believed them to be entirely fictitious, but Bosworth6o1 notes enough 
similarities between the various versions of the speech to suggest a common source, 
590 Polybius 12.20.1. 
591 Arrian 2.10.3; 2.105. 
592 Janke, 1910,155-162. 
593 Bosworth, 1980,203; Devine, 1985b, 42, calls it the Deli Tchai. 
594 Stark, 1958,6. 
595 Roughly 7.4km. 
596 Devine, 1985b, 43. 
597 Bosworth, 1980,204. 
598 Stark, 1958,6. 
599 Arrian 2.7.3-9. 
600 Such as that before the siege of Tyre, Arrian 2.17.1. For a general discussion of the feasibility of formal 
speeches to a whole body of troops prior to battle see Hansen, 1993,161-180 (against); Pritchett 1994,27- 
109 (for); Clark, 1995,375-6 (for); Erhardt, 1995,120-1 (for). 
601 Tarn, 1948,2.286. Bosworth, 1980,204. 
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probably Ptolemy. 602 Despite the likelihood of a common, original source, it seems highly 
unlikely that Alexander would have presented the Persians, at this time, as cowards, 603 
and why Ptolemy should wish to portray them as such seems equally puzzling. We may 
conclude that although the speech came from Ptolemy, it probably did not come 
ultimately from the mouth of Alexander. 
Once Alexander had addressed the troops he began the movement towards the 
Persians. The advance occurred in three stages: initially an advance force of cavalry and 
archers was sent to secure the coastal defiles, the route by which Alexander would have 
to return to the Pinarus, while the rest of the army was instructed to eat a meal and rest in 
preparation for the coming battle. 604 The second stage occurred after nightfall: Alexander 
and the remaining elements of the army moved to occupy the "narrow gateway' , 
605 
presumably the Pillar of Jonah. The passage was secured around midnight, and the men 
were allowed to rest for the remainder of the night. The third stage of the advance began 
at the third trumpet call, just before dawn, the following morning; the whole army 
marched in column along the coast road. As the army advanced out of the foothills, and 
as space began to open up, the frontage was gradually extended as heavy infantry were 
brought up, one taxis at a time until the Macedonian right was touching the foothills to 
the east and the left of the line was touching the sea coast. 607 It is evident from 
Polybius'608 description that Alexander placed his heavy infantry at the head of the 
column with the cavalry and other infantry units further back. This may be seen as 
something of a departure from the normal order of march with lighter, more mobile 
troops at the front. We hear no mention of the hypaspists or Agrianians during this stage 
of the advance, through broken ground, indicating that Alexander may have expected to 
be attacked while on the march; he was far from certain that Darius would actually wait 
for him at the Pinarus, and so he had to prepare for that eventuality. As the heavy infantry 
entered the plain, the infantry was able to deploy in battle array, at first thirty two ranks 
deep, thinning to sixteen and finally eight ranks 609 
Macedonian Order of Battle 
Devine 610 notes that Alexander's primary tactical problem was how to effect a 
central penetration of the Persian line without being outflanked; a problem that was 
central to every one of Alexander's set piece battles, particularly given that he was 
consistently greatly outnumbered. The solution on the left flank was made easier by the 
602 Arrian 2.7.3-9; Curtius 3.10.3-10; Justin 11.9.3-4. In the speech, Arrian places more emphasis upon the 
coming battle and its significance, whereas Curtius emphasises former achievements up to and including 
the battle of the Granicus River. 
603 Arrian 2.7.4; cf. Curtius 3.10.6 & 9. 
604 Arrian 2.8.1, while Alexander himself climbed a nearby high ridge and made sacrifice to the local 
deities, Curtius, 3.8.22. 
605 Arrian 2.8.1-2. 
Curtius 3.8.23. 
607 Arrian 2.8.2. 
608 Polybius 12.19.5-6: the account comes from Callisthenes and is the fullest description of the advance; cf. 
Arrian 2.8.2. 
609 Polybius 12.19.5-6; cf. Arrian 11.8.2; Curtius 3.9.12. 
610 Devine, 1985b, 49. 
92 
presence of the sea: Parmenio, initially with only the Allied Greek cavalry, was given 
strict orders to maintain a link between the sea and the Macedonian centre. 611 The heavy 
infantry was, as always, deployed in the centre according to a strictly adhered-to code of 
honour. The greatest position of honour, on the right of the heavy infantry, was occupied 
as always by the hypaspists, under Nicanor; Parmenio's son. Following these from right 
to left were the taxeis of Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Ptolemy, 2 Amyntas, and 
Craterus on the left, next to Parmenio's cavalry. 613 At the initial stage of disposition, the 
Thessalian cavalry, the Companion Cavalry, the Paeonians and the prodromoi were all 
deployed to the right of the hypaspists, along with Alexander himself; indicating that 
Alexander planned a massive cavalry strike from that area towards the Persian centre: a 
strategy that was not at all original, but the size of the force was. Positioning so much of 
the cavalry force, some 4,500 men, 614 to the right, left Parmenio dangerously 
undermanned on the extreme left, commanding as he did only around 600 cavalry; 615 a 
problem that Alexander would realise and rectify later. To the extreme right of the army 
were positioned the Agrianians and archers, along with some unspecified cavalry unit as 
a precaution to protect the right flank from the few Persian troops that had been stationed 
in the foothills. 
The strength of the Macedonian army at Issus was very similar indeed to that at 
the Granicus; there were, however, two new missile units, the Thessalian javelin men and 
the Cretan archers. The Greek allied troops and the Greek mercenaries are not mentioned 
during the battle, and were perhaps used as a second line, much as will be seen at 
Gaugamela, or, more likely, were left to guard the Pillar of Jonah and other key strategic 
points in the region. Alexander's front line strength at Issus was around 5,100 cavalry and 
14,000 infantry. 616 
Certain conclusions can be drawn from Alexander's initial dispositions: that he 
intended a defensive action on his left seems clear; Parmenio was not given enough 
troops to do anything else. That the main thrust of the attack was to come in the form of 
the cavalry on the right seems equally clear. The heavy infantry were stationed in the 
centre as usual, but we can not speculate upon their orders simply from their positioning; 
they could be intended to be offensive or defensive, only time would indicate their true 
purpose. The initial dispositions, then, were very similar to every one of Alexander's set 
piece battles; there appeared little innovation at this point. 
Persian Order of Battle 
By the time Alexander arrived on the battlefield, Darius had already deployed his 
troops. His dispositions strongly indicate that he had a well developed tactical position. 
611 Arrian 2.8.4. 
612 Son of Seleucus rather than the historian, Ptolemy son of Lagus. 
613 Curtius 3.9.7-8; Arian 2.8.4. 
614 Diodorus 17.17.4, establishes the approximate numbers as follows: Companions, 1,800, Thessalians, 
1,800, Prodromoi and Paeonians c. 750. There had been reinforcements of 300 companions and 200 
Thessalians since 334 but these would mainly have replaced losses. 
615 Diodorus 17.17.4; Arrian 2.8.9; 2.9.2; Curtius 3.9.8. 
616 Ashley, 1998,225. 
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Darius evidently had studied Alexander's dispositions at the Granicus, and expected 
Alexander to deploy in much the same way. To counter the central strength of the 
Macedonian heavy infantry, he deployed his Greek mercenary troops in the centre, 617 
under the command of Thymondas whom Darius had recalled from the Aegean to take 
this command 618 The Greek mercenaries were stationed along a stretch of banks between 
500m and 1.6km from the coast. 619 In this area the banks were steep enough to remove 
the possibility of attack from cavalry. 620 Deploying Greek mercenary troops in this area 
was tactically very sound indeed - the steep banks would make an assault by cavalry 
impossible, and would severely disrupt the Macedonian heavy infantry. Adding to the 
defensive strength he created several abatis, essentially temporary defensive palisades, 621 
at the most vulnerable points. Arrian and Curtius, following Callisthenes, 622 both give the 
strength of the Greek mercenary force at 30,000, but given their location this must be a 
serious overestimate. They were stationed opposite the hypaspists and pezhetairoi, which 
themselves numbered 12,000, and as they did not seriously overlap the Macedonians we 
can assume that, if their depth was the same as their opponents', their numbers would 
have been similar. 623 
There is considerable disagreement in the sources regarding the Persian order of 
battle, particularly with regard to the infantry. Arrian shows little interest in the minutiae 
of the Persian line-up, apart from the front line, and those troops that Darius posted in the 
foothills to the extreme left of his line. With the exception of these troops Arrian makes 
specific reference only to the Greek mercenary infantry and to the Cardaces, 
624 whom he 
describes as hoplites, clearly believing them to be heavy infantry. Arrian states clearly 
that the Cardaces were stationed to either side of the Greek mercenaries and numbered 
60,000 625 Callisthenes, 626 however, tells us equally clearly that the Persians drew up their 
cavalry next to the sea with the Greek mercenaries next to them, a group of peltasts to 
their left stretching all the way to the Amanus Mountains. Given the limitations of space 
in the plain, and the large mass of cavalry by the seashore, it seems highly unlikely that 
Arrian could be correct that the Cardaces were posted to either side of the Greek 
mercenaries. The Cardaces, in all likelihood, should be identified with the peltasts of 
Callisthenes. These peltasts were stationed along the mid section of the Pinarus River, 
between 1.6km and 3.5km from the coast. This section of the river was virtually 
impassable even for light infantry: their main function was to screen the left of the Greek 
mercenaries and defend against small scale crossings by the Macedonians. Light infantry 
617 Arrian 2.8.6. 
618 Curtius 3.8.1. 
619 Devine, 1985b, 47. 
620 Arrian 2.10.1; 2.10.5. The description comes ultimately from Callisthenes, who described the banks as 
"precipitous and inaccessible": Polybius 12.17.5. 
61 Arrian 2.10.1. 
622 Arrian, 2.8.6. Curtius 3.9.2. Polybius 12.18.2. 
623 Although we must note that there is no indication in any of the sources as to what their depth actually 
was; it could be that they were 16 or 20 deep which would put their numbers at 24,000-30,000. 
624 Arrian 2.8.6; cf. Polybius 12.17.7. 
" Arrian 2.8.6. 
626 Polybius 12.17.7. 
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could also be used to move rapidly up or downstream to oppose a breakthrough by the 
Macedonians 627 
If we are right in associating the Cardaces628 with the peltasts of Callisthenes, then 
Arrian is clearly wrong in calling them hoplites; they are also not an attempt by the 
Persians to develop a native force that could oppose Greek hoplites. 629 Arrian no doubt 
simply made the error of assuming that in ancient warfare the centre of the line was 
invariably occupied by the heaviest infantry that were available. If Arrian was assuming 
this then it is understandable that he therefore believed the Cardaces to be hoplites, when 
in reality they were light-armed peltasts. Having said this we must remember that the 
Macedonian pezhetairoi and hypaspists were essentially peltasts themselves, possessing 
very little defensive armour and only a small shield. Given that they are almost always 
referred to as a phalanx, and thus regarded as being heavy infantry, we should not be too 
quick to label the Cardaces. Expressions like heavy infantry, light infantry, peltasts and 
skirmishers invite conclusions about their abilities and likely deployment which are not 
always valid. 
The Persian order of battle, then, seems to have been as follows: 630 the extreme 
right was the heavy cavalry commanded by Nabarzanes, 631 screened by a group of 
slingers and archers. Next to these were the Greek mercenary infantry in their prepared 
defensive position and commanded by Thymondas. Then came the Cardaces, perhaps 
20,000 strong or slightly more given their frontage, commanded by Aristomedes, a 
Thessalian mercenary commander. Beyond these were stationed the Hyrcanian and 
Median cavalry along with a group of unspecified Persian cavalry and a detachment of 
javelin men and slingers deployed in front of them. Behind the Persian front line was a 
reserve force of infantry for which Curtius gives the probably inflated figure of 40,000,632 
and Darius himself along with his 3,000-strong cavalry guard. It is likely that Curtius is 
correct in the location of Darius behind the front line, despite Arrian's633 seeming to place 
him in the centre of the front line; Persian monarchs did not typically fight at the front. 
Arrian 634 is cautious about giving the total number of Persian troops at 600,000, reporting 
it as hearsay, although Plutarch635 gives the same figure. Diodorus and Justin report 
400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry, whilst Curtius gives the lowest estimate, 250,000 
627 Devine, 1985b, 47. 
628 See Bosworth, 1980,208, for a description of Cardaces in the sources outside of the career of 
Alexander. 
629 Ashley, 1998,225. It is a possibility that the Persians were in fact attempting to develop a force similar 
to the Macedonian heavy infantry and this has been consistently misunderstood as an attempt to match a 
standard Greek Phalanx. The Persians had, after all, had the opportunity to witness the dominance of 
Macedonian infantry over those of the city states during Philip's rise to pre-eminence in Greece. 
630 Curtius 3.9.1-6. 
631 Curtius 3.115. 
632 Curtius 3.9.5. 
Arrian 2.8.11. 
634 Arrian 2.8.8. 
635 Plutarch Alex. 18.6 
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infantry and 62,000 cavalry. 636 All of these estimates may be too high but it is likely that 
Alexander was, as usual, heavily outnumbered. 637 
Curtius explicitly lays out Darius' tactics for the battle: he at first intended to 
occupy the foothills with a force in excess of 20,000, intending to make an encircling 
movement "both in the front and in the rear". 638 On the seaward flank he apparently 
planned a similar operation: Darius, therefore, planned a double encirclement that would 
press Alexander from every direction. The strategy was sound if the topography allowed 
for it, as it had for the Persians at Cunaxa, and would at Gaugamela. At Issus, however, 
the plain was narrow and Alexander's flanks were protected by the sea to the west and 
the Amanus Mountains to the east. Alexander had lured Darius to the Issus plain for this 
very reason. 
Darius was no fool and realised that the plain was unsuitable for the double 
envelopment that he had planned, and his modified tactics demonstrate this. Devine639 
notes that there were several changes to this preferred plan, firstly the strong defensive 
position along the river bank already discussed. The second change was far more 
complex and involved two phases: in the first, the advance guard of the Persian army, 
consisting of cavalry, 640 archers and some light infantry, 641 were to harass the 
Macedonian column on the seaward side, as it advanced onto the plain. This sound 
stratagem was disrupted by Alexander deploying his heavy infantry in deep order to 
cover his deployment. 642 The second phase was to threaten an attack against Alexander's 
right flank, essentially to feign the envelopment strategy that had initially been planned. 
Once this had been accomplished they were to retire to the foothills and await the passing 
of the Macedonian flank, and this would present the opportunity for a version of the 
encirclement manoeuvre. The cavalry were quickly withdrawn by Darius once he saw 
that they would be ineffective in disrupting the Macedonians. BoSWorth643 doubts, 
probably correctly, the numbers of cavalry involved: 20,000 would be an extremely 
unwieldy force with which to conduct harassment operations, and would seriously disrupt 
the Persian defensive line as it withdrew across the Pinarus. 
The dominant topographical feature of the battlefield was the River Pinarus; for 
the purposes of examination it can be divided into a number of sections each with very 
different characteristics. 644 The first section had a stony river bed and shallow banks, 
perhaps 1-2m high; easily fordable by cavalry. The next section of river was narrow, 4- 
636 Diodorus 17.31.2. Justin 9.9.1. Curtius 3.2.4-9. 
637 Bosworth, 1980,209. 
638 Curtius 3.8.27-28. 
639 Devine, 1985b, 48. 
640 20,000 in number; Curtius 3.8.28. 
641 Curtius, 3.8.27-28; cf. Arrian 2.8.5: although Arrian does not mention the archers, there is no reason to 
doubt their presence. 
12 Devine, 1985b, 49. 
643 Bosworth, 1980,208. 
644 These descriptions of the three sections of the Pinarus River are based upon information preserved in the 
sources, and not on an identification of the ancient river with any of the modern rivers in the region, which 
has been argued is difficult. 
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15m; its banks were steep and impassable to cavalry except at two narrow fords. 645 The 
banks in the third section were steep, from 2-4m, effectively prohibiting both infantry and 
cavalry action. The final section of the river, leading into the foothills, was wide with 
precipitous banks, a minimum of 3m high rising to 10m in places, the only crossing point 
being a ford perhaps 3.5km from the sea. 6' 
Darius evidently attempted to open the battle by sending a unit of cavalry across 
the ford on his left wing. It quickly became apparent to him, however, that the 
narrowness of that ford and the steepness of the banks along that section of the river 
would seriously hamper any encounter in that area. AshleyTM7 has argued that this 
movement of cavalry was a response to Alexander attempting to lure the Persians across 
the river: this would tend to fit with the general strategy of always fighting on terrain of 
his choosing, and of sacrificing a small unit to draw the enemy out of a defensive 
position; but the fact that the troops were withdrawn by Darius suggests that their 
movement was proactive rather than reactive on the part of Darius, that he was attempting 
to open the battle himself rather than reacting to Alexander's lure. ArrianTMS tells us that 
these troops were quickly withdrawn without an engagement and the bulk of the Persian 
cavalry strength was transferred to the Persian right. What remained on Darius' left was a 
relatively small force of cavalry and some light infantry in the foothills who were 
instructed to attack Alexander's flanks as they attempted to pass the ford. Darius 
evidently believed that an attack in strength across the upper section of the Pinarus would 
be difficult to execute but far easier to defend against. 
Once it had become apparent to Alexander that the main thrust of the Persian 
offensive would come against his own left flank, he ordered the Thessalian cavalry to 
reinforce the left, taking care to conceal their movement behind the infantry. TM9 Bosworth 
notes that Arrian does not give us any information regarding exactly how Alexander 
managed, or even proposed, to hide the movement of 1,800 cavalry from one flank to the 
other. 65° He also notes, however, that at the time of the transfer the plain was only just 
wide enough for some cavalry to occupy ground at the side of the heavy infantry. 65 This 
cavalry was almost certainly the Companions, and thus the Thessalians were not at the 
front line at this time. Coupling this with the fact that the infantry would have held their 
sarissa upright so far from the enemy, and considering the amount of dust thrown up by 
the movement of tens of thousands of men and horses, it is not difficult to see how such a 
transfer could have been concealed. We should note the possibility that Alexander had 
always intended to employ the Thessalians on the left, as he did in every major 
engagement, and that the fact that the transfer had not occurred before this point is simply 
an indication of the lack of space in the plain; they would have had to wait until the 
infantry was sufficiently far advanced on to the plain to allow them to move from the 
6t5 Delbrück 1920,204; Ashley, 1998,223. 
Distance from sea - Devine, 1985b, 49. Topographical data taken from Arrian 2.10.1; Delbrück 1920, 
206; Hackett, 1989,113; Ashley 1998,222-3. 
647 Ashley 1998,223, 
6`8 Arrian 2.9.2. 
649 Arrian 2.9.1. 
10 Bosworth, 1980,210. 
65' Arrian 2.8.9. 
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pass, to the left. The counter to this argument, of course, is the fact that both Arrian and 
Curtius652 specifically tell us that the Thessalians and Macedonians were posted to the 
right initially, with only the Peloponnesians on the left. 
This enforced653 movement of the Thessalians prompted Alexander to re-examine 
the tactical situation on his right flank. On his right, next to the Companions, he now 
posted the prodromoi under Protomachus, the Paeonian cavalry commanded by Ariston 
and Antiochus' Macedonian archers. To the extreme right Alexander deployed Attalus 
and his Agrianians and an unspecified unit of cavalry, along with one of archers. It can 
reasonably be assumed that this unit of cavalry were the Odrysians who are not 
mentioned in any account of the battle, but are presumably present. This final group on 
the right wing was drawn up at an angle654 to the front line and essentially formed the 
prototype of the flank guards that were so crucial to Alexander's success at 
Gaugamela. 655 Arrian also tells us that Alexander intended to divide his right wing into 
two prongs, the first to attack across the river and the flank guard to attack into the 
foothills. We will see many times during this study that Alexander frequently and 
deliberately allowed the army to lose its cohesion by separating off sections if it served 
his tactical purpose; as, for example, at the Granicus and the Hydaspes. 
The tactical situation on the left was similar, although far less complex, than on 
the right. The Thracian javelin-men under Sitalces and the Cretan archers were stationed 
to the left of the heavy infantry, forming a flank guard and a link with the Greek allied 
cavalry. 656 This force was entirely inadequate to the task of resisting the charge of the 
massed Persian cataphracti that opposed them. 657 
While the transfer of the Thessalians was occurring, Alexander completed his 
tactical dispositions by placing the Greek mercenary infantry in their usual position 
behind the Macedonian heavy infantry as a reserve, 658 as he was to do again at 
Gaugamela. 659 The contingent supplied by the League of Corinth is not mentioned as 
taking any role in the battle; but this should not surprise us greatly as Arrian's list of 
Alexander's dispositions is not comprehensive. He omits, for example, the Odrysian 
cavalry and Balacrus' javelin-men as well. 660 We can reasonably assume that at least 
652 Sian 2.9.1; Curtius 3.9.8. 
653 Assuming, of course, that it was the product of the changing Persian dispositions. 
654 Sian 2.9.2-3. 
ess Devine, 1985b, 50. 
bsb Arrian 2.8.9. 
bsý Curtius 3.11.15; and Arrian 2.11.4, both tell us that both horse and rider in the Persian heavy cavalry 
were covered with plate armour, thus losing considerable mobility. The finest of the Persian heavy cavalry 
were the Saca horsemen, who played a significant role at Gaugamela (Arrian 3.13.4). The Bactrian and 
Sogdianian cavalry were not present at Issus (Arrian 3.8.3; Curtius 3.2.9) and the cataphracti mentioned at 
Issus were probably Parthian. There were definitely Hyrcanian cavalry present at Issus (Curtius 3.2.6,9-5) 
and it is reasonable to assume the Parthians would also be present given that they seem to have formed a 
single satrapy (Berve, 1926,264-5). Curtius 3.9.8-9; Arrian 2.9.1; 2.9.3. 
658 Devine, 1985b, 50. Griffith, 1935,32, notes that at Gaugamela their line was not continuous; the same 
may well have been the case here. 
659 Arrian 3.12.1; 3.14.6. 
660 Bosworth, 1980,210. 
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some of the 7,000 infantry supplied by the League of Corinth formed a second line along 
with the Greek mercenary infantry, 661 but their lack of direct involvement in the battle led 
to them being omitted by our sources. 
As Arrian puts it: "Alexander observed a certain weakness on his right", 662 partly 
because the Persian line was strong and partly because it extended far beyond the 
Macedonian line into the mountains. 663 Alexander countered this first by moving two Hai 
of Companion Cavalry 664 from closer to the centre to add depth to the prodromoi and 
Paeonians already there, and by adding depth rather than extending the line, their 
movements would have been partially concealed from the Persians. 665 Callisthenes tells 
us that Alexander had deliberately avoided deploying into the foothills so as to avoid the 
Persian skirmishers there, until he was ready. 666 Alexander's final dispositions were to 
transfer the Macedonian archers from the right of the heavy infantry, the Agrianians and 
some Greek mercenaries from the reserve line, at the extreme right, into the mountains 667 
This resulted, according to Arrian, in Alexander's line actually outflanking the Persian 
left. 668 The only remaining troops stationed in the foothills were two ilai of cavalry; 669 
Curtius seems to imply that they were the same units that were detached from the centre 
to the right, 670 mentioned above: but it is highly unlikely that Alexander would use such a 
large number of his elite heavy cavalry on a mission better suited to light cavalry. Devine, 
probably correctly, suggests that this may have been an attempt by Curtius to simplify 
Alexander's complex dispositions. 671 
From the Persian perspective, Darius' plan to outflank Alexander by deploying 
troops in the foothills was entirely sensible, but failed completely due to Alexander's 
ability to react to the fluid situation on the battlefield. Having said this, the tactical 
situation on the opposite wing was developing well for Darius. The sources differ widely 
on the detail of the engagement in this sector; in Arrian the engagement is of little 
importance, an adjunct to the fighting in the centre and on Alexander's right. Arrian 
clearly states that "The Persian cavalry facing Alexander's Thessalians refused, once the 
battle had developed, to remain inactive on the further side of the stream, but charged 
across in a furious onslaught on the Thessalian squadrons". 672 The fighting was 
undoubtedly fierce and the Persians did not give way until they saw Darius in flight in the 
661 Again, as was the case at Gaugamela; Arrian 3.12.4. 
662 Arrian 2.9.3. 
663 Arrian 2.8.7. 
1 The ilai in question are those from Anthemus commanded by Peroedas and the so called Leugaean 
squadron under Pantordanus, son of Cleander; Arrian 2.9.3. Bosworth, 1980,211, notes that Anthemus was 
the name of a city, a district and a river, probably in the valley of the Vasilikoitkos River on the shores of 
the Thermaic gulf immediately south of Thessolonica (Hammond, 1976,190-1); members of this ile had 
probably received their estates from Philip II. 
5 Bosworth, 1980,211. 
Polybius 12.21.5. 
Arrian 2.9.2; cf. Bosworth, 1980,211. 
Arrian 2.9.3. 
69 Curtius 3.9.10-11; 3.11.2; Arrian 2.9.4. 
670 Curtius 3.11.2. Atkinson, 1980,226; Hammond, 1981,104. 
671 Devine, 1985b, 51. 
672 Arrian 2.11.2-3. 
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centre; only then were they routed, suffering the most significant losses of the battle 
whilst being pursued by Parmenio. 673 Arrian's reduction of the significance of the role of 
the Thessalians and Parmenio in the battle is part of a long series of instances noted in 
previous chapters of attempts by Ptolemy to reduce the significance of Parmenio whilst 
glorifying Alexander's role in the battle. 
Curtius' account is somewhat different: in this account the battle actually began 
on the Macedonian left wing. 674 Curtius tells us explicitly that the Persians attacked along 
the shoreline against the Peloponnesian and Greek allied cavalry before the Thessalians 
arrived; indeed their dispatch by Alexander seems to have come as a reaction to this 
opening Persian move. 675 We can also gather from Curtius' narrative that the 
Peloponnesians and allied Greeks may have inadvertently begun the battle by straying 
into Persian missile range: "they had now come within javelin-range when the Persian 
cavalry made a furious charge on the left wing of their enemy". 676 
Curtius goes on to say that: 677 
When the Macedonian saw this he ordered two ilai to 
maintain a position on the ridge while he promptly 
transferred the rest to the heart of the danger. Then he 
withdrew the Thessalian cavalry from the fighting line, 
telling their commander to pass unobtrusively behind 
the Macedonian rear and join Parmenio. 
Perhaps Curtius used a source biased towards Parmenio, whilst Arrian's 
demonstrated an anti-Parmenio stance. 678 
Airian679 ascribes the confidence in the Persian heavy cavalry to Darius, and it 
may be that Darius was confident enough before the battle to send a communication to 
Demosthenes in Athens680 almost guaranteeing victory. Curtius' emphasis seems to be 
that Darius preferred a cavalry battle not necessarily because of great confidence in this 
arm, but because he did not believe his infantry could win victory in the centre. 681 
Curtius' brief account gives us valuable insight into Alexander's tactical 
thinking. 682 Alexander's initial dispositions may, at first sight, suggest that he believed 
673 Devine, 1985b, 51, Callisthenes also seems to place the opening of the battle on the Macedonian left: 
Polybius 12.18.11. 
674 Curtius 3.11.1; cf. Diodorus 33.2-3; Devine, 1985b, 51. 
675 Atkinson, 198,225. 
676 Curtius 3.11.1. 
677 Curtius 3.11.2-4. 
678 Atkinson, 198,225. 
679 Arrlan 2.6.5. 
680 Aeschines 3.164, Demosthenes evidently flourished some letters, possibly communications from Darius; 
cf. Atkinson, 1980,226. 
681 Curtius 3.11.1. 
682 Devine, 1985b, 51. 
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that he was going to be fighting a cavalry battle on both flanks; as he approached the 
Pinarus River, Alexander evidently came to the conclusion that the foothills were entirely 
unsuitable for a cavalry battle. Darius had evidently already arrived at the same 
conclusion and transferred the bulk of his cavalry to the coastal strip. Alexander 
countered the Persian move by transferring the Thessalians to the left flank; the fact that 
he gave instruction for them to hide their movement behind the infantry line suggests that 
he intended to surprise the Persians on that wing. This is a typical, and reasonable, 
interpretation of the situation as put forward by Devine; it does not, however, go quite far 
enough in my view. Alexander had spent a considerable amount of time in this region 
prior to the battle and would have known the terrain well; it seems unlikely that he would 
have made such a tactical blunder as not to realise initially that the foothills were 
unsuitable for a cavalry action, and if we accept this point then what was Alexander 
doing? It seems likely that in accordance with Alexander's usual tactical plan, he 
intended to lure the Persians into attacking where it was most advantageous to Alexander. 
Regarding Alexander's deployment, Darius took this to be a mistake on the part of 
Alexander and reorganised his troops to make a massive, and he hoped decisive, blow 
against Alexander's left. This is, I believe, exactly what Alexander wanted: Devine683 is 
right in so far as Alexander ordered the Thessalians to conceal their movement behind the 
heavy infantry684 line in order to make a surprise flanking counter-attack against the 
Persian cavalry. This could also explain the view suggested above that the Peloponnesian 
and Allied Greek cavalry strayed too close to the Persians intentionally in order to 
provoke an attack, even though they were massively outnumbered. Alexander simply 
outmanoeuvred Darius into fighting a battle on Alexander's terms. 
Devine has argued that the absence of the Allied Greek cavalry from the 
narratives of the battle implies that their stand against the Persians was 
"unmemorable", 685 and that they must have been attacked before they could form up. It is 
more likely, as argued above; that their failure was simply part of Alexander's tactical 
plan, and the surviving narratives omitting them is more to do with not wishing to glorify 
troops that did not form a core part of the army; instead concentrating on the role of the 
Thessalians and Parmenio on this flank. The sources do not credit Alexander with great 
genius in laying the trap here for a number of possible reasons. They may not have 
understood the nuances of the plan, actually believing it to be a mistake. If they did, then 
it was a mistake by untrained Greek Allies, and Alexander could hardly be blamed for 
that. They also have him reacting brilliantly to the situation and saving the day, thereby 
demonstrating the tactical and speed of reaction that was one of his greatest strengths as a 
commander. Whatever the reality of what occurred on the left flank, mistake or superb 
tactics, the Persians had enough discipline to maintain their formation and ride over one 
He of Thessalians. 686 The superior mobility of the Thessalians carried the victory, 
683 Devine, 1985b, 51. 
684 Hammond, 1981,103, notes the availability of "dead ground" behind the heavy infantry that would have 
aided in the concealment. 
685 Devine, 1985b, 52. 
686 Curtius 3.11.14. 
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rN, 
however: maintaining their usual rhomboidal formations they were able to drive 
Nabarzanes' cataphracti back across the Pinarus. 687 
The tactic of using a relatively weak body of cavalry as bait to draw a stronger 
force of enemy cavalry on to unfavourable ground and into a position where they could 
be exposed to a flankinf attack by other, stronger Macedonian units, is a regular feature 
of Alexander's battles .6$ At the Granicus in the previous year, Alexander sacrificed his 
advanced cavalry guard in order to throw the Persian cavalry guarding the ford into 
confusion. 689 At Gaugamela two years later, Alexander ordered the mercenary cavalry 
under Menidas to attack the vastly stronger Bactrian and Scythian cavalry commanded by 
Bessus, who were, at the time, moving around his right flank with the evident objective 
of attacking Alexander's rear. Menidas' cavalry were driven back and suffered heavy 
losses, but the attack was enough to cause confusion among Bessus' troops, which 
Alexander exploited by then committing his Paeonians, Prodromoi and a large body of 
mercenary infantry. 690 At Issus, the stratagem was relatively simple, but a tried and tested 
one. The allied Greek cavalry did not need to be particularly convincing, perhaps making 
a slight feint; but the Persian cataphracti were eager to attack a seemingly weak enemy. 
The result of Persian overconfidence was that they exposed their flanks to 1,800 well 
trained Thessalians, falling neatly into Alexander's trap. This was a seemingly simple 
tactic, but one that was devastatingly effective, and one which Alexander perfected: "both 
Issus and Gaugamela saw it progressively developed and ingeniously adapted to specific 
circumstances and topographical conditions". 9 This is essentially the same tactic 
repeated a number of times, but it is far more complex than that. This tactic was used in 
different situations on different terrain and against different enemies each time. On every 
occasion Alexander needed to disguise his tactical plan by developing new means of 
deploying his troops in order to draw the Persians into his trap. The fact that it was 
gradually developed for every situation is the true adaptability. It is this kind of 
adaptability, the ability to fight in all conditions and all terrains, which marks Alexander 
out as a military genius. 
In contrast to the complexity on the left, the battle on the right was far less 
innovative. 692 Arrian gives us a view of a spectacular cavalry charge, using the metaphor 
of the line surging forward like a wave to fall upon the enemy. 693 This metaphor is clearly 
modelled on Xenophon's famous description of the Greek charge at Cunaxa, 694 and is 
entirely incorrect. 5 There was simply no room for the battle to be conducted as Arrian 
described; it seems far more likely that the Persian left was driven back from the ford by 
687 Curtius 3.11.15; tells us that the Persians horses and riders were weighed down by "rows of armour 
plating". Arrian Tact. 16.3; Aelian Tact. 18.2 
$8 Devine, 1985b, 52. 
689 Arrian 1.15.3; cf. Badian, 1977,289-290. cf. 57-8,255. 
690 Arrian 3.13.3; cf. Devine, 1975,383-384. 
691 Devine, 1985b, 52. 
692 But at the same time, it did not need to be. 
693 flan 2.10.3; 2.10.5. 
694 Xenophon Anab. 1.8.18. 
695 Bosworth, 1980,213. 
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a combination of the cavalry and light infantry units on Alexander's right, namely the 
Prodromoi, the Paeonians, the Macedonian archers and the Agrianians. 696 
Hammond is surely incorrect in having Alexander lead the h1paspists in this 
initial push over the river against nothing more than Persian archers; 6 7 he argued that 
because there were only two small fords over the river on the Macedonian right it follows 
that the hypaspists would cross in line. He further argues that had the Companion Cavalry 
led the attack they would have been funnelled into two narrow areas and would have 
suffered heavy casualties. Hammond's case originates with his knowledge of the 
topographical6 8 difficulties of the area; he attempts to rationalise the charge in Arrian 699 
and justify his position by arguing that "the expression `dromdi'... is generally used of an 
infantry charge". 0° A brief examination of the text of Arrian701 does not support this 
theory: besides 2.10.3, Arrian used `droinöi' 15 times in his military narratives; 02 three 
of these refer exclusively to cavalry, 703 three to combined units of cavalry and infantry, 704 
two are indeterminate 705 and only seven706 definitely refer exclusively to infantry. 707 It 
seems, then, that we cannot use `dromo' to state specifically that infantry made the initial 
attack; the hypaspists were probably closer to the coast, occupying their typical position 
between the heavy infantry in the centre and the troops on the right. 
The theory that cavalry cannot attack across a river simply does not fit with the 
evidence we have, nor was it the case at the Granicus. It seems likely that the Prodromoi 
and Paeonians attacked first because they were a little less encumbered by armour and 
thus more mobile; and it is highly likely that they would have been supported by light 
infantry like the Agrianians in their initial assault, 708 the Companions being spared for an 
attack on open ground once the river crossing had been achieved. Ashley, following 
Hammond's lead, is further incorrect in having the Cardaces stationed directly behind the 
archers with the evident confusion of the former retreating into and through the latter. 709 
Once the light cavalry, supported by the Agrianians and archers, had forced the 
crossing, they held the enemy at bay while the Companions forded the river, ile by ile, 
696 Devine, 1985b, 52. 
697 Hammond, 1981,104. 
698 Although this, of course, is made far from easy by the changes in the courses in rivers in the Issus plain, 
and by our lack of specific knowledge as to which of the current rivers can be equated with the Pinarus. 
699 Arrian 2.10.3; 2.10.5. 
"'Hammond, 1981,104. 
701 Devine, 1985b, 52, n. 80. 
702 Only 12 of those in the Anabasis. 
703 Arrian 3.15.1; 3.21.9; 6.6.6. 
704 Arrian 2.4.6; 3.14.2; 3.18.6. 
pos Sian 4.16.1; 4.16.3. 
706 Arrian 1.6.7; 4.26.3; 5.16.1; 5.24.2; Indica 24.6; 24.7; Ect. 29. 
'Ö' Diodorus uses `dromöi' three times exclusively of infantry (4.52.4; 14.23.1; 15.55.3) and once 
indeterminately (18.34.1). Shrimpton, 1980,34, n. 16, notes that Herodotus 9.59.1 and Thucydides 1.63.1 
use `dromöi' to describe the movement of soldiers wading through water. 
708 Again, as at the Granicus River; cf. 57-9. 
709 Ashley, 1998,227. 
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and once on the far bank formed up into their wedge formations. 10 Once in formation, 
the Companions took over from the light cavalry, charging at the remaining cavalry on 
the Persian left, the Hyrcanians and Medes, in the face of defensive fire from the nearby 
Persian archers . 
711 Darius had weakened his left in order to deliver what he hoped would 
be a hammer blow against the supposedly weak Macedonian left, but this decision proved 
fatal. The Persian left quickly melted away under the onslaught of the fresh Companion 
Cavalry. 712 Once this breakthrough had been achieved, Alexander wheeled the 
Companions to their left to fall upon the Persian centre, where Darius was stationed. This 
flanking attack, such a hallmark of Alexander, was perfectly timed to coincide with the 
attack of the hypaspists under Nicanor, and the two taxeis of the heavy infantry on the 
right. 713 With the hypaspists and pezhetairoi attacking the Persian centre, and 
Alexander's cavalry attacking on the right, there seems to have been a gap in the 
Macedonian line between the two; evidently Alexander did not expect the Cardaces to 
attack over the river, as they were stationed along a section with high precipitous banks. 
The separation of Alexander's army into essentially two arms, the left and centre on the 
one hand, and Alexander's attack on the extreme right, is highly reminiscent of my 
interpretation of the battle of the Granicus River, and indeed of the Hydaspes. The shock 
of the Macedonian heavy infantry attack across the river, combined with a flanking attack 
by Alexander and the Companion Cavalry, was simply too much for the Persian centre to 
handle. They quickly began to retreat, following the lead of Darius himself. 714 
Bosworth notes Arrian's narrative as being "remarkably laconics715 in this phase 
of his account, and notes that the troops Alexander attacked on his right were those 
stationed to the extreme left of the Persian formation, virtually in the mountains. 
16 
Plutarch confirms the general position of Alexander's attack on the right and that the 
battle was rapid on that flank. 7' 
Curtius718 places great emphasis upon Alexander's desire for opimum decus, 719 in 
this case the death or capture of Darius. In spite of the overly dramatic feel to this 
statement, it may very well have been Alexander's main aim; killing Darius would 
effectively have ended the war and prevented the necessity for a Gaugamela. 720 With this 
plan in mind, Alexander would likely have expected to find Darius in the centre of the 
Persian line'721 but because of the steep banks along that stretch of the Pinarus, a direct 
frontal assault was impossible. Once a successful crossing had been achieved on the right, 
""Devine, 1983,201-202. 
711 Arrian 2.10.3. 
712 Arrian 2.10.4; 2.11.4. 
713 Those of Coenus and Perdiccas. 
714 Curtius 3.11.7-8; 3.11.11; Diodorus 17.33.5; 17.34.2-7; Arrian 2.11.4. 
715 Bosworth, 1980,213. 
716 Arrian 2.10.4; cf. 2.8.7. 
717 Plutarch, Alex. 20.8. 
719 Curtius 3.11.7. 
719 A variant of the usual opima spolia, the arms taken in battle from a defeated enemy (as at Curtius 
7.4.40). 
720 Cyrus the Younger made a similar attempt upon his brothers Artaxerxes at Cunaxa in 401; Xenophon 
Anabasis 1.8.26-7. 
721 Arrian 2.7.8-9. 
104 
however, Alexander wheeled towards the Persian centre. This movement, coupled with 
the heavy infantry attack in the centre, essentially created a two-pronged penetration. In 
order to protect himself from the possibility of a counter-attack, Alexander created a 
second flank guard; the prodromoi, Paeonians, two ilai of Companions, the Macedonian 
archers, the Agrianians and some Greek mercenary infantry. The need for this flank guard 
was limited as the Persian extreme left had melted away; it would only have been used if 
that flank had had the discipline to reform, but it evidently did not. 
The engagement in the centre of the line between the pezhetairoi and the Greek 
mercenary infantry of Darius was almost completely ignored by Curtius, 722 who chose to 
concentrate on Alexander's action on the right, no doubt reflecting a bias in his source. 
Arrian, who gives some details, does not present an exhaustive or a particularly clear 
narrative. Arrian does tell us that the fighting was vigorous and brutal; he explains this by 
means of the river banks that were steep in many places, and because of the pezhetairoi's 
movement towards their own right. 23 It is clear that the heavy infantry were not making a 
basic frontal assault but that an intricate tactical plan was being played out. 
Commensurate with the desire for the pezhetairoi to coordinate their attack with 
Alexander, they needed to move en echelon, with the two right-hand taxeis724 leading the 
way, along with the hypaspists. 
Once the right-hand two pezhetairoi taxeis crossed the river, they turned to their 
left to make a flanking attack against the Greek mercenary infantry, an attack timed to 
coincide with the full attack of the remaining four pezhetairoi taxeis across the river. 725 
The hypaspists, on the other hand, seem to have continued advancing towards Darius and 
his bodyguards; this attack coinciding with Alexander's flanking attack from the extreme 
right. Arrian makes little or no mention of the Cardaces during the battle; this is not 
altogether surprising when we consider that the fighting simply passed them by. There 
seem to have been no Macedonian troops immediately opposing them: given that the 
banks were precipitous, they could have done little to prevent Alexander's cavalry charge 
on their left flank by the Companions. They also evidently did not react fast enough to the 
crossing of the hypaspists, who essentially ignored them and made straight for Darius. 
The final element of the fighting that we must consider is the action surrounding 
Darius himself. Arrian portrays Darius fleeing the field almost at the outset of the battle, 
but Bosworth notes the possibility of a heroic stand by Darius' bodyguard as potentially 
being suppressed by Arrian or his sources. 726 The two traditions probably should not be 
conflated as is attempted by Tarn. 727 Arrian is, indeed, the only source to present this 
picture; the vulgate tradition speaks of vicious fighting around Darius and notes that he 
only fled when his horses began to panic and capture appeared imminent. 728 The vulgate 
account appears to be the one accepted by history; and the Alexander mosaic from the 
722 Curtius 3.11.4-5. 
723 Arrian 2.11.4-5. 
724 Those of Coenus and Perdiccas. 
'u Arrian 2.11.1. 
726 Arrian 2.11.4; Bosworth, 1980,214. 
727 Tarn, 1948,1.27. 
728 Diodorus 17.34.2-7; Curtius 3.11.7-12; Justin 11.9.9. 
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house of the Faun at Pompeii depicts either this stage of the fighting here, or the 
equivalent stage from the battle of Gaugamela. 729 If Arrian is to be accepted, then the 
entirety of the vulgate tradition must be dismissed on this point. If Arrian's account is 
correct, it likely originates with the court history; Callisthenes seems unlikely to have 
produced an account where Darius is seen as being almost as heroic as Alexander, despite 
his initial assertion that the two kings wished to meet on the field of battle. 30 One final 
circumstantial piece of evidence for the last stand of Darius is that if he had fled 
immediately his officers are unlikely to have continued to fight bravely; 731 flight would 
also have made raising another army at Gaugamela almost impossible if he had shown 
himself to be a coward. 732 We can assume, therefore, that the vulgate tradition is correct 
in that the fighting surrounding Darius was fierce, and Darius' withdrawal occurred only 
when there was no alternative. 
Connected with the flight of Darius is a theme that yet again echoes Gaugamela, 
the request for assistance, 733 this time by the Macedonian centre. 734 Arrian tells us that 
Alexander immediately turned back once news reached him that the heavy infantry were 
in trouble, and did not resume the pursuit of Darius until the whole of the Persian army 
was routed. 735 Curtius' account is very similar, clearly deriving from the same source; 
Alexander only pursued Darius once the Persian right wing was in full retreat 736 
Devine737 speculates that it is far more likely that Alexander initially pursued Darius from 
the field for the four or five stades that Plutarch738 credits Darius with being able to cover 
in a matter of minutes. The pursuit this far is reasonable enough within the bounds of 
battlefield manoeuvres, but it is unlikely that Alexander pursued Darius immediately for 
the 200 stades that Diodorus credits him with. 739 The only evidence for this is the (quite 
reasonably) presumed desire of Alexander to kill or capture Darius. 
Casualties 
Diodorus, Curtius and Arrian all give the same Persian casualty figures: 100,000 
infantry and 10,000 cavalry. 740 Plutarch gives a round 110,000 total for the whole army 
and, Justin differs from both in his 61,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry along with 40,000 
729 Bosworth, 1980,215. 
730 Polybius 12.22.2. 
731 Murison, 1972,422. 
732 Marsden, 1964,5-6. 
733 Arrian 3.15.3; Curtius 4.15.6-8; 4.16.2-3; 4.16.19; Plutarch Alex. 32.3-4; 33.6. 
734 Arrian 2.11.7; at Gaugamela the request (if it existed at all) was from Parmenio. 
735 Arrian 2.11.7. 
736 Curtius 3.11.16. 
737 Devine, 1985b, 54; he speculates that Alexander turning back to help the beleaguered pezhetairoi was 
simply an apologetic device to remove any blame from Alexander for showing little or no interest in the 
well being of the heavy infantry. 
738 Four or five stades equals 0.74km and 0.925km; this is the head start that Darius apparently had over 
Alexander (Plutarch Alex. 20.10; Bosworth, 1980,216 notes that this distance is very small, suggesting that 
Darius did not flee at the onset of the battle. Plutarch Alex. 20.10. 
739 18.5km. Diodorus 17.37.2 
740 Diodorus 17.36.6; Curtius 3.11.27; Arrian 2.11.8. 
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taken prisoner. 741 The only source to dissent slightly from these massive numbers is the 
Oxyrhynchus Historian, who gives a total of 50,000 Persian infantry casualties and 3,000 
cavalry, along with an unspecified number of mercenaries. 742 If we assume this 
unspecified number to have been of the order of 10,000 then we have almost the same 
totals as in Justin. 743 Persian losses for the battle are massively inflated by our sources 
and we can never know the true figure; the best we can say, however, is that Persian 
losses would have been significant. This would have been partly due to the vicious nature 
of the fighting that comes through in our sources, and partly because of the pursuit of the 
fleeing enemy, albeit a limited pursuit. 
Macedonian losses are a little more believable, if probably underestimated. The 
most frequently cited figure for cavalry losses is 150, in Diodorus, Curtius and Justin. 744 
For infantry Diodorus gives 300, Curtius only 32, although that figure has been emended, 
with general acceptance, by Hedicke to 302, and Justin 130? 45 Arrian746 gives the lowest 
number at 120, although this is a figure only mentioned in passing and refers only to 
casualties among the pezhetairoi in their skirmish with the Greek mercenary infantry. 747 
The Oxyrhynchus Historian 748 gives the highest figure at 1,000, although this mal 
include the wounded, which Curtius puts at 504,749 and Hedicke emends to 4,500. 
Bosworth notes that both Persian and Macedonian losses are propaganda figures and 
inherently untrustworthy. 
Conclusion 
Darius' plan for the battle was sound; he evidently planned for a strong defence in 
the centre, aided by the abatis that he set up along the less steep sections of the river. It is 
clear that his tactics were not purely defensive, however, given his positioning of troops 
in the foothills with the intention of outflanking Alexander's right. His final plan, to 
attack Alexander in strength along the coast, shows Darius adapting to what he saw as the 
tactical situation of the battlefield: he believed that an opportunity had presented itself to 
deliver a decisive blow against that wing; the fact that this failed was more to do with 
Alexander's supreme planning, foresight, adaptability, and my proposal that this was 
Alexander's brilliantly laid trap, than any deficiency on the part of Darius. 
For Alexander, we can see in the Battle of Issus his supreme strategic and tactical 
ability. Firstly drawing the Persians into terrain that was best suited to his army, as he so 
often does; and secondly in the execution of the battle itself. At Issus we see a series of 
741 Plutarch Alex. 20.10; Justin 11.9.10. 
742 Oxyrhynchus Historian FGrH 148 F 44, col. 4. 
743 Bosworth, 1980,216-7. 
744 Diodorus 17.36.6; Curtius 3.11.27; Justin 11.9.10. 
745 Hedicke cited in Bosworth, 1980,217. For the 302 emendation, along with 4,500 wounded see 
Atkinson, 1980,243. Diodorus 17.36.6; Curtius 3.11.27; Justin 11.9.10. 
7' Arrian 2.11.7 gives no overall figure for Macedonian casualties. 747 Atkinson, 1980,243. 
748 Oxyrhynchus Historian FGrH 148 F 44, col. 4. 
749 Curtius 3.11.27. 
750 Cited in Bosworth, 1980,217. 
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brilliant flanking manoeuvres; the cavalry on the left luring the Persians forward only to 
be outflanked by the Thessalians moving from the right to execute a brilliantly planned 
trap. We also see Alexander forcing a crossing on the extreme right of the formation and 
then wheeling left to flank the Persian guard defending Darius. Next we see the 
hypaspists and the right-hand two pezhetairoi taxeis moving to their right to force a 
crossing of the river, then the pezhetairoi swinging left to flank the Greek mercenary 
infantry, at the same time as they were being attacked from the front by the rest of the 
heavy infantry. Finally we have the hypaspists, once across the river, swinging to the 
right to attack Darius in the opposing flank to Alexander. 
This battle is a large-scale demonstration of some of the strategic and tactical 
skills that Alexander demonstrates throughout his career. Drawing the enemy onto 
ground favourable to him, attacking the enemy on two flanks simultaneously and the 
brilliant use of every element of a combined arms force. 75' 





c c ý7 I \\\ 













3 CL 0) E EDÜ 
41 
U 



















2 y ý9 

























= o U T 






















































































































R Y y 
N 
W E a 
kV W 
V 


























































W 61 W 




























































































U a Z 
a 
Iv) 
0. W CL ro N 






















































































































j1ýý/ a °1 Q 
14 
l 
rr/ ,U 7Ü U =ä 
m1 
as 




























E ap c 

























Tyre & Gaza: 332 
Introduction 
The escape of Darius after his defeat at Issus presented Alexander with a major 
strategic decision: pursue Darius into the Persian heartlands; or continue south, as he had 
been doing, along the coast. To pursue Darius would be to leave the major Persian 
strongholds of Phoenicia and Egypt unconquered, as well as leaving the still active 
Persian fleet with bases from which potentially to take the battle to Greece, as had been 
Memnon's strategy the previous year. 752 The decision appears not to have been a difficult 
one for Alexander. He immediately set off south along the Phoenician coast towards 
Tyre, and ultimately Egypt. We also have to realise that for a man raised in the Greek 
world it would have been natural to wish to complete the conquest of the Mediterranean 
basin before moving further into the Persian heartlands. 
I)Ie 753 
Most of the coastal cities in Alexander's path, such as Byblos and Sidon, 
surrendered without a struggle. 754 On the way to Tyre, however, Alexander was met by a 
delegation of representatives offering peaceful terms. Curtius presents the Tyrians as 
more willing to accept alliance with Alexander than subjugation, which is supported by 
later events. 55 Alexander thanked them for their offer and informed them of his intention 
to make sacrifice in the temple of Heracles within the city. 56 The Tyrians refused to 
permit any Persian or Macedonian 757 entry to the city, and offered Alexander the 
opportunity to use the temple in Old Tyre, 75 on the mainland. Alexander's anger at this 
refusal is reported by both Arrian and Curtius, 759 with the latter reporting it as more as an 
irrational tantrum. 76 It is possible that Alexander anticipated the Tyrian response, or at 
the very, least used it to his advantage as a pretext, if one were needed, to storm the city. 
Curtius 61 is by far the most plausible source in describing the Tyrian reliance upon their 
752 With hindsight, we can probably say that this latter point was highly unlikely; it may not have appeared 
that way to Alexander. 
753 For the siege of Tyre see Arrian 2.16.1-24; Plutarch Alex. 24-5; Diodorus 17.40.2-46.6; Justin 11.10.10- 
14, cf. Polyaenus 4.3.3-4; 4.13.1. 
754 Arrian 2.15.6. 
755 Curtius 4.2.2. 
756 Bosworth 1980,235, notes that the temple was legendary: according to Herodotus (2.44) it dated back 
2,300 years and we know of improvements that were made during the reign of Hiram I c. 950 (Menander, 
FGrH 783 Fl). Herodotus (2.44.3) also mentions a second temple of Heracles in Tyre: this is almost 
certainly the temple in Old Tyre mentioned above. Arrian 2.15.7. 
757 Arrian 2.16.7. 
758 Curtius 4.2.4. 
759 Arrian 2.16.6; Curtius 4.2.5. 
760 Stating that "Alexander lost his temper, which he also failed to control on other occasions", Curtius 
4.2.5. 
761 Curtius 4.2.6-15. 
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defensive fortifications762 as their primary motive for resisting Alexander. Diodorus763 on 
the other hand saw it as part of a grand strategy on the part of the Persians to resist 
Alexander: this seems unlikely. 7M 
The island city of Tyre was, from the strategic standpoint, superbly sited. The 
island was separated from the mainland by a strait four stades wide. 765 Curtius also tells 
us that it was particularly exposed to south-westerly winds, a fact that will be extremely 
important during the siege.? 6 Curtius states that it was the wind that was the greatest 
obstacle to the construction of the mole. 767 The strait was relatively shallow, until a 
couple of hundred metres from the fortress; at that point the sea bed fell away quite 
dramatically and the water was three fathoms deep at that point 768 Tyrian confidence was 
further boosted by a delegation from Carthage who promised help against the 
Macedonians. 69 Curtius goes on to describe quite formidable Tyrian defences: catapults 
lining the walls, harpagones770 constructed to use against Alexander's siege engines, 
along with "ravens"77 and other devices. 
Curtius772 tells us that Alexander tried to avoid a protracted siege by offering 
terms, but the envoys were killed, leaving little option for the Macedonians. 77 
Immediately after the murder of the envoys, Alexander gathered his troops together in 
Old Tyre and gave a speech. 774 Curtius tells us that it was to overcome the reluctance of 
the troops to attack the island fortress, but the contents are not at all similar to those 
presented by Arrian. Tarn775 believed that the contents of the speech in Arrian are broadly 
authentic, but the contents are oddly out of place. The main thrust of the speech is 
regarding the impending assault upon Babylon and the need to occupy Egypt; themes that 
would be far more relevant after the victory at Issus than before Tyre. The fact of a 
762 Romane, 1987,80. 
763 Diodorus 17.40.2ff. 
764 Atkinson, 1980,295; cf. Marsden, 1964,7, in discussing Gaugamela; and Green, 1974,247. 
765 Curtius 4.2.7; Something like 750m. 
766 As does Arrian 2.20.10; Diodorus also refers to a north-west gale 42.5 and we also know of north- 
easterly gales, Atkinson 1980,296. In short, the island was very exposed! 
767 Curtius 4.2.8. 
768 Arrian 2.18.3; Curtius 4.2.9. 
769 Carthage being a foundation of Tyre; Curtius 4.2.11. 
70 Harpagones were grappling irons, invented by Pericles according to Pliny. (NH 7.56.209; cf. Diodorus 
13.50.5) They are known to have been used by Alcibiades (Polyaenus 1.40.9; cf. Diodorus 13.50.5), and 
Livy 30.10.16 describes their use by the Carthaginian navy: They were therefore something new to 
Alexander, but certainly not new to Greek warfare. 
771 Corvus (Greek korax) or ravens (perhaps crows) are not the complex grappling hook and boarding 
bridge made famous by Duilius in the first Punic War, and described by Polyaenus 1.22.4ff; Curtius 4.3.26 
is imagining a simple grappling hook of the type used at Mycale in 36; Appian B. C. 5.106. Atkinson, 1980, 
297. 
772 Curtius 4.2.15. 
73 It should be noted that none of the other sources mention this incident, Arrian 2.24.3 has a story of some 
Macedonian sailors being intercepted and thrown from the walls into the sea; this story of the envoys could 
represent a corruption of that story (or vice versa): Atkinson, 1980,298. 
" Arrian 2.17.1; Curtius 4.2.17f. 
775 Tarn, 1948.2,286f. 
776 Bosworth, 1980,238. 
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speech occurring before Tyre is highly likely, given that it appears in various forms in our 
two main sources, but the specific contents are certainly not recoverable. Arrian makes 
two further curious statements before the siege proper begins; the first that "Alexander 
had no difficulty in persuading his officers that the attempt upon Tyre must be made"; 777 
the second that "in spite of all the difficulties ... Alexander's decision to attack.. . was 
accepted". 778 Perhaps this is a rare insight into the command structure of the army: are we 
to infer, for example, that there was ever a doubt surrounding the decision and the support 
that Alexander received from his commanders? It is difficult to see what Arrian is trying 
to achieve at this point. 






ý'". `... r..,,...,, Camp 
Old Tyre 
Egyptian Harbour 
Phoenician Fleet Position 
Approximate site of 
Final Breakthrough 
Figure 19: Sketch of the Siege of Tyre 
Siege - 1S` Phase 
The siege of Tyre can be divided into two operational phases; the first which 
culminated in the destruction of the mole by means of the fire ship, and the second that 
resulted in the fall of the city. 
The defences of Tyre were legendary, and it would no doubt have been known to 
Alexander that the city had withstood a siege lasting thirteen years by the Babylonian 
'n Arrian 2.18.1. 
778 Arrian 2.18.3. 
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King Nebuchadnezzar in the sixth century. ' To a man like Alexander, however, this 
would have acted as a spur and not a deterrent. Following the speech to the troops, and 
the senior commanders apparently agreeing to besiege the citadel, Alexander was faced 
with the obvious problem of how to undertake such a task. Given that Alexander 
possessed no significant fleet, 7W certainly not one that would be comparable to that of 
Tyre, he was left with little alternative to the most direct method: to construct a mole 
from the mainland to the island, thus connecting it to the land and allowing his troops to 
attack the city directly. 78' One imagines Philip would have either agreed to the Tyrian 
terms or used some subterfuge to capture the city; Alexander was not Philip. 
Construction began on the mole almost immediately; 782 Arrian tells us that there 
was an abundant supply of stone and timber for the construction of the mole; what is left 
unsaid, however, is that this was due to Alexander's total demolition of Old Tyre. 
783 The 
initial stages of construction occurred without interference from Tyre, but the time and 
effort were prodigious; the first phase of the siege probably lasted several 
784 
"9 May, Stadler and Votan, 1984,34; Fuller, 1958,101; Ashley, 1998,239. 
780 None that was present at least; Curtius 4.1.36, mentions that Alexander, shortly before Tyre, summoned 
his fleet from Greece to the Hellespont where it defeated Aristomenes and a Persian fleet. 
'$' The idea of a mole could have come from Dionysius I's use of the same device in his siege of Motya in 
397, Diodorus 14.48.3,51; cf. Bosworth, 1980,240. 
'ffi Polyaenus 4.3.3. Claiming that Alexander took a basket and started work on the mole himself, a 
symbolic act much like throwing the spear into the ground at the crossing into Asia and claiming it "land 
won by the spear". This act is also reminiscent of the commencement of modem building projects. 
'ffi Arrian 2.18.3; Curtius 4.2.18; cf. Bosworth, 1980,240. 
710 Arrian 2.18.3. The siege as a whole lasting nine months; roughly January to September. 
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Figure 21: Tyre 
As the mole approached deeper water, closer to the fortress, the Tyrians evidently 
became worried. Once within range of projectile weapons fired from the city, the 
construction teams came under constant attack, both from the walls and from seaborne 
raids at various points along the mole. '85 To counter these raids, the Macedonians 
constructed two siege towers on the mole; they were intended to be higher than the city 
walls, so that missiles could be rained down upon the defenders, ' thus preventing them 
from attacking the construction workers. Anticipating an incendiary attack, and learning 
from the mistake at Halicarnassus, he had the towers covered with skins and hides to 
protect them. 787 Curtius several times mentions another key factor: the mole was 798 One suspects that this was due partly due to insufficient foundations, 
especially once the huge towers were built, but partly because of the prevailing winds and 
associated waves. Curtius also mentions a storm that caused considerable damage to the 
mole, none of which is found in 789 
If, as noted earlier, the idea of a mole originated with the siege of Motya, 790 then 
the idea of protecting the workers with siege engines would no doubt have come from the 
same precedent. The surprising thing is that it did not occur to Alexander to protect the 
mole and the workers in some way before suffering casualties. This reactive nature of 
Alexander's strategy is confirmed by both Arrian and Curtius who make it clear that the 
towers were there for the defence of the mole; 791 they were not the towers that were used 
'ffi Arrian 2.18.3. 
Artillery pieces were placed in the towers, Arrian 3.18.3. 
78' Arrian 2.18.3. 
'81 Curtius 4.2.8-, 3.6-7-1 Diodorus 17.42.5. 
789 Curtius 4.3.6-7. Curious, as this would have made the task of capturing Tyre more difficult and thus 
success all the more Herculean. 
790 Diodorus 14.2.23. 
791 Bosworth. 1980,240. 
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to assault the walls later in the siege, as described by Diodorus. 792 If Alexander had taken 
the time to protect the workers properly, this would have slowed the progress of the mole; 
what we see is a mistake on the part of Alexander, one caused by his impatience and 
carelessness, as the siege was already several months old and he had not engaged the 
enemy yet: this impatience led to an overall delay which is exactly what he was trying to 
avoid. 
During the first stage of the siege, the Tyrians showed themselves to be more 
flexible and proactive than the Macedonians - the fire ship is another example. The 
Tyrians filled a transport vessel with brushwood793 and other flammable materials, set up 
twin masts in its bows, from each of which were suspended cauldrons of pitch. The vessel 
was heavily ballasted aft, 794 which meant the front of the vessel was out of the water, 
allowing it to run aground on the mole more easily. 795 The vessel was evidently a horse 
transport of no ordinary Greek style; 796 Curtius stresses its enormous size and thus the 
amount of flammable material that it could contain. 797 
The fire ship was then towed, stern first, towards the mole. 798 As the transport 
vessel approached the mole, some crewmen in the ship set the kindling ablaze and leapt 
overboard to be rescued by the trireme tug-boats. Once the transport vessel made the 
mole, the towers quickly caught fire and were completely destroyed. The marines on the 
triremes landed at various points along the mole and burned the siege equipment that had 
escaped the range of the fire ship. This single ingenious counter attack, along with a 
violent storm, set the siege back months. 
After the incident, Alexander gave orders to his engineers799 that the mole be 
widened and rebuilt, 800 allowing space for more towers, and further siege engines were to 
be constructed. Palisades were also set up along the sides of the mole to protect from 
naval assault. After leaving specific instructions, Alexander left Tyre for an expedition to 
Sidon. 801 It seems that it was only now that Alexander realised that without a fleet he had 
little hope of capturing the city. 802 As has been argued throughout this work, it was 
792 Diodorus 17.42.7; although this is assumed by Fuller, 1958,210. 
793 Increasing the depth of the vessel, and thus the amount it could carry, by heightening the sides. 
794 With rocks and sand, Curtius 4.3.2. 
795 Arrian 2.19.1. 
796 Athenian horse transports of the day were essentially triremes with the lower levels of oars removed; 
this was something far larger: Morrison & Williams, 1968,248f; cf. Bosworth, 1980,240. 
797 Curtius 4.3.2. 
798 Bosworth, 1980,241, for a discussion of the language of the text. Towing the vessel from the stem 
would have been more challenging given the aft weight, but far from impossible. Cf. Arrian 2.19.3. 
799 Arrian only twice makes reference to the famous siege engineers, here and at 2.21.1. None of our extant 
sources mention any of them by name, but we can probably assume that the Thessalian Diades was among 
them; once famously described as "the man who took Tyre with Alexander" Bosworth, 1980,241. Charias 
was probably among them too, the pupil of Polyeidus, Philip's engineer at Perinthus and Byzantium. 
Charias was no doubt responsible for the stone-throwing catapults used against Halicarnassus, Tyre and 
later Gaza: Diodorus 42.7; cf. Arrian 2.21.7; Marsden, 1971,102f. 
800 Arrian 2.19.6. 
so' Arrian 2.20.1-5. 
802 Ashley, 1998,242. 
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Alexander's hallmark strategy to attack in multiple directions simultaneously: this is how 
he ultimately managed to capture the city. Not to follow that strategy until this point 
seems incredible, and a very significant mistake. The lack of a fleet made during the 
initial stages of the siege made the tactic impossible, of course, and it is probably an 
example of Alexander's arrogance that he attempted to capture the city essentially by 
brute force. The failure to defend the mole properly is also a mistake, his impatience to 
blame there; he evidently believed that taking the time to build abatis along the edges of 
the mole and to properly protect the towers would have slowed progress that was already 
proceeding too slowly for Alexander's liking. It is sobering, however, that this failure 
resulted in far greater delays than if he had taken proper precautions initially. 
Curtius presents us with a picture of a depressed Alexander, a man undecided 
whether to continue with the siege, or to abandon it; 803 his decision to stay only coming 
with the arrival of the Cyprian fleet. This is almost certainly another instance of Curtius 
misunderstanding his sources. It is likely that Alexander considered leaving, but not that 
he considered abandoning the siege. The history of his career tells us that he could never 
admit that he had been beaten, and thus Tyre had to fall. I see little reason to doubt, 
however, that Alexander himself considered leaving the siege, perhaps with Perdiccas in 
charge, and continuing the advance towards Egypt. Alexander was a man of action and 
sitting for several months while the mole was constructed without being able to engage 
the enemy at all would have been unbelievably frustrating for him. We do have an 
example of a similar action, the siege of Halicarnassus; here Alexander left before the 
final fall of the city to continue the campaign, leaving some troops behind to complete the 
capture. There may well have been discussions along these lines which Curtius confused. 
The Persian fleet had now effectively disbanded, given that most of their home 
ports were now in Alexander's hands. The fleets of many of those cities now joined 
Alexander at Sidon; Gierostratus, King of Aradus, and Enylus, King of Byblus, both 
arrived after leaving the fleet of Autophradates. 804 On a single day eighty Phoenician 
triremes arrived at Sidon, along with nine from Rhodes, three from Soli and Mallus, ten 
from Lycia and a fifty-oared vessel from Macedonia. Shortly after this the Kings of 
Cyprus arrived with 120 warships, Alexander accepted all regardless of previous 
allegiance. 805 Arrian's total number of vessels is 224, a figure roughly in agreement with 
Plutarch's 200. Curtius states that Alexander used 190 in the final assault against Tyre. 806 
Whilst the fleet was being organised, Alexander took some cavalry, the 
hypaspists, Agrianians and archers in an expedition into the Lebanese Mountains. 807 As 
always, these are the troops that Alexander used for these sorts of expeditions, where 
lightning fast movement and flexibility of arms are required. For ten days he conducted 
operations; the reasons are two-fold: partly to establish a supply of timber for the siege 
works, (massive amounts were no doubt being consumed by the mole and the siege 
803 Curtius 4.3.11. 
04 Arrian 2.20.2. 
805 Arrian 2.20.1-3; Romane, 1987,82. 
806 Plutarch Alex. 24.5; Curtius 4.3.11. 
807 Arian 2.20.4. 
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engines, as well as in cooking fires), and partly to relieve his own frustrations and those 
of his men after being unable to engage the Tyrians properly. 808 It is important to note 
that Curtius809 places the expedition against the "Arabs" before the assault by the fire 
ship. This seems an obvious device to remove any blame from Alexander by having him 
away on expedition in the Lebanese Mountains at the time. 810 Once Alexander returned to 
Sidon, he found Cleander waitin with 4,000 much-needed Greek mercenary 
reinforcements from the Peloponnese' 
Siege - 2nd Phase 
With his new fleet properly equi pied, Alexander embarked as many of his foot 
soldiers as he could into triremes. Arrian 1 tells us that this was because he assumed that 
the anticipated naval engagement would involve close-order fighting rather than 
traditional naval tactics. This statement of Arrian is extremely informative of Alexander's 
strategic thinking. We know from his reluctance at Halicarnassus that Alexander was 
astute enough to realise that he had little knowledge or experience of naval warfare; 
therefore he refused a skirmish in that instance. Here we have Alexander with superiority 
of numbers (or at least near equality), yet he still assumes that the action will essentially 
be a land battle fought at sea; he fails to improvise and adapt to this environment - the 
only instance in his career of this kind of lack of adaptability and an unwillingness to 
embrace a new theatre of warfare. 
It seems that the Tyrians were prepared to offer a naval engagement as long as 
they were numerically superior, but, once the size of Alexander's newly acquired fleet 
became apparent, they retreated within their harbours and blocked the entrances. 813 This 
Tyrian tactic is interesting: despite almost certainly possessing superior naval tactics, they 
again chose the defensive security of their city; or perhaps they understood Alexander's 
temperament and understood that again refusing an engagement would cause him 
tremendous frustration. Despite the Tyrian refusal, some of Alexander's vessels rammed 
three of the ships of Tyre's fleet that were blocking the northern harbour, 814 sinking them. 
That the harbour mouth was narrow can be shown by the fact that Alexander sank only 
three vessels. The Tyrians probably moored their blockading ships in place and the three 
that were sunk were probably the outermost line of defenders. 815 
The harbour was too narrow to launch a general assault, 816 however, and 
Alexander's navy had to withdraw for the day. The following morning, Alexander gave 
orders that the city be blockaded; the Cyprian contingent was stationed outside the 
808 Morrison, 2001,41. 
809 Curtius 4.2.24-3.7 uses the term "Arab" probably incorrectly. 
810 Rutz, 1965,376f. 
811 Cleander had been sent back to Greece probably in the spring of 333 (Arrian 1.24.2), spending almost a 
year recruiting. Arrian 2.20.4-5. 
812 Arrian 2.20.6. 
813 Arrian 2.20.6. 
814 Curtius 4.3.12; Arrian 2.20.6 
815 Bosworth, 1980,245. 
816 Arrian 2.20.6. 
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northern harbour, the Phoenician navy outside the southern. 817 Further to this the mole 
had reached the walls. Alexander was now in a position in which he could press from all 
sides: from this point it was only a matter of time for the defenders. 
There is a variation on the tradition, however, preserved in the text of Diodorus. 818 
In this alternative tradition, the Tyrians were in the process of launching an assault upon 
the mole when Alexander appeared with the newly acquired fleet and tried to cut off their 
retreat, whilst making an attempt on the Sidonian819 harbour at the same time. The key 
elements of the episode also appear in Polyaenus. 820 The only common factor in the 
Diodorus and Arrian/Curtius traditions is the sinking of the three Tyrian ships defending 
the harbour mouth. 821 Even this, however, is problematic; Diodorus places the sinking of 
the three ships much later in the siege, when the naval blockade had been in force for 
some time. 82 Either there is a gap in the narrative of Arrian, or else the vulgate tradition 
has fabricated additional details, or conflated known details in a way common throughout 
Diodorus' text. 823 
It is certain that the texts of Arrian and Curtius omit much of the detail of the 
siege. There is certainly not enough narrative to fill the eight months that we know it took 
Alexander to capture Tyre. 824 One obvious and significant omission is the construction of 
the mole; it seems to disappear from Arrian and Curtius for quite some time. One minute 
it is being destroyed by the fire ship, the next it has been doubled in size and is at the very 
walls of Tyre itself. Diodorus provides a little vital tactical information, that after early 
mistakes Alexander was protecting the construction workers with a heavy screen of naval 
vessels. 825 Bosworth suggests that Ptolemy may have only included the most interesting 
elements of the siege, which is entirely plausible; 826 but it is also possible that Ptolemy 
may not have been present for parts of the siege. Junior officers would likely have been 
sent, from time to time, on scouting or foraging missions. The lack of Ptolemy's name in 
the histories at this point makes it impossible to know. 827 
Once the construction workers828 on the mole had been relieved of the constant 
threat of attack by the Tyrian navy, work progressed quickly and very soon the mole was 
up to the very walls of the fortress. Once Alexander had his fleet, and the mole had 
reached the walls (or at least was very close), he was able to attack the city at all points 
817 Curtius 4.3.13; Arrian 2.20.6. 
818 Diodorus 17.42.1-5. 
819 The northern of Tyre's harbours. Strabo: 14.2.23, claims that it was a closed harbour: this is unlikely in 
Alexander's day, but the harbour was narrow, Arrian 2.21.8. 
'20 Polyaenus 4.3.4. 
821 Bosworth, 1980,245. 
822 Diodorus 17.42.5-7. 
$23 Bosworth, 1980,245. Brunt, 1962,148. 
824 Bosworth, 1980,245. 
:1 Arrian 2.21.3. Diodorus 17.42.5. 
826 Bosworth, 1980,245. 
827 Heckel, 1992,222-228. 
828 Alexander had gathered together a very large body of workmen from Cyprus and Phoenicia: Arrian 
2.21.7. 
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with artillery and battering rams. This reference in Curtius, supported by Arrian, 829 to all 
points around Tyre being attacked by artillery and rams is key; it demonstrates that 
Alexander had equipped some of his triremes with stone-throwing catapults as well as 
rams, an ingenious strategy. Diodorus tells us that the catapults were used directly against 
the walls, and Marsden83 believes that this is the first time in history that stone-throwing 
catapults were used in such a way, although it is likely that this happened at 
Halicarnassus, 831 and probably even Miletus shortly before that. While the catapults 
would have been placed on individual ships, the rams were a different story. Diodorus832 
tells us that triremes were lashed together and siege towers built on them, thus allowing 
the rams to attack higher up the walls where they would be weaker. Curtius supports this 
claim, stating that pairs of quadriremes were tied together at the prows, forming a delta 
shape with the central section being boarded over acting as a platform for troops. 833 
Arrian mentions both types of vessel; the ones carrying artillery or rams, and the troop 
transports. 834 They were clearly intended to be used as a combined arms force, one 
providing covering fire for the other as the walls were stormed. 835 Alexander was using 
the kind of land-based tactics that had proved so successful, the integrated use of a 
variety of troop types, and adapting it to a new environment; something that he did time 
and again during his career. 
In order that the walls could be stormed, the troop carriers were equijped with 
scaling ladders, which Arrian calls gephura, and Diodorus calls epibatra. 83 The two 
words are synonymous as is proved by Arrian's description of the siege of Massaga, 
where he clearly used both to describe the same scaling ladders. 837 The scaling ladders 
that Alexander's engineers created seem to be a forerunner of the sambycae which were 
later used by Marcellus in a siege of Syracuse and again by Mithradates against 
Rhodes. 838 These later ladders were larger and raised by a pulley system mounted on the 
top of the mast. 839 Alexander's, on the other hand, seem to have been raised by means of 
a specially constructed wooden turret; the principle was essentially the same, however, 
ship-borne scaling ladders that could be raised to the height of the walls. 840 
The defenders were equally ingenious: they erected wooden towers to rain 
missiles down upon the attackers, seemingly at all points around the circuit of the city. 
Fire arrows were used against the Phoenician ships so that their crews were afraid to 
approach within range. 8 1 Diodorus describes revolving wheels, something akin to 
829 Curtius 4.3.13; Arrian 2.21.7. 
830 Diodorus 17.45.2; Marsden, 1969,101,103. 
831 Marsden argues that they were used as anti-personnel devices at Halicarnassus, not against the walls. 
832 Diodorus 17.43.3. 
833 Curtius 4.3.14ff. Atkinson, 1980,304, points out the lack of manoeuvrability of ships lashed together in 
such a way. 
834 Sian 2.23.3. 
835 Bosworth, 1980,247. 
836 Arrian 2.21.2; Diodorus 17.45.5-6; 46.2. 
837 Arrian 4.26.6,27.1. 
838 Bosworth, 1980,247. 
839 Polybius 8.4.2ff; Appian, Mithridates, 26.103,27.105; cf. Landels, 1966,69-77. 840 Diodorus 17.45.2. Bosworth, 1980,247. 
841 Sian 2.21.3. 
124 
windmills842 that were used to deflect projectiles thrown by catapults. 843 Curtius tells us 
of barbed grappling irons and shields piled with red hot sand that were then dropped on 
besiegers who could have no defence against such an attack. Tarn844 dismisses these 
Tyrian inventions, as well as others in Arrian's text, as being little more than a copy from 
a Hellenistic textbook on siege warfare, ignoring the fact that both Arrian and Curtius 
agree on the detail of such devices. 
It is no doubt a serious exaggeration on the part of Arrian, or more likely 
Ptolemy, 845 to put the height of the city walls opposite the mole at 45m, although some 
have accepted it without question. 846 If the walls had been this height, there would have 
been no need for the defenders to build additional wooden towers on the ramparts in 
order to be higher than Alexander's siege towers. 847 The only references to the 
dimensions of the walls made by either Curtius or DiodoruS848 are to the secondary wall 
that the Tyrians built as insurance against the first failing; this was ten cubits thick and 
five cubits behind the outer wall. 
There is a second incident during the siege of Tyre where Alexander perhaps 
shows himself to be unwilling or incapable of adapting to naval warfare. In order for the 
Phoenician navy to engage the fortifications properly, the water had to be cleared of 
rocks. 849 Alexander set his ships to clearing away these rocks, but the Tyrians equipped a 
number of ships in such a way that, if they sailed close to the anchored Phoenician 
vessels, 850 they would cut the mooring ropes. Alexander's first response is telling: he 
fitted out a number of vessels and used them as a defensive screen against the Tyrian 
ships. This is exactly the tactic that he used to protect the workers on the mole, essentially 
a solid barrier. It was only after the Tyrians used divers to cut the ropes that Alexander 
started using chains. 851 In this incident, as with earlier ones on the mole, we see 
Alexander reacting to actions of the defenders. This is certainly not the proactive 
innovator that we would expect. What we may have here is something we see elsewhere: 
when Alexander is confronted with an entirely new situation for the first time, the 
outcome is usually less successful than in subsequent encounters in similar 
circumstances. We can see, for example, the struggles initially in the Balkans, at 
Halicamassus and the island of Tyre juxtaposed with the later stunning successes at the 
842 One can only imagine the devastation in the city that must have been caused by the constant need for 
building material for new defensive works as well as repair work. 643 Diodorus 17.43.1-2. 
844 Curtius 4.3.24-5. Grapnels were common enough in ancient warfare (for example, Alcibiades' use of 
such a device against Mindarus' ships; Diodorus 13.50.5, Polyaenus 1.40.9). The closest parallel to the 
Tyrian device, as noted by Atkinson, is the harpax supposedly invented by Agrippa in 36 B. C; (Appian 
B. C 5.118; cf. Casson, 1971,122). The Tyrian invention seems a precursor of this, but it is hard to see how 
they would have been deployed from walls that were 45m high (Arrian 2.21.4; likely to be an 
exaggeration), Atkinson, 1980,308. Tarn, 1948,2.120-1. 
845 Sian should not escape criticism, however, for not realising the exaggeration. s46 Fuller, 1958,210. 
sal Bosworth, 1980,247. The towers were apparently 45m high. 
848 Curtius 4.3.13; Diodorus 17.43.3. 
849 Apparently thrown into the sea to prevent vessels from drawing too close. 850 They had to be anchored as they tried to winch the blocks on board, also using ropes. $51 Arrian 2.21.4. 
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Granicus, Gaza and the eastern sieges. Alexander shows himself to be a commander who 
does not instantly make the correct decisions when faced with a situation he has never 
seen, but quickly learns and adapts. 
At this point the defenders were becoming desperate and were prepared to gamble 
on a final naval sortie. They had noticed that the Cyprian fleet, which was guarding the 
northern harbour, withdrew at midday, every day, to cook their meal ashore. 852 At some 
unspecified point, the Tyrians had rigged a screen across the whole of the mouth of the 
Sidonian Harbour; behind this, unobserved, they manned three quinqueremes, three 
quadriremes and seven triremes with hand-picked men. 853 The Tyrians waited for 
Alexander, who was stationed with the Phoenician fleet that was guarding the Egyptian 
harbour, 854 to withdraw at noon as usual before the sortie began. The Tyrian vessels 
sailed from the Sidonian harbour and engaged the Cyprian fleet. What they encountered 
were ships that were either empty or had mere skeleton crews. Three Cyprian ships were 
sunk immediately and many others were driven onto the beach and disabled. 855 One of 
the ships that were sunk was the flagship of King Pnytagoras of Cyprus. By pure 
chance, 56 Alexander had not taken his usual afternoon nap, but had returned to the 
Phoenician fleet almost immediately. Upon hearing of the sortie, he ordered the Egyptian 
harbour to be sealed lest another attack be launched from there, and sailed with the 
remainder of the Phoenician fleet to the relief of the Cyprian. Most of the attacking 
Tyrian vessels were either captured or sunk as they failed to make the safety of the 
harbour before being engaged by Alexander, although the loss of life was small as the 
sailors simply swam to safety. 857 
The stratagem employed by the Tyrians of attacking at mid-day when the enemy 
was breaking for lunch was virtually as old as Greek warfare. 858 Their hope was to 
emulate the success of Lysander against the Athenians at Aegospotami in 405 when the 
Spartans captured almost the entire 160 trireme Athenian fleet. Success on anything like 
this level would have dealt a very serious blow to Alexander's ability to attack the city at 
all points, 859 and would have relieved the blockade. 860 
852 Cooking a meal on board ship would have been all but impossible in conditions that probably would 
have been even more cramped than usual with the siege engines and extra troops that they were carrying. 
Ashley, 1998,243,458. 
853 Arrian 2.21.6-8. The size of the fleet, or lack thereof, suggests that the Tyrians either did not have many 
vessels left at their disposal, or that they were running short of qualified men to sail in them. 
954 The Egyptian harbour being the southern of the two ports of Tyre. 955 Sian 2.21.8-9. 
856 We need not assume that this was any more than chance, such as some kind of advance intelligence; if it 
had been then the Cyprian fleet would surely not have been left so vulnerable. 
857 A ian 2.22.11. 
858 Examples include Herodotus 6.78; Thucydides 7.39f, Xenophon, Hellenica 2.1.24ff. 
as9 Ashley, 1998,243. 
860 Resources must have been running seriously low in Tyre, particularly food and fresh water. 
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With the mole at the very walls of Tyre '861 and all hope of protection from their fleet gone, the defenders were in a desperate situation. 862 The walls on the landward side 
of the city were, apparently, far too strong to be breached by the siege engines positioned 
there. 863 The walls to the north of the city proved to be equally strong, but the walls to the 
south were weaker. A considerable length of wall shook after a prolonged assault and 
finally collapsed. 8M Arrian tells us that Alexander, almost immediately, made a rather 
tentative and probing attack that was easily repulsed. 865 The impression we get from both 
Curtius and especially Diodorus is of something more serious. The failure of this attempt, 
according to Curtius, 66 led Alexander for a second time to consider abandoning the siege 
altogether and heading for Egypt, but again Alexander could not abandon the siege; his 
career again tells us that he was a man who evidently could not tolerate failure, his own 
or that in others, and he resolved to continue the siege. However, Atkinson867 has argued, 
quite correctly, that this section of Curtius owes more to romance than history; Curtius 
also tells us of a sea creature that rose from the waters and came to rest upon the mole. 
The breach in the wall was probably not large, and almost certainly not down to 
the foundations as implied by Diodorus. 86 More than likely a section of the ramparts 
gave way, as described by Arrian; but this was important as it meant the attackers did not 
have to fear red-hot sand, and the other defensive countermeasures, as they made their 
final assault. Arrian gives us a picture of Alexander probing the city at all points, the 
defenders being "caught in a ring of fire". 869 This was partly to try to force an entray and 
partly to draw defenders away from the section he wished to concentrate upon. 87 The 
Tyrian resistance was both impressive and desperate; they threw back the Macedonians at 
the breach, and resisted Alexander's attempt to force both the Sidonian and Egyptian 
harbours. 871 
After the repulse at the breach, there was a lull in the fighting. Diodorus872 tells us 
that Alexander made an offer to accept the surrender of Tyre. The offer, if real, was not 
popular amongst the Macedonian high command; only Amyntas son of Adromenes 
861 Tam, 1948,2.120-1, believed erroneously that the mole never reached the city walls. It is clear from 
Arrian 2.22.6 that it did. He also did not believe that wooden towers could be mounted on ships, and seems 
to imply perhaps not even on the mole when he argues that they can only be used on land: Curtius 4,26.1 
and 4.27.1, shows us that they were mounted on ships; cf. Bosworth, 1980,251, for arguments against 
Tare's position. 
862 Romane, 1987,84-85. 
863 Arrian 2.22.6-7; Curtius 4.3.13-18; Diodorus 17.43.3-44.5. 
864 Diodorus 17.43.3-5. 
865 Sian 2.22.6. 
866 Curtius 4.4.1. 
867 Atkinson, 1980,308. That Alexander seriously considered abandoning the siege at this point must be 
dismissed, although it is entirely possible, as noted earlier, that he considered leaving a small contingent to 
complete the capture of the city, as he had done at Halicarnassus. Cf. above, p. 120. 868 Diodorus 17.43.4 states that the wall was thrown down to the length of a plethron. 869 Arrian 2.22.7. 
870 As noted many times, attacking from various points at once was Alexander's favoured stratagem. 871 Romane, 1987,85. 
872 Diodorus 17.45.7. 
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supported it. 873 The Tyrians were given two days to surrender; on the third the final 
assault began. 874 A delay is also attested in Arrian, although he attributes it to bad 
weather; and in Curtius, 875 where the chronology of the final stages is confused. The final 
assault began with an artillery barrage which was a precursor those that were to become 
so common during World War II offensives. 876 After the naval barrage, which we can 
assume was conducted around the whole circumference of the city, a taxis of hypaspists 
under Admetus attacked the breach. 877 Admetus was killed by a spear before gaining the 
walls, 878 but Alexander, who was also present, pressed forward and soon the southern 
sector of the city walls was in Macedonian hands. It is clear from our sources that the 
troops were well drilled and commanded: they did not simply pour into the city as might 
have been expected, but remained in the vicinity of the walls to ensure the breach was 
held as more troops were brought forward. 879 
There was now a general collapse of the Tyrian defences; the Phoenician fleet 
successfully forced an entry into the Egyptian harbour and made short work of the enemy 
fleet stationed there; the Cyprian fleet had similar success to the north. 880 Most of the 
Tyrian soldiers that remained alive withdrew to the shrine of Agenor, the father of 
Cadmus, who was the legendary founder of Tyre and Sidon, 881 with the intention of 
making a last stand; they were not disappointed. Arrian tells us the slaughter was terrible, 
the Macedonians were allowed to vent their fury at such a brutal siege upon the 
survivors. 82 Some 8,000 Tyrians were killed and the remaining 30,000 were sold into 
slavery, as was the usual practice. 883 
Conclusion 
The capture of Tyre is usually regarded as Alexander's finest achievement, or at 
any rate, one of his forest of his career. This is not without some justification; Tyre was a 
seemingly impregnable island fortress that was heavily defended and commanded by an 
extremely talented king Azemilcus. When we closely examine the events of the siege, 
873 It is a considerable exaggeration to call this Amyntas a member of the high command: he is otherwise 
unattested (and absent from Heckel, 1992) and perhaps thought it a potentially good career move to support 
the king. 
874 Romane, 1987,85. 
875 Arrian 2.23.1; Curtius 4.4.10. He places the delay after the final naval sortie, but he places this after the 
failed assault on the breach in the wall. 
976 And a key ingredient of Blitzkrieg: Guderian, 1937; cf. Messenger, 1976,127ff. 87 Arrian 2.23.2 uses the term taxis; given that a taxis of the hypaspists was 1,000 men, and that 1,000 men 
simply could not fit in the small number of vessels discussed, it is clearly the wrong term. Milns, 1971,189. 
Admetus was probably the commander of the agema of the hypaspists, Heckel, 1992,253; Tarn, 1948, 
2.151; contra, Bosworth, 1980,251, believed him to be merely a chiliarch of the hypaspists; cf. Arrian 
2.23.1. 
878 Arrian 2.24.3. 
879 Bosworth, 1980,253. 
880 Arian 2.24.4. 
881 Curtius 4.2.15. 
882 Arian 2.24.4. 
883 Arrian 2.24.5; Diodorus 17.46.4, gives the number of captives at 13,000 and claims 2,000 were 
crucified. Curtius 4.4.15 adds 15,000 were smuggled to out to Sidon; highly unlikely but these figures also 
total 30,000. 
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however, we see that many of Alexander's great innovations were in fact enforced 
reactions to Tyrian inventiveness. We see Alexander making a series of key errors, such 
as pushing work on the mole at the expense of defending it properly, which led to its 
destruction and a major delay, as well as not anticipating a noon sortie against his fleet. 
We also see Alexander's lack of creativity as an admiral, using essentially land based 
tactics for his fleet. This said, however, Alexander certainly showed himself very capable 
of adapting to new situations and new defensive measures with increasingly elaborate 
ideas of his own. That Alexander captured Tyre is beyond doubt and we should recognise 
that fact; the victory was due as much to persistence and the quality of his troops as it was 
to innovation. We should also note, as a final point, that king Azemilcus was one of the 
most able commanders he ever faced, and should be given the honour that he deserves. 
Gaza - Introduction 
Tyre was no doubt one of Alexander's greatest military achievements, albeit not a 
series of unremitting innovations as some may wish to suggest. In terms of strategy, Gaza 
was at least as interesting; although always understandably overshadowed by Tyre, and 
not examined in anything like the detail it deserves. 884 
Sources 
The siege of Gaza lasted two months, and contained some extremely interesting 
insights into Alexander's ability as a siege commander. It seems to have been treated, in 
all of our sources, as something of an interlude between the great siege of Tyre and the 
events in Egypt; because of this much information has inevitably been lost. 
The siege of Gaza is mentioned in all of our surviving sources, 885 as is to be 
expected of a two-month siege. Only two, however, give any significant details: Arrian 
and Curtius. 886 Arrian's account lacks depth; it tends to focus on personalities887 rather 
than technical details, and although it does provide us with a reasonable chronology of 
events, the account is brief and much must have been missed; 888 that is to say nothing of 
the evident errors that will be discussed more fully later. 889 Curtius' account, on the other 
hand, is shorter but contains a greater amount of technical information. On this occasion, 
Curtius' source is evidently the superior one. 890 Hammond has argued that Curtius' 
source for the Gaza campaign was Cleitarchus, and I see little reason to disagree with 
this, although, as Rutz noted, 891 Curtius' narrative shows enough similarities with Arrian 
and Diodorus for us to conclude that Cleitarchus was not Curtius' only source. Much of 
884 Diodorus, for example, commits only a couple of lines to the whole two-month siege. 883 Sian 2.26; Curtius 4.2-6; Plutarch, Alex. 25; Strabo 16.2; Polybius 16.229.5-6; Diodorus 17.18; 
Josephus, Ant. 8.3-4. 
886 Arrian 2.26; Curtius 4.5-6 
887 Romane, 1988,22. 
888 Although it is still the longest of the surviving narratives. 
889 Bosworth, 1980,257-260. 
890 Atkinson, 1980,315-319. 
891 Hammond, 1983,126. Rutz cited in Atkinson, 1980,315. 
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the technical detail in Curtius' narrative892 must have been provided by a technically 
proficient eye witness. 
Aftermath of Tyre 
After the successful capture of Tyre, Alexander continued his journey down the 
Phoenician coast intent upon completing the grand strategy he set out at Halicarnassus of 
defeating the Persian navy on land by depriving it of its ports. 893 This was, as has often 
been noted, 894 a momentous decision. It meant, initially at least, that every port between 
Miletus and Egypt had to be captured. 895 By late 332 the strategy had been largely 
obviated by events: the formerly powerful Persian navy was essentially now in the hands 
of Alexander. There was, effectively, no longer any risk of the Persians carrying the war 
into Greece, 896 so why did Alexander not pursue Darius at this point and leave Egypt to 
its own devices? There are a number of possible explanations: firstly it does not seem to 
be in Alexander's character897 to leave a potentially powerful adversary unchallenged. 
The second reason may be Alexander's desire to conquer the whole of the Persian 
Empire, of which Egypt was certainly part, albeit a reluctant and recalcitrant part. 898 
Alexander also, undoubtedly, wished to visit the shrine at Siwah, one of the most famous 
in the ancient world; Arrian presents his pothos as occurring suddenly at Thebes, 899 but it 
is not improbable that Alexander felt this urge once he was presented with the possibility 
of capturing Egypt after Tyre. A final, and not to be underestimated, reason for 
Alexander's conquest was the need for food. Throughout the ancient world, Egypt was 
something of a bread basket for most of the Mediterranean region, from fifth century 
Athens to the Roman Empire. Alexander had a flair for logistics, 00 as is evident from the 
lack of difficulties he had: he seldom ran low of food or water, and this was partly 
because he took care of these essentials whenever he had an opportunity, as now. 
Gaza was the principal frontier fortress of the Persian Empire in that region. 901 
For years it had stood guarding the Persian heartlands from aggression from an often 
recalcitrant Egypt, 902 and now it stood directly in Alexander's path. Gaza simply had to 
892 Such as with the mining operations. 
893 Arrian 1.20.1. 
S94 Bosworth, 1980,141-2; Green, 1974,191. 
895 Green, 1974,192. 
8 Realistically there had been little chance of this after the death of Memnon. 
897 It is, of course, highly dubious to make judgements about Alexander's character, but in this instance it 
seems valid based upon the fact that throughout his career he never seems to be able to resist this kind of 
challenge for long. 
898 Cambyses first conquered Egypt in 525, and from around the middle of the fifth century (the time 
Herodotus was writing) Persia was extremely unpopular there. In 404 Egypt successfully revolted from 
Persian rule, until a brutal re-conquest by Artaxerxes III Ochus in 341. Romane, 1988,21; cf. Cook, 1983, 
49. 
899 For details on the visit to Siwah see Arrian 3.3.1ff; Diodorus 17.49-5 1; Curtius 4.7.5-30; Plutarch, Alex. 
26-27 and Strabo 17.1.43. For the fame of Siwah see Curnow, 2004,33f. For Alexander's Pathos see Arrian 
3.3.1. 
900 Engels, 1978, particularly 54-70; 113-131; 144-158. 
901 Romane, 1988,23. 
902 Cook, 1983,49. 
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be captured; although Alexander probably had contact with what we would now call the 
Egyptian resistance, he could not be certain of the welcome he would receive. If the 
Egyptians proved hostile, Darius could easily trap him between Egypt and Palestine using 
Gaza as a forward base. 
The defenders of Gaza were numerically relatively weak and commanded by an 
otherwise unattested Persian. The precise name and position of the garrison commander 
is the subject of some dispute: 903 the text of Curtius reads Betis, more or less the same as 
the Batis of Arrian; Josephus, on the other hand, records two forms of the name, 
something like Babemesis. 04 Arrian attests Batis as a eunuch; Curtius905 describes him in 
neutral terms as simply city commander, and stresses his great loyalty to Darius 906 Only 
Josephus terms him specifically garrison commander. 907 As Bosworth notes, Batis was 
either specifically assigned as garrison commander by Darius, or he was a local chieftain 
who assumed the position as Alexander approached. In either case he could well have 
been a eunuch: Hermias of Atameus was a eunuch and ruled in the Troad908 and Bagoas 
commanded one third of the Persian army during the invasion of Egypt in 343 909 
Whatever the name and specific designation of the commander, his troops are worthy of 
note: Arrian describes the defenders as "Arab mercenaries". 910 Arab mercenaries are 
nowhere else attested, although at the battle of Raphia Antiochus III raised a force of 
10,000 Arab warriors from the Gaza region. 91 ' Arrian also tells us that they had been 
preparing for a lengthy siege by stockpiling supplies 912 We also know they were well 
trained and highly motivated. 913 
Gaza - Siege 
Gaza was situated 20 stades914 from the Mediterranean coast and was a city of 
significant size. Arrian tells us that the city was well-sited on a tell and surrounded by a 
crenellated wall. 915 No other source, however, ever gives the impression that Gaza was at 
all elevated above the surrounding terrain. The modern city is located on a low hill 18- 
30m high and around 3km in circumference, 916 but this should not be used to support 
Arrian's assertion, as the current mound could simply be the result of material deposited 
903 Bosworth, 1980,257-258; Atkinson, 1980,334-336; Romane, 1988,23. 
904 Curtius 4.6.7. Arrian 2.25.4. Josephus, AJ. 11.320. Bosworth, 1980,257; Tarn, 1948.2.265-270. 
905 Arrian 2.25.4. Curtius 4.6.7. 
906 Bosworth, 1980,257. 
907 Josephus AJ. 11.320. 
908 Bosworth, 1980,258. 
909 Diodorus 16.47.4; cf. 16.50.8. 
910 Arrian 2.25.4. 
911 Polybius 5.79.8,82.12; cf. Bosworth, 1980,258. 
Six Arrian 2.25.4. 
913 Curtius 4.6.7. 
914 Arrian 2.26.1; contra Strabo 16.2.30.759, stating 7 stades. 20 stades being 3.3km, 7 stades 1.2km; the 
difference could be a change in the coastline: Atkinson, 1980,337. 
915 Arrian 2.26.1. 
916 Bosworth, 1980,258. If Arrian's description is correct, to the outside observer the fortifications must 
have looked something akin to a medieval Mott and Bailey Castle. 
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over the centuries. Arrian's use of a tell seems to be a deliberate attempt to exaggerate the 
difficulty, and thus the glory, of the siege. 
It seems likely that Alexander had scouted the city before he arrived as he 
immediately made camp opposite the weakest point of the fortifications 917 and set about 
rebuilding the smaller arrow throwing siege equipment that he had brought over land 
from Tyre. 918 Behind his lines, Alexander also began to dig a number of mine shafts, 
intending to undermine and collapse the walls. The geology of the area particularly lent 
itself to this form of siege technique. The ground was soft sand with no large rock 
outcroppings that would impede the progress of a tunnelling operation. 919 
Once Alexander had made camp, he ordered the construction of a turf wall around 
the city. 920 At the same time as this was being constructed, his engineers were rebuilding 
the siege engines that the army had carried from Tyre. The engineers themselves 
evidently advised Alexander to wait until the bulk of the siege equipment (the towers and 
larger siege artillery) was brought by sea from Tyre, but Alexander ordered them to press 
on with the siege. The defensive levee, we are told, was of a size that would allow the 
catapults and various other siege machines to be at the same level as the city walls 921 If 
this is the case then it is strong evidence that the city was not, itself, on a mound. It is also 
a good instance of Arrian actually contradicting himself seriously. Arrian also tells us that 
the levee was all of equal height, so that the siege machines could easily be moved from 
one point to another, but that it was highest opposite the southern city wall, the area 
perceived to be the weakest. 922 When the defensive wall reached the correct height, the 
siege towers and battering rams were brought up for an assault on the city walls. 
In this initial stage of the siege, Arrian presents the most significant problem 
faced by the besiegers as the difficulty of getting the siege engines to the level of the top 
of the walls. 923 Curtius has an entirely different and more plausible emphasis, that the 
main effort was put into the mining operations; indeed, the mining operations are only 
mentioned in passing by Arrian. 924 Curtius tells us that Alexander only tried to use his 
siege engines as a diversionary tactic, and that the assault only failed because the wheels 
917 Romane, 1988,23. 
918 Arrian 2.26.2. 
919 Curtius 4.6.8; Arrian 2.26.2. 
920 Arrian 2.26.2. This turf wall (or circumvallation) was not the first of its kind in Greek history, but 
became far more widely used during the Roman Republic and later. There remains a question, however: if 
Gaza was located in a desert and surrounded by sand, where did Alexander get enough turf to construct a 
circumvallation? The answer could be that the area was more fertile in the fourth century, and thus there 
was more turf than there is at present. It seems unlikely that the immediate area was more fertile, given that 
the events of the siege strongly imply that the area was indeed very sandy. It seems likely either that the 
turf came from some distance or that Arrian simply made a mistake in using the wrong terminology (i. e. the 
wall was not made of turf). 
921 Arrian 2.26.2. 
922 Arrian 2.26.3. 
923 Bosworth, 1980,258. 
924 Curtius 4.6.8-9. Arian 2.27.4. 
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of the siege engines became bogged down in the soft sand. 925 There is no hint of this in 
Arrian, for whom the main difficulty was the height of the mound and the strength of the 
walls. 26 Every effort is made by Arrian to present the fortifications as impregnable and 
thus magnify the difficulty of the siege. 
There are many problems with the accounts of the early part of the siege. Curtius 
must be incorrect in stating that the assault on the walls was a diversionary tactic; this 
theory would certainly fit well with Alexander's general plan, which I have argued for 
throughout this thesis, of attacking at various points at once. There would, however, have 
been no need for a diversion at this time: the point was to collapse the walls, and the more 
defenders that were in that area when the walls did collapse, the better for Alexander. The 
attack must have been a serious attempt by Alexander to carry the siege and prevent the 
work required on the mining operations. The fact that Alexander did not wait for the bulk 
of his siege engines is either an indication of impatience or a sign that the walls were not 
as strong as Arrian would have us believe. 
The second main problem with these accounts is the circumvallation itself. We are 
essentially asked to believe that siege towers and battering rams were pulled up to the top 
of the circumvallation and then down the other side, 927 and that this was seriously seen by 
Alexander as a viable way to attack the fortifications. Ashley, 928 following Bosworth, has 
argued that the Macedonian mound was only against one wall, the southern, already 
noted as the weakest section. Bosworth's argument essentially comes from Curtius, who 
makes no reference to a mound during the early part of the siege 929 Whilst it is possible 
that the mound was only against one wall, it would be contrary to Alexander's strategy at 
almost every military encounter of his career, that of attacking from multiple directions 
simultaneously. It would also have been supremely dangerous, as the tunnel would have 
collapsed the mound as well as the wall. There would have been no way to collapse only 
a small section of the tunnel. The only possible support for the argument might be to 
suggest that the mound was built to protect the mining operation from the prying eyes of 
the defenders, and potentially to attract more of them to that stretch of the wall, so that 
when it did collapse more of them would be killed. 
It is far more plausible that the circumvallation was actually built with gaps to 
allow the siege engines to be dragged along level ground. If this was the case, it also 
explains how the entire city was surrounded with a mound as high as the city walls in 
what could only have been a couple of weeks. It seems more plausible that a number, 
perhaps a large number, of individual mounds were built upon which the catapults were 
stationed. 
9=5 Curtius 4.6.9, adding that the men were exhausted by moving the towers forward and then backwards 
after the initial assault failed. 
926 Bosworth, 1980,258. 
927 This must be the case unless we accept Arrian's version that the city itself was on a mound; if so then 
the circumvallation could have stretched to the walls themselves. 
928 Ashley, 1998,249, fn. 177. Ashley also accepts Arrian's version of the city being situated on a mound; 
Bosworth, 1980,258. 
'29 Bosworth, 1980,258. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, a full discussion of the incident of the crow and the 
clod of earth is unnecessary, save to say that Plutarch states that: 
930 
A bird flying overhead let fall a clod of earth which 
struck him (Alexander) on the shoulder. The bird 
then perched upon one of the siege engines and 
immediately became entangled in the network of 
sinews which were used to tighten up the ropes. 
Curtius'931 account is the more interesting, however. He states that the bird landed 
on the nearest siege tower and that its wings became stuck on the surface, a surface that 
had been smeared with pitch and sulphur. The question is why would a siege tower be 
smeared with pitch and sulphur? These chemicals were used in the ancient world as 
incendiaries, 932 not as flame retardants that we might expect to cover the visible side of a 
siege tower. This exact combination of chemicals is what the Spartans had used against 
the Plataeans during the siege of that city in 429. This very siege may have formed part of 
the model for Alexander's attack on Gaza as the Spartans also made use of mounds of 
earth, and built a circumvallation, just as Alexander was doing. 
933 Along with the siege of 
Plataea, the Peloponnesian War perhaps also provides an explanation for the pitch and 
sulphur on Alexander's siege towers. Thucydides provides this climactic description of 
the fall of the Athenian-held-fortification at Delium in 424/3; 934 
The Boeotians took the fort by an engine of the following 
description. They sawed in two and scooped out a great beam 
from end to end and fitted it together again like a pipe. They 
hung by chains a cauldron at one extremity, with which 
communicated an iron tube projecting from the beam, and this 
they brought up on carts to the part of the wall composed of 
vines and timber and inserted huge bellows into their end of the 
beam and blew with them. The blast passing closely confined 
into the cauldron, filled with lighted coals, sulphur and pitch 
made a great blaze and set fire to the wall and made it impossible 
for the defenders to remain at their posts. They abandoned their 
positions and fled; and so the fortifications were captured. 
Alexander could well have been about to attempt a similar tactic (although by a 
different medium, a burning tower rather than essentially a flame thrower), and obviate 
the mines before they were complete. There is no other conceivable explanation for 
preparing his siege towers to burn at the slightest encouragement. In this act, Alexander 
shows himself happy to learn the lessons of history. 
930 Plutarch Alex. 25.4. 
93' Curtius 4.6.11. 
932 http: /www. globalsecurity. org/military/systems/munitions/incendiary-history. htm. 
933 Thucydides 2.77. 
9'a Thucydides 4.100 
134 
Despite the incident involving the raven, Alexander ordered the siege engines 
forward. The sand was far too soft, however, and the engines quickly became bogged 
down in the loose and shifting ground. With the Macedonians under constant missile 
bombardment from the defenders, Alexander ordered a retreat 935 As the Macedonians 
were struggling to execute the order, and extricate their siege equipment from such an 
impossible situation, Batis ordered a sortie from the city. This is the picture presented by 
Curtius at least; Arrian936 presents a slightly different version. In Arrian, Alexander is 
found holding back from the initial assault and only joins the battle as Batis counter- 
attacks. This tactic fits precisely with what we consistently see from Alexander: drawing 
the enemy onto ground of his choosing. At Halicarnassus Alexander was taken by 
surprise by Memnon's sortie, but at Gaza he was banking on Batis making the same 
gambit. 
After what Curtius describes as something of an assassination attempt on the part 
of one of the Arab mercenaries, 937 Alexander organised the hypaspists and attached the 
Arabs who had sortied from the town. During this assault, Alexander was struck by a bolt 
from a catapult stationed upon the walls. The bolt penetrated his shield and cuirass and 
struck him in the shoulder. The wound was grievous, and Alexander was carried from the 
field. The defenders evidently believed that they had slain the Macedonian king, and 
celebrated a great victory. 
Alexander's wound was serious, and he seems to have taken several weeks to 
recover as we now have something of a pause in the siege. Further preparations were 
undertaken for the final stages: the mounds were strengthened and raised, the engineers 
began work on the mines in earnest and the bulk of the artillery arrived by sea from Tyre. 
Curtius939 suggests that Alexander was adopting a new strategy at this point, but it seems 
more reasonable to suggest that he was building upon the strategy that he had already 
decided upon. Arrian's figure of a mound of c. 76m is surely an exaggeration; the modern 
mound that Gaza is situated upon is only c. 30m. Fuller940 assumed a relatively low 
breastwork around most of the city, with the high mound being only against the southern 
section; he is supported by Bosworth, 941 but perhaps Fuller is underestimating the 
dimensions a little: 30-40,000 men working for several weeks could raise a very 
significant circumvallation indeed. Curtius942 tells us specifically that the Macedonian 
siege towers overlooked the city walls and were able to bombard the interior of the city; 
but as I argued earlier, it seems unlikely that the siege machines would have been pulled 
935 Curtius 4.6.9-10. It is important to note that Curtius places this aborted assault before the incident with 
the raven. 
936 Sian 2.27.1; cf. Bosworth, 1980,259. 
937 Curtius, 4.6.15-16. Atkinson, 1980,339, argues that the Arabs were probably Nabataeans and that Gaza 
may have been a dependency of the Kedarite Sheikhs. 
938 Curtius 4.6. 
939 Arrian 2.27.3; Curtius 4.6.21. 
940 Fuller, 1958,217. 
941 Bosworth, 1980,259. 
942 Curtius 4.6.22. 
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on to the top of the circumvallation, but rather into the gaps that I assume were located at 
various points around the circuit. 
Once Alexander had recovered from his wound, and once the mines and machines 
were in place, the final stage of the siege began. The wooden supports in the mines were 
set ablaze, the catapults began their volleys and the rams were moved up against the 
walls. 43 In relatively short order the mines collapsed, bringing several stretches of the 
walls down with them. Arrian tells us that once sections of the walls had collapsed; 944 the 
Macedonians, with the aid of suppressing fire945 from the missile weapons, quickly 
gained control of sections of the walls. The fighting was evidently fierce and the Arab 
mercenaries acquitted themselves admirably. We hear of three assaults946 by the 
Macedonians being repelled by the defenders. The fourth was too much, however; it was 
during this final assault that Alexander brought the main body of the heavy infantry into 
the battle and victory was assured. Curtius947 reports a second wound suffered by 
Alexander, this time to his leg, although evidently not as serious as the earlier shoulder 
injury. During the final assault, Arrian948 notes that the officers were competing to see 
who would be first to lead his men into the city. Neoptolemus was evidently first, 
although hotly pursued by most of the remaining taxeis. The city was ultimately razed to 
the ground and the women and children sold into slavery. 949 This evidently raised 
considerable sums: Alexander soon after sent his former tutor 500 talents of frankincense 
950 and 100 talents of myrrh 
The story found in Curtius, 951 although interestingly not Arrian, of Batis being 
dragged behind Alexander's chariot whilst still alive, around the circuit of the city is an 
intriguing one. The Homeric story presents Achilles dragging Hector's corpse behind his 
chariot, but here Batis is still alive. Green952 sees little difficulty with the discrepancy, 
stating that there was also, along with the Homeric tradition, a tradition of Hector still 
being alive during the incident at Troy. Lane Fox953 defends the historicity of the story by 
claiming that this was a Thessalian punishment, but the sources present no evidence to 
support this assertion. The most we can say is that such an act would have appealed to 
Alexander's sense of kinship with Achilles. The absence of this story from our other 
sources is puzzling, except to say that incidents that a flattering source may have 
considered unworthy of Alexander could easily have been omitted. 
93 It is this kind of movement that strongly argues against a continuous circuit: pulling heavy rams across 
soft and shifting sand would have been difficult enough without the added obstacle of the circumvallation. 
944 Arrian 2.27.4. Curtius 4.6.23, states that, once the walls fell, this was effectively the end of the siege. 
945 Which is to say the artillery pieces were acting to prevent defenders from getting onto the walls to 
defend the city and allowing time for the attackers to form a breach before they would stop firing. 
' Arrian 2.27.4. 
947 Curtius 4.6.24. 
948 Arrian 2.27.4-5. 
949 Arrian 2.27.7. 
9" Romane, 1988,25. 
951 Curtius 4.6.29. 
952 Green, 1974,541 n. 58, citing Sophocles Ajax 1029-1031 & Euripides Andromache 339; cf. Atkinson, 
1980,342. 
913 Lane Fox, 1973,193. 
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We may imagine that the mad dash that was the end of the siege is 
uncharacteristic of the Macedonians. During the final stages, however, when booty was 
there for the taking and the Macedonians were about to fall upon the civilian population, 
with all that that entailed, it was probably all but impossible for Alexander to maintain 
any kind of discipline. There would also have been a significant element of competition 
between senior commanders as to who broke into the city first. Perhaps the real surprise 
is that some cities were left standing after being taken by force by the Macedonians. 
Conclusion 
The siege of Gaza presents us with a situation virtually unique in Alexander's 
career, a city built on sand rather than hard rock. 954 This topography allowed Alexander 
to perform sapping operations that we see nowhere else, operations that ultimately were a 
fundamental part of the fall of the city. As at Tyre a few months earlier, Alexander was 
presented with a situation that required a novel solution, and he was not found wanting. 
Along with this new tactic, we see old tactics employed to great effect. As noted several 
times, Alexander's key tactic is to attack from multiple locations at once. At Gaza he 
achieves this by employing the circumvallation with artillery pieces at various points, 
along with the use of rams and siege towers, along with the final ingenious element of the 
mining operations. Gaza, like Tyre before it, shows Alexander to be someone highly 
capable of creating innovative strategies when the need arises, 955 or the situation allows 
for it. 
954 Some later sieges in India and on the return journey to Babylon were also undertaken on soft ground. 





After the battle of Issus, Alexander took the key strategic decision not to chase 
Darius into the Persian heartlands, but instead to continue his policy of defeating the 
Persian navy at sea by continuing south along the coast towards Tyre. Once Egypt had 
been `liberated' he was finally now in a position to return his attentions to the Great King 
and force a conclusion once and for all. Gaugamela presents us with just as many 
difficulties in reconstruction and interpretation as do the other set-piece battles; as with 
them, the main problems arise from significant differences in the surviving source 
material. Before attempting a reconstruction of the battle, and an understanding of 
Alexander's strategy, we must first discuss some of the difficulties with these sources. 
Sources: Diodorus 
Diodorus does not give us a continuous narrative of the battle, 956 but instead 
concentrates on set pieces: The Persian scythed chariots, the capture of the Macedonian 
baggage train, 957 and the duel between Alexander and Darius. The only part of the battle 
that is narrated is the action involving the Thessalians towards the very end. 958 Diodorus' 
account has a tendency to be rather more graphic than that of Arrian: the Persian scythed 
chariots slicing off arms and severing heads, for instance. In Plutarch, 959 Alexander only 
views Darius from a distance; but in Diodorus, Alexander gets close enough to throw a 
spear at the Great King which kills the driver of his chariot. The very account of Darius' 
flight shows colour that is lacking in other sources; occurring as it does in a cloud of dust, 
and behind the Macedonian front line. 960 
Parmenio is treated favourably by Diodorus, a fact which presents a number of 
problems. This treatment decreases the likelihood961 that he was influenced by the 
negative sentiment in Callisthenes 962 Devine963 argued that the prominent place of the 
Thessalian cavalry in both Diodorus and Plutarch suggests a commonality of sources; but 
I think it more likely that, in the absence of specific passages that are obviously from the 
same source, their prominent role in both was simply a reflection of actual events; that is 
956 Devine, 1986,89. 
957 Diodorus 17.59.2-8. 
958 Diodorus 17.60.1-8. 
959 Plutarch Alex. 33.5. 
9w Diodorus 17.61.1. One wonders how such an escape could have been successfully executed, however. 
961 But does not eliminate it as in Devine, 1986,89. 
962 Hammond, 1980,138, cites Cleitarchus as Diodorus' major source here, noting the vivid portrayal of 
both authors. 
963 Devine, 1986,89. 
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to say that they in fact did have a significant role in the battle. It has been argued9M that 
this commonality of source is a reflection of the pan-Hellenic nature of Callisthenes; but 
the prominent role of Parmenio, and not just of the Thessalians, calls this into question. 
Devine96S goes on to argue for an as yet unidentified common source, despite 
Hammond's966 confidence that the common source is in fact Cleitarchus. 
The incident of the call for help by Parmenio, just after he began the pursuit of 
Darius, 967 is also interesting. Again, it shows no malice towards Parmenio at all, but 
simply presents a picture of the Thessalians in genuine difficulty asking for help. 
Diodorus, in common with Arrian, simply presents Alexander's response without 
comment, unlike Plutarch and Curtius who note Alexander's frustration. Interestingly, 
along with Diodorus' attributing no blame to Parmenio for this incident, he also attributes 
no blame to Alexander. 968 Diodorus' account is far less useful than Curtius or Arrian, but 
surely deserves more than to be called "childish and worthless" as in Hammond. 969 
Polyaenus 
Polyaenus is our least important surviving source, although he still offers some 
interesting information. He again offers no continuous narrative of the battle, but at two 
points recounts key anecdotes 970 The first is a recounting of the Persian attack on the 
Macedonian baggage train, as well as Alexander's reply to Parmenio's plea for 
assistance. 71 Polyaenus' version follows the tradition that denigrated Parmenio, and thus 
probably finds its source in Callisthenes. This is not something that Polyaenus places 
great emphasis upon, however; rather he uses the episode to highlight the dictum that he 
who would protect his baggage risks jeopardising the bulk of the army. The second 
anecdote of note regards the Persian caltrops972 that were prepared on the battlefield 
before the Macedonians arrived. Polyaenus claims Alexander's movement to the right 
before the battle was to avoid these devices. The Persian reaction, moving their line to the 
left to maintain the integrity of their flank, resulted in the line breaking. This break was 
brilliantly exploited by Alexander; the incident is accurately described and shows 
significant similarities with the relevant section in Arrian. 973 
964 Schachermeyr, 1973,269; Kaerst, 1927,394 n. 1,165 n. 1 and 338 n. 1; cf Atkinson, 1980,243-244 and 
454-455, for a discussion. 
'mS Devine, 1986,90. 
' Hammond, 1983,20-27; 51; 173 n .11. 9"' Or perhaps just before the pursuit began. 
968 Devine, 1986,90. 
'*9 Hammond, 1980,138. 
970 Devine, 1986,89. 
971 Polyaenus Strat. 4.3.6. 
972 Polyaenus Strat. 4.3.17; Essentially holes dug into the ground so that charging cavalry would step in the 
holes and break their legs, a form of ancient land mines. 
13 Arrian 3.13.1. 
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Curtius 
Curtius' account of Gaugamela is b far the most problematic of the surviving 
sources: the account lacks internal cohesion 974 and many modem authorities have taken 
Tam's lead in dismissing the account as being an "impossible confusion" of information, 
adding that Curtius "contradicts himself far too often for it to be worth notice". Tam 
does, however, concede that there is content within the account of Curtius that can be 
used and that "without him certain things in Arrian would hardly be intelligible" 975 
Tam's general approach to Curtius is much as mine has been to all of our sources 
throughout this work, and seems entirely sensible. 
Curtius' objective with his account of Gaugamela is to highlight the activities of 
the principal characters, Alexander, Darius and Parmenio, whom he accuses of gross 
dereliction of duty. 976 There are also parts played by Sisigambis, Mazaeus, Artes, 
Aristander etc. 977 Due to this aim, the narrative is episodic and highly disorganised, as 
when he confuses the distinction between the Macedonian front and rear lines. 78 As 
noted above, however, the account is vital for some of the information it provides, as will 
be discussed in more detail later. 
Elsewhere in his work, Curtius cites three sources: Cleitarchus, Timagenes and 
Ptolemy. 979 Neither Cleitarchus nor Timagenes are likely to have been the primary source 
for a battle narrative, 980 and an examination of commonalities with Arrian, who is 
undoubtedly based upon Ptolemy, shows that he also was not Curtius' main source, 
although there are enough commonalities to suggest that he did indeed have access to 
Ptolemy's account. Curtius' attitude towards Parmenio provides us with some clues as to 
his main source; in places he follows a tradition that is favourable towards Parmenio, 981 
whilst being hostile towards Menidas, who was heavily implicated in Parmenio's 
murder; 982 although there is undoubted criticism of Parmenio also. 983 Curtius' picture of 
Alexander himself is also rather different from that which would have been found in 
Callisthenes. Alexander is depicted as gnashing his teeth in frustration and rage at the 
escape of Darius, 984 but Curtius perhaps goes too far in describing Alexander as 
indecisive and prone to panic 985 This presentation of Alexander tallies nicely with the 
often positive picture presented of Parmenio, as noted above. Curtius links his 
occasionally negative picture of Alexander with an improbable description of the 
974 Devine, 1986,91. 
975 Tarn, 1948,2.182. 
16 Curtius 4.16.2-3. 
977 Devine, 1986,91. 
97s Curtius 4.15.9; 4.15.12; 4.15.13; 4.15.14; 4.15.28. 
979 Curtius 95.21. 
980 Devine, 1986,91. 
981 Atkinson, 1980,439-440,454. 
982 Curtius 4.15.18-22. cf. 4.12.4; 4.15.12. cf. Atkinson, 1980,61; 400-401; 413; 440-441. 
983 I. e. His appeal for help at the end of the battle, 4.16.2-3. 
994 Curtius 4.16.3; cf. Devine, 1986,91. 
9'5 Curtius 4.12.21; 4.13.1-3. 
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Macedonian army as also being prone to panic. 986 The over-generalised statement that he 
puts in the mouth of Parmenio, that "soldiers, he said, were more prone to groundless and 
irrational fears than to those having some justification" is unlikely to be true of any 
successful veteran army; nor does it seem likely that a commander would have such a low 
opinion of his own core troops. Devine notes that here, Curtius, like Tacitus, is 
misapplying rhetorical cliches about the instability of the mob. 987 
Curtius' contribution to our understanding of the battle of Issus is considerable; it 
is unfortunate that his narrative of Gaugamela does not match that precedent. Having said 
this, however, he does provide a number of key pieces of evidence that we do not find 
anywhere else. He tells us categorically that Mazaeus988 was commander of the Persian 
right flank, and Bessus of the left. 989 The respective orders of battle are also worthy of 
note; his representation of the Macedonians is confused by several key 
misunderstandings, 990 whereas his picture of the Persians991 gives us vital information. 
Curtius' picture does differ from that of Aristobulus, 992 but is extremely detailed, 993 and 
provides us with the only evidence we have for the strength of some of the key elements 
of the Persian army; as well as information on its command structure. Curtius also gives 
us information that helps us to locate the Persian positions, and therefore the site of the 
battlefield, by noting Darius' advance of eighty stades from the Lycus to the Boumelus994 
and his final march of ten stades to the battlefield. 995 Whilst I have argued that Curtius' 
general narrative of Gaugamela is seriously flawed, I have also noted that there are a 
number of key areas where we can believe him at the expense of Arrian: this seems on 
the surface contradictory. For most of this battle, the reconstruction has to come from the 
narrative of Arrian, but with specific regard to the orders of battle of each side, Curtius 
gives us far greater detail than does Arrian. The amount of detail suggests that he heavily 
relied upon a very detailed source (perhaps one that had access to the captured Persian 
battle plans, if they existed). 996 Further to this, his account of the dispositions looks 
credible and their data were not negatively affected by whatever dubious sources he used 
to reconstruct the rest of his narrative of Gaugamela. 
986 Curtius 4.12.14; 4.15.2; 4.15.9. 
987 Devine, 1986,91. Atkinson, 1980,390. 
988 Curtius 4.16.1; 4.16.4. 
989 Curtis 4.15.2. 
990 For example, two taxeis of pezhetairoi (Craterus and Meleager) are omitted from the Macedonian order 
of battle (4.13.26-31). An incorrect distinction is made between the phalanx and a taxis of the pezhetairoi 
(4.13.28). Craterus is a cavalry commander rather than a taxiarch (4.13.29) as in Arrian, the Agrianians 
become cavalry troops (nowhere else attested and I assume an error, 4.15.21-22), and finally, the rear line 
of infantry begin the battle facing away from the enemy (3.13.31); Devine, 1986,91. 
'9' Curtius 4.12.6-7. 
.. Z Arrian 3.11.3-7. 
993 Curtius 4.12.6-7 for example, a picture of the Persian left wing. 
'4 Curtius 4.9.9-10. 
995 Curtius 4.12.13. Devine, 1986,92. 
996 See above p. 20. 
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Arrian 
For the campaign of Gaugamela, Arrian certainly is our best surviving source. 
The narrative he provides is the most detailed and cohesive, and he provides tactical 
information that is coherent, and not simply intended to aid the narrative flow. Despite 
this general point, some caveats must be noted; Tam's attitude is typical: "Arrian's 
account is not always clear as to detail or as to the exact sequence of events. He is 
following Ptolemy's account but he may not always have understood it". 997 Tam's initial 
point is perfectly valid - the modem historian can always find inconsistencies with 
ancient sources if he looks hard enough - but the latter unfair. Arrian was a perfectly able 
commander in his own right; there is no reason to assume"' that he would be easily 
confused by military terminology or tactics; the only difficulty, therefore, would come if 
Ptolemy's account was itself incoherent. More recently, however, there has been a trend 
to place Arrian's narrative under greater scrutiny. Badian and Bosworth999 have led the 
way in noting that the problems of Arrian's sources are extremely complex. Bosworth 
notes that Arrian is prone to "all of the errors one would expect in a secondary author: 
omissions of essential material, misunderstandings of technical expositions, inaccurate 
reading of sources, and uneasy conflation of variant versions". Bosworth also notes, 
however, that the main problem is the quality of Ptolemy and Aristobulus, Arrian's 
primary sources. One can only see to the truth of the matter by a critical analysis of these 
sources with the vulgate tradition as preserved in Curtius and others. 1000 
When using Arrian, it is normally assumed that his use of Ptolemy, who was 
himself a leading military figure in Alexander's army, makes his account the most 
reliable. We know that Ptolemy was indeed present at both Issus10°' and the Hydaspes, 1002 
and it is assumed that he was also an eyewitness to Gaugamela, but this assumption needs 
to be challenged. It seems that it is impossible to prove that Ptolemy was actually present 
at Gaugamela at all: comparison between the accounts of Gaugamela and the Hydaspes 
reveals considerable differences with regard to the use of terminology, and the level of 
detail provided. Ptolemy's presence at the latter battle, the level of detail provided, and 
Arrian's frequent citation of Ptolemy there, all make it clear that he was Arrian's primary 
source for the Hydaspes. 1003 This could well not be the case at Gaugamela, and although 
this is speculation and essentially an argument from absence (i. e. we have no direct proof 
that he was at Gaugamela), I think it is a reasonable one based upon the differences in 
terminology from a battle where we can reasonable assume Ptolemy's presence based 
upon Arrian's citations. The differences in terminology etc. in all likelihood lead us to the 
'*7 Tarn, 1948,2.182. 
998 As is often the case. 
999 Badian, 1958,148-50; Bosworth, 1976,1-33. 
10°° Bosworth, 1976,8-9. 
1001 Arrian 2.11.8. 
1002 Arrian 5.13.1; At the Granicus, Ptolemy was a relatively minor figure within the army and therefore 
Arrian's account presents other difficulties. 
1003 Devine, 1986,93. 
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conclusion that the account of Callisthenes was probably Arrian's main source for 
Gaugamela. 10°4 
In reproducing or adapting large sections of Callisthenes' official account, 
Ptolemy could easily excise Callisthenes' 1005 many misrepresentations that would have 
been included at the approval of Alexander himself. At the time of Ptolemy's writing, 1006 
both Alexander and Parmenio were long dead, so he would have had little reason simply 
to reproduce Callisthenes blindly, especially where he had knowledge to the contrary. We 
should finally note that Ptolemy would have been unwilling, even after Alexander's 
death, to impugn his military reputation; the figure of Alexander loomed large over the 
successors for many years after 323. 
Prelude to Battle 
Alexander arrived in Egypt, remained briefly as he secured the administrative 
issues of the area, and then headed back towards Tyre during the harvest, 1007 so that he 
could ensure continuity of supply for the coming campaign. Alexander set off from 
Memphis some time in April 331 and marched along a pre-prepared path across bridges 
that had been erected across the Nile. 1008 Alexander quickly crossed the Sinai and headed 
back towards Tyre; we know almost nothing of the journey except that he conducted a 
campaign in Samara, where his governor had been executed in an uprising. 1009 From there 
he headed directly for Tyre. Alexander's second delay at Tyre was in a similar vein to his 
delay in Egypt: '°'° he was securing the administration of the city and region in order to 
ensure supplies were successfully moved by ship from the newly founded Alexandria (or 
some other more established nearby port) to Tyre, from which they would be forwarded 
as required. There was a second reason for Alexander to delay the coming battle: the 
previous winter Alexander had sent for reinforcements from the Balkans. During his stay 
in Egypt these reinforcements, 15,000 strong, '°" 1 had set out from Macedonia and they 
were in Asia Minor at the time Alexander set out from Tyre; why then did Alexander not 
delay long enough for this considerable body of men to reach him? The answer is perhaps 
twofold: Lane Fox speculated that Alexander had received a message from Darius, not of 
1004 We can only speculate that Ptolemy probably had not returned from a scouting mission. Alexander's 
advance to Gaugamela was slow, as discussed below, and numerous scouting and foraging parties would 
have been in the field at any given time. 
1005 Bosworth, 1976,29-33; cf. Devine, 1986,93. 
1006 At the end of the 19'h century, Wilcken, 1894,119 (1932 reprint used, same page) argued that Ptolemy 
was writing towards the end of his life (perhaps around 288 to 283/2), Tam, 1948,2.19,2.43 followed this, 
as did Kornemann, 1935,30-39; as well as others. More recently, Errington, 1969,233-242, Pearson, 1960, 
193, Badian, 1976,35-36 and Bosworth, 1976,1-33, Devine, 1986,93f have all argued that Ptolemy's work 
belongs to his early period in Egypt, when he had more reason to enhance his own reputation at the expense 
of the likes of Perdiccas, Leonnatus, Polyperchon and Antigonus. Hammond, 1983,37-38 has recently 
attempted to reassert the older view, suggesting a publishing date of around 285-283. I tend to follow 
Hammond in this and believe that the work was written towards the end of his life. 
"Engels, 1978,27,64. 
1008 Bosworth, 1988,74; Arrian 3.6.1. 
'0°9 Bosworth, 1988,233. 
1010 Engels, 1978,64. 
1011 Lane Fox, 1973,226. 
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peace, but of his readiness for battle, thus goading Alexander into action; the second is 
related to this, Alexander's renowned impatience. He had already delayed the decisive 
battle with Darius for over a year and he was no doubt desperate to force a conclusion: 
this rashness in Alexander's character could so often have proved fatal; but here, as in the 
rest of his career, luck was to be on his side. '012 
The campaign of Gaugamela can be considered to begin in early summer; 
although not earlier than July 10th, when Alexander reached Thapsacus. 1013 Some time 
earlier, Alexander had sent Hephaestion with a team of engineers to construct two 
wooden bridges, in separate locations, across the Euphrates. Lane Fox speculated that this 
was mid-July, but it must have been at least a month earlier, as Arrian clearly states that 
the bridges were almost complete when Alexander reached Thapsacus. 1014 Hephaestion 
had failed to complete the two bridges, despite having sufficient time to do so, because 
the far bank was guarded by Mazaeus and 3,000 Persian cavalry. 1015 Upon Alexander's 
arrival, Mazaeus withdrew and the crossings were quickly completed. Curtius and 
Diodorust°16 support Arrian's claim that Mazaeus was charged with preventing the 
Macedonian crossing of the Euphrates, but also mention orders to prevent Alexander's 
crossing of the Tigris. Bosworth suggested that Mazaeus was essentially performing 
reconnaissance at the Euphrates and was charged with reporting Alexander's movements 
back to Darius, and later given the order to prevent the Tigris crossing. 1017 
In a key passage, Arrian then tells us what Alexander did after crossing the 
Euphrates: "He then proceeded up country, with the river Euphrates and the Armenian 
mountains on his left, through the land called Mesopotamia". 1018 Alexander could not 
have travelled very far north, and he certainly did not reach the Armenian mountains; it 
was perhaps only a day or two of travel before heading directly east towards the Tigris 
and the ultimate site of battle; at this point Engels has Alexander following the military 
highway. 1019 Why head north at all, rather than south-east towards the wealthy centres of 
Babylon and Susa? It is entirely possible that Mazaeus had initiated a scorched earth 
policy1020 in that region, as reported by Curtius, t°zt to force Alexander in a northerly 
direction: this whole issue hinges, however, on the location of Darius' army at this time. 
Most modern authors have tended to ignore this vital question, but it needs to be 
addressed. Diodorus and Curtius both tell us that Darius marshalled and trained his new 
1012 It is, of course, dangerous to make character judgements on Alexander, but I believe that we can draw 
certain conclusions in this regard based upon his actions during his career, and those actions do appear to 
suggest that he was impatient and occasionally rash. 
101 Arrian 3.7.1 tells us that this was during the month of Hecatombaeon, during the Athenian archonship 
of Aristophanes. Dinsmoor (1931,359,429 table xiv) fixes this to between July 10`h and August 9i°; cf. 
Bosworth, 1980,284, Marsden, 1964,11. 
1014 Lane Fox, 1973,226; Arrian 3.7.1; bridges were complete save for the final sections; Arrian 3.7.1. 
1015 Arran 3.7.1; Curtius 4.9.7f, 14f, Diodorus 17.55. If. 
1016 Curtius 4.9.7f, Diodorus 17.55. If. 
101 Bosworth, 1980,286. Cf. Marsden, 1974,15f. 
1018 Arrian 3.7.3. 
1019 Engels, 1978,69. 
10'-'0 Bosworth, 1980,286: This had been the case in 401, Xenophon, Anabasis 1.6.1. 
1021 Curtius 4.9.8. 
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army in Babylon, but there is little evidence that he remained in Babylon at the time of 
Alexander's crossing of the Euphrates. Curtius tells us that the Persians began to marshal 
when Alexander was in Egypt, 1022 and we know his march north-east was slow, with a 
lengthy stop in Tyre; the Persians, therefore, had plenty of time to train and equip their 
new army before Alexander reached the Euphrates. 
Why did the Persians move north? There can be little doubt that a major objective 
of Alexander would be the wealthy administrative centres of Babylon and Susa, together 
with their wealthy hinterlands, so why abandon them? Many commentators have made 
much, rightly so, of the wide open plains of northern Mesopotamia, and of how they were 
particularly suited to the Persians. Seldom has it been noted, 1023 however, that the plains 
north of Babylon were at least equally suitable for the Persians. Staying in Babylon 
would have meant that the Persian levies would not have to undertake a lengthy march 
north, and would have stayed on their lines of supply. Darius no doubt envisioned a 
replay of Cyrus' march, and a second Cunaxa, 1024 with similarly positive results. Curtius 
is probably correct in suggesting a scorched earth policy: this would again re-enact the 
Cunaxa style campaign'° s as well as explaining the size of Mazaeus' contingent. 1026 This 
detachment was too large to be scouting and too small to oppose a Macedonian crossing 
successfully. Darius' decision to re-introduce scythed chariots to the Persian order of 
battle is another indication that Cunaxa was heavily on his mind. 
The Persian strategy is, therefore, relatively easy to follow: They would muster 
and train north of Babylon, destroy fodder to the north of this area and await Alexander's 
arrival. Darius would reasonably have expected Alexander to march directly towards him 
at Babylon, rather than in the opposite direction, seemingly avoiding a confrontation. If 
Alexander was to have operated in the manner Darius expected, the Macedonians would 
have arrived in poor shape having undertaken a lengthy march, with the Persians fresh 
and ready to do battle. The Persian strategy is remarkably reminiscent of the strategy of 
Saladin at Hattin in 1187,1027 one of the bloodiest battles of the crusades, and a disaster 
for the crusaders, as it surely would have been for Alexander. The Persian strategy is 
sound, as noted by Green; 1028 it was simply that Alexander had other ideas. 
Arrian gives us a very clear indication of Alexander's strategic plans, stating that: 
"Alexander did not march by the direct road to Babylon". 1029 This statement of Arrian 
strongly implies that Babylon was the ultimate objective, otherwise he would have made 
some statement to the effect that Alexander was moving north to engage Darius because 
1022 Curtius 4.9.2f. 
1023 Marsden, 1974,12. 
1024 A second Cunaxa in style. The fact that Cunaxa was close to Babylon and the Persians moved north for 
the final battle demonstrated that Darius did not expect an exact repeat, more a campaign that would use 
similar tactics. 
1025 Xenophon Anabasis 1.6.1. 
1026 Marsden, 1974,12. 
1027 Kedar, 2002. 
1028 Green, 1974,283. 
1029 Arrian 3.7.3. 
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he was in the Gaugamela region, or that Alexander was drawing him in that direction. 1030 
The very mention of Babylon tells us that Alexander was fully aware of the strategic 
situation whilst at Thapsacus. 
Another reason for Alexander heading north is perhaps an historical precedent 
noted earlier. There is only one direct indication in the whole of the surviving source 
material that Alexander was aware of Xenophon's Anabasis, 103 1 although we can 
reasonably assume that he did, and would therefore be aware of the fate of that expedition 
at Cunaxa. We know from his use of captured native guides elsewhere that Alexander 
would have attempted to gain some local knowledge of the terrain between the bridges 
over the Euphrates and Babylon. He would have quickly determined that the plain was of 
varying widths, but was always a relatively narrow strip of fertile land between two 
deserts to east and west. He would also have been aware of the scorched earth policy 
executed by Mazaeus, and therefore a move north was the best strategic option. As 
always, Alexander attempted to lure the enemy into terrain of his choosing; even when 
that, at first sight, favoured the enemy. 1032 In this decision, Alexander shows rather more 
restraint than some would suggest him capable of: we must also note, however, a similar 
decision after Issus not to force an immediate battle that would have perhaps been 
unfavourable to Alexander. 
Alexander's strategy of drawing the Persians towards him was based upon more 
than simply hope; Alexander's experience with the Persians to this point in his career had 
demonstrated that they were extremely unwilling to allow the Macedonians to occupy 
more Persian land than was absolutely necessary. 1033 Now that Darius had a large 
standing army once again, Alexander would have judged this strategy to continue. 
Alexander expected Darius to march out of Babylon and engage him. 
Alexander's decision brought some immediate benefits to the Macedonians. They 
would not only be fighting on terrain of their choosing, in an area with greater access to 
vital supplies, but forcing Darius to pursue effectively ended the training that was 
underway of the new Persian army. The army had been recently gathered and would have 
consisted largely of conscripts; a lengthy training period was vital, yet impossible on the 
long march north. 
Alexander crossed the 2,400 stades, or 460km, 1034 between Thapsacus and the 
crossing point on the Tigris'035 relatively slowly. Assuming Alexander set out around the 
1030 Marsden, 1974,13. 
1031 Alexander's speech before Issus, Arrian 2.7.3-9; cf. Bosworth, 1980,204. We can also assume, 
although there is no positive evidence, that Alexander was aware of the use of rafts to cross a river in 
Xenophon, Anabasis 1.5.10. 
1032 For topography of Gaugamela see 147-8. 
1033 Marsden, 1974,14. 
1034 Strabo 2.1.38. Engels, 1974,68f, Marsden, 1974,22, claims 527km for the same journey. Engels, 
1987,70 n. 86 believes that all of Marsden's distance figures are too high, although why this is the case he 
does not argue. 
1035 That likely being the Abu Dhahir (see below p. 147 n. 1042); Marsden, 1974,22 argues for the Abu 
Wajnam. 
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end of July, this would give him around 54 days to cross this distance; a rate of march of 
only 8.2kmpd. Alexander frequently achieved rates of in excess of 24kmpd for the whole 
army1036 through enemy terrain; why so slow now? Darius, conversely, would have set 
out around one week after Alexander, allowing for the time it would take for Mazaeus to 
report Alexander's unexpected change of direction. The Persians had to march around 
595km in perhaps 47 days; a rate of 12.66kmpd. 1037 The Persians would have found it 
harder than the Macedonians to keep up this rate of march, their army being less well 
trained and considerably larger and more encumbered. Nevertheless, this is an entirely 
plausible rate of march. We can reasonably speculate that Alexander's slow march rate 
was because he did not want to tire his army before the coming battle. His advanced 
scouts would have informed him that the Persians were waiting at Gaugamela, and 
Alexander was evidently prepared to let them wait until he was ready. 
Once Darius realised that his dreams of recreating Cunaxa had failed, he 
dispatched Mazaeus once again to reconnoitre all potential crossing points on the Tigris. 
The intention cannot have been to oppose Alexander's crossing, 1° 8 simply to report on 
his location. On the journey to the Tigris Alexander captured several men from the 
Persian army; Arrian calls them men "who had gone off on reconnaissance", 1039 Lane 
Fox surely exaggerates in calling them spies. 1o o These prisoners told Alexander of 
Darius' location at Arbela; upon receiving the news Alexander hastened towards the 
Tigris. '041 Alexander reached the Tigris on September 18th and crossed by the most 
obvious route, the ford at Abu Dhahir. 1042 The crossing was unopposed, yet still difficult 
due to the current, and a number of men died. The water was fast flowing and chest deep; 
Diodorus records: ' 43 
The force of the current swept away many who were 
crossing and deprived them of their footing, and as 
the water struck their shields, it bore many off their 
course and brought them into extreme danger. 
Alexander's defence against the current was to have his men lock arms; this 
would ensure a certain amount of stability against the force of the current. It also 
probably meant that the shield would be slung over the back, and thus be less likely to 
catch the water and act as a sort of parachute than if it were carried by hand. Cavalry 
were also probably deployed as a screen slightly upstream to break up the current. 
1036 Engels, 1974,153. 
1037 Marsden, 1974,22; Bosworth, 1980,285 notes that Alexander's rate of march seems excessively slow 
for an army that was, according to both Arrian (3.7.5) and Curtius (4.9.13), in a hurry. 
1038 As the force was around 6,000 strong according to Curtius 4.9.12. 
1039 Arrian 3.7.3. 
1040 Lane Fox, 1974,228. 
1041 Arrian 3.7.3. 
1042 This was the location of the crossing of the Persian Royal Road over the Tigris: Lane Fox, 1974,228. 
For alternative possible routes from Thapsacus to Arbela see Green, 1974,284. 1043 Diodorus 17.55.4. 
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After the arduous crossing of the Tigris, Alexander allowed his troops to rest for a 
while. During this time there was an almost total eclipse of the moon; Alexander then 
offered sacrifice to the Sun, Moon and Earth showing a high degree of understanding of 
this astronomical phenomenon. The eclipse reached its peak at 21.12 hrs on September 
20`h 331.1044 Plutarch notes that it occurred at the same time as the start of the Eleusinian 
mysteries in the month of Boedromion, also noting that eleven nights after the eclipse 
was the eve of battle. 1045 In his Camillus, Plutarch gives a date for Gaugamela as 15th 
Boedromion, 10 which was indeed the beginning of the Eleusinian mysteries. Plutarch's 
dating is internally consistent and provides a synchronous point, 15 Boedromion equates 
to 20 September; the battle, therefore, took place on 1S` October 331.1047 
Topography of the Battlefield 
Only Arrian and Curtius provide us with any useful topographical details of the 
battlefield; the main feature being its flatness, save for the nearby mound of Tell Gomel, 
and the presence of two rivers. Arrian tells us that Darius pitched camp on the river 
Boumelus, 1048 noting that estimated of the distance from Arbela was 600 stades. 1049 Later 
he notes varying estimates of the distance, ranging from 500-600 stades. 1050 The second 
river, the Lycus, was located behind Darius' lines and only crossed by Alexander while in 
pursuit of Darius after the battle. 1051 The Lycus is now known as the Great Zab, and is 
around 32km directly east of the battlefield. 1052 CUrtiuS1053 is a little more precise in his 
information regarding the two rivers; he tells us that Darius left his baggage train at 
Arbela, bridged the Lycus River, and advanced the 80 stades to the eventual battlefield. 
Curtius' figure of 80 stades is an underestimate as it is about half the actual distance 
travelled. 10 4 
The location of Gaugamela seems almost certain. Ever since the nineteenth 
century it has been known that the mound of Tell Gomel etymologically preserves the 
name of Gaugamela; the mound itself, however, proved difficult to locate accurately. loss 
Schachermeyr established that Tell Gomel lies to the north of the Jabal Maqlub, in the 
plain of Nauqur. Modem estimates of the distance between Arbela and Gaugamela vary 
between 80 and 95km, around 420-495 stades. 1056 
10" Arrian 3.7.6. Bosworth, 1980,287. 
1°4S Plutarch Alex. 31.8. Bosworth, 1980,287. 
1046 Plutarch, Camillus, 19.5. 
1047 20'' September see Dinsmoor, 1931,359.429; 1s` October see Bosworth, 1980,287. 
1048 The modern Boumodus. 
1°49 Arrian 3.8.7. 
1050 Arrian 6.11.6, cf. Bosworth, 1980,293. 
1051 Devine, 1986,94. 
1052 Bosworth, 1980,312. 
1053 Curtius 4.9.9-10. 
1054 Curtius 4.9.9; c. 15.3km. Bosworth, 1980,312. 
1011 For etymology see Devine, 1986,94. Stein, for example, identified it with a mound to the south of 
Manqube; cf. Stein, 1942,155-164. 
rosa Schachermeyr, 1973,270. 
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Both Arrian and Curtius1057 mention a range of hills in front of the Persian 
position. Arrian notes that Alexander crested these hills the night before the battle, and 
sighted the enemy some 60 stades away. These hills are almost certainly the Jebel 
Maqlub range. '°58 In order to take up his position, Darius would have had to turn off the 
Royal Road before reaching Manqube, and march a significant distance to the north. This 
movement matched Curtius' march of 80 stades, as well as allowing for the advance of 
10 stades in order of battle. 1059 
Of the topography of the battlefield itself, there is little that can be said. The 
Persians had taken up position in a vast featureless plain; they had evidently taken some 
time before Alexander's arrival to level the area artificially to allow for deployment of 
their cavalry and scythed chariots. 1060 The only topographical feature of note was a 
stretch of ground that remained untouched by the Persians, 1061 evidently a range of hills. 
Darius either did not have time for, or felt they were too far to his left to feature in the 
battle. 1062 As always, however, Alexander chose not to fight on his enemies' chosen 
ground, but upon his own, and his movement towards these foothills on his right enabled 
this. 1063 
Macedonian Order of Battle 
The battle of Gaugamela was a new challenge to Alexander: he faced Darius on 
terrain that had been specially prepared to optimise the use of the enemy's cavalry and 
scythed chariots. The most obvious tactical issue faced by Alexander as a result of the 
terrain was the discrepancy in troop numbers, 1064 and the inherent advantages that 
afforded Darius. The discrepancy was so great that a double envelopment was a real 
possibility against the Macedonians. According to Arrian, 1065 Alexander left his camp 
under cover of night, leaving behind the baggage train and intending to force a battle at 
dawn. The baggage train reappeared during the battle, however; and we must conclude 
that some baggage, probably replacement weapons, food and water, were brought up to 
the battlefield and left within easy reach of the infantry. '066 The problems do not end 
there, however. No other source mentions a night march, and if Curtius is to be believed 
that the camp was pitched when Darius was still 150 stades away, 1067 then a prolonged 
night march was remarkably foolish on the part of Alexander. 1068 The night march would 
have been over unknown ground using guides that were Persian and marching towards a 
1057 Arrian 3.9.2-3; Curtius 4.12.18f. 
loss Bosworth, 1980,294. 
'059 Curtius 4.9.9-10; Devine, 1986,95. 
1060 Arrian 3.8.7; Curtius 4.9.10. 
1061 Arrian 3.13.2. 
"'Devine, 1986,96. 
'063 See below p. 160-1 
1064 See below p. 156-7. 
1065 Arrian 3.9.1. 
1066 Arian 3.12.5; 3.14.5. Bosworth, 1980,294. 
1067 Curtius 4.10.15.150 stades = 28.8km. 
1068 Strasburger, 1952,468f. Suggests a shorter Macedonian stade than the Olymic stade of 192m; but does 
not seem to address the issue fully: I see little evidence to support the existence of a Macedonian stade, 
although it should be recognised that many states did indeed have their own stade. 
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numerically superior enemy. Arrian himself, later, even presents the march as being by 
day. 1069 The problems surrounding the night march come within the context of the 
location of the Macedonian base camp. Arrian mentions two camps, the fortified base 
camp and the temporary camp close to the battlefield. '070 Curtius confuses the situation, 
however, by noting three camps: the four-day rest camp, the temporary camp below the 
hill occupied by Mazaeus1071 and the fortified camp on the hill that was soon vacated by 
Mazaeus. 1072 The commonality in the sources is that the final camp was on the hill 
overlooking Gaugamela; but in Arrian it was temporary, in Curtius, fortified. 1073 The final 
difficulty comes during the battle itself: for Curtius the camp is the planned target of a 
large force commanded by Mazaeus; for Arrian1074 it is ransacked as the result of an 
unforeseen breakthrough of Alexander's lines: the reality is unknowable. 
As both armies began to move towards each other, 1075 they each took up 
formation; this occurred before each commander saw the other, and must have been 
based partly upon scouting reports and an estimation of what the enemy intended to 
do. '°76 This topographical and numerical disadvantage forced Alexander to innovate. As 
Devine notes, ' 77 Alexander had no natural obstacles upon which to rest his flanks as at 
Issus, so he adopted a formation that may be called a tactical square. The Macedonian 
front was drawn up along its usual lines, but at either side were placed flank guards; these 
were drawn back at an angle from the main line, 1078 and behind this was a reserve line. 
The accounts of the order of battle of the Macedonian army at Gaugamela are by 
far the most detailed that we possess. The surviving sources provide us with a picture that 
disagrees significantly in only one respect: who led Amyntas' taxis of heavy infantry? 
This is hardly a major difficulty in analysing the battle. 1079 Arrian begins his detailed 
dispositions on the right of the main line where the Companion Cavalry were stationed, 
the agema of which was commanded by Cleitus. Towards the centre were the Companion 
Cavalry ilai of Glaucias, Ariston, Sopolis, Heracleides, Demetrius, Meleager and 
Hegelochus. 1080 After the cavalry came the heavy infantry, as always led by the 
hypaspists, commanded by Nicanor; l°sl following these three taxeis were the Companion 
Cavalry commanded by Philotas, who took general control of the right side of the line, 
1069 Arrian 3.9.1; Bosworth, 1980,294. 
1070 30 stades (5.76km) from the Persian line, 3.9.3; cf. Bosworth, 1980,294. 
1071 Curtius 4.10.15,17ff. 
1°72 Curtius 4.12.19,24. 
1073 And the location for captured Persian prisoners, 4.13.35; 4.12.2-3. 
1074 Curtius 4.15.5ff, Arrian 3.14.5-6; cf. Bosworth, 1980,294. 
1075 After a four-day pause, perhaps caused by rumours of hidden traps in the plain set by Darius for 
Alexander's cavalry, Marsden, 1964,42. 
1076 Marsden, 1964,42, claims that the formations were based upon previous experience: this can hardly be 
the case as neither had fought on this terrain before in these circumstances. 
1077 Devine, 1986,96. 
1078 Devine, 1982,62-63. 
1079 Arrian 11.8-12.5; Curtius 4.13.26-32; Diodorus 17.57.1-5. 
1080 Arrian 3.12.2. 
1081 It is interesting to note that Arrian describes these as shock troops, not as being primarily defensive as 
is usually assumed of the so called heavy infantry; cf. English, 2009,1-27 for an argument that the 
Macedonian pezhetairoi were in fact light infantry. 
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but his location is unspecified, presumably somewhere in the centre of the line. The 
pezhetairoi taxeis were commanded by Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, Polyperchon, 
Philippus1082 and Craterus. 1083 Arrian adds the curious point that Craterus "commanded 
all the infantry in that sector". 1084 Given that he was describing the dispositions in the 
centre of the line, he can only be referring to that sector, and thus Craterus must have had 
overall command of the pezhetairoi. If this is the case, it is the only instance in the 
sources of the pezhetairoi having an overall commander; if this were the case, it is 
curious that he would be positioned at the extreme left of the six taxeis, however. 
Completing the extreme left of the front line were the allied cavalry under Erigyius and 
the Thessalian cavalry under Philip; '085 although the overall commander of the left, 
including the Thessalians was, as always, Parmenio. 
Behind the front line was a reserve line of infantry. Curtius is the only source that 
gives any detail of its composition; Diodorus does not even mention its existence whilst 
detailing the Macedonian dispositions. 1086 Curtius tells us it comprised the Illyrians and 
mercenary infantry, along with the Thracian light-armed. This must have been the general 
composition as these are the only troops that are not stationed elsewhere during the battle. 
Curtius' belief that the rearguard began the battle facing away from the Persians is surely 
a misunderstanding. 1087 Arrian, more reasonably, claims that they initially faced the 
enemy; with both claiming that they had the tactical flexibility to change their frontage by 
1800 to face in the opposite direction. 1088 The basic fact of a reserve line that could face 
away from the Persian starting position in order to form an enclosed square is key, 
however. 
The positioning of the flank guards was fundamental to Alexander's strategy. 
Arrian tells us that on the left flank: '°89 
one half of the Agrianians, commanded by Attalus 
and in touch with the Royal Squadron on the right 
wing, were, together with the Macedonian archers 
under Brison, thrown forward at an oblique angle, 
1082 Arrian 3.11.9 names Simmias at this point in the line (brother of Amyntas), but he is the only source to 
do so. Curtius 4.13.28 and Diodorus 17.57.3 name Philippus son of Balacrus; the error is likely to be 
Arrian's. Bosworth, 1976,125 assumes the error originates with Aristobulus and Arrian simply passed the 
error along. Who actually commanded Amyntas' taxis in his absence is difficult to say. Berve, 2.27.354 
(no. 704); 2.27.384 (778) names Simmias without any justification or discussion, but Philippus was the 
commander according to the vulgate as noted above; it seems that only Ptolemy names Simmias. Both, 
however, are obscure to say the least: Philippus is never mentioned again and Simmias only reappears 
during the plot of Philotas. In reality we simply do not know the answer, and for our purposes here it makes 
little difference. Cf. Bosworth, 1980,301. 
1083 Devine, 1986,113. 
1084 Arrian 3.12.1. 
1085 Arrian 3.12.1. 
1086 Diodorus 17.57.3-4. 
1087 Curtius 4.13.31-32. 
1088 Arrian 3.12.1. 
1089 Sian 3.12.2. 
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in case it should suddenly prove necessary to 
extend or close up the front line of infantry. 
In order to maintain a frontage facing the enemy, but still protecting the flanks of 
the army without exposing its own, the flank guards were likely at an angle of 45° to the 
main line. 1090 Marsden's picture of the flank guards being at an angle, but also of the 
main line being drawn back en echelon, is implausible. 109 This would result in neither 
the flank guard nor the main line actually facing the enemy; there seems no reason for 
Alexander to have done this. The most plausible and simple solution is that the main line 
did indeed face the Persians directly and the flank guards were at an angle. 1092 This would 
maintain the ability to extend the main line if necessary by the flank guards moving 
parallel to the front, or closing the tactical square by them pivoting backwards slightly. If 
Marsden had been correct there would be no possibility of extending the front if required 
and a large measure of tactical flexibility would be lost for no tangible alternative 
advantage. Tarn1093 argued that the tactical square was already closed at the outset of the 
battle; that the flank guards were already at 90° to the main line; this can be rejected on 
similar grounds. Judeich'°94 argued the opposite of Tarn: that the flank guards were 
stationed to extend the front and were facing the enemy. 1095 The only interpretation of the 
sources that makes sense is that the flank guards were at an angle to the main line, with 
the flexibility of closing the formation or extending it. Curtius' 1°96 description of the 
formation as "roughly rectangular" does not detract from the angled flank guard theory; 
but it has been over-used in support in the above-discussed modem theories. 097 
The flank guards were undoubtedly powerful, and not simply afterthoughts to the 
strategy. They were arranged as follows: on the left were stationed the Thracian javelin 
men (under Sitalces), Cretan archers, Achaean mercenary infantry, Allied Greek cavalry 
(Coeranus), Odrysian cavalry (Agathon) and the mercenary cavalry (Andromachus). The 
right-hand flank guard was at least as strong, 1098 consisting of: the Agrianians (Attalus), 
the Macedonian archers (Menidas), the `old' mercenary infantry (Cleander), the 
Prodromoi (Aretes) and the Paeonian cavalry (Ariston). 
On the extremes of the line were stationed the best of the cavalry units, as was 
usual. To the left were the Thessalians, commanded by Philip, as well as a body of allied 
Greek cavalry under Erigyius; Parmenio, of course, held overall command on the left. To 
1090 Devine, 1986,96; Marsden, 1964,48f, Bosworth, 1980,302. 
'091 Marsden, 1964,48. 
1092 Bosworth, 1980,302; Devine, 1086,96. 
1093 Tam, 1948,1.48,2.184. 
1094 Judeich, 1922,7. 
1095 For further objections to Tarn and Judeich see Griffith, 1947,77. 
1096 Curtius 4.3.31-2. 
1097 See also Bum, 1952,85f Fuller, 1958,167-9. 
1098 In fact it is probably fair to argue that the right-hand side flank guard was rather stronger than that on 
the left. 
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the right were stationed the Companion Cavalry commanded by Philotas; Alexander was 
also stationed with the Companions. 1099 
According to Arrian the Macedonian army as a whole consisted of around 7,000 
cavalry and 40,000 infantry. "0° Arrian does not give us any indication of his source for 
this figure, but it is generally thought to be from Ptolemy or Aristobulus and probably 
originating with Callisthenes' account. 11°' If this is the case, and if the figures are correct, 
and there is no reason to doubt them, then the cavalry had increased in number 
significantly since 334 when the highest figure for their numbers was that of Anaximenes 
at 5,500.1 10 Given that both the Companion Cavalry and the Thessalians appear to have 
had a relatively static number of troops, around 1,800 each, ' 103 the increase must have 
come from somewhere else. Their source must be the allied Greek states, as there is no 
mention at this time of Persian cavalry units being incorporated into the army. The other 
possibility, of course, is that the numbers were simply inflated by our surviving sources, 
but whilst we know that this could happen (the size of Alexander's army at Gaugamela 
for example); we should not simply assume the sources were lying or mistaken every 
time a small discrepancy is noted. 
Persian Order of Battle 
Arrian goes to great lengths to tell us that, after the battle, certain Persian 
documents written by Darius himself which detailed the Persian order of battle fell into 
Greek hands: 1104 he also adds that this information came to him through Aristobulus. The 
information contained in Arrian's Persian order of battle is usually considered to be 
authentic, 1105 with some justification. Of all of Alexander's set-piece battles, Gaugamela 
is the only one where we have such detailed dispositions, including nationalities of each 
contingent. ' 106 This detail is not universally accepted, however. Schwartz' °7 believed 
that Aristobulus' order of battle was a fabrication created to justify such a detailed 
report. 108 Bosworth notes that it is striking that the Persian order of battle, as presented 
by Arrian, is not standard throughout the sources. Although the dispositions are similar in 
broad outline, Curtius gives a description that is significantly different in certain 
details. 1109 The Cossaeei, Gortuae and Phrygian contingents only appear in Curtius, for 
example. There are differences in the locations of certain contingents too: Curtius places 
the Susian cavalry further to the left than does Arrian/Aristobulus whilst the Cadusii are 
1° The Companion Cavalry were subdivided into eight alai, these being commanded by Glaucias, Ariston, 
Sopolis, Heracleides, Demetrius, Meleager and Hegelochus with the so called royal ile commanded by 
`Black' Cleitus. Devine, 1986,98. 
10° Arrian 3.12.5. 
1101 Berve, 1926,1.178; Tarn, 1948,2.159; Marsden, 1964,24,27; Bosworth, 1980,303; Devine, 1986,99. 
102 Plutarch Alex. 15.1; FGrH 72 F 29; cf. Arrian 1.11.3. cf. Bosworth, 1980,303-4. 
1103 As they were in 334 at the crossing of the Hellespont; Diodorus 17.17.4. 
104 Arrian 3.11.3. 
1105 Pearson, 1960,162; Marsden, 1964,44, n. 1; Bosworth, 1980,297; Schachermeyr, 1973,269. 
"06 Compare, for example, to descriptions of Darius' army at Issus (Arrian 2.8.5-8; Curtius 3.9.1-5). 
107 Schwartz, 1893,2.913. 
1108 Fabricated by Aristobulus rather than by Arrian, passing the blame to Aristobulus. 
109 Bosworth, 1980,297; Curtius 4.12.6-13. 
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placed on the right instead of to the left of centre. 1110 Bosworth attributes some of the 
discrepancies to Curtius' notorious lack of care in transmitting lists. "111 A more 
significant error, however, could come from difficulties in translation. Any captured 
Persian documents, especially ones written by Darius' royal scribes, would have been in 
Aramaic; translating these into Greek may have proven problematic and could easily 
account for differences in positions of troops etc. for two main reasons. The meaning of 
the Aramaic could well have been unclear to the Greeks and after a period of time a 
number of different translations may have been in circulation leading to potential 
discrepancies (although I would count this as possible rather than likely). Another 
possibility is that Aristobulus was the only contemporary source to use the captured 
documents, but this seems very unlikely indeed. Such documents, and I think we can 
assume they existed, were likely to have been captured at Arbela after the battle; 1112 
Alexander failed to capture Darius there but he did find "all of his valuables", which 
included three or four thousand talents and a large wardrobe of Persian attire. "3 
As always in the ancient world, numbers for each side in battles are inflated; 
either for propaganda or through errors in transmission etc: Gaugamela is no exception, 
as we will see later. Despite the difficulties caused by the lack of accuracy of expression, 
as well as errors, we can still establish the relative positions of many of the key Persian 
units, as well as approximate strengths. The Persian left wing was held by a large force of 
Bactrian cavalry, perhaps 8,000 strong; 1114 these were under the leadership of Bessus, the 
satrap of Bactria. Arrian mentions them as stationed on the left, and as being only 1,000 
strong: this is probably an error of Arrian; he may be referring to a smaller flank guard 
detachment. "' It is Curtius who gives their strength. Curtius, however, goes on to 
confuse matters by stating that they were next to the chariots. ' 116 It is clear from Arrian 
that the chariots were stationed in front of the Bactrians and not to the side of them. 1117 
Stationed alongside the Bactrians were detachments of Dahae and Arachosian cavalry; 
numbering 1,000 and 2,000 respectively. ' 118 The Dahae were the most populous of the 
Saca peoples and almost certainly provided more than 1,000 troops total; the rest were 
probably on the other flank along with some stationed in the centre with Darius. Curtius 
also positions the Massagetae alongside the Bactrians, but fails to give troop numbers. ' 119 
Along from the Dahae were a unit of mixed cavalry and light infantry: perhaps 
Darius was learning from Alexander at Issus, where he stationed infantry with cavalry on 
his extreme right there; a group that quickly forced a crossing of the Pinarus. Along with 
110 Curtius 4.12.12; Arrian 11.3; Bosworth, 1980,297. 
"" Bosworth, 1980,297. His errors regarding the Macedonian heavy infantry, for example, at 4.13.28-9. 
112 Arrian 3.15.5. 
"" Diodorus 17.64.3; Curtius 5.1.10. 
114 Devine, 1986,100; Arrian 3.11.3 puts the figure at only 1,000 Bactrians. 
Arrian 3.11.3; cf. 3.11.6. 
116 Curtius 4.12.6. 
1117 Atkinson, 1980,402. 
118 Devine, 1986,101. Curtius 4.12.6. provides the numbers here, although the strength of the Arachosian 
cavalry has to be inferred from the text; cf. Atkinson, 1980,403; Bosworth, 1980,297-198. 
1119 Curtius 4.12.6. Bosworth, 1980,298. 
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this mixed unit were the Susian and Cadusianl 120 cavalry, each 2,000 strong. Completing 
the Persian left were, in front of the rest of the wing, 2,000 Scythian and 1,000 Bactrian 
cavalry along with 100 scythed chariots. 1121 Chariots were something of a return to a 
more ancient form of warfare; but Darius believed that they would give him a tactical 
advantage by breaking up the Macedonian lines. Darius should be commended, despite 
his failure, for attempting an innovative tactic, 1122 rather than simply relying on weight of 
numbers to win the day. 
The right wing consisted of units from lowland Syria 1123 and Mesopotamia as well 
as the Medes. Slightly closer to the centre were the Parthians and Sacae as well as the 
Tapurian and Hyrcanian contingents; lastly the Albanians and Sacesinians: 1124 this is how 
Arrian describes the Persian right, without numerical values attached to each contingent. 
The units from Coele Syria and Mesopotamia were apparently brigaded together under 
the command of Mazaeus: 1125 they were presumably cavalry, ' 126 although this is not 
explicitly stated; it can be inferred from their role and position. The Medes were 
commanded by their satrap Atropates, 1127 and again we can safely assume they were 
cavalry. The Parthians and Sacae were mounted archers, an idea Alexander had never yet 
adopted, although he was to do so to great effect in Bactria and beyond. 1128 The Tapurian 
and Hyrcanians were both cavalry units, and units of some reputation, particularly the 
Hyrcanians. The mention of Albanians 1129 is puzzling, and only appears in Arrian; it is 
perhaps a mis-translation or mis-understanding on the part of Arrian, but we can only 
speculate. In front of this wing were also stationed an advance guard of Armenian and 
Cappadocian cavalry, along with 50 scythed chariots. ' 130 No source gives numbers for the 
Persian right, but it is highly likely to have been the same as or very similar to the left; 
i. e. around, or perhaps slightly in excess of, 7,000. 
The Persian centre was under the direct command of the Great King. Stationed 
with Darius were the Royal kinsmen; these were an elite group of cavalry, probably 1,000 
1120 Sian 3.11.3; Diodorus 17.59.5 gives the Cadusian strength; cf. Curtius 4.12.6, who inexplicably 
places the Cadusians on the Persian right, certainly a mistake. 
121 Arrian 3.11.6 and Curtius 4.12.6, Both give 1,000 Bactrians at this point. Marsden, 1964,35-6 and 
Atkinson, 1980,404, identify these Bactrians with the Maagetae of Curtius 4.12.7. (Devine, 1986,101); 
this may well be the case. 
1122 With the already-noted caveat that this was not new, more recycling of an old tactic; it was still new in 
the war with Alexander. 
1ý23 More frequently referred to as Coele Syria. 
ii 24 Arrian 3.11.4. 
1125 Arrian 3.8.6. 
1126 Bosworth, 1980,292-3. 
1127 Arrian 3.8.4; Curtius 4.12.9. Cf. Berve, 1926,2.180. 
1128 Arrian 3.11.4. Curtius 4.12.11, misplaces the Parthians on the Persian left. The Sacae were commanded 
by Mauaces (Arrian 3.8.3). The Parthians, Hyrcanians and Tapurians were brigaded together, before the 
battle at least, and commanded by Phrataphernes (Arrian 3.8.4). During the battle they acted in concert with 
the Sacae, no doubt because they were also horse archers; cf. Atkinson, 1980,25,409; Bosworth, 1980, 
290; Devine, 1986,102-3. 
1129 Arrian 3.11.4. 
1130 Arrian 3.11.7; Devine, 1986,103. 
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strong. 1131 They were of the highest Persian nobility, demonstrated by their exclusive 
right to kiss the king. ' 132 Along with the cream of Persian nobility were the elite Persian 
infantry unit, the melophoroi; these were handpicked from the 10,000 Immortals, and 
distinguished by displaying golden apples on their spear butts. 1133 This is exactly the 
opposite of the Macedonian infantrymen whose sarissa had a large spear butt; this was 
partly to balance the weight and partly to allow it to be dug into the ground to brace 
against a charge by the enemy. With this inability to brace the spear against an enemy 
charge, the Persian , nelophoroi were ill equipped to resist a cavalry charge by an 
enemy. 1134 This is the main feature of the dispositions in that sector that prompted Devine 
to state that "the arrangement of the centre was more ceremonial than tactically 
functional". 1 135 The Greek mercenary infantry, the strongest of the Persian front line 
infantry, but numbering only around 2,000 by this time, 1136 were stationed to either side 
of the elite Persian units. 1137 The Greek mercenaries were positioned directly opposite the 
Macedonian heavy infantry, and were probably the only infantry at Darius' disposal 
capable of opposing them; their lack of numbers was a critical problem, however. The 
remainder of the Persian centre consisted of Indians, "stateless" Carians1138 and Mardian 
archers. 1139 Forming a sort of second line, ' 140 immediately behind these units were the 
Uxians, Babylonians, "troops of the Persian Gulf" and the Sitacenians. 1 41 
The reported numbers for the total strength of the Persian host vary wildly: Arrian 
gives 1,000,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 scythed chariots and 15 elephants. Curtius 
gives 200,000 infantry and 45,000 cavalry; 1,000,000 is the total presented in Plutarch, 
and 800,000 infantry and 200,000 cavalry in Diodorus; Justin tells us of 400,000 infantry 
and 100,000 cavalry. 1142 The first thing to note is that the 200 scythed chariots in Arrian 
"31 For Royal kinsmen see Arrian 3.11.5; Diodorus 17.59.2. For the size of the contingent see Diodorus 
17.59.2. Curtius 3.3.14, claims that they were 15,000 strong. Bosworth, 1980,298, notes that this is 
? robably a mistake for the whole of the Persian national cavalry strength. 
'32 Diodorus 17.20.2; Xenophon Cyropedia. 1.4.27; Arrian 7.11.1,6. 
1133 Arrian 3.11.5; Bosworth, 1980,299. 
1134 The organisation of these elite units into chiliarchies was later copied by Alexander. Bosworth, 1971, 
13 If. 
1 135 Devine, 1986,101. 
136 Because of successive losses in earlier campaigns, Darius did not find it easy to replenish the numbers. 
Lane Fox, 1973,229 believes 4,000. 
1137 Arrian 3.11.5; Curtius 4.12.10. 
1138 They had been forcibly removed from Caria and resettled in central Asia. 
1139 Arrian 3.11.5. cf. Curtius 4.12.7,4.12.9, who misplaces the Mardians, Indians and Persian Gulf infantry 
on the Persian left wing. At this point there appears to be only one contingent of Indians, although earlier 
Arrian distinguishes two. The first from the region bordering Bactria, commanded by Bessus, (Arrian 
3.8.3. ) and having brought 15 elephants (Arrian 3.8.6. ). The second were Indian hill tribesmen commanded 
by Barsaentes (Arrian 3.8.4. ). It is likely that both were amalgamated into one unit some time during the 
preparations for the battle. Devine, 1986,102. 
140 Arrian 3.11.5 uses the term epitetagmenoi: it is intended in the normal sense of posted behind as 
described. He goes on to use the term eis bathos: this is very rare in the pages of the Anabasis, occurring 
only four times in a tactical context (Devine, 1986,102). Elsewhere it is used to describe Alexander's 
phalanx depth against the Triballians (Arrian 1.2.4); it evidently does not just mean stationed behind, but 
also refers to the significant depth of the formation. The second-line infantry were poor troops and, if 
Curtius 4.12.6 is to be believed, largely useless as front-line troops. 1 141 Arrian 3.11.5. 
1142 Arrian 3.8.6; Curtius 4.12.13; Plutarch Alex. 31.1; Diodorus 17.53.3; Justin 11.12.5 
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are perfectly plausible given the time Darius had to prepare and the resources at his 
disposal. 114 We can also say with some certainty that the elephants were not present at 
Gaugamela; they are mentioned in the Persian order of battle, but do not appear to have 
actually taken any part in the battle itself. Alexander, therefore, did not encounter 
elephants in battle until the Hydaspes. Apart from the chariots, most of our sources 
provide wildly exaggerated estimates, as was typical in the ancient world. The most 
plausible figures, however, are those provided by Curtius: 200,000 infantry and 45,000 
cavalry are not unreasonable numbers; given that this was to be Darius' last stand and 
that he had had around twoyears to prepare, summoning contingents from what remained 
of his empire. Devine, " in attempting a slight defence of Arrian, proposes the 
believable hypothesis that Arrian's 40,000 cavalry may have been a paper strength, 
although it was never actually achieved. This in itself is plausible enough, but it is a 
number unfortunately juxtaposed against the 1,000,000 infantry, which has to be pure 
fantasy. 
The Battle of Gaugamela 
The Macedonian tactics for the battle are complex and only discernible with 
hindsight; a simple examination of Macedonian dispositions does not reveal Alexander's 
thinking; the Persian tactics are simpler to understand, however. The Persian order of 
battle at Gaugamela was specifically designed to counteract the tactics that Alexander 
had employed at Issus; 1145 there, Alexander had delivered the fatal blow with his right 
wing, and fought a defensive action on his left. Also, in the earlier set-piece battles 
Alexander had launched a small-scale initial attack to open the battle. 1146 
Stationed on the Persian left wing was an imposing force of cavalry, the forward 
units of which were Scythians and Bactrians, perhaps 3,000 strong. The intention of these 
units seems to have been to absorb Alexander's initial attack that was expected in that 
sector, if Issus was to be repeated by the Macedonians. This would also have the 
secondary effect of allowing the troops in the centre to deal with Alexander's heavy 
infantry without fear of being outflanked. Marsden notes that of the 200 scythed chariots 
available to Darius, fully half were stationed opposite the Macedonian right wing and 
only 50 opposite in the centre, where we have such vivid descriptions of how the heavy 
infantry moved aside to make channels for them to advance through. l 147 Historically 
scythed chariots had not had great success against Greek heavy infantry; Darius evidently 
felt that they might have a more positive impact against cavalry. 
The Persian tactic was evidently for the advance units of Scythians and Bactrians 
to absorb Alexander's initial attack on the right whilst Mazaeus would renew the battle 
with Parmenio and the Thessalians on the left that had been left unresolved at Issus. 
Darius knew that heavy infantry alone would not conquer the Persian Empire, even if 
1143 Devine, 1986,102. 
'Devine, 1986,102. 
1145 And indeed at the Granicus before that. 
1146 Marsden, 1964,42. 
1147 Marsden, 1964,44. 
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they were intact after the battle; he also knew that his own infantry were not of the same 
calibre as the Macedonian! 148 With this in mind, the Persians adopted a novel strategy: to 
rely almost exclusively on cavalry for victory. Persian success depended in part upon this 
new tactic coming as a surprise to Alexander; this was all but impossible to achieve given 
the possibility of Alexander viewing the Persian order of battle from a hill 5km away 
from the Persians' chosen ground. There was little Darius could do about this 
disadvantage; and he probably reasoned that being on a wide open plain 1149 where his 
cavalry could theoretically have almost total freedom of movement would be sufficient. 
In order to regain the tactical initiative, Alexander conducted a reconnaissance 
operation with the light infantry and Companion Cavalry to "examine minutely the whole 
terrain where battle would be fought". 150 Darius did not attempt to counteract this 
operation, perhaps because he was set in position upon the battlefield and did not wish to 
be drawn out by Alexander, perhaps also his army was not sufficiently trained or 
disciplined to be able to launch an unplanned counter-attack at such short notice. 1151 After 
his inspection of the Persian positions and the battlefield, Alexander returned to his camp 
and ordered his men to stand down for the night. Darius on the other hand instructed his 
men to stand at arms all through the night, "52 lest the Macedonians launch a night 
attack. 1153 Bosworth notes that, for Persian armies, this was standard practice; given that 
Darius could not retire to a safe location, it was probably accepted military practice to 
stand at arms through the night and not an original mistake of Darius. 1154 Ordering his 
men to stand down in this manner so close to the enemy seems like a tremendous risk on 
the part of Alexander; he was gambling that the Persians would not be interested in a pre- 
emptive night attack. As so often in his career his gamble paid off: although we do not 
hear of fatigue in the battle, it undoubtedly played a part in the Persian defeat. 
Although the Greeks were stood down that night, Alexander did not rest. Curtius 
tells us that he was up late into the night studying and calculating Persian strength and 
Persian dispositions in order to determine his tactical plan for the coming battle. '15 
Alexander's inspection tour the day before the battle would have made him 
acutely aware that the Persians were very strong in cavalry on their left, his typical initial 
target. They had perhaps 19,000 cavalry in this sector with Alexander being able to 
muster probably only 3,500 at most. 1156 It is highly likely that he toyed with the idea of 
transferring his main attack to the centre or his left, as Curtius suggests, but ultimately 
1148 Marsden, 1964,44; Arrian 2.11.2. 
1149 Which was also specially levelled to provide the greatest possible advantage. 
1150 Arrian 3.9.5. 
1151 And still maintain control of the army. 
1152 Arrian 3.11.1-2. 
1153 A night attack which we hear Parmenio advocating (Arrian 3.10.1), is probably a later invention, as is 
frequently the case with how our sources treat Parmenio. 
1154 Bosworth, 1980,297. Xenophon Anabasis 3.4.34-5, records that in 401 the Persian army never made 
camp whilst within 60 stades of the Greeks. 
1155 Curtius 4.13.16; cf. Diodorus 17.56.1; Plutarch Alex. 32.2. Diodorus 17.56.1; Plutarch Alex. 32.1 and 
Curtius 4.13.17-25, all also record Alexander oversleeping on the morning of the battle as a result of his 
studies. 
1156 Marsden, 1964,46. 
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rejected the plan. ' 157 After all the deliberations Alexander appears to have decided upon 
the same basic strategy that he had used at the Granicus and Issus: to draw the Persians 
out onto ground of his choosing and then, at the optimal moment, launch his counter- 
attack. This would involve, as before, essentially the sacrifice of some troops in order to 
achieve the desired result, but Alexander had no qualms about that. 
Marsden notes that on the day of the battle Alexander drew up his line in a 
remarkably similar manner to his dispositions at Issus two years previously; '158 there 
were a couple of key differences, however. The creation of powerful flank guards at 
either end of the line was an innovation, one that would help protect against an 
outflanking action by a massively larger enemy. The flank guard on the right is of 
particular interest; it was designed to perform two tasks. The first was to draw out as 
much of Bessus' cavalry as it could and to hold them in battle for as long as possible. 
Secondly they were to protect the Companion Cavalry until the opportune moment came 
for the counter-attack. ' 59 The left flank was set up in a similar manner but with no real 
intention of a Thessalian counter-attack on a grand sale. The left flank guard was to fight 
a holding action as always. 
Before marching to battle Alexander addressed the officers, with instructions that 
the address be passed on to the men: ' 160 
Let him but remind them each for himself to preserve 
discipline in the hour of danger - to advance, when called 
upon to do so, in utter silence; to watch the time for a hearty 
cheer, and, when the moment came, to roar out their battle- 
cry and put the fear of God into the enemy's hearts. All must 
obey orders promptly and pass them on without hesitation to 
their men; and, finally, every one of them must remember 
that upon the conduct of each depended the fate of all: if each 
man attended to his duty, success was assured; if one man 
neglected it, the whole army would be in peril. 
We can infer from this speech that Alexander had a general tactic; but by 
reminding the commanders, and thus the men, to watch out for changes in orders that 
should be executed rapidly; it seems that Alexander expected to make changes during the 
battle. 
The following morning, September 30`h, Alexander led the Macedonian host to 
the battlefield. Initially the Macedonians left a considerable overlap to their left flank, so 
much so that the Companion Cavalry were opposite the Persian centre; 
1161 this can have 
1 157 Curtius 4.13.16. 
1158 Marsden, 1964,47. 
1159 Marsden, 1964,50. 
160 Arrian 3.9.5f I think it is beyond doubt that pre-battle speeches were made, but what would have been 
remembered of them by Ptolemy etc. is questionable, as is Arrian's interpretation of that. What we likely 
have, therefore, is the gist of what was said rather than a verbatim transcript. 1161 Arrian 3.13. Iff. 
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been no accident as Alexander had spent a considerable amount of time the previous day 
examining the Persian positions that evidently had not moved overnight. What this 
deployment appears to have been was the first stage in attempting to lure the Persians out 
of their set positions: Persian discipline held, however, and they did not move. 
Alexander's second attempt to force the Persians' hand was a now famous movement to 
his right. 162 Arrian tells us that this was countered by a similar move from the Persians: 
evidently they did not wish to use the tactical advantage offered by the initial overlap, but 
nor were they prepared to lose it. We could infer from the text of Arrian1163 that there was 
no change in the relative positions of the two armies, but this would be a mistake. Even 
though both were moving in the same direction, it would have taken the Persians some 
time to see Alexander's movement, analyse it, and pass orders to individual units to move 
in a similar fashion; thus Alexander would have considerably reduced the overlap by the 
time the Persians reacted. This must have been the case given that later in the battle 
Mazaeus easily encircled the Thessalians on Alexander's left, indicating that they had 
moved a considerable distance relative to the Persian lines. 1164 
Whilst it seems certain that Darius attempted to maintain some kind of overlap on 
the Macedonian right we must ask why? The frontage of his army was such that wherever 
the Macedonians set up he would have a massive overlap on one side or the other, or 
both; why did he wish to maintain the initial starting position? Darius would no doubt 
have expected Alexander to launch his main attack from the Macedonian right where he 
was stationed with the Companion Cavalry; this is what had happened at Issus and would 
have been a reasonable supposition. If Darius did indeed assume this, then he would have 
wanted to maintain as massive a numerical superiority in that sector as possible to 
counter the expected assault. After both armies had been moving in the same direction for 
a time, towards a group of foothills, and away from the ground that had been specially 
prepared by the Persians, Darius evidently ordered a stop. We do not know this directly, 
nor with certainty, but when Darius launched his general advance, beginning with the 
chariots, we can assume that the army would have been stationary first. After the Persians 
had stopped marching, Alexander continued to the right, thus' 165 gaining ground both at 
the start of his movement, before the Persians could react, and at the end, as the Persians 
launched their assault. 
1162 Arrian's use of the term "hos epi"' at 3.13.1, is problematic, especially in a tactical context. Arrian also 
uses the term at the Hydaspes (5.16.3), which Tam (1948,2.194-197) translates as a feint, a movement "as 
if towards the enemy". Given that Arrian uses the term so frequently during his narrative (Hamilton, 1952, 
27, n. 12, claims about 90 examples: Devine, 1986,104, n104, states 130 in the Anabasis), this 
interpretation would mean we would have to alter entirely our interpretations of Alexander's battles that 
use Arrian as a source; every tactical movement he made would become a feint. It is more reasonable to 
accept Hamilton, 1956,26-31, in arguing that Arrian uses "hos epi" and "epi"' interchangeably and both can 
be translated as towards or against. I think it is reasonable to assume that this was an actual movement of 
troops towards Alexander's right, and not a feint in that direction. 
163 Arrian 3.13.1; cf. Marsden, 1964,52. 
U64 Arrian 3.14.6. 
1165 Arrian 3.14.1. 
160 
Before this general Persian assault began, however, Darius ordered his advance 
guard on the leftl166 to circle around to the side of the Macedonian right wing and stop 
their lateral march toward the foothills. Darius was evidently afraid that, if Alexander 
continued his movement towards the foothills and away from the prepared ground, his 
scythed chariots and advantage in cavalry could be nullified. ' 16 The first round of 
tactical sparring was won by Alexander: he had enticed the Persians out of their prepared 
positions. As soon as Alexander saw the Persians make a move he ordered Menidas and 
the mercenary cavalry, ' 168 only a few hundred strong, to counter-attack the 3,000 enemy 
cavalry. Alexander did not expect these few troops to rout the Persians: they were a pawn 
sacrifice in exactly the same manner as at the Granicus and Issus; they were intended to 
draw the enemy forward and force them to commit themselves, ' 169 placing them in a 
position where he could counter-attack with larger numbers and greater quality troops. As 
expected, Menidas was quickly driven and fled the field of battle, it is likely that his men 
did not fight with particular vigour, but they did perform their function. 1170 
At this point the text of Arrian becomes difficult to interpret. 1171 He seems to 
imply that there were three stages to the cavalry battle on the right: Menidas' failed 
counter-attack, the reinforcement by the Paeonians, and finally Aretes' attack with the 
prodromoi. 1 172 The more likely interpretation of the text is that there were two stages: 
after the repulse of Menidas, Alexander ordered a charge by the prodromoi of Aretes and 
Ariston's Paeonians, supported by the veteran mercenary infantry of Cleander. 1173 This 
second counter-attack by the Macedonians met with far greater success, largely because it 
employed greater numbers of higher quality troops. As this was becoming apparent to 
Darius, Bessus, his left wing commander, ordered the remainder of the Bactrian and Saca 
Scythian cavalry, perhaps some 8,000 strong, ' 174 to engage the enemy. The fighting was 
hard and the Macedonians suffered heavy losses against the armoured Saca horsemen. 1175 
At this point in the battle, around 11,000 Persian cavalry were being held back, perhaps 
with great difficulty, by 1,100 Macedonian light cavalry and 6,700 mercenary 
infantry1176 Despite the discrepancy in defensive armour, however, the Macedonian 
1166 This advance guard consisted of the 1,000 Bactrian cavalry and the 2,000 Scythian Massagetae; Curtius 
4.12.6-7; cf. Devine, 1986,103. 
1167 Devine, 1986,103. 
1169 Arrian 3.13.2; cf. Hamilton, 1955,217-8. 
1 169 Marsden, 1964,53. 
1 170 This could have been an intended retreat, of course, in order to preserve their numbers for future battles 
and to further draw the Persians forward in greater disorder. 1171 Arrian 3.13.3. 
1172 Bosworth, 1980,305. 
1173 Devine, 1986,103; cf. Bosworth, 1980,305. 
1174 Curtius 4.12.6. 
1175 Arrian 3.13.4; cf. 4.9.3. These Saca cavalry, which both Arrian and Curtius describe as wearing 
chain mail on both the horse and rider, originated in the region south of the Aral Sea some time during the 
6`h century. This practice seems to have originated with them (Rubin, 1955,264ff; cf. Eadie, 1967,161-3), 
although the Assyrians also developed such cavalry independently. Initially these cavalry seem to have 
specialised in either lance or bow, but by the 4t' century they were proficient with both. Alexander was 
evidently so impressed by these horsemen that by 327 (Arrian 5.12.2) he incorporated them into his army. 
They later formed the basis of the Seleucid cataphracts (Livy 35.48.3; 37.42.1; Polybius 30.25.9. ); 
Bosworth, 1980,306. 
1176 Marsden, 1964,54. 
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cavalry held their own against superior numbers. Arrian tells us of repeated cavalry 
charges by Bessus, indicating that the battle on the Macedonian right was lengthy and 
perhaps that the Persian defeat was more to do with demoralisation after Darius fled than 
a military defeat. Devine"77 also notes the possibility of treason by Bessus; it seems 
unlikely in the heat of battle that an enemy commander could negotiate a treaty and if it 
had been organised before the battle, then why fight at all, why not simply change sides? 
The treason story originates in Curtius, 1178 and it is no doubt true to say Bessus was 
ambitious, as Curtius does, but it is a long way from ambition to outright treason. 
The battle on the right culminated in a final charge by the Macedonians. Tarn 
made the error of assuming that these Macedonians were the Companion Cavalry, ' 179 
believing them to be the only ethnically Macedonian units in that area at the time. He also 
erroneously believed that the Persians broke through the flank guards in order to reach 
the Companions. Arrian here is not using Macedonian in the ethnically specific sense, but 
as a generalisation for troops within the Macedonian order of battle. 118 The troops that 
ultimately held and then repulsed Bessus were the mercenaries, prodromoi and Paeonians 
as described above. 
At some point which remains unclear, some of Mazaeus' cavalry on the Persian 
right broke through the Macedonian lines: Arrianl's1 describes breaking through the 
centre, whilst Curtius has 1,000 cavalry being ordered to ride around Alexander's 
extreme left to "plunder the enemy's baggage". ' 182 Curtius here has a request sent to 
Alexander with news of this action and a request for orders: this is not a request for 
assistance as is assumed by Devine, but an alteration to the plan to which Parmenio felt 
himself unable to adjust. Alexander's response was to ignore the raid, as if they were to 
"win this battle we shall not only recover our own baggage but also capture the 
enemy's". 1183 
Arrian's text is also problematic: a breakthrough in the centre (and at the very end 
of the battle) presents a number of difficulties; any breakthrough that reached the baggage 
train would have to pass through the second, reserve phalanx; this does not seem to have 
occurred in Arrian. Indeed, the reserve phalanx only learned about the breakthrough 
when the baggage train was being looted. Alexander's baggage was also some distance to 
the rear, some 6km. "84 A second problem is that Arrian has the Indians and Persian 
cavalry fleeing in defeat, but the camp was no longer in a direct line behind the 
Macedonians because of Alexander's rightward movement before the battle. 1185 These 
fleeing cavalry, then, are supposed to have regained their composure, despite the battle 
being over and Darius already in flight, in order to attack the guarded Macedonian camp. 
1177 Arrian 3.13.4. Devine, 1986,103. 
1178 Curtius 4.6.4. 
1179 Tarn, 1948,2.185-186. 
1180 Bum, 1952,87, n. 6. cf. Griffith, 1947,80-8 1. 
118' Arrian 3.14.5. 
1182 Curtius 4.15.5. 
1183 Devine, 1986,109, n. 127. Curtius 4.15.5. 
1184 30 stades. 
1185 Burn, 1952,89. 
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We can only conclude that Arrian is wrong in the timing of the breakthrough: it was not 
at the end of the battle but earlier, as in Curtius, and also in the direction of the Indian and 
Persian cavalry. The camp was 6km away and thus not an easy or tempting target for any 
cavalry units that did manage to break through; we can therefore only conclude direct 
orders for the camp to be assaulted, again as in Curtius: the intention no doubt being an 
attempt to recover Darius' family. "86 
This initial fighting was a significant tactical victory for Alexander: the cavalry of 
Bessus had been charged with defeating Alexander's right flank, and yet that had failed to 
break through even the flank guard. This essentially gave the Companion Cavalry free 
rein to attack the Persians without having to fight a way through the heavily armed 
Scythian cavalry. Alexander's tactic, oft repeated, of luring the enemy onto ground, and 
into a position, of his choosing had again proved a success. 
At the same time as this cavalry action was being fought, Darius launched a 
second assault directed at the Macedonian right; one hundred scythed chariots were sent 
against the Companion Cavalry! 187 The intention is obvious, to cripple the horses and 
render Alexander's finest units useless. The assault was evidently an attempt at a two- 
pronged attack by Darius, the cavalry circling to attack from the flank and the chariots 
from the front. ' 188 This assault proved equally ineffective; the chariots were routed by 
ians that had been stationed in Balacrus' javelin-men and the remaining half of the Arian 
front of the Companion Cavalry to act as a screen. ' 19 At the same time as this chariot 
assault was launched against the Companions, two smaller assaults, each by 50 chariots, 
were made against the heavy infantry in the centre and Parmenio on the left. Curtius 
confuses the assault on the centre with that on the Macedonian right, but nevertheless 
gives us a valuable insight into the battle. Curtius describes the following: ' 190 
Some were killed by the spears that projected well 
beyond the chariot-poles and others dismembered by 
the scythes set on either side. It was no gradual 
withdrawal that the Macedonians made but a 
disordered flight, breaking their ranks. 
The following is Curtius' description of the chariot assault on the "front line". 
This is evidently the skirmishing troops as he later describes: ' 191 
1186 Burn, 1952,88-90; cf. Bosworth, 1980,308. 
1187 Arrian 3.13.5-6. 
1188 Bosworth, 1980,306, was the first to realise the evident point that the two attacks came simultaneously; 
cf. Curtius 4.15.14, Diodorus 17.58.2. 
1189 Tam, 1948,2.149ff, argued that some of the hypaspists were also involved. Arrian does seem to imply 
that some of that corps were stationed behind the front line, but it seems unlikely given their lack of 
numbers, only 3,000, that they would not all have been used in the front line where they could do the most 
damage. Bosworth, 1980,307, notes that these troops were perhaps the small private contingent of the 
king's bodyguard, and not the more famous units of heavy infantry. 
1 190 Curtius 4.15.4. 
1191 Curtius 4.15.14-15. 
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After causing havoc in Alexander's front lines, the 
chariots had now charged the phalanx, and the 
Macedonians received the charge with a firm resolve, 
permitting them to penetrate to the middle of the column. 
Their formation resembled a rampart; after creating an 
unbroken line of spears, they stabbed the flanks of horses 
from both sides as they charged recklessly ahead. 
The commonly held view, and the more likely explanation, is that the infantry 
simply moved out of the way of the chariots; to have moved far enough to stab the horses 
in each of their sides with a sarissa some 5.5m long would have meant creating a series of 
perhaps 15m gaps in the line: this seems unlikely in the heat of battle. It is much more 
plausible to assume a smaller gap without the heavy infantry being able to use their 
sarissa. Either way, the Macedonians evidently had more difficulty with the chariots than 
Arrian has led us to believe. 
The use of scythed chariots by Darius against the Companion Cavalry could have 
been disastrous for Alexander, but the ease with which they were dealt with demonstrates 
Alexander's close attention to detail: Alexander must have taken note the previous day of 
the location of the chariots, noting fully half of the total number stationed on the Persian 
left, and immediately formulating a plan as to how to counter their use. Given that, even 
in the centre where they had some limited and evidently short-term impact, ' 192 this action 
also clearly demonstrates that the chariot's day as a key unit on the battlefield was 
over. 1193 
It seems from the text of Arrian that Alexander had not yet ordered his centre to 
advance: "as Alexander moved forward the Persians sent their scythed chariots against 
him 1194 This seems to imply a movement by Alexander and the Companion Cavalry, not 
the infantry as is surmised by Devine. ' 195 Marsden notes Darius' confidence at this point, 
claiming that from his perspective the Macedonian right was contained' 196 and that he 
had a good overlap on probably both sides making a flanking manoeuvre very possible. I 
would add that from Alexander's perspective, the battle was also going very well indeed. 
He had managed to entice the Persian cavalry on his right into attacking, sacrificing only 
a small band of non-Macedonian cavalry in the process. He had also managed to contain 
this charge without using his elite Companion Cavalry; and he had successfully dealt with 
the potentially dangerous scythed chariots, with no casualties at all. 
Riding high, as Darius evidently felt he was, he ordered a general advance. This 
would not only have consisted of the infantry in the centre: Mazaeus also advanced upon 
Parmenio and the Thessalians, and Bessus no doubt used ever more cavalry against 
192 Short-term because we know that the heavy infantry recovered enough to form part of the wedge that 
attacked the Persians, and to assault the Persian centre. 
193 Chariots had been equally ineffective at the battle of Cunaxa (Xenophon Anab. 1.8.19-20). 
1194 Arrian 3.13.1. 
"95 Devine, 1986,104. 
"" Marsden, 1964,54. From Darius' vantage point it would have appeared as though the Companion 
Cavalry were engaged as well as the flank guard. 
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Alexander's right. ' 197 Once the general Persian advance had started, Alexander 
immediately ordered Aretes to attack the 2,000 cavalry that were moving forward to 
support Bessus. 1198 This had the effect of taking even more of the Persian cavalry out of 
the battle by tying them up against the flank guard now supported by Aretes. Once these 
extra Persian cavalry had been committed, and neutralised by Aretes, Darius had around 
5,000 cavalry remaining that were not yet engaged. Alexander had, therefore, by the quite 
brilliant plan of luring the Persians out of their initial position, reduced the odds against 
the Companions from around 5: 1 to a much more palatable 5: 2; 1199 whilst also preventing 
the encirclement of his right flank by using essentially only the flank guards. 
Bessus' initial orders had been to halt the Macedonian lateral movement, which 
he had done. In order to achieve this, however, he had to attack the Macedonians not 
from the front, but from the side. This had necessitated Bessus breaking rank with the 
Persian centre, thus allowing a gap to form in the Persian line. The general movements 
that had occurred to this point in the battle had led to Alexander's army, in all likelihood, 
being at an oblique angle to the Persians with the left refused and the right advanced. 
Alexander now seized the opportunity and wheeled his Companions. He made a series of 
wedge formations, 1200 and charged straight for the gap. 1201 The right wing of Alexander's 
charge was covered by the Agrianians and archers, again at an oblique angle, who were 
fresh from dealing with the Persian scythed chariots. Also present were the hypaspists 
and the pezhetairoi from Polyperchon and those to his right. '2 2 
Curtius1203 tells us that the Persian line on the left was thinner than the rest of the 
Persian front, because of the detachment of Bessus' cavalry. They were perhaps still in 
the process of reorganising themselves to attempt to maintain some kind of link with 
Bessus as Alexander struck. Alexander's charge evidently left him deep within Persian 
ranks, and he was surrounded by the enemy. Alexander's charge had separated him from 
his supporting infantry units, and he was only saved when the Agrianians caught up to his 
position. 1204 The situation in Alexander's sector was now extremely confused; the 
Companion Cavalry were under attack on all sides, having charged the Persian left centre. 
Those Persians that were behind Alexander were now also being attacked from behind by 
1197Arrian 3.14.1. 
1198 2,000 cavalry consisted of 1,000 Dahae and 1,000 Arachotians; Arrian 3.14.1. 1199 Marsden, 1964,55. 
1200 This delta-shaped wedge formation had been borrowed from the Scythians by Philip II; Asclep. Tact. 
7.2-3; 7.6-7; Arrian Tact. 16.1; 16.6-8; 17.3; Aelian Tact. 18.1; 18.4; 19.5; 40.2-4; 40.6; cf. Devine, 1986, 
107. 
1201 Arrian 3.14.2. 
1202 Only those taxeis of Polyperchon and Craterus did not charge towards the gap, or more accurately 
charge at an oblique angle towards the Persian centre and the gap that had developed with the left. 
Marsden, 1964,57 appears incorrect in writing "forming all forces not yet engaged into a gigantic wedge". 
Not all of the pezhetairoi were involved in charging towards the gap; the left-hand two taxeis appear not to 
have been involved. This view is supported by Arrian 3.14.2; "with all of the heavy infantry in this sector 
of the line", that is to say not all of the heavy infantry. 
1203 Curtius 4.15.20. 
1204 Curtius 4.15.21 mistakenly (twice) calls these Agrianians cavalrymen: they can only have been the 
famous light infantry units as we have no positive evidence at all of them being employed as mounted 
troops. 
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the Agrianians and other light infantry units; meanwhile Bessus' cavalry were still fully 
engaged, except for those that had broken loose to attack the Macedonian baggage train. 
We are given next to no details of the fighting in the centre involving the 
pezhetairoi, but we can draw a number of conclusions. We do know that this engagement 
occurred after Alexander's entry into the battle; and we get the impression from the 
sources that it did not take the Companion Cavalry too long to break through on the right 
and engage Darius directly in his flank. The pezhetairoi, therefore, were not engaged for 
long. This would have been Alexander's intention; the Macedonian heavy infantry were 
nothing like a traditional hoplite phalanx in that they were not heavily encumbered by 
body armour. The Macedonian pezhetairoi relied heavily upon their sarissa as a first 
strike weapon; they expected to roll over the enemy like a modern tank. Any gap that 
opened in the line was a serious blow as it meant the enemy could engage a relatively 
undefended soldier. Alexander's heavy infantry were not a defensive unit; they were a 
strike weapon in exactly the same way as the Companions. The basis of Alexander's 
tactics was always for himself and the Companions to break through on the right, and 
wheel against the enemy centre, at about the same time as the pezhetairoi hit them from 
the front. The combined strike force of both was irresistible. If for any reason the flanking 
attack of the Companions was delayed then the heavy infantry would begin to struggle 
after the initial shock. 
Arrian's'205 narrative passes from Alexander being hard pressed on the right to 
Darius' rout in a matter of only a couple of lines. Bosworth notes that the description of 
the cavalry battle bears significant similarities to that at the Granicus and is almost 
formulaic in feel: 1206 the brief mention of the bristling sarissas of the heavy infantry 
adding irresistible weight is perhaps modelled on Homer. 1207 Arrian has Darius turning 
tail at almost the first sign of difficulty, claiming that he was "the first to turn and 
flee. " 1208 The vulgate tradition, 1209 however, has an epic, almost Homeric-style, duel of 
hand-to-hand combat which resulted in Darius' driver being killed. Only at this point 
does the Great King flee the battlefield. Plutarch gives the most reasonable and reasoned 
account of Darius' flight, 1210 claiming that he only fled when the situation was desperate 
and the battle lost, mobility also being hampered by the infantry in the centre who were 
already in flight. 1211 Plutarch should here be accepted at the expense of the other 
traditions for several reasons. Darius was a significant military figure in his own right and 
had proved himself an able commander before the war with Macedon; bearing this in 
mind it seems unlikely that he would flee at the first sign of battle. The Vulgate tradition 
is obviously far too Homeric and formulaic to be trusted as fact; only Plutarch has a 
1205 Arrian 3.14.3. 
120 Bosworth, 1980,306. Arrian 1.16.1. 
1207 Homer, Iliad, 4.282; cf. 6.61-2. There was something of a tradition making such a link; cf. Diodorus 
16.3.2; Polybius 18.29.6; Curtius 3.2.13; cf Bosworth, 1980,306. 1208 Arrian 3.14.3. 
'209 Diodorus 17.60.2-4; Curtius 4.15.24-33; Justin 9.14.3. 
1210 Many have seen Darius' flight as an act of cowardice; Marsden, 1964,58, however, is more reasonable 
in seeing it more as an act of political expediency: the battle was lost, why stay longer and risk death? 121 Bosworth, 1980,308. 
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seemingly reasoned picture of a battle that was hard fought with the defeated monarch 
fleeing the field once the battle was lost. 
In this sector, Bessus was evidently also in flight, as described by Arrian: "The 
outflanking party on the Macedonian right was also broken up by the powerful assault of 
Aretes' men". 1212 Given the strength of Bessus' forces, it seems unlikely that the 
Macedonian flank guards would have routed them so easily; it is more likely that they 
would only have fled when they saw Darius doing the same. Griffith's121 view that 
Bessus must have been assaulted by a more formidable force than just the flank guards 
has merit, but is unsupported by the evidence. The second force could only have been the 
Companion Cavalry wheeling right as they passed the gap in the Persian line, rather than 
left to attack Darius. It is inconceivable that Alexander, when faced with the choice of 
attacking the flanking troops or attacking the Great King, would have steered away from 
Darius. We can further argue that Alexander's whole tactic was to attack the Persian 
centre from two directions simultaneously, and with the heavy infantry either engaged, or 
about to engage the Persian centre, he could not afford a delay in mopping up the Persian 
left, if the battle was to be won. There is also no hint of his proposed attack against 
Bessus in Arrian. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the battle on the Macedonian 
right was hard fought and only won when Bessus saw Darius in flight and thus decided 
that there was no reason to continue. 
The general Persian rout on the right and in the centre is described graphically by 
CUrtiUS: 1214 
The Macedonians wandered around like people in the 
dark, converging only when they recognised a voice 
or heard a signal. But they could hear the sound of 
reins time and time again lashing the chariot horses, 
the only trace they had of the fleeing king. 
Ancient battles would often have been fought in such circumstances, with little 
visibility or opportunity for communication. The geographical areas in which Alexander 
fought, largely in extremely dry regions of Persia, would have meant that this was a 
ubiquitous problem. Many of the areas where Alexander fought campaigns were bone dry 
for large parts of the year, and any activity on the ground, such as marching or the 
movement of horses, would have thrown up considerable amounts of dust into the 
atmosphere. This dust would have had the effect of massively reducing visibility to the 
point where directing a battle for anyone would have been almost impossible. Alexander 
would have had to rely upon his commanders knowing their responsibilities under the 
tactical plan and executing their orders precisely. Communication would have been 
facilitated by cavalry messengers carrying messages from one sector of the battlefield to 
1212 Arrian 14.3-4. 
1213 Griffith, 1947,82ff, Fuller, 1958,177f, Marsden, 1964,58f. 
1214 Curtius 4.15.32-33. 
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another: this is demonstrated by the plea for help from Parmenio towards the end of the 
battle of Gaugamela, assuming it occurred. '215 
The Hydaspes River is perhaps Alexander's only major battle where this problem 
would not have been encountered, given the monsoon rain and the resulting mud at the 
time of the battle. Given these conditions of limited visibility and communication, it is 
easy to see how panic could spread quickly in such circumstances. Generals relied 
heavily upon competent sub-commanders and the discipline of their troops for victory. 
Much like the battle in the centre, we know little about the detail of the action on 
the Macedonian left. We do know that the fighting was harsh, as everywhere else on the 
battlefield, with little quarter given by either side. Curtius tells us that "the fortunes of the 
battle were very different for both sides" from those on the right or in the centre. 1216 
Mazaeus, the Persian commander in that sector, conducted a vigorous and violent 
charge against Parmenio with all of the cavalry at his disposal. Mazaeus was attempting 
to encircle Alexander's left wing utilising his numerical superiority, leaving Parmenio in 
a desperate position when he sent a plea for help, to Alexander. 1217 
All of our sources agree that a plea for help was sent, 1218 and that it occurred at 
this juncture in the battle, but the method of delivery, and Alexander's response, is far 
from clear. Arrian tells us that Alexander turned back from his pursuit, decided that the 
Persians were in retreat and proceeded to resume his pursuit of Darius. 1219 This, as has 
often been noted, is unrealistic: if Alexander was in full pursuit of the Great King it is 
difficult to conceive how an exhausted Thessalian cavalryman could have caught up with 
him in order to deliver the message. Griffith argued that Alexander did not pursue Darius 
immediately but stayed to help out his right wing, whilst Marsden1220 assumes some kind 
of prearranged signal. Griffith cannot be right as this theory does not have Alexander 
pursuing Darius as is claimed in every source, and Marsden is unlikely to be correct 
because it is unlikely that such a signal would have been successful given all of the dust 
and general confusion on the battlefield illustrated by the Curtius passage above. 1221 
Plutarch tells us of Alexander's pursuit and his annoyance upon receiving the 
message from Parmenio; he also notes Alexander's decision to hide the truth of their 
abandonment of the pursuit from the men, blaming the failing light. 1222 Curtius tells a 
1215 See above pp. 18,20. 
1216 Curtius 4.16.1. 
'217 Curtius 4.16.1-2. 
1218 Arrian 3.15.1; Curtius 4.16.2; Diodorus 17.60.7; Plutarch Alex. 33.9. This section relies heavily upon 
Bosworth, 1980,309ff. 
1219 Arian 3.15.1. 
1220 Griffith, 1947,87-8. Marsden, 1964,61-2. 
122' Curtius 4.15.32-33; see also the introduction above. 1222 Plutarch Alex. 33.9-11. The failing light is also an indication that the battle lasted for quite some time: 
no doubt the preliminaries took up a considerable part of the day with the battle commencing early 
afternoon. We also know that the battle started late because of Alexander being late to rise on this occasion. 
The descriptions of the battle that we have do not allow for a battle lasting all day. 
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similar story of the message only reaching Alexander when he was some way from the 
battlefield; again Alexander halts his pursuit in order to return. 1223 He also tells us that 
Alexander had reached the river Lycus before he turned back, after protests from his men 
to press the pursuit; Curtius also mentions failing light. Curtius adds that he turned back 
because he believed that Parmenio was in trouble; this sits well with Diodorus' 1224 claim 
that the message was never delivered presumably because Alexander was some distance 
away, and with my own interpretation of a message only being delivered once Alexander 
was returning to the battlefield. 
Many have found Diodorus' 1225 account of the message not having been delivered 
convincing, especially since Arrian's version presents a number of significant problems. 
Arrian's account clearly implies two pursuits, the second of which lasted until nightfall: 
there is a hint of two separate pursuit incidents in Curtius; but this is not explicitly stated 
as Bosworth has argued. 1226 All of our sources at least hint at two pursuits of Darius, the 
first aborted in order to provide assistance to Parmenio, the second a more concerted 
effort. 
I would argue that the most plausible version of the story is for Alexander to have 
immediately pursued the fleeing Darius, but to have called off the chase as the hour 
became late. 1 27 As he was returning to the battlefield 1228 the messenger from Parmenio 
reached him, but by the time he returned the battle was long over, Mazaeus having fled 
with the rest of the Persian army. The following day, a second concerted pursuit of Darius 
began, no doubt better organised and with a greater number of troops. Thus Parmenio's 
message was delivered, but some time after it was sent; in the intervening period 
Parmenio managed to hold, and ultimately win the battle on the on the left. There were, 
1223 Curtius 4.16.3. 
1224 Curtius 4.16.16-19: Although how he could have come to believe this without any actual evidence in 
the form of a message is not explained. The only real possibility is that Alexander knew how outnumbered 
Parmenio was and speculated that he could only hold out for a short period, and thus Alexander perhaps 
believed that he had a narrow window of opportunity to pursue Darius before Parmenio's situation became 
critical. Diodorus 17.60.7-8. 
1225 Griffith, 1947,88; Hamilton, 1980,89; Bosworth, 1980,310. 
1226 Bosworth, 1980,310 notes that Curtius has Alexander turn back "for the first time" at nightfall, the 
Latin does not in fact say this. Curtius 4.16.18-19 actually states "Alexander instantibus suis ne impune 
abeuntem hostem intermitteret sequi, hebetia esse tela et manus fatigates tantoque cursu corpora exhausta et 
praeceps in noctem diei tempus causatus est, re vera de laevo corms, quod adhuc in acie stare credebat, 
sollicitus, reverti ad ferendam opera suis statuit. " Alexander does turn back, but there is no explicit mention 
of "for the first time". 
1227 Note that I am assuming an error in Arrian as to the timing of the ending of the first pursuit; Alexander 
being forced to turn back to help an imperilled Parmenio fits well with the anti-Parmenio strand that occurs 
in Arrian. Presenting Parmenio as less than competent (in failing to initially secure his own area of the 
field); the argument becomes even more effective if Alexander was given little chance of catching Darius 
(i. e. having to turn back before nightfall), no blame could be assigned to him for failing if he had to break 
off the pursuit so quickly. 
1228 And presumably after a brief but bloody battle with a band of retreating Persian cavalry: Arian 3.15.2; 
Curtius 4.16.20. 
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therefore, two pursuits of the Great King, one on the day of battle that failed to capture 
him, the second the following day. 1229 
Casualties 
It is usually the case, as it is at Gaugamela, that the vulgate tradition gives higher 
casualty figures than does Arrian. Arrian tells us that there were "at most" 100 dead on 
the Macedonian side; that this figure cannot be true hardly needs to be said. Diodorus 
gives a figure of 500 dead and very many wounded, with Curtius claiming less than 300 
losses. 1230 Arrian even gives us solid grounds for rejecting his estimate; he tells us that 
sixty Companions fell in the final exchange, on Alexander's return from the pursuit. 123I 
He also tells us that over 1,000 Macedonian horses died in battle or of fatigue during the 
pursuit. 1232 Alexander must have suffered considerably more than only forty losses in the 
vicious fighting on both the left and right; 1233 Arrian even tells us that Alexander suffered 
greater losses than the Bactrians. The highest, and we must assume most reasonable 
figure, is from the Oxyrhynchus historian who states 1,200 Macedonian dead. 1234 
As far as Persian losses are concerned we see the same story as in every battle, 
massively inflated casualty figures: for Arrian, 300,000; for Diodorus, 90,000; Curtius, 
40,000 and the Oxyrhynchus historian, 53,000.1235 These figures are as unbelievable as 
those of the Macedonians, and are similar in order of magnitude to Issus. Devine's1236 
guestimate of "a few thousand" seems plausible enough for the battle; but the Persians 
would have sustained their greatest losses in flight. 
Conclusion 
Gaugamela shows Alexander's tactical brilliance; he encountered a vastly 
superior army on a wide open plain that had been specially levelled in order to take 
advantage of the Great King's numerical superiority. Alexander shows himself not to be 
the rash gambler so often described, but a cool and level-headed tactician. He assessed 
1229 Contra Rhodes, 2006,364, who argues that no message was sent at all from Parmenio to Alexander. He 
argues that in the confusion of a melee of 200,000 or more men, along with the dust that that would have 
generated, there was no way that a message could possibly have reached Alexander. I do not disagree with 
this point, in general terms; but it assumes that the message would have been sent during the height of the 
battle, when Alexander was preparing to pursue Darius, or during that pursuit. I have tried to argue that the 
message would only have reached Alexander a little later than this, when he had already given up the 
pursuit and was returning towards the battlefield. Given that only a few cavalry accompanied Alexander on 
the pursuit of Darius, these would not have generated much dust, and Alexander would have been perfectly 
visible on his return journey, as most of the fighting (and thus the dust it generated) was over by that time. 
1230 Arrian 3.15.6; Diodorus 17.61.3; Curtius 4.16.26: Bosworth, 1980,312, also quoting this same passage 
of Curtius, mistakenly claims 330 dead. 
1231 Arrian 3.15.2. 
1232 Arrian 3.15.6. 
1233 Boworth, 1980,312. 
1234 Arrian 3.13.2-4. Oxyrhynchus Papyri 1798. 
1235 Arrian 3.15.6; Diodorus 17.61.3; Curtius 4.16.26; Oxyrhynchus Papyri 1798. 
1236 Devine, 1986,108. 
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the battlefield and studied the enemy positions the day before the battle, and developed a 
tactic specific to the situation, albeit with some key hallmarks. 
His initial assessment of the Persian position clearly showed that it would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for him to implement his preferred pincer movement against 
the enemy centre. The Persian left was simply too big and too strong for him to force his 
way through it and wheel on the centre to coincide with his infantry attack. His solution 
was brilliant, to set up his army too far to the left deliberately, to allow the Persians a 
massive overlap on his right. Once he was set up in this position he began moving to the 
right, towards a group of foothills, knowing that Darius must act to stop him. In any 
attempt to stop Alexander's movement, Darius would have to use a significant proportion 
of his left flank cavalry. Anticipating that this would have to occur, Alexander created 
two powerful flank guards, as well as a second line in case of encirclement, that would be 
charged with engaging the enemy and essentially taking them out of the battle. Once the 
Persian left wing cavalry were removed from the Persian order of battle, Alexander was 
free to execute his preferred strategy with devastating results; the combined infantry and 
cavalry attack of the Persian centre ended the battle quickly. 
One clarification does need to be made: Alexander's sacrifice of Menidas' 
mercenary cavalry. Devine views it as "irresponsible" to throw a small unit of cavalry 
against a vastly superior one; 1237 but this is to miss the point of what Alexander was 
trying to achieve. The purpose of sending Menidas' cavalry forward was to entice the 
enemy out of their formation and into an engagement that would see the cavalry on 
Darius' left effectively removed from the battle, and free the Companions to penetrate 
through the gap that was formed. Some may condemn Alexander for wilfully sacrificing 
a unit of his troops in this way, but there was a clear aim. Alexander had done exactly the 
same at the Granicus and Issus, and this kind of pawn sacrifice1238 can be considered one 
of Alexander's hallmarks. 
Darius' generalship is often unappreciated: his own strategy was perfectly sound; 
he attempted to encircle the Macedonians in order to attack them in several directions at 
once. This was a perfectly reasonable strategy, but needed time to be effective, time that 
Alexander's charge at the head of the Companion Cavalry did not allow. His use of 
chariots was a reasonable gamble, and could have been devastating, but in reality did 
little. The great failing on the part of the Persians was not in generalship, but in allowing 
a gap to develop between the centre and the left; the Persians did not possess enough 
quality infantry to maintain a cohesive link. This is a role that would have been played by 
the hypaspists of Alexander, but the Persians possessed only 3,000 quality infantry, the 
Greek mercenaries left over from Issus. 
'23' Devine, 1986,108. 
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Chapter 7 
The North-East Frontier: 328-7 
The set-piece battles, as well as the great sieges of Alexander's career, have been 
examined thoroughly; this was intentional as they represent the main narratives that we 
have for any study of Alexander's military career. This chapter, however, is rather less 
detailed: this is entirely deliberate. The sources for this chapter of Alexander's career 
give us a reasonable narrative of what Alexander was doing in Bactria and Sogdiana, but 
they are frequently lacking in military detail, and there are few major episodes to study. 
This chapter, therefore, is intended to pick out those salient points that are particularly 
relevant to this study, details that can illustrate Alexander's tactical and strategic 
thinking. 
Victory at Gaugamela also brought the defeat of the Persian Empire. The 
elimination of the Persians as a military threat left the great cities of Susa, Persepolis, 
Ecbatana and Pasargadae undefended. These Achaemenid royal cities also housed the 
accumulated wealth of 230 years of Persian rule; '2--9 riches beyond the imaginings of 
"'`' Heckel, 2008,80. 
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Figure 32: Alexander's campaign in the east of the former Persian Empire. 
even the most avaricious Greek. "Immediately after the battlei1240 Alexander moved 
south towards Babylonia. In order to complete the capture of the Persian treasuries as 
quickly as possible, he also sent ahead Philoxenus to Susa, in order to accept its 
surrender12 1 Babylon also surrendered without a struggle, 1242 as did Susa. It seems that 
the Macedonian host travelled the 365km from Babylon to Susa in 20 days, and this 
included a lengthy stop in Sittacene. 1243 We do not know how long the delay was, but a 
rate of march of between 20 and 25km per day is impressive when we consider it is 
through essentially unknown enemy terrain. Once Susa had been secured, Alexander 
would never again find finances a problem. 
Alexander did not delay for long in Susa, as the great prize of Persepolis lay only 
600km away. 1244 In order to claim that prize, Alexander first had to cross the 
mountainous terrain occupied by the semi-independent Uxians. 1245 The winter was 
already well advanced 12 as the Macedonians set off from Susa, but delay was 
unthinkable for Alexander. Four days after leaving Susa Alexander crossed the Dez and 
the Pasitigris, via pontoon bridges, 247 and entered the territory of the Uxii. The terrain 
was considerably different from that which he had recently crossed, being 
mountainoust248 with many sheer cliffs and only a few narrow passes in the north, tailing 
off into plains further to the south. 
The sources are confused about the operations in this region, but it seems clear 
that there were two separate actions, the first of which was against the lowland Uxii. The 
Uxii had blockaded a narrow pass and demanded the same tax payment that they had 
received from Darius when he traversed these lands. 1249 Medates, the Uxii commander, 
evidently did not know of Alexander's reputation, that he would never buy his way out of 
a situation when violence would work just as effectively: Alexander's preferred option 
also had the effect of making a statement to the Uxii and anyone else who would choose 
to resist. The day before the encounter, Alexander detached a secondary, fast moving 
column, led by Craterus, consisting of some 12,000 troops. 1250 This column was sent on a 
forced night march through another mountain pass. Alexander was evidently employing 
local guides as he did frequently when in unknown lands, in order to take the enemy in 
the flank - as we have seen many times, his preferred strategy whenever possible. At the 
'=J0 Arrian 3.16.1; Bosworth translates it thus, rather than the usual "immediately from the battle": 
Bosworth, 1980.313. We can assume that he first observed the correct religious rituals and buried the dead; 
Bosworth. 1988,85. 
'_ Arrian 3.16.4. 
1212 Mazaeus fled the field of Gaugamela and headed straight to Babylon, where he surrendered the city to 
Alexander upon his arrival. Mazaeus was then installed as governor; this was the same man who had 
commanded the Persian right wing at Gaugamela only days before; Arrian 3.16.3f. 
1243 Bosworth. 1988.88. Arrian 3.16.7. Diodorus 17.65.2, notes "a number of days"; cf Curtius 5.2.2. 
12" Hammond. 1980.166. 
1243 Ashley. 1998,271. 
'='6 Winter of 331. 
1247 Strabo 729; Diodorus 17.67.1; Curtius 5.3.1. 
124$ The Zagros Mountains. 
'='9 Strabo 728; Arrian 3.17.1. 
130 Some 3,000 h)paspists, 1,000 Agrianians, 1,000 Archers, 1,000 Thracins and fully four taxeis of heavy 
infantry; Curtius 5.3.3. 
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start of the next day, Alexander attacked a number of accessible Uxii villages, killing and 
looting as he went, before falling upon the defended position in the pass. 1251 Once 
Craterus had taken up his position on the heights covering the Uxii's suspected line of 
retreat. Alexander launched a lightning fast frontal assault. The untrained Uxii were so 
frightened that they abandoned their positions without a shot being fired. The Uxii 
suffered losses, however, as they fled to what they thought was the safety of the 
mountains, but was in fact, straight to the waiting Craterus. 
1251 Ashley, 1998,271. 
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After a brief delay sacking Uxii villages, 1252 Alexander divided his forces. The 
mercenary and allied troops, together with the baggage train, were 
left under the 
command of Parmenio to travel towards Persepolis via what Arrian 
describes as the 
"carriage road". 'ZSZ This is almost certainly the route identified by Stein as that which 
'u2 Arrian 3.17.6 notes "such were the `dues' paid by Alexander to the Uxians". 
1253 Anian 3.18.1. 
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Figure 33: The Persian Gates: Alexander marched thousands of men, at night, tnrougn uie 
mountains to turn the Persian fortification. 
Persian Gates 
branches south-east leading to Kazarun and the modem highway to Shiraz. 1254 Although 
this was the main route to Persepolis, it was not the quickest; Alexander chose the direct 
but lesser used route over the mountains. As is almost always the case when dealing with 
a column not commanded by Alexander, we have little information of any difficulties 
encountered by Parmenio. The path Parmenio was assigned was the main route in the 
Achaemenid period: 1255 it is simply not believable that the Persian Gates would have been 
so carefully defended, but the main highway into Persis was unguarded. Bosworth, 
following the lead of Polyaenus, 1256 suggests a very convincing possibility. The 
commander of the defending Persian troops at the gates is usually assumed to be 
Ariobarzanes; Polyaenus, on the other hand, claims it to have been Phrasaortes, a man 
Alexander later made satrap of Persis. 1257 The theory is that Polyaenus is conflating the 
two commanders into only one action, when in fact Ariobarzanes was at the Gates and 
Phrasaortes was blockading the road to the south. The fact that he was later rewarded 
with a satrapy suggests he surrendered to Parmenio without difficulty. Parmenio here 
would be showing himself more like a Philip than an Alexander, relying on diplomacy 
rather than military action; both produced the same result in the end, however. 
Either way, Ariobarzanes had prepared his position well: he had built a wall1258 
across the narrow pass and had men stationed on the heights to either side. Alexander 
advanced upon the gates slowly and with extreme caution, 1259 evidently aware of the 
dangers and expecting an attack of some kind. Alexander's first response upon seeing the 
wall shows an uncharacteristic lack of style, thought or preparation: almost immediately 
he launched a frontal assault. It could be that he attempted the same strategy as had 
worked against the Uxii previously, to terrify them into retreat without the need for battle. 
Alexander was not facing Uxii villagers, however, but Persian infantry. Whilst the 
Persians did not possess first-class infantrymen, they certainly had greater discipline than 
the Uxii, and held their ground. The frontal assault was an unmitigated disaster: missiles 
rained down upon the attackers from the heights to either side, as well as from those 
defending the wall. The Macedonians quickly fell back in disorder, leaving behind their 
dead in the pass. 1260 One can only imagine the fury that Alexander must have felt at this 
humiliation. Even within this fury Alexander was evidently rational enough, or was 
sufficiently open to good counsel, to realise that a further frontal assault would not fare 
any better. After interrogating some prisoners, or perhaps questioning his local guides, 1261 
a secondary path was revealed. He was also told that this narrow pass was difficult to 
traverse, so he instructed Craterus to remain behind with his own taxis and that of 
Meleager, along with some archers and cavalry. 1262 Craterus was instructed to launch a 
1=54 Stein, 1940,18ff. Bosworth, 1980,324. 
1253 Hansman, 1972,117-119. 
'216 Bosworth, 1980,324; Polyaenus 4.3.27. 
1257 Arrian 3.18.11. 
1258 Arrian 3.18.2-3. 
1259 Diodorus 17.68.1; Curtius 5.3.17; Arrian 3.18.2, all tell us that it took him five days to travel the 30 km 
to the fortified position. 
'260 Diodorus 17.68.2-3; Curtius 5.3.17-23; Arrian 3.18.3. 
1261 Arrian 3.18.4; Diodorus 17.68.5; Curtius 5.4.4-14; Plutarch Alex. 37.1; Polyaenus 4.3.27, all claim a 
bilingual Lycian herdsman revealed the secondary pass. 1262 Arrian 3.18.4. 
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further frontal assault only when they were sure that Alexander was behind the Persians. 
Arrian claims the remainder of the troops travelled with Alexander through the pass. 
Alexander waited for the cover of darkness, and then set off for the alternative 
pass. '263 After a night march of around 20km, Alexander took the decision to divide his 
forces further. 126 Alexander took with him one taxis of heavy infantry, the Agrianians 
and archers along with the Royal ile of Companions and one double squadron of 
cavalry. '265 With these troops Alexander turned and moved towards the pass. What the 
remaining troops were instructed to do is unclear, as there are two distinct traditions. 
Curtius tells us that this second column was ordered to advance slowly towards the 
enemy, and presumably act as a third prong to the impending action. '266 Arrian's view 
that the remaining troops, led by Amyntas, Philotas and Coenus' 267 were ordered to 
bridge the Araxes River that would need to be crossed in order to gain access to central 
Persia, 1268 is in many ways far more plausible. The idea of a three-pronged attack is 
attractive, but if the pass and the terrain were as difficult as we are led to believe, then I 
think it is more plausible that Alexander realised that he had taken too many troops with 
him through the pass. His intention, therefore, was to reduce the numbers that would be 
involved in the final assault to only his elite troops. Whatever the purpose of Amyntas' 
detachment, it is certain that Alexander led the assault in person. 1269 
The action probably occurred over two consecutive nights, 1270 with Alexander 
showing considerable caution in avoiding the Persian scouting parties that were no doubt 
at work in the area. Once he was ready, he came down upon the defenders from the north- 
east destroying two forward fortifications and falling upon the wall. 1271 The attack was 
signalled by the use of a salpinx1272 that told Craterus to attack down the gorge. The 
Persians were caught totally by surprise by the two-pronged attack; there were few places 
to run or hide for the Persians, although Ariobarzanes and a group of horsemen and 
infantry did manage an escape. Ariobarzanes fled to Persepolis where he was refused 
entry; he died in an engagement with the advancing Macedonians shortly afterwards. '273 
Heckel'274 notes the quite startling similarities between the Persian Gates and the 
battle of Thermopylae some 150 years previously. No doubt much was made of this 
incident by the propagandists, especially as Persepolis would shortly be in flames, as 
Athens had been soon after Thermopylae. 
1263 Arrian 3.18.6. 
1264 Curtius 5.4.20; Arrian 3.18.6. 
1265 Arrian 3.18.6. 
1266 Curtius 5.4.20; Bosworth, 1988,91. 
1267 Curtius 5.4.20; adds the name Polyperchon. 
1268 Bosworth, 1980,327; Strabo 729; Curtius 5.5.2-4; Diodorus 17.69.2. Arrian 3.18.6. 
1'69 Arrian 3.18.6. 
1710 Curtius 5.4.17,22-3. 
1271 Bosworth, 1988,91. 
un A trumpet-like instrument. 
127 Curtius 5.4.33. 
1274 Heckel, 2008,82. 
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Alexander once again shows a genius for rapid and silent movements of large 
bodies of men in order to maintain the element of surprise. We also see Alexander, once 
again, using the two-pronged approach of attacking the enemy in multiple directions 
simultaneously. This has to be balanced, however, against Alexander's serious lack of 
judgement at the initial assault; to sacrifice men so needlessly when his usual flanking 
strategy was so readily available (once the pass had been identified) is puzzling. We can 
only assume that he felt the defenders would retreat immediately upon seeing his 
advance, as the Uxians had done. 
After fleeing Gaugamela, Darius made for Ecbatana with the intention of raising a 
new army. He had managed to keep together some of the remnants of his defeated army, 
perhaps 3,000 cavalry and 30,000 infantry. 1275 Given that Alexander had already defeated 
these same troops at least once, 1276 there was little likelihood that this force could have 
gained victory, but Darius was making every effort to regain control of his former 
Empire. 
Alexander set off from Persepolis in May 330, probably before news reached him 
of the victory in Greece of Antipater over the Spartan-led revolt of Agis, 1277 determined 
to force a conclusion with Darius. Darius had evidently failed to build the kind of army 
he expected, so upon hearing news of Alexander's march from Persepolis, he set out east 
towards the Caspian gates and the eastern satrapies with the hope of further rebuilding his 
army from the still loyal provinces. 1278 
After an eleven-day forced march, Alexander met a Persian noble, Bisthanes, who 
told him that Darius had already left Ecbatana some five days previously. 1279 Alexander 
immediately divided his forces in the usual manner, keeping the elite, fast-moving troops 
with him, and set off in pursuit; this time he was not to be denied. Alexander had only a 
slight delay in Ecbatana, where he disbanded the Thessalian cavalry, as well as the other 
allied contingents. He also detached Parmenio and the remaining troops, along with the 
baggage train, from his flying column and left orders that they were to occupy 
Ecbatana. 1280 After ten more days Alexander passed the Caspian gates without incident 
and continued east. Alexander's chase was relentless, but he ultimately would be robbed 
of his prize by a Bessus-led internal coup; there was little Alexander could do, but Darius 
was dead. 1281 Before setting off for the mountains of what would become the north-east 
`m Curtius 5.8.3; cf. Diodorus 17.73.2 quote 3,300 cavalry, 4,000 Greek mercenaries and 26,000 Persians. 
Arrian 3.19.5; notes only 3,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry: these numbers of Arrian are oddly low given 
that Darius had had six months in Media to recruit new troops; conscript infantry would be the easiest to 
come by. 
1276 Some, especially the remaining Greek mercenaries, would have fought at Issus too. 
'Z" Bosworth. 1988,94. The chronology of the Agis revolt is problematic: for the most recent examination 
see Badian in Worthington, 1994, ch. 13. 
"'73 Curtius 5.8. I, ß, Arrian 3.19.1-2. 
'279 Bosworth, 1988,94. Arrian 3.19.5 actually notes a march of "within twelve days". '280 Arrian 3.19.7. Bosworth, 1988,94-5, believes that Alexander did not in fact visit Ecbatana at all. 
''s' Bosworth 1988,95ffi for more detail that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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frontier, Alexander spent some time reorganising his army and dealing with internal 
difficulties of his own. 1282 
-. 0 ýt-r at ` _. _. . ý.. . 
Figure 34: The Dasht-c-Kavir Desert, where Darius (lied. 
Bactna 
ý. 
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After securing Hyrcania, '283 in a campaign we know little or nothing about, 
Alexander marched on Bactria. Ancient Bactria'284 was very far removed, 
topographically, from the Greek world. '285 The soaring mountains of the Hindu Kush and 
the Pamirs ranges' 286 surrounded Bactria on three sides; the west to north-west is 
bordered by the deserts of Turkestan through which runs the Oxus River1287 on its way to 
the Aral Sea. ' -188 This was terrain entirely alien to Alexander: no longer would he be 
facing large armies in massive set piece battles. From this time forward, at least until he 
reached India, he would be facing an entirely new form of warfare: that of guerrilla 
action. Alexander would now face small-scale ambushes and rapid strikes against his 
forces, he faced enemies who knew they could not defeat him in battle, and so he devised 
an alternative means of fighting using the very land of Bactria to its fullest advantage. 
The Philotas affair. 
A small region bemeen Ecbatana and ßactria. 
Roughly modem Afghanistan. 
1295 When the term "13actria" was used by ancient (and indeed modem) authors, it is almost always taken to 
be the area covered be both 13actna and Sogdiana: Holt, 1989,11. 
12m With peaks as high as 25,000 fixt. 
12' The modem Amu Darya. 
1288 Holt_ 1989.12. The dispute surrounding the course of the Oxus River in antiquity had been thought to 
have been resolved (Tarn, 1938,488-493), but has been reopened by Hamilton, 1971,106-111; and 
13ossworth. 198(). 373-374. 
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As Alexander set off from Zadracarta, on his march towards Bactria, news arrived 
of a revolt in Areia. ' 2") Satibarzanes, the native whom Alexander had appointed satrap of 
the region. had risen up and murdered the Macedonian military commander, Anaxippus, 
and the forty mounted javelin men that had been left in the capital, Artacoana. 1"'0 
Satibarzanes evidently planned to link up with Bessus; some Bactrians were already with 
him. in order to form a more coherent resistance to the Macedonian conquerors. As can 
he expected. Alexander's response was rapid and decisive. 
As was usually the case, Alexander divided the army in smaller, 1" 1 more mobile 
units capable of a more rapid response. He took with him the usual suspects' 292 and 
: \rrian ±. '5.1 tf. 
Diodorus 17.78.1: Arrian 3.25.5. The location of Artaroana (which Diodorus 17.78.1. calls Chortacana) 
is. as vet. unresolved. 
Curtius 6.6.21. 
Arrian 3.25.6: notes the Companion Cavalry, the mounted javelin men. the archers. Agrianians. and two 
ra. veis of pe; hetairoi: namely Amyntas and Coenus. 
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reached Artacoana. a march of some 120km, in only two days. 1293 The remaining troops 
were left under the command of Craterus. At this point the sources diverge: Arrian has 
Satibarzanes taken so completely by surprise that he fled almost immediately, with many 
of his troops deserting; he also has Alexander completing the recapture of Artacoana 
himself, and Craterus rejoining the army later on the road to Zarangia. 1"94 The vulgate 
tradition has Alexander first laying siege to Artacoana, and then pursuing Satibarzanes 
once he fled: with Craterus being left to complete the capture of the city, "'95 an honour 
that he actually leaves for Alexander upon his return from the chase, and after a siege of 
some thirty days. 129e Neither source provides us with enough data to determine which is 
the more accurate. but the core is much the same: a revolt that was quickly suppressed, a 
division of forces, a lightning march and the flight of Satibarzanes. 
Satibarzanes evidently attempted a second revolt '2 7 in Areia: he entered the 
province with 2,000 cavalry given to him by Bessus and persuaded the natives to rise up 
once more. ` Alexander evidently did not feel this revolt significant; Craterus was 
dispatched with 600 cavalry and 6,000 Greek infantry to suppress it. 1 99 Satibarzanes 
became cornered and fought fiercely, but he was killed in action and his men fled. His 
death ended the revolt in Areia: there was no longer a figurehead around which to gather. 
There were also evidently few men willing to revolt, as none actually seemed to join 
Satibarzanes: The revolt was, therefore, perhaps not as serious some later revolts would 
prove to he. 
Bactria and So diana 
Alexander's campaign in Bactria is far more complex than is generally supposed; 
it is frequently stated that this stage of the campaign represents a watershed in the style of 
combat that Alexander would face, and the army was reorganised to adapt to that change. 
There were no major cities to capture, and the population lived in small isolated villages, 
or were nomadic. 1 °° The military capacity of the region was enormous; Curtius notes a 
potential of 30.000 cavalry, although no significant infantry were availahle. I 
In the same way as he had with Darius. Alexander needed to settle matters with 
Bessus. In late March 329 he crossed the Parapamisadae region, centred on the Kabul 
02 Valley forming the crossroads between Bactria, India and Arachosia. "' Supplies were 
short and snow still blocked the mountain passes; Alexander was forced to wait until 
"°' Arrian 3.25.6: Bosworth. 1980.357: rightly suggests a march rate of 60 kni per day is suspiciously high 
gi%en that two taxeis of heavy infantry were present. C/ I Heel,, I97ti. I ýW.. I'm klei, iik on whv it 
armies always have a slower rate of march then smaller mir". 1'O' Arrian 3.25A He also calls the country Drangiana. 
'05 Curtius 6.6.25. 
96 Curtius 6.6.25-32: Diodorus 17.78.3. 
After the Philotas affair. 
. -\rTian 
3.28.2: Diodorus 17.78.2-4. 
Curtius 7.3.2: it is unusual for Alexander to include so Iew Mace(luniaus. perhaps none (the ethnicity o( 
the 600 ca, alrý is unknown), in this kind of mission. 
x' Ashley. 1998.289. 
Curtin, 30. The parallels to pre-Philip Macedonia are ohvio, u,. 
I'd 
spring. He provisioned the army from the villages of Parapamisadae1303 and founded a 
new Alexandria near 1304 to guard the mountain passes of Shibar and Khawak, 
and protect against incursions from Bactria once the army had moved on. 
Bessus' defence of Bactria initially was the scorched-earth policy that the Persian 
nobility was so opposed to before the Granicus. There was little else Bessus could do, as 
he had failed to unite the Bactrian nobility under his banner, and he commanded only 
seven or eight thousand cavalry. 1305 With the scorched-earth policy under way, Bessus, 
and those few who were loyal, moved north of the Oxus River. 1306 Alexander occupied 
the central Bactrian region without bloodshed, and after appointing Artabazus as satrap 
he pursued Bessus across the 75km of parched desert that led to the Oxus. 1307 
In a rare propaganda coup that his father would have been proud of, Alexander 
announced that his quarrel was with Bessus alone, and that any deserters would be 
rewarded. 1308 Dataphernes, Catanes and Spitamenes decided to make peace with the 
conqueror and arrested Bessus, presenting him to Alexander soon after, thus ending the 
short-lived revolt. Alexander here showed himself a keen strategist: he realised that the 
region would be all but impossible to conquer by force of arms, as so many armies have 
come to realise over the centuries. Here, Alexander takes his lead from his father and 
overcomes an extremely dangerous situation without the need for bloodshed. 
Initially Bactria did not resist Alexander's passing. There appears to have been no 
stomach for resistance, and little support for Bessus' grab for power; this can be 
demonstrated in the lack of troops that he had available to him as noted above. As 
Alexander marched through Bactria, one by one prominent nobles and warlords made 
their peace with him. These nobles, including Dataphernes, Catanes and Spitamenes, 
were rewarded and allowed to return to their kingdoms or satrapies. 1309 The Bactrian 
cavalry that had briefly served Bessus had returned to their native towns and villages 
without further resistance. 1310 Holt notes that "the only scars upon the land had been 
made by the torches of Bessus, not Alexander". 1311 
The only sign of the passing of a great army was the very few old and infirm that 
had been left behind as garrisons, particularly at Bactra. 1312 Only one native had died 
during the campaign, Bessus himself, 1313 for the Bactrians, once Alexander had passed 
through, their lives would return to normal; there was simply a new king on the throne. 
M Curtius 7.3.18; cf. Hamilton, 1969,98-99; Bosworth, 1988,105; Engels, 1978,93-5. 
1304 Likely the Alexandia at Ai Khanum, see fig. 34 above. 
1305 Arrian 3.28.8 claims 7,000; Curtius 7.4.20 claims 8,000. 
1306 The modem Amu Darya. 
1307 The desert crossing was extremely difficult and many died, especially with the uncontrolled drinking by 
the parched soldiers from the Oxus River once it was reached. 
1308 Diodorus 17.83.7-8; Curtius 7.4.18-19. 
109 These were the nobles who had arrested Bessus; Curtius 7.5.2 1. 
1310 Arrian 3.28.10; Curtius 7.4.20. 
1311 Holt, 1989,52. 
1312 Bactra was the capital of the satrapy of Bactria. 
1313 For the possibility of a massacre of the Branchidae, see Bigwood, 1978,36-9; Pearson, 1960,240; 
Parke, 1985,62., x; Bosworth, 1988,108; 
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This goodwill would very soon evaporate and Alexander would be forced to fight a long 
and bloody campaign to suppress the region, exactly what his diplomatic skills in 
capturing Bessus had been designed to avoid, and we must ask why. 
Alexander had passed peacefully through Bactria and Sogdiana to reach the 
Jaxartes River without incident; indeed we know that Alexander received a supply of 
horses from the natives as he passed through Maracanda. 1314 Seemingly out of nowhere, 
at the Jaxartes, a band of Macedonian foragers was massacred by a native force. 1315 
Alexander's entirely predictable massive counter-offensive only succeeded in 
intensifying the resistance. 1316 Macedonian garrisons all along the Jaxartes were 
slaughtered and resistance spread throughout Sogdiana. 1317 Almost in an instant, 
Sogdiana was in flames and Alexander was embroiled in two years of fierce and 
relentless fighting, perhaps the hardest and most prolonged of his career. 
As with Cyrus before him, 1318 we must ask why Alexander only met with such 
massive resistance once he reached the frontier zone of Sogdiana and Scythia. Arrian is 
usually thought to supply the answer: either the locals were becoming increasingly fearful 
of Alexander, or it was because the nobles feared the general summons of all the local 
leaders to a meeting in Bactra. 1319 Arrian cannot be correct, however; there is no reason 
why the natives should suddenly become fearful of Alexander, and Arrian 1320 makes it 
clear that the summons only occurred after the revolt had begun: it seems Alexander was 
intending to ask the Bactrian nobles like Spitamenes to help crush the revolt, a revolt they 
ultimately joined. If we reject Arrian's assertions regarding the origins of the war, we 
have Alexander only performing one major undertaking whilst in Sogdiana, the 
foundation of Alexandria-Eschate: 1321 but why would this simple act, one repeated by 
Alexander throughout the Empire, provoke such a reaction? 
Holt notes that it was almost immediately after the site for the new Alexandria 
had been chosen, and planning begun, that the immediate area rose up in revolt. 1322 It was 
only against fierce opposition that Alexander's engineers were able to build the walls up 
to a defensible height. 1323 Alexander responded with a lightning campaign, re-capturing 
all seven of the towns that had revolted in only two days. 324 The inhabitants, being held 
responsible for the revolt, were either killed or enslaved. 
1314 Arrian 3.30.6; Curtius 7.6.10. 
1315 Curtius 7.6.1-9 surely overestimates the native force at 20,000; Arrian 3.30.10 likewise at 30,000. 
1316 Curtius 7.6.3-9; Arrian 3.30.11. 
1317 Curtius 7.6.14-15; Arrian 4.2.1: only small numbers of Bactrians were drawn into the war. Bosworth, 
1981,17, notes that Bactria also rose up against Alexander; contra, Holt, 1989,52ff. 
1318 Holt, 1989,54. 
1319 Arrian 4.1.4-5. Hammond, 1980b, 190; Holt, 1989,54. 
1320 Arrian 4.1.5; states that the revolt was "already in progress" at the time of the summons. 
1321 Arrian 4.1.3-4,4.4.1; Curtius 7.6.13,7.6.25-27; Holt, 1986,315-323. 
1322 Holt, 1989,54. 
1323 Arrian 4.4.1. 
1324 Arrian 4.3.2-4; Curtius 7.6.16-23. 
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The Sogdian revolt, I believe, 1325 was a direct result of the foundation of 
Alexandria-Eschate; the reaction of the natives, local nobility such as Spitamenes, and the 
Scythians who had recently joined the fight, can only be explained by what the city 
represented to the region. This new city was the first to have been built by Alexander in 
Bactria or Sogdiana. 1326 Previously to this only a few old and disabled Greeks or 
Macedonians were settled in the region, and it appeared to the locals that the new king 
would soon leave the area to return to how things had been under the Great Kings. The 
creation of a large fortress-like foundation'327 with a seemingly entirely military objective 
was a clear statement to the local population that their existing way of life was under 
threat. 1328 
Alexander's clear intent was to militarise the Jaxartes region, and prevent the 
Scythians from crossing that river. 1329 Scythians had a long history of interaction, both 
military cooperation and trade, with the peoples of the Persian Empire, and it was 
Alexander's stated intention to break these bonds. Ultimately Alexander wished to 
prevent a military alliance between Sogdians, Bactrians and Scythians against his rule at 
some point in the future; instead he instantly created just that. Alexander responded to the 
revolt with systematic destruction, but this only succeeded in exacerbating the problem as 
the natives could see more plainly that their way of life was being destroyed. 13 
328 BC 
At the beginning of 328 Alexander marched east from Bactra against the 
remaining rebels eastward along the Oxus River, crossing into Sogdiana after marching 
through Bactria. 1331 As was becoming usual practice, Alexander also divided the army, 
this time into five mobile columns in order to cover the greatest possible amount of 
terrain simultaneously: these were commanded by Ptolemy, Hephaestion, Perdiccas, and 
by Coenus and Artabazus jointly; the final column was led by the king himself. 1332 Arrian 
does not give details, '333 but does tell us that the first four columns reduced many 
fortified positions in Sogdiana. This appears to have been a devastating campaign; 
Alexander used a scorched-earth policy of his own across the whole of the Zeravshan 
valley. 1334 This strategy demonstrates Alexander's belief that the new circumstances 
required a new approach.. 
1325 Following Holt, 1989,52f. 
1326 The Alexandria mentioned above, p. 190, was not strictly speaking in Bactria, although the border was 
ill-defined. That city was also in reality little more than a fortified camp, rather different in scale from 
Alexandria-Eschate: cf. Holt, 2005,31. 
1127 The city had a circuit of 60 Stades (Curtius 7.6.25); Maracanda was 70 Stades by comparison (Curtius 
7.6.10). 
1328 Cyrus' city foundation had provoked a similar response from the native population: Pliny NH 6.18 (49); 
Holt, 1989,56. 
13229 Curtius 7.6.12 has Alexander warning the Scythians not to cross the Jaxartes without his explicit 
rJ rmission. 
0 Holt, 1989,60. 
1371 Bosworth. 1981,29. 
1332 Arrian 4.16.3. 
1333 Bosworth, 1981,29f. 
1334 Ashley, 1989,292. 
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The lack of security in the whole of the Bactria/Sogdiana region is clearly 
demonstrated by an ambush of Spitamenes. He drove a herd of cattle into a plain and 
waited in a wooded area to ambush the Greeks that he expected to pass by. The ploy 
worked brilliantly and the Greeks, led by Attines, were slaughtered to a man; Spitamenes 
withdrew after a successful counter-attack by a small leaderless group of Companion 
Cavalry 1335 and Greek mercenaries, who were in turn defeated by a detachment of 
Scythians as they travelled back to Zariaspa. 
Alexander's strategy of militarising the Sogdian frontier continued with the 
construction of a series of garrison settlements in modem Tadzhikistan. Alexander 
continued moving east towards the Hissar Range'336 occupying strongholds as he 
went. 1337 The most significant was the Sogdian Rock, or the Rock of Ariamazes, which 
probably was attacked in the summer of 328.1338 The rock was reported to be some 
5,760m high and 30km in circumference. The fortress boasted sheer cliffs on all sides, 
and was seemingly impregnable. The Rock was heavily defended; a total of 30,000 
natives are reported to have taken refuge within its walls. '339 Coupled with these natural 
advantages, the fortress had enough supplies to last for a two-year siege. ' 340 In order to 
capture the citadel, Alexander decided upon deception, something rare in his career. A 
frontal assault was impossible so Alexander offered the massive reward of twelve 
talents'34' to the first man to climb the nearly sheer cliffs that overlooked the natural 
amphitheatre of the fortress. More than 300 men attempted the night climb, with 
instructions that once dawn broke they were to make as much noise as possible. Both 
Arrian and Curtius1342 confirm that 32 men died during the arduous climb. There is some 
debate on the time it took for the climb: Arrian states a single night, whilst Curtius has 
two nights and one day. '343 Curtius surely exaggerates the height of the mountain, but, if 
the men had to accomplish a substantial climb up a mountain they had not climbed 
before, his two nights and a day is more credible than Arrian's single night. Either way, 
1335 They were evidently the sick and infirm that Alexander had left behind. 
1336 The range of mountains that separated east and west Sogdiana. 
133' Bosworth, 1981,36. 
1333 Arrian 4.18.4-19, does not actually name it as such, but calls it "the rock in Sogdiana"; he also dated 
this episode it in the spring of 327 (Arrian places far more in the year 327 and leaves almost nothing to 
occur in 328; the vulgate tradition is more reasonable and does not leave such lacunae. Cf. Bosworth, 1981, 
17-39); it is more commonly known as the Sogdian Rock, from Arrian 4.18.2. The chronology that I find 
most convincing and coherent is that of the vulgate tradition (Curtius 7.11.1, E , Metz Epitome 15fß). Arrian's 
account is difficult and fragmented; he places far too much in the year of 327 and almost nothing in 328. 
One of the principal aberrations is the dating of the two great sieges, this one first, which he dates to the 
spring of 327 (Arrian 4.18.4ffi. This chronology is argued for in great detail by Bosworth, 1981,36; contra 
Tarn, 1948,1.72-6. For dating the siege see: Bosworth, 1981,36; Bosworth, 1988,113; contra Ashley, 
1998,301, who places the siege in the spring of 327, following Arrian. 
1339 Curtius 7.11.1f 
13''0 Ashley, 1998,301. 
1341 Curtius 7.11.28; Arrian 4.19.4-5. 
1342 Arrian 4.19.1-2; Curtius 7.11.19. 
1343 Bosworth, 1995,129, supports Arrian's view, stating that Curtius 7.11.14-15 is highly rhetorical at this 
point: this is true, but a climb to a height of nearly 6,000m in a single night strains credulity. Even if 
Curtius was grossly exaggerating the height of the mountain, a climb of even 3000m would have been 
difficult under the circumstances in a single day. 
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when dawn broke, the defenders saw above them what they could only assume were 
flying men, and their morale disappeared. The Rock surrendered to Alexander without 
further loss of life. 1344 In the capture of this mountain-top fortress, Alexander once again 
showed himself capable of analysing a seemingly impossible situation and formulating a 
winning strategy. We also see an example of Alexander taking a calculated risk, that the 
defenders would surrender, rather than attack the mountaineers whom they outnumbered 
100: 1, and he was again proved correct. 
In late summer, Alexander drew together all of the various flying columns that he 
had deployed throughout Sogdiania, converging on Maracanda. Alexander accepted the 
surrender, or at least the offers of allegiance, from the Saca tribes. 1345 It appears that they 
were suitably impressed with Alexander's campaign of 328 to think it prudent to come to 
terms. 1 Even whilst in the midst of the most bloody campaign of his career, Alexander 
was evidently planning ahead; he declined an invitation from the Chorasmian king to 
campaign towards the Black Sea, 1347 stating that his sights were firmly on India as his 
next objective. ' 348 
An excellent illustration of a possible deficiency in Alexander's army is given by 
the slaughter of Pharnuches' men at the hands of Spitamenes and his 600 Scythian 
mounted archers. They evidently engaged the Greek infantry, but not by a direct frontal 
assault, but by riding around them at a distance firing arrows at the Greeks. Being only 
infantry, the Greeks had no capability to respond, and were slaughtered. Usually this 
would not have been a usable tactic if the Greek force had possessed cavalry, and this is 
an excellent illustration of the need for mounted troops to protect infantry in ancient 
warfare. This defeat was so potentially devastating for morale that the few survivors that 
made it back to the main army were told, under penalty of death, to remain silent on the 
disaster. 
Resistance crumbled in late 328. Spitamenes did launch a daring raid upon 
Maracanda soon after the successful slaughter of Pharnuches' men, 1349 but was quickly 
driven off into the desert by a column commanded Alexander himself; the pursuit had to 
be broken off as the desert was reached, for lack of supplies. Spitamenes' rebellion was 
ultimately defeated after a loss to a column commanded by Coenus; he managed to 
withdraw but was betrayed by his Massagetic allies who made peace with Alexander. His 
former allies arrested and beheaded him, while the other rebel commander, Dataphernes, 
was handed over to Alexander in chains. 1350 
After a lengthy delay in Maracanda, which included the murder of Cleitus, 
autumn was suddenly upon the Macedonians. 1351 One final campaign was to be 
1344 Curtius 7.11.28; Metz Epitome 18; Arrian 4.19.4-5, cf. 4.16.3. 
1-145 Bosworth, 1988,113. 
'346 Curtius 7.1.7-9; contra Arrian 4.15.1-6, who places these diplomatic missions in Bactra in early 328. 
"" Alexander having been told that Amazons inhabited this region. 
" Bosworth. 1988,113. 
1-3'9 Curtius 7.6. 
1350 Arrian 4.17.4-7; Curtius 7.3.1-16; Metz Epitome 20-3; cf. Berve, 1926,2318; Bosworth, 1988,116. 1351 Plutarch Alex. 51.8; Curtius 8.1.48-51. Bosworth, 1981,36. 
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conducted before the onset of winter, however. From Maracanda, Alexander moved south 
to eliminate a group of Bactrian rebels who were based in the city of Xenippa, the 
location of which is unknown. 1352 No details are known about the campaign, other than 
its successful nature. After this, Alexander moved to what would become his winter 
quarters in Nautaca, probably located between Maracanda and the Oxus River. '353 
Nautaca was the last refuge of the rebels commanded by Sisimithres: 1354 these Alexander 
forced into submission too as the last military action of 328. Sisimithres was situated in 
another seemingly impregnable citadel, which was again well supplied with food and 
water in order to withstand a lengthy siege. Access to the fortress was blocked by a deep 
ravine that contained a torrent of water that came from the plateau above. Arrian has the 
ravine encircle the rock, but this cannot be so. It was essentially a river; Arrian's seems to 
be a stock description, or else he is confusing two sources. 13 5 As usual Alexander did 
not allow nature to stand against him and, taking his cue from the siege of Tyre, he set 
about building a causeway across the chasm. The causeway was a marvellous feat of 
engineering that is usually underappreciated by modern historians: it consisted of a series 
of interlockinf stakes that were cantilevered over the narrowest point of the gorge. 1356 As 
at Aornus, 135 Alexander supervised the work personally, and split his men into two 
shifts, day and night. Progress was slower than at Aornus, where the men constructed a 
stade-long stretch in a single day; access was more limited here. 1358 
The construction of the causeway is a matter of considerable difficulty. Some 
modem historians1359 have assumed Arrian refers to pegs being driven into the side of the 
ravine so as to create a framework for a bridge, the river flowing underneath. Bosworth 
doubts that such a construction could have been wide enough to span the ravine at all. 136(3 
It does seem more likely that there were in fact stakes driven into the bed of the river 
upon which the bridge would have been constructed. On the top of the bridge would have 
been a wicker flooring that would support earth and wood that would form the walkway 
across the ravine. 1361 Alexander also showed himself capable of learning difficult lessons 
from previous sieges: hides were placed at the leading edge of the construction to protect 
the builders and engineers from projectile weapons fired by the defenders. 13 2 The 
defenders did not have the same will to resist as did the Tyrians, and at this display of 
1352 Bosworth, 1981,36. 
1353 Arrian 4.18.1; Curtius 8.2.19; reads Nauta; Metz Epitome 19; reads Nautace. For location see Arrian 
3.28.9. 
1354 Arrian 4.21.2, calls the rebel leader Chorienes, sometimes taken to be a corruption of Sisimithres (Holt, 
1989,66), but the two do seem to be clearly different personages. For a full discussion, Bosworth, 1995. 
135. Curtius 8.2.19-33; Strabo 517; Arrian 4.21.1-9 (sets the siege later in 327 and names Chorienes as 
ruler, a man who is named elsewhere by the vulgate tradition (Metz Epitome 29; Curtius 8.4.21)). Cf. 
Bosworth, 1981,30-32. 
1355 Arrian 4.21.2. 
'356 Arrian 4.21.4-5; Curtius 8.2.23-4; cf. Bosworth, 1988,117; Bosworth, 1995,136-7. 
'357 Arrian 4.29.7. For Aornus see below pp. 201-3. 
158 Arrian 4.30.1; Bosworth, 1995,136f. 
1359 Lane Fox, 1973,316; Hammond, 1980b, 199. 
'360 Bosworth, 1995,137. 
1361 Arrian 4.21.5; Curtius 8.2.24. 
1361 Specifically Tyre, where Alexander only adopted defensive measures like this after suffering losses to 
ship-borne missile weapons. For hides as protection see Arrian 4.21.6. 
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siegecraft they surrendered before a final assault could be begun against the defences 
proper. The Rock's vast stores of provisions were enough to winter the Macedonian 
army. 
This represented the end of the rebellion in Bactria and Sogdiana; 1363 most of the 
local nobility had come to terms with Alexander, willingly or otherwise, and the native 
population had been terrorised into subjugation. Amyntas was left as satrap of the region 
with a massive force of 10,000 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, an army to rival that left in 
Macedonian with Antipater. 
3271364 
Whilst in winter quarters in Nautaca, Alexander undertook what was to become a 
significant new military policy. Alexander was evidently concerned by these provinces, 
and their potential for causing further trouble, but he was so impressed by the quality of 
the troops that they had supplied to both Darius and the rebellion that he began a 
recruiting programme. 30,000 youths were conscripted into the army and their training 
began in order to turn them into Macedonian-style heavy infantry: they were to be trained 
in Macedonian tactics and weapons; 1365 significant numbers of native cavalry were also 
enlisted. This recruitment drive had the dual effect of strengthening the Macedonian field 
army for the coming Indian campaign, whilst also removing significant numbers of 
troops, potentially rebellious troops, from Sogdiana and Bactria. This is a policy that has 
a precedent in Alexander's career of his actions in the Balkans, where thousands of 
Thracians, Odrysians, Triballians etc. were conscripted for exactly the same reasons. 1366 
Early in the spring of 327, expecting the major campaigning in Sogdiana to be 
over, Alexander marched out after a two-month winter break. Impatience, lack of 
intelligence, or freak weather served to make this an extremely bad decision, however. 1367 
The army suffered badly from a series of lightning storms that were accompanied by a 
drop in temperature and a snowstorm. Disaster was only averted when a supply caravan 
arrived from the former enemy, Sisimithres. 1368 After some minor operations, the army 
marched south to Bactra. Here, Craterus was left with three taxeis of pezhetairoi to deal 
with the remaining insurgents, 1369 few though they were. After a further delay in Bactra 
to make preparations, the army marched towards India. 
1363 But not the end of the fighting. This would drag on into 327; see below. 
136' See above p. 195 n. 1338. 
1365 Arrian 7.6.1; Plutarch Alex. 71.1; Diodorus 17.108.1-3; Curtius 7.5.1. 
1366 Diodorus 17.17.4. 
1367 Curtius 7.4.1. 
13" Now reinstated as commander of the Rock of Ariamazes or the Sogdian Rock depending on the 
nomenclature of the source. 




By the spring of 327 Alexander had quashed the rebellion in Sogdiana and Bactria 
and was ready to march on India. It is evident that Alexander had been contemplating this 
expedition for some time, at least since summer the previous year, and almost certainly 
long before that. 1; 70 The army that marched with Alexander was around 50.00) strong, 
hardly more than had fought at Gaugamela. The size of the Macedonian contingent was 
also reduced: there had been no documented reinforcements from Macedonia for almost 
four years. There had been a large influx from Greece, but they were left behind to ensure 
that there were no further difficulties in Sogdiana and Bactria. 1"' The organisation of the 
army had also changed to make it more mobile and able to respond to changing 
circumstances: the pe<hetairoi had all but abandoned the sarissa. its use is not recorded 
again in the sources. The prodronaoi had been merged with the Companion Cavalry, 
probably a sign of seriously reduced numbers: Orientals also started to be introduced into 
the ComQanions' ranks. A new officer class had also emerged in Sogdiana, partly by 
design°'2 and partly enforced due to the removal of men like Parmenio. Philotas and 
Cleitus. The new officer cadre consisted of Alexander's childhood friends, men he 
believed he could trust intimately: the likes of Hephaestion, Ptolemy and Perdiccas. 1373 
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Figure 36: Map of Alexander's march from Bactria to Taxila. 
ýý 
"-0 Arrian 4.15.6. 
1''1 Lane Fox. 1973.334. 
1572 Alexander had probably wanted to get rid of Parmenio's family influence almost since the day he 
became king (Green, 1991.11 l, Jt); this view ultimately comes from Radian. 1963. 
; 71 Lane Fox. 1973.334. 
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Alexander's justifications for the invasion of India1374 are not difficult to find; 
although he demonstrably never needed a justification or an excuse. He had already 
received representations from Indian rulers who wished to use Alexander as a means of 
expanding their own territory, or of crushing their enemies. 1375 Alexander's army had 
also picked up a number of Indian refugees like Sisicottus, 1376 such men had every reason 
to encourage Alexander to invade, although no encouragement was needed. 1377 
Alexander's main justification would not have been manipulation by Indian 
rebels, or representations from anyone; it is most likely that Alexander wished to 
complete the conquest of the Achaemenid Empire. It is a much debated question how 
much control the Persians actually exercised over India: Gandhara1378 and the lands of the 
Indus had been nominally under Persian control since the reign of Darius I. It was 
Herodotus1379 that tells us that Darius I extended the Persian Empire as far as the Indus, 
but the Persian presence by 327 was minimal at best: 1380 Persian rule probably extended 
no further than the Kabul Valley which bordered the satrapies of Bajaur and Swat to the 
south. 1381 
Ten days march south from Bactra took the army back across the Hindu Kush 
mountains and into Parapamisadae; from there they advanced down the Cophen River 
valley towards the plains of the Indus and the satrapy of Bajaur. '382 After crossing the 
Hindu Kush, the invasion force was divided into two columns as had become the general 
policy. 1383 The first column was commanded by Hephaestion and Perdiccas, and 
consisted of three taxeis of heavy infantry, half the Companion Cavalry and all of the 
mercenary cavalry, a total of around 6-7,000 men. 1384 This column was instructed to 
secure the main road to India, no simple task. The remainder of the army, commanded by 
Alexander, marched into the mountainous terrain north of the Kabul River into the 
regions of Bajaur and Swat, continuing his brutal campaign from Sogdiana. 1385 At first 
glance this campaign looks punitive, but it was vital in order to protect his lines of supply 
and communication down the Kabul River valley. Bosworth notes that Alexander, in his 
guise as the newly appointed Great King, saw these natives as his subjects and any 
resistance to his rule was met with bloody repression. 1386 The campaign was started by 
1374 Heckel, 2008,112, argues that it is wrong to speak of a Macedonian conquest of India, believing that 
many were brought on board through diplomacy, "restoring the authority of the empire over the eastern 
satrapies and establishing a buffer zone". 
1375 Diodorus 17.86.4; Curtius 8.12.5, for representations from the ruler of Taxila who approached 
Alexander while he was still in Sogdiana. 
1376 Arrian 4.30.4, Sisicottus had initially aided Bessus but had gone over to Alexander's side in Sogdiana. 
1377 Bosworth, 1988,113. 
1378 Stein, 1926, for a description of the topography of the region. 
1379 Herodotus 4.44. 
1380 Illustrated by the lack of Indian involvement at the Battle of Gaugamela; cf. Arrian 3.8.3. 
1381 Ashley, 1998,306. 
1382 Cophen River valley = Kabul River Valley. Bosworth, 1988,119. 
1383 Bosworth, 1995,149, notes that the actual location of the division of forces is not known. 
1384 The three taxeis were those of Gorgias, Cleitus the White and Meleager; Arrian 4.22.7. 
1385 Heckel, 2008,116. 
1386 Bosworth, 1988,121. 
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the occupants of a local town1387 who had retired to a mountain stronghold and made 
ready to resist Alexander. In the initial assault Alexander was slightly wounded by an 
arrow to the shoulder; this, coupled with Alexander's desire to make an example of them, 
led directly to a massacre of the defenders. 1388 There is little doubt that this act was a 
deliberate policy, ' 389 to terrify the native population into submission; Curtius tells us that 
even before the city fell, Alexander had instructed the troops to take no prisoners. ' 390 The 
sack had an immediate impact in that the neighbouring city of Andaca surrendered 
without incident. 1391 
Alexander's column was further divided; Craterus was left to continue 
suppressing the native populations while Alexander moved on into the Kunar Valley to 
the east. 139 By this time Alexander's reputation for brutality was preceding him; in every 
town he encountered the inhabitants fled into the mountains before he arrived, and 
frequently burned their homes. As a furtherance of his policy of militarising the region, 
Alexander founded another city in a strategically important location; 1393 this is a direct 
copy of the policy conducted in Sogdiana that had both caused the revolt, and helped to 
suppress it. 
After almost two years of mountain campaigns against enemies conducting 
guerrilla warfare, Alexander had become adept in dealing with these tactics. The 
Aspasians of the Bajaur region offered little more than an inconvenience to the 
Macedonians; the Assacenians1394 of Swat were a different matter, however. The king of 
the Assaceni in the Lower Swat valley, named Assacanus, 1395 commanded a substantial 
force of some 30,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, 1396 which was further strengthened by 
mercenaries, perhaps 7,000 strong. 1397 Despite this large force, it was not sufficient to 
meet Alexander in open battle, and Assacanus was astute enough to realise this, retiring 
to a number of local strongholds, the most important of which was Massaga located in the 
region of the Katgala pass. 1398 
Massaga was another formidable natural defensive position, bordered by a fast 
flowing river with sheer banks to the west preventing any approach, and by steep cliffs to 
the south. Curtius describes the fortress location as: ' 99 
1387 Anonymous in all of the sources. 
1388 Arrian 4.23.4-5; Curtius 8.10.6. 
1389 Hammond, 1983,148. 
1390 Curtius 8.10.5. 
1391 Bosworth, 1995,158, notes that the city is nowhere else named, and cannot be identified. It is the same 
town as the "fortified town' mentioned in the Metz Epitome 35. 
1392 Arrian 4.24.1. 
1393 Arrian 4.24.7; cf. Bosworth, 1988,121. 
1394 Assaceni in Arrian 4.25.6; 5.20.7; but also named Assacani at 4.30.5; Strabo 15.1.17(698); Bosworth, 
1995,167. 
1395 Arrian 4.27.4,30.5; Curtius 8.20.22. 
1M Arrian 4.253. 
1397 Arian 4.26.1; Curtius 8.10.23, puts the Massaga garrison at 38,000 infantry; Ashley, 1998,462; 
Bosworth, 1988,122. 
1398 Caroe, 1962,51-3; Eggermont, 1970,66. 
1399 Curtius 8.10.24. 
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A barricade of beetling crags, at the foot of which 
lie caves and chasms hollowed to a great depth 
over a long period of time. Where these terminate 
a ditch of massive proportions forms a barrier. 
The city itself was protected by massive walls over seven kilometres long, their 
lower sections made of stone, the upper of unbaked brick bounded by pebbles. 14 These 
mud brick walls were further reinforced by a wooden superstructure. 140 F 
Despite initially retiring to the defences of the city, Assacanus marched out with 
his mercenary infantry to engage the Macedonians. Arrian implies that finances were 
short for Assacanus and the need to pay the Indian mercenaries for the duration of their 
service was a factor in the decision. '402 Another factor was probably Alexander's 
relatively small advance force: Assacanus probably felt, depending on his level of 
reconnaissance information, that he could destroy this and the war was over; or possibly 
that if he destroyed half of the army now, the rest would be easily picked off whenever it 
finally arrived. '403 Ever the great recycler of successful strategies, Alexander saw the 
mercenaries advance from the fortification and realised that the battle was to be fought 
close to the city, so that the Indians could easily retire to the city when they were 
defeated, 1404 surviving to fight another day. Alexander, therefore, withdrew to some 
nearby high ground in order to draw the enemy towards him and increase the distance 
they would have to retreat after the engagement. '405 This is a classic tactic of Alexander: 
we see on countless occasions the Macedonian king making some kind of pre-emptive 
movement to draw the enemy onto terrain of his choosing, rather than fighting on the 
enemy's terms. Seeing the Macedonians seemingly in retreat, the Indians advanced into 
the trap. At the appropriate moment, the advance force of Macedonians turned around to 
face the enemy and engage them. The Indians were apparently charging up the hill in 
considerable disorder; they were quite simply no match for the disciplined ranks of the 
Macedonian heavy infantry. Arrian tells us that this display of discipline left the Indians 
badly shaken, the following engagement was brief and the Indians fled almost 
immediately; 200 of them left dead on the battlefield. '406 
As Alexander surveyed the fortifications after the skirmish he was wounded in the 
leg by an arrow. 1407 The wound must have been relatively minor, however, as it did not 
stop Alexander taking an active role in the siege preparations. The king's strategy was 
typical: he was confronted with a fortress that was inaccessible, and well sited for natural 
1400 Curtius 8.10.25, notes walls 35 stades long. 
1401 Arrian 4.26.4; Curtius 8.10.27; Metz Epitome 40. 
1402 Arrian 4.26.1-2. 
1403 Bosworth, 1995,170. 
'404 Whilst we can never really know what is in the mind of a man who died twenty three centuries ago, I 
think in this case we can say with some degree of certainty that Alexander never contemplated defeat here 
(or probably elsewhere). 
1405 Arrian 4.26.2. 
1406 Arian 4.26.3, this part of the siege is only found in Arrian. 
1407 Curtius 8.10.27-28; Metz Epitome 40; Arrian 4 26.4, has Alexander wounded in the ankle. 
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defence. In front of Alexander was what appears to have been a moat of some kind; in 
another repetition of earlier sieges, Alexander had his men set about dismantling the 
buildings he came across outside of the fortifications, and started filling in the moat. '408 
The similarities with the siege of Tyre and the mountain sieges in Sogdiana the previous 
year are striking. Arrian has siege towers appear from nowhere on the second day of the 
siege, whereas Curtius presents a more reasonable picture of a nine-day delay as the moat 
was filled in, and the towers were constructed from scratch. 1409 Bosworth believes that 
this delay was time enough for Craterus to bring up the siege train, but I doubt that towers 
would have been transported over the Hindu Kush Mountains; they were more likely 
constructed from scratch as required. The speed of some of Alexander's movements 
would have left them far behind if nothing else. 
As a breach in the walls had been achieved, the siege towers were brought 
forward and threw a bridge over the breach. "Over this he led his Guards, the unit which, 
by the same tactic, had helped him to the capture of Tyre. "1410 At this point even Arrian 
recognises Alexander using the same tactics, even using the same units to achieve them. 
The construction of the tower's bridge was flawed, coupled with the hypaspists being too 
keen to get across, and this caused it to collapse with many lost lives. The following day 
the same tactic was repeated with another tower, this time with far more success. At the 
death of their commander the Indian mercenaries sued for peace and joined Alexander's 
army. The mercenaries planned treachery, however, and the following night Alexander 
had them surrounded and massacred. 141 1 After the defection of the Indians, Arrian says 
the city was undefended and fell with ease; there is no mention of the thousands of other 
native troops noted earlier in his narrative. 
The Rock of Aornus 
After the fall of Massaga, the army was again divided into a number of flying 
columns; Coenus was sent to Bazira whilst Attalus, Alcetas and Demetrius advanced 
upon Ora. '412 Attalus was instructed to blockade the town pending Alexander's arrival. 
This is a curious instruction and suggests either Attalus' force was very small and not 
capable of carrying the siege, or Alexander wanted the glory of the capture himself. Of 
the two blockaded cities, Alexander first made for Ora, ' 13 which fell at the first assault. 
On hearing this news, the citizens of Bazira abandoned their town in the middle of the 
night and made for the defensive position called the Rock of Aornus. '414 
1408 Curtius 8.10.31f, Arrian 4.26.4. 
"9 Bosworth, 1995,171; Curtius 8.10.31, Arrian 4.26.4. 
1410 Arran 4.27.6, the Guards in question were the hypaspists. 
141 Arrian 4.27.3, claims that they intended to slip away in the night and return home, not wishing to take 
up arms against fellow Indians. Diodorus 17.84, attributes gross treachery to Alexander, however, claiming 
the mercenaries were attacked and slaughtered without provocation of justification. Cf. Plutarch Alex. 59.3- 
4. 
1412 Arian 4 275. 
1413 Identified as Ude-gram by Stein, 1929,43,59ff. 
1414 Arran 4.28.1. The Rock of Aornus was first identified as Pir-sar by Stein, 1929,128ff. This 
identification has recently come under question; Tucci, 1977,52-5; Eggermont, 1984 and (tentatively) 
Badian, 1987,117, n. 1, all argue for Mt. Ilam instead of Pir-sar. For a reaffirmation of Pir-sar as the rightful 
location of the Rock of Aornus, see Bosworth, 1995,179-80. 
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Pir-sar is but one of a series of narrow spurs 
which.. . range stretching east 
from above Upal throws out 
to the south before it drops rapidly and flattens out fanlike 
towards the low plateau of Maira, washed at its foot by 
the Indus. Of those spurs Pir-sar preserves its height for 
the longest distance, and owing to the uniform level and 
the very fertile soil of its summit, affords most scope both 
for cultivation and grazing. The practically level portion 
of the top extends at an average elevation of about 7,100 
feet for over a mile and a half. At its upper end this flat 
portion is bordered for some distance by gentle slopes 
equally suited for such use... Pir-sar forms a dominating 
position over-looking all the other spurs. '415 
Stein's description is very similar to Arrian's who gives a height of 8,000 feet and 
describes the Rock in similar terms, 1416 also noting the abundant natural water springs on 
the plateau. What Stein does not say is that the summit has a circumference of some forty 1417 
kilometres. 
The fortress was not only well situated and well defended, but it was provisioned 
enough to withstand a two-year siege. Alexander could easily have blockaded the fortress 
with a small force and moved the main army on towards India, but it was not in his 
nature; he never refused a seemingly impossible challenge (or at least, a very difficult 
one). Whilst preparing for a lengthy siege, Alexander was approached by a native guide 
who offered to show him a location that would overlook the Rock fortress, a ridge called 
Bar-sar. '418 Ptolemy was sent, at night, to occupy this position with a detachment of 
hand-picked troops, including the Agrianians, archers and some hypaspists. The 
following morning Alexander made a frontal assault, but was repulsed by the Indians in 
part due to the difficulty of the terrain. An Indian attack on Ptolemy's position was also 
repulsed. The following day Alexander fought his way through to Ptolemy who was 
essentially cut off once the Indians realised his location, and a further joint assault was 
also repulsed by the defenders. A straight frontal assault was evidently difficult and 
costly in manpower, 
1419 so he ordered every man to cut 100 stakes with the intention of 
building a bridge across the ravine from Bar-sar to Pir-sar. '420 This was a tried and tested 
tactic of Alexander: if a natural obstacle stood in the way, remove it. We see many 
examples of this: first at Tyre, and then on several occasions in Bactria, Sogdiana and 
now India. By the third day the bridge was complete; and by the fourth, Pir-sar had 
fallen. 1421 The rapididity of the construction of the bridge is yet another testimony, if one 
were needed, of the quality of Alexander's engineers. They were constantly called upon 
1415 Stein, 1929,128-9. 
1416 Arrian 4.28.1. 
1417 Arrian 428.1; Diodorus 85.3; Curtius 8.11.6 both say a circuit of 100 stadia and height of 16. 
1418 Ashley, 1998,313. 
14t9 And Alexander was lacking in Macedonians by this time. 
1420 Ashley, 1998,313. 
1421 Ashley, 1998,313. 
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to make the impossible a reality, and in remarkably short periods of time. The bridges 
that were constructed in Sogdiana and here at Aornus only took a few days; modem 
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Figure 38: Photograph of the Aornus Rock. 
At Aornus Alexander put the lives of his irreplaceable men at risk on a whim: he 
could easily have isolated the Rock at little cost in manpower and moved on, but ego, or 
perhaps pride, would not allow this. The local story of Heracles' failure to capture the 
r fl:. ýý 
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Rock was all the incentive he would have needed: much as with the Gordian Knot in Asia 
Minor, or the later crossing of the Gedrosian Desert in emulation of Queen Sisigambis, 
Alexander simply did not possess the will to resist a seemingly impossible challenge. 
After the fall of Aornus, Alexander marched to Ecbolima where he received a 
report that the brother of Oxyartes, Erices, had blockaded a narrow pass on the road 
towards India with a force of some 20,000 men and 15 elephants. 1422 Curtius tells us that 
advancing quickly, with apparently only the sliners and archers, he dislodged the 
defenders from the pass and scattered them. 142 This is an example of Curtius' 
exaggeration, or simply a mistake. Alexander commanded no more than 2,000 archers 
and slingers; and it seems unlikely, to say the least, that these missile troops, with no back 
up of infantry or cavalry, could have carried a pass commanded a force ten times its size. 
After crossing the Indus River, Alexander entered Taxila. Almost immediately he was 
met by king Taxiles who brought Alexander some much-needed supplies. Alexander's 
next stop was the Hydaspes River. '424 
Hydaspes River 
In many ways the battle of the Hydaspes is the most interesting of all of 
Alexander's set-piece battles, although certainly not the most famous. Alexander was 
faced with an entirely new weapon of war, the elephant, and as Hamilton notes, his 
ability to adapt and overcome this new tactical roblem demonstrates his genius just as 
well as the manoeuvres that ensured victory. 142T Despite being a fascinating battle, it is 
probably the most difficult to reconstruct given the difficulties of the surviving 
sources: 1426 these must be examined first before Alexander's tactics can be established 
with any certainty. 
Sources 
Almost all modern historians rightly accept Arrian's account of the Hydaspes as 
the fullest, most reliable and most tactically coherent. 1427 Arrian suffers, as always, from 
the usual problem of the inadequacy of information in his sources. Arrian cites only two 
of his sources by name: Aristobulus1428 and Ptolemy; 1429 the others are cited 
collectively. 1430 It is likely that most of Arrian's narrative is derived from Ptolemy, 
largely because he appears to have an important role in the battle and he was always wont 
to emphasise his own achievements, especially if it was at the expense of his later rivals. 
14n Curtius 8.12.1; cf. Diodorus 17.82.2, who calls the man Aphrices. 
1423 Curtius 8.12.2. 
1424 Ashley, 1995,317. 
1425 Hamilton, 1956,26. 
1426 Devine, 1987,91. 
1427 For example: Bosworth, 1995,262ff, Lane Fox, 1973,351f Devine, 1987,94-6; Hamilton, 1956,26. 
There are still tactical flaws, however. 
1428 Arrian 5.14.3. 
1429 Arian 5.14.5-6; 5.15.1. 
1430 Arrian 5.14.4, and then only once: Bosworth, 1995,289, believes the un-named source is a much later 
writer using the nucleus of Aristobulus in order to produce a "rhetorical fiction". 
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Despite being in the boat alongside Alexander as he crossed the Hydaspes River, Ptolemy 
does not present a good overall tactically coherent narrative, 143 1 but he does include the 
orders to sub-commanders when they occur. 1432 If it is the case that Ptolemy did not have 
an overall picture of the tactics for the battle before it occurred, then Alexander could not 
have held a council of war, like that before Gaugamela, '433 as Ptolemy would surely have 
been invited by 326. Ptolemy's coherence would also have suffered from Alexander's 
necessity to change the tactics of the battle continually, to adjust to weather, terrain and 
Porus' elephants. The overall strategy would have been well thought out before, but 
flexible in its execution. Holding a council of war at Gaugamela, and not at the Hydaspes 
River, is probably a sign of Alexander's increasingly insular nature closer to the end of 
his life. It does not display a lack of trust in his sub-commanders, however, as he relied 
heavily upon them performing their duties with alacrity in order to gain victory here as 
elsewhere. '434 
Curtius' account is replete with rhetoric and anecdotal material, as is frequently 
the case. Curtius does, however, present us with valuable topographical information: such 
as the width of the Hydaspes River, the islands in the river, 43ý the island upon which 
Alexander mistakenly landed, the slippery ground, 1436 and the plain where the final battle 
occurred. '437 Curtius' manpower figures are slightly higher than our other sources, but 
not excessively so, and his number of elephants is actually the least at eighty-five. 1438 As 
Devine notes, 439 Curtius tends to pay little attention to tactical movements, and more to 
individual aristeiai, and is therefore of lesser use in a tactical study. 
Plutarch's account is based almost entirely on "Alexander's letters"; 1440 although 
other sources are cited: these include Onesicritus'441 and Sotion, 1442 as well as "most 
writers"1443 when he clearly does not wish to divulge his source specifically. The 
authenticity of the letter has been much debated; 1444 the most we can say is that the letter 
143` Devine, 1987,94. 
1432 Orders such as those to Craterus 5.11.4, Meleager, Attalus and Gorgias 5.12.1, the pezhetairoi 5.14.1, 
Tauron 5.14.1, Coenus 5.16.3, Seleucus, Antigenes and Tauron 5.16.3. 
1433 Arrian 3.9.3-4; Curtius 4.13.3-10. 
1434 Strasburger, 1934,34,48,55, argued that Alexander held regular and routine meetings with his senior 
commanders to discuss strategy and policy, but that Ptolemy suppressed any record of these meetings; and 
only sought to publicise those meetings, such as the council of war before Gaugamela, where Alexander 
simply sought to distribute information on tactics for the coming battle. This has been convincingly 
disputed by Atkinson, 1980,180, who argued that "Alexander called into consultation whom he wanted 
when he chose". Devine, 1987,94-5. 
1435 Curtius 8.13.13-17. 
1436 CurtiuS 8.14.4,19. 
1437 Curtius 8.14.7-8. 
1438 Curtius 8.13.6; 30,000 infantry and 300 six-man chariots. 
1439 Devine, 1987,94. 
1440 Plutarch Alex. 60.1; 60.11. 
1441 Twice, Plutarch Alex. 60.6-7; 61.1. 
1442 Plutarch Alex. 60.3, whose source in turn was Potamon of Mytilene (Devine, 1987,94). 1443 Plutarch Alex. 60.12-13; 61.1. 
1444 Delbrück, 1975,224-5; Tarn, 1948,2.196-7 (argues it is a forgery, although he also notes that "the 
earlier part of the letter.. . has been carefully done from good sources and would pass muster"); Devine, 1987,92; Hamilton, 1956,26, n. 3 ("no decisive evidence regarding its authenticity"); and 1961,9-20 
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is probably not genuine, but that it is certainly based upon good primary sources; it is 
consistent with the picture we have in Arrian from Ptolemy and Aristobulus. In general 
terms, Plutarch does not often use tactical terminology, 1445 nor is he terribly interested in 
strategy and tactics; the Hydaspes is no exception. With this drawback, he is of little use 
to us here. 
Diodorus is similar to the rest of the vulgate tradition in that his narrative is 
rhetorical in nature and contains, in this case, little of tactical interest. As in Plutarch, 
terminology, when used, is vague and lacking in full detail; for example, Porus divided 
his cavalry by posting a body on each flank and that he divided his elephants equally 
along the length of the front line. 1446 The motif of the castle wall is repeated throughout 
the vulgate tradition. 1447 Diodorus' descriptions of Alexander's dispositions are even less 
tactically useful: "he viewed those of the enemy and arranged his own forces 
accordingly". 1448 Diodorus also fails to recognise that there were several phases of the 
battle involving some intricate manoeuvres from Alexander. 19 Hammond has argued, 
convincingly, for Diodorus' source for the Hydaspes being Cleitarchus on the grounds of 
the sensationalism in the narrative coupled with his lack of interest in topography or 
tactical manoeuvres of any kind. '450 The remainder of the surviving sources are useful 
only in very limited areas and on minor points. 
Topography 
Frontinus tells us that Alexander made his night crossing of the Hydaspes 
upstream of his main camp opposite Porus. '45' Arrian tells us that the crossing point was 
150 stades from the camp, around 29 km, where there was a headland projecting into the 
river from the western bank. 1452 This headland was extensively wooded, as was the island 
in the centre of the river; these factors together led Alexander to determine that, given the 
amount of cover, this was an ideal crossing point. '453 The descriptions of the headland are 
supported by Curtius who noted the vital information that there was a large depression'454 
on the west bank, again aiding in the concealment of a significant body of men. '455 Where 
our sources diverge, however, is in the descriptions of the island that Alexander first 
("good claims... to be considered genuine"); Pearson, 1960,172-3,198 ("almost certainly a 
forgery ... written 
by someone who knows both Ptolemy and Aristobulus"); Hammond, 1980b, 211-212 
("not genuine but... constructed from an account of Aristobulus"). 
1445 Frequently uses slightly vague terms like "ride ahead of" and "engage"; cf. Plutarch Alex. 60.7-10: for 
more examples. Devine, 1987,92-3. 
1446 Diodorus 17.87.4. 
1447 The elephants representing towers with the infantry acting as the curtain wall between them. 
1448 Diodorus 17.87.5. 
1449 Devine, 1987,91. 
1450 Hammond, 1983,16-7,38,51. 
1451 Frontinus Strat. 1.4.9. Curtius 8.13.23, also implies this but does not say it directly. 
1452 Arrian 5.11.1-2. 
1453 Devine, 1987,96, I will suggest later that the landing on the island was entirely accidental and an 
extremely dangerous mistake. 
1454 Fossa praealta. 
1455 Curtius 8.13.17. 
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landed upon. Arrian1456 calls it a large island, probably following Ptolemy; 
Aristobulus'457 and the author of `Alexander's letters' 1458 present it as being a rather 
small island. We must note, of course, that there appear to have been two islands in the 
Hydaspes River at the crossing point. The first was evidently larger, and closer to the 
western shore, than the second; which was in turn obscured from view by the first. '459 It 
may be possible that each source had part of the truth; Ptolemy could simply be 
describing the first, larger, island, with Aristobulus paying more attention to the second. 
If this is correct, then Arrian simply failed to realise that there were two islands, and there 
was not a disagreement among his sources regarding the size of a single island. 
There is also disagreement as to whether Alexander realised that he was landing 
on an island, or mistakenly landed on it during the crossing, thinking he was landing on 
the far bank. Plutarch and Curtiusl460 lead us to believe that he did know it was an island 
and that the landing, therefore, was intentional. Arrian is a little more candid about the 
1436 Arian 5.13.2. In fact Arrian says both islands were of significant dimensions (the one that was seen and 
that which was unseen, presumably behind the first); Bosworth, 1995,281. 
1457 A pud Arrian 5.14.3. 
1458 A pud Plutarch Alex. 60.3-4. 
1459 Bosworth, 1995,281-2. That the second island was obscured must have meant it was of smaller 
dimension. 
1460 Plutarch Alex. 60.3-7, Curtius 8.13.17-27; Devine, 1987,96; Delbrack, 1975,224-5 n. 2, suggests this 
was a deliberate falsehood in order to cover up a serious mistake by Alexander. This is an entirely plausible 
hypothesis as I can see no way that Alexander could have failed to realise it was an island, see later. 
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Figure 39: Photograph of the River Jhelum (Hydaspes). 
incident, claiming, from Ptolemy, that the landing on the island was indeed a mistake. 1461 
Despite the mistake, there was a ford beyond the island to the mainland which could be 
crossed waist deep by the men; 1462 the total width of the Hydaspes was four stades, most 
of which was to the west of the island. 1463 
Devine notes two further details of relevance: according to Pliny, the distance 
from Taxila to the Hydaspes River was 120 Roman miles. 1464 Strabo adds that 
Alexander's march to the river was mostly in a southerly direction. 1465 Stein used this 
detail to locate the battlefield close to Malakwal on the Jhelum River, roughly opposite 
the modem city of Haranpur. 1466 Stein's route from Taxila to the Hydaspes is consistent 
with Pliny's distance and Strabo's general direction of march. Stein went on to suggest 
that Alexander camped at Haranpur and from there marched upstream to Jalalpur, a 
distance of some 28km. 1467 At Jalalpur there was a well defined headland as described in 
the sources, now known as the Mangal Dev, which itself rises over 335m. To the east of 
Jalalpur is the Kandar Kas nullah, 146 which flows into the Halkiwani nullah, the northern 
branch of the Jhelum River. This nullah then skirts around the island of Adana, 1469 the 
largest in that section of the river, 1470 and one which Stein identified with the large island 
of Ptolemy. 1471 
The reconstruction that follows is that of Stein, and places Alexander's base camp 
at Haranpur. It is largely accepted by modern scholars, 1472 often with little comment on 
the alternative; but a second theory also exists. Smith has Alexander marching from 
Taxila to the Hydaspes via the fastest route, that which followed the Grand Trunk 
Road. 1473 If this route is accepted, then the base camp for Alexander's army would have 
been the town of Jhelum, the point of crossing located upstream in the vicinity of Fort 
Mangala, where the river makes a virtual right hand bend. '474 This is superficially 
attractive, but there are a number of discrepancies with the sources. The distance from 
Taxila to Jhelum is considerably less than the 120 Roman miles reported by Pliny; 1475 it is 
146' Arrian 5.13.2. 
1462 Arrian 5.13.3; Plutarch Alex. 60.7. 
1463 Approx. 768m. Curtius 8.13.8. 
1464 Devine, 1987,96. Pliny NH 6.21.62; equates to approx. 177km. 
1465 Strabo 15.1.32. 
1466 Stein, 1932,31-46. Devine, 1987,96. 
1467 Stein, 1937,1-36. 
1468 Nullah being the Hindi word for a stream or watercourse. Stein, 1932,31-46, identifies this with the 
fossa praealta of Curtius, but this is difficult to reconcile given that a nullah is a stream and the fossa 
praealta was a depression on shore. 
1469 Devine, 1987,96. 
1470 Stein, 1932,31-46; 1937,1-36, cites the dimensions of the island as being 9.6km long (6 miles) and 
2.4km at its widest point (1.5 miles), as well as noting that it was still heavily wooded. 
1471 Arrian 5.13.2. This detailed description of the river is that presented in the sources. The likelihood that 
the river has changed course means it is difficult to identify modem features and accurately site the battle. 
The main text does assume Stein's identification based upon modem topography is correct, if he is wrong 
then we are not in a position to suggest an alternative. 
1472 Fuller, 1958,184-5; Lane Fox, 1973,353-5; Green, 1974,389-90. 
1473 Smith, 1914,78-85. Bosworth, 1995,267. 
1474 Bosworth, 1995,267. 
1475 Pliny NH 6.21.62. 
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in fact closer to 80.1476 The terrain to the east of the river at that point is broken and not 
suited to the kind of cavalry battle that was fought. The final point is that if Porus was 
encamped close to the modern Fort Mangala, then it is inconceivable that Alexander's 
fleet could have been rebuilt on the river without drawing the attention of the Indians. 
These objections all assume, of course, that the river occupies roughly the same course 
now as it did twenty three centuries ago, something that is far from certain, although 
Stein believed vehemently that it does. 14 7 
The best we can say is that the accepted location for Alexander's camp is 
probably true, although unproven. We can also say with a high degree of certainty that 
Alexander marched via the main route from Taxila to the Hydaspes; this was the only 
route that would have allowed him to transport his fleet easily across land. As Bosworth 
notes, this route must have followed something like the course of the Grand Trunk Road, 
as this avoids any major hills. '478 
Prelude to the Battle 
Diodorus tells us that Alexander was 400 stades1479 from Porus when he learned 
of the latter's location; 1480 almost immediately upon hearing that the Indian king was 
positioned along the banks of the Hydaspes, Alexander hastened to the river to force a 
decisive engagement. Upon arriving at the Hydaspes, Alexander was, at first glance, 
faced with a similar problem to that he encountered at both the Granicus and Issus: an 
opponent established in a strong defensive formation along the banks of a river. The most 
significant difference being the river itself: the Granicus was relatively shallow and 
fordable, as was the river at Issus; '48' the Hydaspes was deep and fast-flowing as well as 
being in spate with the beginning of the monsoon rains. The size and situation of the 
Hydaspes, coupled with Porus' defence on the far bank, presented Alexander with one of 
the most difficult positions of his career. Alexander was further disadvantaged by his 
complete lack of knowledge of the terrain or of the upcoming monsoon season. 
Alexander must have been employing native guides, as was usual, who provided 
him with information about the terrain that he was marching into. This can be 
demonstrated by Arrian's statement that he had his fleet on the Indus dismantled, "the 
smaller vessels cut in half, the thirty-oared galleys into three", 1482 and transported by cart 
to the Hydaspes and reassembled. He must, therefore, have had a certain amount of 
advance warning about the topography of the area, but his knowledge could not have 
matched that of the native king. 
Porus' strategy was to prevent a crossing of the river by the Macedonians; 
something rather different from what Alexander had encountered at the Granicus or Issus. 
'476 Bosworth, 1995,267. 
1477 For stein's argument, see: Bosworth, 1995,268. 
1478 Bosworth, 1995,268. 
1479 Almost 77km. 
1480 Diodorus 17.87.3; 
1481 Although both had steep banks in places. 
1482 Sian 5.9.1. 
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There the Persians intended to use the river to their advantage in battle by forcing the 
Macedonians to cross it and thus fight at a disadvantage: they in the river, the Persians on 
the banks. At the Hydaspes, however, that was not possible. If Porus was to defeat 
Alexander and remove the threat from his kingdom, why attempt this attrition strategy? A 
commander more confident in his troops might have withdrawn a little way from the 
river, enticed some of the enemy across and then attacked whilst they were in confusion 
and before they could get the whole army across. The strategy of Porus betrays a lack of 
confidence in his ability to defeat Alexander in open battle; whilst barring a crossing, the 
best Porus could hope for was that the Macedonians would run into difficulties of supply 
and turn their attention elsewhere. This would essentially be victory by the absence of 
defeat. 1483 This appears to have been Porus' main intention, but coupled with this strategy 
was Porus' need to delay the Macedonians and await the anticipated arrival of Abisares, 
king of Kashmir, who had apparently offered assistance. '484 We cannot know how Porus' 
strategy would have changed once the two armies had merged, but I doubt he would have 
made an offensive move, as he would be in the same position as Alexander was, unable 
to cross unopposed. Porus would simply have been in a far better position to defend all 
vulnerable parts of the eastern banks of the river. 
Alexander, of course, needed to enable a crossing of the river in order to force a 
decisive battle with the Indian monarch. The river was too wide and fast-flowing simply 
to use the fleet or any of the rafts that were also constructed; lass too few of the 
Macedonians would be able to get across if they were opposed. Alexander, therefore, 
needed a stratagem that would allow him to safely cross the river unopposed; to achieve 
this, he used a quite brilliant misdirection strategy. 
Alexander quickly determined that he needed a crossing point that was 
unopposed; '486 after conducting a thorough reconnaissance of the river banks both 
upstream and downstream, Alexander found what appeared to be a perfect crossing point 
some 30km upstream from his base camp near a 90 degree bend in the river, close to the 
island of Adana. 1487 The bend in the river, coupled with the dense woodland on the banks 
and islands, would act as excellent cover for his troops as well as the ships that would 
transport them across. Alexander knew that Porus was watching his operations keenly, 
and was matching his movements to prevent an unopposed crossing, so Alexander 
ordered large detachments of the army to march both upstream and downstream, mostly 
at night, making a lot of noise to be sure the Indians would follow suit. This strategy 
appears brief in the sources, but in order for Porus to become lulled into a false sense of 
security by the numerous movements, it must have taken place over several days and 
nights at least. These continuous movements led Porus to alter his defensive strategy 
somewhat; instead of continuing to shadow every move of the Macedonians, he posted a 
1483 Not too dissimilar to Pericles' strategy at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, the refusal to fight 
the Spartan on their terms. 
14ß4 Diodorus 17.87.2, calls this king Embisarus, but also refers to him as Sasibisares at 17.90.4. This king 
is also known as Abisares in Arrian (5.22.2) and Curtius (8.13.1; 14.1) and I have taken that to be his name. 
1485 Arrian 5.9.2-3. 
1486 Lonsdale, 2007,86-7. 
14u7 Around 19 miles; Arrian 5.11.1. Heckel, 2008,116, notes 17 miles (27km). 
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screen of lookouts along the river at potential crossing points whilst maintaining some 
reduced facility to follow Alexander's scouts. 1488 
Alexander's strategy had effectively worked; Porus was no longer shadowing 
every movement. Alexander began preparations for the crossing with some key 
dispositions. Macedonian pickets were stationed along the banks of the river at evenly 
spaced distances, so that each could see those stationed both upstream and downstream of 
themselves. These pickets would have been crucial for communication with the complex 
movements that were to follow. '489 To continue the misdirection strategy, the pickets 
were ordered to keep their watch fires lit at night, and to make enough noise that the 
Indians could hear them; this again, apparently, lasted for several days. 14 
Alexander also needed a way to force Porus to keep most of his army in camp 
while he was effecting the crossing; he did this simply by leaving Craterus and a 
relatively small force1491 in the base camp to act as a pinning force. 
Type Number Total 
His own Hi arch 500 
Arachotian Cavalry 2 00 1492 
Parapanisadae Cavalry ,5 3,000 Cavalry 
Two Pezhetairoi Taxeis 3,000 
Indian Troops 5,000 1 nfan 8,0001 
Craterus was instructed to force a crossing once the main battle was joined. He 
would, therefore, also be required to perform a flanking attack upon the Indians, 
assuming he was able to ferry enough troops across the Hydaspes in time. 1494 
Craterus was given very detailed and specific instructions that have survived in 
Arrian, although in reality, Craterus was held at bay until the Indians were in flight and 
the battle was over. Craterus' instructions, according to Arrian, were: 
Craterus was ordered not to cross until Porus and his forces had set 
off against them (the troops commanded by Alexander), or until he 
learned that Porus was in flight and he himself (Alexander) was 
victorious. If, however, Porus should take part of his army and lead 
it against me (Alexander), while leaving another part, together with 
the elephants, back at his camp, you (Craterus) are to stay where 
1488 Arrian 5.9.1; Curtius 8.13.5. 
1489 Devine, 1987,97. 
1490 Arrian 5.11.2. 
1491 His own hipparchy of Companion Cavalry, the Arachosian and Parapamisadian cavalry, two taxeis of 
asthetairoi/pezhetairoi (Alcestas (formerly Perdiccas') taxis and Polyperchon) and the 5,000 Indian infantry 
of Taxiles. (Perhaps 3,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry in total, see table). 
1492 This figure is assumed, based upon the size of the Bactrian/Scythian contingents. 
1493 Arrian 5.12.1; those of Alcetas and Polyperchon. 
1494 Devine, 1987,97. Fuler, 1958,187; Tarn, 1948,2.192-193. 
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you are. If, on the other hand, Porus leads all his elephants against 
me (Alexander), though leaving behind a part of the army at the 
camp, you (Craterus) are to cross promptly. For it is only the 
elephants, he said, which are dangerous to disembarking horses, 
the rest of the army being no problem. '495 
The flanking force was arranged in two separate divisions. The first, commanded 
by Alexander, was to travel the furthest upstream and also be first across the river. This 
force was relatively small by necessity, but certainly contained some of the elite troops of 
the army: the agema of the Companion Cavalry, four hipparchies of Companions, 
14 6 the 
Bactrian, Sogdian and Scythian cavalry, a detachment of Dahae horse archers, the 
hypaspists and two taxeis of pezhetairoi/asthetairoi and, of course, the Agrianians, 
archers and javelin men. 1497 Arrian gives the total of 5,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry, but 
the real total should be a little higher: 
Type Number Total 
A ema 300 
Four Hipparchies 2,000 
Bactrian Cavalry 
Sogdian Cavalry 2,000 
Scythian Cavalry 
Dahae Horse Archers 1,0001499 5,300 Cavalry 
Two Pezhetairoi Tateis 3,000 
H as ists 3,000 
Agrianians 1,000 
Archers 1,000 
Javelin men 1,000 9,000 Infan 
The secondary turning force was also sent upstream, but not as far as Alexander; 
this force consisted of two taxeis of pezhetairoi, 
'50' supported by the mercenary cavalry 
and infantry. The strength of this detachment is never given, but it would have consisted 
of 3,000 Macedonian pezhetairoi: Fuller's total of 500 cavalry and 5,000 infantry is 
reasonable enough. 
1502 
1495 Arran 5.18.1. 
1496 Those of Hephaestion, Perdiccas, Coenus and Demetrius. 
1497 Arrian 5.12.2; 5.13.4; 5.16.3. 
1498 On Hammond's (1998,418; 1980c, 455ff; 1980b, 191/) interpretation of the total strength of 
Companions at this time of 4,000 (1,800 in 334 Diodorus 17.17.14) divided into eight hipparchies. Cf. 
Griffith, 1963,71, n. 13; Devine, 1987,98. Fuller, 1958,187, states 4,000 Companions with Alexander, but 
this simply cannot be the case as there were eight hipparchies in total, only four with the flanking force. 
1499 Arrian 5.16.4. The Dahae horse archers are the only unit that Arrian actually gives a strength for. 
t500 Devine, 1987,98, assumes 5,300 cavalry and 10,000 infantry; the difference is simply 1,000 in the 
archers detachment. 
X501 man 5.12.1, seems to imply three taxeis of pezhetairoi ordered to cross independently, but makes no 
further mention of them. 
1502 Fuller, 1958,187. 
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Type Number Total 
Greek Mercenary Caval 500 500 Cavalry 
Three Pezhetairoi Taxeis 4,500 
Greek Mercenary Infantry Unknown 5,000? Infantry 
These figures present us with a significant problem: the total is simply too small. 
This would give the army a total strength of only around 22,000 infantry and 8,800 
cavalry, inconceivable at this stage of the campaign, especially after recent 
reinforcements of Bactrians, Scythians etc. into the army. The discrepancy seems to be in 
allied and mercenary troops; the Macedonians do all seem to be accounted for. We have 
no positive information as to the location of the missing troops, but I believe that we can 
posit two solutions: firstly, some troops were probably still campaigning in the region 
between Taxila and the Hydaspes; Alexander had marched through this area rapidly upon 
hearing news of Porus' location, and the region was probably not fully subjugated. The 
second is a tactical consideration: Alexander's tactic at the Hydaspes was deception, and 
Porus was no fool. In order to properly "sell" the deception, Alexander would have had to 
employ rather more than two forces. 1504 One can imagine other detachments of minor 
troops, mercenaries etc. could have been sent both upstream and downstream with no 
intention of crossing, simply to confuse the Indians and hopefully divide their forces 
further by having to shadow these non front-line-troops. This would be similar to the use 
of such troops in all of the other set piece battles; they were assigned important tasks that 
did not involve actual fighting, but were critical to victory; i. e. to act as a second line etc. 
The Crossing 
Along with all of the misdirection and deception strategies being employed by 
Alexander to effect an unopposed crossing, he was lucky that the night when he chose to 
conduct the operation was alive with thunder and lightning, as well as torrential rain. The 
round trip for Alexander's flanking force was of the order of 58km. '505 considering the 
conditions and distance involved; we must seriously rethink the timeframe for the 
crossing. 29km was often a full day's march by the main army, and that was during the 
day. 1506 This figure should be increased: the full host and baggage train was not present, 
but that is surely more than negated by the weather, the muddy ground and unknown 
terrain involved. A 29km night march in the conditions described in the sources would be 
challenging; a long night march coupled with a difficult river crossing for 9,000 infantry 
and 5,300 cavalry stretches credulity, especially when we consider an equally long march 
to Porus' camp and two battles also to be fought. With this in mind I would propose that 
Alexander marched to the crossing point and waited in the forests and gullies of the area; 
hence their prominence in Arrian's descriptions, and their importance to Alexander in the 
selection of the crossing point. If Alexander set out at dusk, and that would have occurred 
even earlier than normal, given the thunderstorms and torrential rain described in Arrian, 
1503 Meleager, Attalus and Gorgias. 
1504 His and Meleager's. 
1505 Or 36 miles; the crossing point was approximately 18 miles upstream. 
15°6 Engels, 1978,153-4. 
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then he could have reached the crossing point perhaps at midnight or at the latest in the 
early hours of the morning. 1507 Once there, he rested his troops until just before dawn. '508 
Just before dawn, when it was still dark and the sky obscured by heavy clouds, the 
rain stopped and the wind died down a little from the violent gales of the previous 
night. 150-9 It would have taken some considerable length of time to embark the army, get 
to the island, disembark and then find the ford and cross it safely in order to reach far 
shore. A number of trips would have been required given the limited numbers of transport 
vessels and inflatable straw rafts available. 15' With regard to the island landing, I suspect 
that Arrian is correct in that it was unintentional; 15" Alexander would have been aware of 
the existence of the islands somewhere in the river at that point, and would have had 
some idea of their extent having read the scouting reports that may have been provided 
for him, but he would have intended to avoid them during the crossing and get straight 
from one bank to the other. It is easy to see, however, that during the total darkness of the 
night, coupled with the generally poor conditions of a river in spate, Alexander crossed a 
few hundred metres further upstream than he intended and landed on the island instead of 
the intended mainland. From the perspective of the historian, this is an understandable 
error and one that can be easily explained, but one that could have been disastrous had a 
ford from the island to the far bank not been found. 1512 If they had been stranded on the 
island and had to re-embark before achieving the shore, Porus surely would have 
discovered the attempt and moved troops to oppose it. We should also remember that in 
all likelihood only the first batch of troops would have landed on the island; others would 
have realised the mistake and crossed at the originally intended point. 
Initial Engagement 
Alexander's crossing was witnessed by some of Porus' scouts who were too few 
in number to oppose the crossing. No doubt obeying orders, these men quickly rode back 
to Porus' camp to report the news; Bosworth1513 reasonably estimates that the Indian king 
would have known about the crossing within two hours of its commencement. This gap, 
coupled with the time it would take to muster a detachment of troops, and the time it 
would take to advance to the crossing point, would have been more than enough time for 
Alexander's advance force to cross the river safely. If Arrian's account is correct, then it 
is clear that Porus immediately knew this was a crossing by Alexander's forces, and not 
the expected reinforcements of Abisares that the vulgate claims)514 What Porus still did 
not know, of course, was the size of the crossing force; it could quite easily have been a 
1507 1 would suggest a little earlier than 03.00 hrs suggested by Ashley, 1998,319. 
I'll Sian 5.12.3-4; Curtius 14.23-4; Plutarch Alex. 60.3-4. 
1509 Another example of the many times in Alexander's career when luck played a significant part. 
1510 Arrian 5.9.2-3; there do seem to have been large numbers of these, but they were of limited value in 
transporting large bodies quickly and safely. 
Arrian 5.13.2. Cf. above p. 208. 
Aman 5.13.2, gives us an intriguing description of the crossing: "It was no easy task, as the water in the 
deepest part was up to the men's armpits and the horses' necks". This is a good indication, and few are ever 
really given, of the small size of warhorses in the ancient world. Cf. Sidnell, 2006. 
1513 Bosworth, 1995,281. 
1514 Curtius 8.14.1; Diodorus 17.87.2. 
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diversion to move him away from camp and allow the bulk of the Macedonian army to 
cross unopposed. With this possibility in mind Porus first dispatched a rapid cavalry force 
to engage Alexander. 
Arrian tells us that Alexander was prepared for an immediate engagement, and set 
up his forces accordingly. '515 The Sacan horse archers were deployed in a defensive 
screen ahead of the main force of infantry1516 alongside the Saca cavalry, to their right, 
were the agema of Companion Cavalry. '511 Arrian's text at this point is seriously 
defective: 1S18 there is no mention at all of the left wing of cavalry, or of the Bactrians and 
the two hipparchies of Companions that we also know crossed. It is likely that the 
Bactrian were stationed on the left to play the role of the Thessalians, with the 
Companions stationed alongside the agema on the right, but we have no positive proof of 
this. The order of battle of the infantry is equally confused by Arrian: there is no mention 
of the two pezhetairoi taxeis that crossed with Alexander. 's 9 It is likely that these units 
were the last to cross the river, '520 and may not have made the shore by the time the army 
set off south, thus have been omitted, but carelessly without a proper explanation. Some 
modern commentators 1521 have assumed, without discussion, that the cavalry were set up 
alongside the infantry; but Arrian's text is quite specific that the cavalry were in front of 
the infantry. Schachermeyr1522 recognised the problem in Arrian, and proposed that the 
Macedonian cavalry only advanced once Alexander knew that the force commanded by 
Porus' son was small, '5 
only 
leaving the infantry behind. '524 This again does not coincide 
with the text of Arrian who has Alexander set up in this order immediately after landing. 
The battle order is no doubt in part connected with the cavalry crossing first, the infantry 
following later, as there were limited boats/rafts available. Once the cavalry had crossed, 
Alexander probably felt that delay was unacceptable, and so he set off in the direction of 
Porus, and instructed the infantry to follow once safely across the river. 1525 This is not as 
foolish as it may at first appear, as there were three taxeis of pezhetairoi who were 
waiting to cross and link up with Alexander closer to Porus' camp; therefore he would 
not be without infantry for long. 
1515 Arrian 5.13.2. 
1516 Probably following some way behind. 
1517 Bosworth. 1988,128. 
1518 Bosworth, 1995,283. 
1319 Arrian 5.12.2. 
1520 Bosworth, 1995,283. 
1521 Devine, 1987,99-100; Fuller, 1958,191. 
1522 Schachermeyr, 1973,425, n. 518. 
1523 I have assumed throughout that Arrian 5.14.3 is correct in asserting that the Indian commander was 
Porus' son; Curtius 8.14.2 claims him to have been Porus' brother, named Hages, frequently emended to 
Spitaces. It seems certain that the force was commanded by one of Porus' relatives, but several died in this 
engagement and the main encounter that there is confusion in the sources as to which of them led the 
advance force: Bosworth, 1995,289. 
1524 Bosworth, 1995,285. 
1525 Arrian 5.13.2. 
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On the initial engagement, there are two major difficulties: the size of the Indian 
force, and the location of the skirmish. Arrian tells us that Aristobulus has the battle occur 
at the crossing point, or at least very close to it. 1526 
According to Aristobulus, Porus' son arrived on the scene 
with sixty chariots before Alexander effected his second 
crossing - from the island, that is; and in view of the fact 
that the crossing was no easy matter even without 
opposition, he might have prevented it altogether if his 
Indians had left their chariots and attacked on foot 
Alexander's leading troops as they were trying to get on 
shore. But in point of fact he merely drove past, and 
permitted Alexander to cross without molestation. 
This account of Aristobulus clearly cannot be correct. It seems inconceivable that 
Porus could have reacted so quickly to the news of the crossing to enable a force, even a 
small and rapid one, to reach the crossing point before Alexander had crossed. To allow 
his forces sufficient time to gain the shore safely was 
'precisely 
why Alexander had 
chosen a crossing point 150 stades from the main camp. 152 It is also inconceivable that, if 
Porus' son had arrived in time to engage the Macedonians as they crossed, he would have 
given up such a prime tactical advantage and allowed them to gain solid ground before 
offering battle. We know Porus was an honourable man, but this would be suicide from 
his son. Whilst the exact location of the skirmish is unknown, it is clear that it was not at 
the crossing point, but some where between there and Porus' main camp. 
The size of the Indian force also presents difficulties: Aristobulus notes only 60 chariots, 
and suggested that these could have been extremely dangerous to Alexander had they 
dismounted and fought on foot at the crossing point. 1528 Alexander's letter, reported in 
Plutarch, 1529 gives 1,000 cavalry and 60 chariots; Ptolemy has 2,000 cavalry and 1201530 
chariots whilst Curtius gives the largest force at 4,000 cavalry and 100 chariots. 1S31 Given 
the fact that this was a rapid reaction force of Indians, Ptolemy's figure seems plausible 
enough and is supported by the ease with which Alexander's 5,000 cavalry defeated 
them. The chariots presented no difficulties at all to the Macedonians: the heavy rain had 
left the terrain in a very boggy condition'532 that reduced the effectiveness of the chariots 
to virtually zero, 1533 and the Indian cavalry were simply outclassed by the Macedonians 
and Saca horse archers. 
'526 Arrian 5.14.3f. 
1527 Hamilton, 1956,27. 
1528 Arrian 5.14.3. 
1529 Plutarch Alex. 60.8. 
1530 Arrian 5.14.4; It is Arrian's figures that Lonsdale, 2007,88, chooses to believe. 
1531 Curtius 8.14.2. 
1532 Aman 5.15.2. 
1533 If they had managed to get there at all, given the conditions. 
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Devine'534 is almost certainly correct to note that the Indian force was never 
intended to defeat Alexander, simply to prevent a crossing, or, failing that, to harry the 
Macedonians and report back on the size of the attacking force. That they were forced 
into battle and quickly routed speaks volumes as to the rapidity of movement of the 
Macedonian and allied cavalry unity. Along with the defeat, Porus' son was killed in the 
skirmish; the survivors fled back to Porus with the news that Alexander was present in 
person and that he had successfully crossed the Hydaspes in force. 
The Battle of the H ddaspes River 
The survivors of the initial encounter reported to Porus that Alexander was 
marching towards him. This news must have dismayed Porus: his strategy had failed, 
both to keep Alexander from crossing and, if an engagement was required, to delay it 
until Abisares' reinforcements had arrived. Porus now had no choice but to risk a battle; 
he left some elephants and a small contingent of troops at the main camp site to prevent 
Craterus from crossing, 1535 and marched northwards towards the rapidly advancing 
Macedonians, 1536 
Conscious of the mud, Porus moved north until he came upon a relatively dry, 
sandy area, on a stretch of level ground, 1537 he halted and made final preparations for the 
coming battle. His order of battle is described in detail by Arrian: 1S38 Porus believed, with 
considerable justification, that his elephants were his greatest weapon; accordingly these 
were drawn up along the length of the front line. 1539 Both the numbers of elephants, and 
their spacing, are much debated in the sources. 
Arrian claims that Porus commanded 200 elephants, and that they were spaced at 
around 30m. '540 If this were the case it would make the line extend to a length of 6km, 
'541 
far too large for the proposed numbers of Indian infantry. Diodorus and Curtius1542 give 
us more realistic numbers of elephants: 130 and 85 respectively. They do not supply the 
spacing between them, but if we accept Arrian's figure, then their battle lines would be 
3.9km and 2.55km respectively, both of which still seem excessive. Polyaenus' statement 
was that the elephants were stationed 15m apart: '543 whilst we still can not know how 
many elephants Porus had at his disposal, if we take the median figure of 130 then the 
battle line would extend 1.95km. 1544 If we assume that the tactical manuals1545 are correct 
1534 Devine, 1987,100. 
1535 Arrian 5.15.3, it seems that he was making final preparations for an attempt. 
1536 Plutarch Alex. 60.9; Arrian 5.15.4. 
153' Hamilton, 1956,27. 
1538 Sian 5.15.5-7; and in slightly lesser detail by Diodorus 17.87.4-5; Curtius 8.14.9-13; and Polyaenus 
Strat. 4.3.22. 
1539 Arrian 5.15.5. 
1540 Arrian 5.15.4. Elephant spacing in the Greek was 1 plethron, equivalent to 100 feet. 
1541 Devine, 1987,101, claims 4 miles, equivalent to 6.5km. 
1542 Diodorus 17.87.2; Curtius 8.13.6. 
1543 Polyaenus Strat. 4.3.22 notes 50 feet. 
1544 Devine, 1987,101, believes that the lowest value of Curtius (85 elephants) should be used, giving a line 
of 1.25km. 
1545 Asclep. Tact. 4.1; Aelian Tact. 11.2; state 3 feet. 
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in that an infantryman needed around 0.9m'546 in compact formation then that would 
mean 2,1301547 men spread across the front of the Indian line. 154 If the Indian troops 
were drawn up 14 men deep then we have a total force of Indian infantry of 29,820. We 
also know that the infantry extended beyond the elephants on either wing so the actual 
figure would be slightly higher; but it is almost exactly the figure provided by both Arrian 
and Curtius of 30,000.1549 It is also the median figure for the size of the Indian infantry 
contingent from Diodorus' 50,000 and Plutarch's 20,000.1550 
Can we assume that the Indian infantry were occupying 0.9m space? 1551 The 
0.9m spacing in tight formation is an argument that comes from the size of the hoplite 
shields excavated at, amongst other places, Olympia; these shields ranged in size from 
78.7cm to 100cm. Given that the individual soldier would have occupied rather less space 
than a shield of this diameter, the size of the shield is the critical factor in an estimation of 
the space occupied by a trooper. '552 Less than 0.9m would have meant overlapping 
shields and an inability to use the spear properly, wider than this would have meant gaps 
opening up between the shield wall, and therefore this could hardly be described as a 
close formation. 1553 This argument does assume that the Indians were using shields of 
roughly the same size as those of a Greek hoplite, but even if the shield was smaller the 
men could not physically stand very much closer so a 0.9m frontage seems the most 
reasonable. 
Whilst some members of the front line of Indian infantry were positioned between 
the elephants, the depth of the line would have meant that many extended behind them. 
We also know that the infantry were flanked on either side by cavalry wings in a typical 
ancient formation, and it is possible that Porus had enough chariots left over from the 
initial encounter, i. e. ones that were not sent with his son, to provide an advance screen in 
front of each wing of cavalry. '554 Porus himself was in the front line sat atop the largest 
and most intelligent of the elephants at the extreme left of the elephant line. 1555 This can 
possibly be taken to be an indication that even in the near east and beyond, the tendency 
of hoplite armies1556 to move to the right as they advanced was thoroughly ingrained as 
1546 Polybius 12.20-2 notes, referring to Roman Legionaries, each individual needed 1.83m (6ft) per man in 
loose formation: but in tight formation used for battle then 0.9m (3ft) was more usual. If 1.83m were 
required, then the battle line of the Indians would have extended a quite ridiculous 8km (5 miles); 
Hamilton, 1956,27, notes this as unlikely. 
1547 1950 (total front of line)/0.915 (space occupied by an individual) = 2,130 (men across the front line). 
1548 Devine, 1987,101, arrives at a figure of 1,400 after a similar exercise. 1549 Arrian 5.15.4; Curtius 8.13.6. 
1550 Diodorus 17.87.2; Plutarch Alex. 62.2. 
1551 Lorimer, 1947,76 n. 3. 
1552 Van Wees, 2004,168-9, fig. 16 for a visual representation of hoplites in a formation occupying 0.9m 
spacing, which he does not accept as being used. At 185-6 he argues that hoplites would have occupied 
1.82m spacing in close formation, and that "close formation" refers to a formation that had a significant gap 
between shields, "The classical hoplite phalanx can therefore hardly have operated with intervals of much 
less than six feet (1.8m)". 
1553 Contra, Van Wees, 2004,185-6 who argues classical hoplites fought with a relatively low density 
formation and occupied gaps of 1.8m. 
1554 Devine, 1987,101. 
1555 Polyaenus Strat. 4.3.22. 
1556 Or at least heavily armoured bodies of infantry if the term hoplite should not apply. 
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Porus stationed his best elephant in that area; although this was probably more to do with 
Porus' anticipation of Alexander launching his assault from his right. Whilst elephants 
would not react in the same way as infantrymen, Porus still elected to place his best 
troops on the left perhaps unconsciously, or perhaps to be closest to Alexander who was 
positioned on the Macedonian extreme right as was usual. 
The sources are again at odds regarding the size of the cavalry forces on the 
Indian wings: Arrian has 4,000, Diodorus 3,000 and Plutarch 2,000,1557 although he also 
mentions that 1,000 cavalry were included in the advance force that was defeated by 
Alexander; 2,000 cavalry on either wing seems plausible. There are two things that we 
can say with some certainty: 
1. Porus was outnumbered in cavalry, even if Arrian's figure is correct. Alexander's 
cavalry strength probably stood at 5,300. 
2. The Macedonian front was overlapped by the Indian line as at Gaugamela. 6,000 
infantry occupied a frontage of around 700m if they were deployed eight ranks1558 
deep and in a compact formation. 1559 Bosworth156° uses these figures to argue that 
Porus had only 50 elephants and considerably fewer infantrymen, thus the lines 
would be the same length. I believe it is unsound, however, to argue as to the size 
of the Indian force from the frontage of the Macedonian army. The result would 
be that the Indians had something similar to Alexander's 6,000 infantry, vastly 
fewer than even the smallest of the ancient estimates. 
The final element of Porus' force were the chariots, each capable of carrying an 
impressive six man crew. Diodorus has them at "more than a thousand", 1561 whilst both 
Arrian and Curtius claim 300.1562 Devine'563 is probably correct in assuming that the 300 
may have been the total contingent at the start of the campaign, and therefore included 
the 60 already lost in the initial enFafement. A remaining force of around 240 is probably 
as close to the truth as we can get. 56 
Alexander reached the battlefield far in advance of his infantry, but due to the 
fundamentally defensive nature of the Indian formation'565 he was able to halt his 
advance and await the arrival of his infantry with little fear of interference from Porus. 1566 
We can reasonably conclude that the delay was quite a lengthy one; a march of perhaps 
15-25km1567 would normally have taken the infantry the best part of a day: 1569 when we 
1557 Arrian 5.15.4; Diodorus 17.87.2; Plutarch Alex. 62.2. 
1558 Devine, 1987,101. 
1559 A front of 750 men each occupying 0.9m (3 ft): cf. p219 n. 15. 
1560 Bosworth, 1995,292. 
1561 Diodorus 17.87.2. 
1562 Arrian 5.15.4; Curtius 8.13.6. 
1563 Devine, 1987,101. 
1561 Hamilton, 1956,27, claims that 300 were still available to Porus during the main battle; whereas 
Heckel, 2008,116ff omits them entirely from his account of the battle. 
1565 More on this later. 
1566 Arrian 5.16.1. 
1567 Around 10-15 miles from the crossing point to the battle site. 1568 Engels, 1978,153-6. 
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factor in the night march of an equivalent length and the crossing, the infantry must have 
been exhausted by the time they arrived. Arrian tells us that "Alexander had no intention 
of making the fresh enemy troops a present of his own breathless and exhausted men". 
'569 
Once they did arrive, there was a further delay by Alexander, entirely sensibly, to 
allow them to rest before the final exertion of the battle. To facilitate the rest that was 
required by the infantry, and to confuse the enemy, Alexander ordered his cavalry to 
manoeuvre continually along the front of the line; this was partially intended to prevent 
the Indians from observing Alexander's final dispositions, and partly to hide the resting 
infantry from Porus. 1570 
It could be argued that Porus missed a golden opportunity to catch the 
Macedonians unprepared for battle, without being organised correctly and with the 
infantry exhausted from their long march; but I think this underestimates Porus. He 
evidently realised that a defensive posture was his best chance of victory whilst 
attempting to prevent Alexander's crossing, partly because his lack of numbers, partly 
due to a probable lack of quality in infantry and finally to the fact that he was awaiting 
reinforcements that he knew were on the way. The fact that the Macedonians chose to 
rest, and thus delay the battle, increased the chance that the army of Abisares would 
arrive to attack the Macedonians in the rear prior to, or during, the battle. 
1S71 There is a 
further point, however: Porus' infantry almost certainly were not of the same quality as 
the Macedonians, and they may not have had the ability to advance in an unbroken line 
for any great distance. If he had attempted to advance on the unprepared Macedonians, 
any gaps that opened could easily have been exploited by even tired pezhetairoi; gaps of 
this kind were precisely what Porus had to avoid if he was to have any chance of victory. 
He would also know that his cavalry were fewer in number than their Macedonian 
equivalents. The real strength of the Indian army, and their main chance of victory, lay in 
their elephants. Devine is therefore not necessarily correct in calling the Indian strategy 
supine: 1 72 Porus had simply recognised his own strengths and weaknesses, and was 
deploying his troops accordingly. 
None of the sources give a chronology for the time of the battle, but it can only 
have been late afternoon by the time the infantry arrived and were sufficiently rested for 
the battle to commence. This time interval, coupled with their lack of desire or ability to 
take the initiative, allowed the Indians to complete their final dispositions. It also allowed 
Alexander the opportunity to study the enemy, as he had done at Gaugamela, and make 
tactical adjustments accordingly. 
Alexander easily deduced the Indian strategy: the elephants were placed at regular 
intervals with the infantry packed in close order between and behind them' 573 and the 
'569 Arrian 5.16.1. 
1570 The armies were easily within sight of each other. 
157 This was essentially exactly like the Athenian delay at Marathon to give the Spartans as much time as 
ý ossible to arrive; in both battles, of course, the expected reinforcements never arrived. 
Sn Devine, 1987,101. 
1573 Arrian 5.16.2. 
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cavalry protecting each wing. It would have been evident to Alexander that Porus' basic 
tactic was to rely heavily upon his elephants; therefore he would have expected the 
infantry and elephants to advance in a straight line, somewhat slowly, with the cavalry 
protecting the flanks. Alexander would have expected no tactical variations from this 
plan, as it would have led to the flanks of the infantry being compromised, or to gaps 
opening in the line. Porus' strategy was very rigid, but it suited the army at his disposal 
perfectly. With Porus' strategy evident, Alexander's response was first to eliminate the 
Indian cavalry to enable the flanking attack that he so preferred. By separating the cavalry 
from the elephants, who would have been incapable of adjusting their momentum to help 
without utterly destroying the formation, he would give himself the best chance of 
victory, and he would also be enacting his favoured strategy of attacking from two 
directions at once, from the front with the infantry and the sides with the cavalry, after the 
Indians were disposed of, of course. 
Alexander opened the battle with an attack on the Indian left, coupled with the 
most discussed order in the entire battle - the order given to Coenus. The understanding 
of this is fundamental to the entire battle, and it therefore must be discussed in detail. 
There are three surviving versions of the order to Coenus. Arrian tells us: '574 
Coenus was sent over to the Indian right with 
Demetrius' hipparchy and his own, his orders 
being that when the enemy moved their cavalry 
across to their left to counter the massed 
formations of the Macedonian mounted 
squadrons, he should hang on to their rear. 
Curtius presents the actual words of Alexander, a later invention in all likelihood. 
Alexander turned to Coenus and said: '575 
Together with Ptolemy, Perdiccas and Hephaestion I 
am going to attack the enemy left wing. When you 
see me in the thick of the fight, set our right wing in 
motion and attack the enemy while they are in 
confusion. Antigenes, Leonnatus, Tauron, you three 
will attack the centre and put pressure on their front. 
Plutarch presents the shortest version: 1576 
Alexander, remembering the threat of the enemy's 
elephants and their superior numbers, attacked their left 
wing and ordered Coenus to charge against the right. 
1574 Arrian 5.16.3. 
1575 Curtius 8.14.15. 
1576 Plutarch Alex. 60.10. 
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The first part of Arrian's statement has been interpreted in three ways, all of 
which I believe are incorrect. Tarn proposed, and then rejected, the idea that Coenus was 
sent to Alexander's right on the basis of references to Porus' left previously. '577 Coenus 
was, therefore, already stationed on Alexander's right wing. The second interpretation, 
which is accepted by Tarn, was that Coenus was sent to Alexander's right, as a feint. 1578 
The third is that Coenus was sent against the Indian right in order to attack it. 1579 The 
second comes closest to the truth as I hope to demonstrate. 
Bosworth divided the complexities of the order into two separate areas: Coenus' 
command, and the tactical picture as a whole; it seems sensible to follow this lead. 1 sso 
Firstly, Coenus' command: Curtius, along with Arrian, 158' presents a picture of Coenus in 
command of the Macedonian left wing. We know with some certainty that he was 
formerly in command of an infantry taxis, and that he was separated from it and given the 
command of a hipparchy for this battle. There appears to be no other reference to his 
being in command of a hipparchy, yet here it is described as "his own" in exactly the 
same way as established commands like those of Craterus and Perdiccas. 15 82 We also 
know that the infantry taxis that he had formerly commanded continued to bear his name, 
and continued to be commanded by him after the battle. 1583 The most confusing element 
of all is that the hipparchy appears from nowhere; it is not present in Arrian's detailed 
order of battle. 1584 
Berve'585 suggested the possibility that Coenus in fact held both commands 
simultaneously; the greatest argument against this hypothesis is that it would be unique in 
the entirety of Alexander's career. There are many instances of individuals being 
promoted from one command to another, but the name attached to their former command 
always changes; Cleitus is known as a taxiarch before the Hydaspes, 1586 and as a 
hipparch afterwards, but there is no evidence at all that his infantry command continued 
to be his after the Hydaspes. '587 
Hammond1588 proposed that there was an exchange of commands, Craterus being 
given the command of the hipparchy of Cleitus, and that Coenus commanded the 
hipparchy of Perdiccas. This seems unnecessarily complicated and unlikely; it relies upon 
there being two individuals named Cleitus and only four hipparchies present during the 
battle. '589 
1577 Tarn, 1948,2.196, n. 1. 
1578 Tarn, 1948,2.196, n. 1, originally suggested by Bauer in 1898. 
179 Devine, 1986,103. 
1580 Bosworth, 1995,294-5. 
1581 Curtius 8.14.15; Arrian 5.16.3. 
1582 Arrian 5.11.4; 5.22.6. 
1583 Arrian 5.21.1. 
1584 Bosworth, 1995,294. 
1585 Berve, 1926,1.109-10. 
1586 Arrian 5.12.2. 
1587 Arrian 5.22.6; 6.6.4; Bosworth, 1995,294. 
1588 Hammond, 1980b, 299, n. 142; Hammond, 1980c, 466. 
1589 Bosworth, 1995,294. 
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Tam1590 argued that Coenus was promoted to the command of his hipparchy at 
Taxila, but that the pezhetairoi taxis that was formerly his continued to bear his name, 
even though he ceased to be its commander. There is one example of this occurring in 
Alexander's career following the death of Hephaestion; 1591 but this is almost certainly a 
special case given his intimate position with Alexander. The continuation of the use of 
Hephaestion's name is an honorary measure for a royal favourite, and thus not a parallel 
for this situation at all. It is also inconceivable that Alexander was lacking in individuals 
with sufficient ability to take on the role of taxiarch, and any individual who did would 
have had his name attached to it. '592 
The most plausible theory, and one that deserves greater examination than it was 
originally given, was proposed by Anspach more than one hundred years ago. 1593 He 
suggested, briefly, that the hipparchy that carried his name did not consist of Macedonian 
Companion Cavalry at all, but comprised the Bactrian and Sogdian cavalry that are 
mentioned by Arian at 5.12.2; these troops do not appear in the battle narrative a few 
pages later. The large body of cavalry on the right commanded directly by Alexander 
appears to have comprised the agema, the two hipparchies of Hephaestion and Perdiccas, 
and the Dahae horse archers. '594 The only cavalry troops omitted are the hipparchy of 
Demetrius and the Bactrian and Sogdian cavalry; " 95 it is further reasonable not to invent 
cavalry troops that we have no positive evidence for, in the shape of another hipparchy. It 
is certain that Coenus held a cavalry command at the Hydaspes, and the only troops that 
do not have a commander are these Bactrian and Sogdian allied cavalry. We can also go 
further than this and suggest why Coenus was given command of these troops and not 
another individual, perhaps someone with more experience of cavalry operations. In the 
winter of 328/7, Coenus commanded a successful and final campaign in northern 
Sogdiana against Spitamenes. Shortly before the final battle of that campaign, Spitamenes 
recruited a large body of Bactrian and Sogdian cavalry; these evidently fought well in 
what Arrian describes as a "vigorous engagement", "9' Spitamenes losing some 800 men 
and the Macedonians 25. Coenus apparently made a sufficient impact upon the Bactrians 
and Sogdians as, while Spitamenes was attempting to make his escape, they deserted to 
Coenus' command. These cavalry troops were presumably the ones that, shortly after 
this, accompanied Alexander into India. 1597 The fact that Coenus had a pre-existing 
relationship with these troops, whose loyalty could easily be questioned, is, I would 
argue, the main reason that Coenus was given their command during the battle. Bosworth 
uses the fact of Coenus' pre-existing relationship with the Bactrian and Sogdian cavalry 
to argue that Ptolemy probably would have emphasised this connection, noting that he 
159° Tarn, 1948,2.146. 
1591 Arrian 7.14.10. 
1592 Bosworth, 1995,294. 
1593 Anspach, 1903,54. 
1594 Bosworth, 1995,295. 
1595 There were probably eight hipparchies in India, but only four are attested at the battle, a clear indication 
in my view that Alexander had launched many more operations on the far side of the Hydaspes to mask his 
crossing than we have evidence for. 
1596 Arrian 4.17.3. 
1597 Arrian 5.11.3 
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had with him the unit of Demetrius and the horsemen whom he had led in Sogdiana. '598 
On this hypothesis, Coenus was temporarily detached from his own command, that of an 
infantry taxis, to take control of potentially difficult and dangerous troops, men whose 
loyalty was not absolutely certain, during the battle. 
The tactical picture regarding the orders issued to Coenus has been much 
discussed; many historians1599 have adopted an approach that is far too analytical and 
source-critical, resulting in self-imposed difficulties. 1600 Arrian's text is relatively simple 
to follow and is coherent with other sources. 
Coenus' initial position in the line is clear from the text of Arrian. The infantry 
had arrived and were rested after a long march. These were then drawn up in the centre as 
usual, facing the opposing infantry and elephants, but with explicit orders not to engage 
the enemy. 1601 The initial assault was to be conducted by Alexander and the Companion 
Cavalry stationed to the right of the infantry, against the Indian left flank: again this was 
almost always Alexander's opening gambit. Both Tarn and Hamilton1602 agree that this 
means there is no doubt that Coenus attacked against the Indian right, as we know he 
attacked the opposite flank to Alexander. Bosworth believes that the same picture is 
presented by both Plutarch and Curtius, 1603 who state that he (Coenus) was ordered to 
attack the right; this would have to mean the Indian right, but this is not specified in the 
sources. A statement that Coenus was ordered to attack the right could refer to an attack 
on the Macedonian right, but if so, this is explicable as we shall see. If this were the case, 
then Coenus is essentially playing the role of Parmenio, although in a more aggressive 
fashion than the old general was usually ordered to do. Bosworth believes that there was 
nothing "surreptitious or secretive"1604 in Coenus' role, ' 605 but I believe he is mistaken. 
Green and Fuller both argued for some kind of feint move, interpreting [ Far/ to mean 
exactly that. Hamilton and others1606 have noted that Arrian frequently uses c £dand 
or! 1607 interchangeably and are simply variants of each other. 
Although we seemingly cannot use Arrian's language to argue conclusively for 
anything untoward in Coenus' orders, perhaps it can be used as supporting evidence. It 
seems that Arrian does use Co ar on occasion to refer to a feint, but that it does not 
exclusively mean that. 1608 We also know that Coenus was ordered to hold off his attack 
until the cavalry on the Indian right wing had moved to reinforce the Indian left that 
would be under attack from Alexander. Once they began to move, he was to pursue them 
1598 Bosworth, 1995,295. 
1599 Devine, 1986,102-5; Hamilton, 1956,27ff. 
1600 Bosworth, 1995,295. 
160' Arrian 5.16.4. 
1602 Tarn, 1948,2.196, n. 1; Hamilton, 1956,27. 
1603 Bosworth, 1995,295. Plutarch Alex. 60.11; Curtius 8.14.15. 
'6" Bosworth, 1995,295. 
1605 Fuller, 1958,197; Green, 1974,397. 
1606 Hamilton, 1956,27-8; Tarn, 1948,2.196; Devine, 1987,110-11; contra Bauer, 1899,105-128. Cf. 
above p. 84. 
1607 Devine, 1987,110-11, for statistics on how frequently this is the case. 
1608 See above p. 228 fn. 1162. 
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behind the Indian lines and attack them in the rear as they arrived to support Porus' left 
wing. We must ask the simple question, why would the Indian right wing move, or be 
ordered to move, in support of the Indian left it they were standing opposite a significant 
body of enemy cavalry? This would quite simply be courting disaster by inviting the 
flanking attack that Alexander so coveted. The answer is simply that they would not, so 
something else must have occurred. I believe that Coenus was initially stationed with 
Alexander on the Macedonian right, but was ordered to circle around the right flank of 
the Indian army once the Indian cavalry had begun to move. Arrian's use of 4.6r/could 
refer to this; whilst it was not specifically a feint attack as he did not engage the enemy, 
he was simply being kept away from the area of the line that he was assigned to attack 
until the most opportune moment. As far as the Indians were concerned, all of 
Alexander's cavalry were concentrated against their left and thus reinforcing this sector 
with cavalry from the right that were not engaged was a sensible strategy; it is 
unfortunate for Porus that this was exactly what Alexander's strategy required. 
Hamilton and Tarn both discussed, at length, the movement of the Indian 
cavalry; 1609 Tarn1610 speculated that the Indian move was an offensive one, that Porus had 
seen an opportunity to defeat Alexander himself at a time when he only commanded two 
hipparchies and the agema. This hypothesis would presuppose a terrible risk if we 
assume that Coenus was already on the Macedonian left, or moving towards it, as noted 
above. Hamilton's1611 suggestion is far more sensible: the presence of a large body of 
Macedonian cavalry on the Indian left forced Porus to reinforce that sector; the move was 
thus fundamentally defensive and caused not by a perceived weakness, but as a counter to 
Alexander's superiority in numbers. If we look at the battle from Porus' point of view for 
a moment, and apply the flanking tactics that Alexander was so fond of, Porus was 
presented with a golden opportunity to attack the Macedonian heavy infantry in the flank 
or rear; something that Alexander would certainly have done while expecting his 
outnumbered cavalry 1612 to hold their position long enough for the battle to be won. As 
noted, however, Porus' strategy was fundamentally defensive, and thus the cavalry 
moved to reinforce the Indian left. Even after the detachment of Coenus, Alexander 
would have perhaps 3,000 cavalry and the Indians 2,000; 1613 hardly an overwhelming 
disadvantage for the Indians, and yet still they chose to reinforce this sector. I would 
count this as Porus' biggest mistake in the entire battle; failing to take the opportunity for 
a flanking attack, and choosing a defensive posture automatically. Porus was essentially 
putting total faith in the ability of his elephants to defeat the Macedonian centre, a battle 
that had not yet even been joined. 
In defence of Porus' movement of cavalry to reinforce his left wing, Devine 
makes the curious argument that Porus believed his infantry to be "immune from attack 
by the Macedonian cavalry, thanks to the presence of the elephants, and would not need a 
"Hamilton, 1956,29; Tarn, 1948,2.196. 
1610 Tarn, 1948,2.196. 
1611 Hamilton, 1956,29. 
1612 This would normally have been the Thessalians led by Parmenio. 
1613 Assuming that Arrian's figure of 4,000 is accepted and they were divided evenly between both flanks; 
Devine, 1987,104, assumes Porus may have only had 1,500 cavalry on each flank, taking into account 
losses suffered by his son in the initial skirmish. 
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cavalry flank-guard on either wing. " 1614 This argument is simply untenable; it assumes 
that Alexander would have been foolish enough to attack the Indian centre from the front, 
in direct opposition to the elephants. This is something we know Alexander contemplated 
and rejected, realising the danger posed to his cavalry by the elephants. Even if 
Alexander were to attack the Indian centre from the front, the cavalry flank guards would 
not have been effective anyway. A flank guard of cavalry is designed to prevent the side 
of an infantry body from attack, and also to prevent any potential encircling manoeuvre 
that would have the infantry attacked in the rear. If Alexander were to attack the infantry 
in the flank or rear, then the elephants were not in a position to prevent this, being 
stationed as they were at regular intervals across the front. Devine calls the Indian 
transfer of cavalry "common sense"; 1615 I would suggest it was a serious tactical error 
that failed to take advantage of the potential for a flanking attack against the Macedonian 
centre. 
Wilcken argued that the transfer came as a response to Alexander's charge, but 
Arrian's1616 text states quite clearly that it was before troops had engaged in hand to hand 
combat, but after Alexander's mounted archers had engaged the Indians. 1617 If this is the 
case, then it is further evidence that Coenus was with Alexander on the Macedonian right 
until relatively late, just before the initial charge, in fact. 1618 
We must also consider the location of the movement of Coenus' cavalry, and of 
the Indian detachment. Was it between the lines or behind them? Devine1619 notes that 
most modem commentators assume that the cavalry passed between the lines, i. e. in front 
of the elephants. This is an area where more recent scholarship has changed its view, and 
most now assume that the Indians moved behind their own lines to reinforce their left 
wing 1620 Veith is one of the few scholars who actually argued that the cavalry moved in 
front of the elephants, rather than simply assuming it; but his arguments were 
comprehensively refuted by Hamilton, 1621 and I think it is now beyond doubt that the 
Indians moved behind their own lines. 1622 If we are assuming, as I have done, that 
Coenus' cavalry units started out on the Macedonian right along with Alexander, 1623 then 
we must also ask the question of their movements. The sources clearly give us the 
impression that stealth was required of Coenus, and thus a movement behind the Greek 
line would seem sensible. We must also note that a movement in front of the Greek lines 
would mean them coming closer to the elephants that they would have been desperate to 
avoid; although they would not have actually engaged them. It was the noise of the 
elephants trumpeting that would frighten the Macedonian horses, and this was to be 
1614 Devine, 1987,104. 
1615 Devine, 1987,104. 
1616 Wilken, 1932,182. Arrian 5.16.3. 
1617 Hamilton, 1956,29. 
1618 Contra Heckel, 2008,115ff, has Coenus on the Macedonian left from the start. 
1619 Devine, 1987,104. 
1620 Heckel, 2008,115ff; Bosworth, 1995,296; cf. earlier works, for example, Dodge, 1890,2.558, and 
Smith, 1914,69-73. 
1621 Veith, 1908,137. Hamilton, 1956,29. 
1622 Cf. Bosworth, 1988,129. 
1623 Cf. Devine, 1987,104f contra, Heckel, 2008,115ff. 
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avoided at all costs, hence Alexander's orders for the flank attack in the first place. "'The 
overriding factor is that untrained horses will not approach elephants... Certainly Coenus 
could not have passed in front of them": 1624 Hamilton is here referring to Coenus' pursuit 
of the Indians, rather than of his cavalry transferring from one side to the other, but the 
principle of the argument is the same. 
There is a possibility that the orders to Coenus that we have preserved in the 
sources are not the full extent of the orders given to him. Bosworth'6 s has noted that 
Coenus was only given orders based upon the eventuality of the Indian right moving to 
reinforce its left; no mention was given of what he was to do if that move did not occur. 
Griffith1626 brings up the point that Arrian may have missed out the first part of the order, 
that which would deal with this situation. If Arrian's text is defective it is more likely to 
be Ptolemy who is at fault, given that Arrian did preserve the orders to Craterus in great 
detail only a few pages previously. Bosworth 162 notes that if the Indian move did not 
take place, then Coenus would have to deal with any attack from the Indian right himself, 
or more likely simply hold his position. This would have been much as Parmenio had to 
do for many years in every set-piece battle Alexander fought before the Hydaspes; on this 
interpretation, Coenus did not need orders specifically. 
Bosworth is starting from the presumption that Coenus opened the battle stationed 
on Alexander's left; if I am correct that he was initially stationed on the right, which 
made the Indian movement of troops far more likely, and thus the order would come into 
play, then we have a slightly different tactical situation. The brevity of the orders to 
Coenus would make sense; if the Indians moved, then he was to circle round the 
Macedonian left and follow the Indian cavalry, eventually implementing a flanking 
attack. If the Indians did not move, then he would simply stay with the right and 
overwhelm the Indian cavalry on their left quickly and easily, following this up with the 
flanking attack from that direction, and the concomitant encirclement of the Indian 
infantry. If this second eventuality came to pass, then Alexander would have been 
implementing the strategy that had brought him victory in every set piece battle of his 
career; a victory that would be primarily won by himself and the Companion Cavalry. 
With this in mind it is more than possible that this was Alexander's strategy; he prepared 
for both possibilities, of the Indian cavalry moving, or of it staying put: both would result 
in a flanking attack and encirclement of the Indian centre. Both would also limit the 
amount of time that his heavy infantry would have to engage the Indian elephants. 
The orders to Coenus are followed immediately by the orders given to the infantry 
commanders, and these are equally problematic. Arrian1628 mentions three individuals, 
Seleucus, Antigenes and Tauron. Curtius also notes three infantry commanders, but 
omits Seleucus, and instead includes Leonnatus. Neither Arrian nor Curtius make any 
reference to Cleitus, whose taxis we know to have been present at the battle, and who 
1624 Hamilton, 1956,29. 
1625 Bosworth, 1995,297. 
1626 Griffith in Hamilton, 1956,29. 
1627 Bosworth, 1995,297. 
1628 Arrian 5.16.3. 
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should have been named. 1629 Seleucus appears to have been in command of the 
Hypaspists by this time, and Tauron commanded the light armed troops including the 
archers. 163° Antigenes1631 makes his first appearance in the sources here, and in Arrian he 
only re-emerges in command of one of the pezhetairoi taxeis which Craterus marched 
through the central provinces on the return to Babylon. 1632 Tarn1633 suggested that 
Antigenes was Coenus' son, and that he commanded his taxis at the Hydaspes, and later 
took over its command permanently after his death. This cannot be the case, however, as 
we know that Cleitus' taxis was asthetairoi1634 and not pezhetairoi, 1635 all of which were 
retained by Alexander and not given to Craterus. 16 6 We also know that Coenus' 
command was given to Peithon after his death. 1637 The missing taxis whose command 
was assumed by Antigenes can only have been that of Cleitus who we know was 
transferred to the command of a hipparchy after the battle. 1638 We do not know where 
Cleitus was at this point, but he does not appear to have taken part in the battle, perhaps 
as a result of some illness or wound. 1639 With regard to the infantry commanders, the 
identification of Leonnatus is the only outstanding issue. Heckel' 640 believes him to have 
been the bodyguard, but he could equally be the son of Antipater161 who we know was a 
trierarch at the Hydaspes. 1642 If Antigenes commanded Cleitus' taxis, then Leonnatus was 
in command of Coenus' taxis. The reverse is also possible; the effect is the same. 
With regard to the actual orders to the infantry commanders, Arrian tells us that 
they were: 
not to engage until it was evident that the 
Indians, both horse and foot, had been thrown 
into confusion by the Macedonian cavalry. 
1629 Curtius 8.14.15. Bosworth, 1995,297. 
1630 Arrian 5.13.4. Devine, 1987,105 suggested Tauron commanded the archers and possibly the light 
armed as a whole. 
1631 Heckel, 1992,308-16. 
1632 Arrian 6.17.3. 
1633 Tarn, 1948,2.146,314; this hypothesis is unlikely and relies on a clever but very uncertain emendation 
of the text of Justin (13.4.17); Bosworth, 1995,298. This Antigenes is more than likely the future 
commander of the Silver Shields, the elite group of heavy infantry that developed from the hypaspists. 
Antigenes is first attested in that role in 321 by Arrian (Succ. F. 1.35), and he was probably first given any 
command in the hypaspists corps in 331 (Curtius 5.2.5). There is no suggestion, however, that he held a 
command with the hypaspists at the Hydaspes, or later under Craterus; in all likelihood he received his 
command of the Silver Shields in 322, when Neoptolemus (cf. Plutarch Eum. 1) was transferred from the 
hypaspists to the army in Armenia (Plutarch Eum. 4.2). Bosworth, 1995,298. 
'3 Arrian 2.23.2. 
1635 For the difference, see English, 2009,25-27. 
1636 Arrian 6.21.3. 
'637 Arrian 6.6.1. 
1638 Bosworth, 1995,294. 
'639 Bosworth, 1995,298. 
1640 Heckel, 1992,99. 
1641 Bosworth, 1995,298. 
1642 Arian Indica. 18.6. 
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This is, of course, the crux of the matter, and provides us with ample information 
on Alexander's tactics for the battle, particularly when examined in conjunction with the 
orders to Coenus. Arrian tells us clearly, with no room for ambiguity, that the infantry 
were not to engage the enemy until they were in visible confusion as a result of his own 
flanking attack. The discipline of the Macedonian infantry, and of their commanders, is 
clearly demonstrated by the fact that this command was followed to the letter; 1643 the 
infantry only advanced when the Indian cavalry had been defeated and confusion reigned 
in the centre because some cavalry troops had fallen back onto the elephants and the 
infantry. ' Porus' fundamentally defensive strategy made it easy for the Macedonian 
infantry to stay out of the battle until the opportune moment, but we can also assume that 
less disciplined commanders might not have been able to prevent their men from 
engaging too soon. 
The initial attacks by the horse archers were a vital element in the battle, as is 
recognised in the casualty lists. 1645 Their repeated attacks were all but impossible for the 
defenders to counter without dangerous gaps opening up. If the Indians had charged then 
Alexander would have had the situation he often craved, that of using a relatively minor 
unit to draw the enemy out of their pre-prepared positions to allow his favoured flankinj 
attack. This was the case at the Granicus and at Gaugamela at the very least. Bosworth'64 
notes that this continued harassment prevented the Indian cavalry from reorganising 
themselves in order to meet the coming charge from the Companion Cavalry. 
At this point in the battle, Alexander appears to have implemented a version of the 
same tactic that he used to open the battle of Gaugamela: he appears to have made an 
oblique movement to his right, away from the infantry, in order to make a flanking 
attack1647 rather than a frontal attack against the Indian cavalry. This was for two good 
tactical reasons, firstly the horse archers would impede a direct frontal charge, and 
secondly Alexander's favoured strategy was to always attack an enemy in two directions 
simultaneously wherever possible. 1648 Devine'M9 spends considerable time on a 
discussion as to the formation of the Indian cavalry at this point, but it is not important; 
the main factor is that Alexander's movement forced the Indians to counter by extending 
their own line in an attempt to prevent a flanking attack. 
Porus hoped that the arriving troops from his right flank would fill in any gaps 
that opened up as a result of his extending line. The brilliance of Alexander is that he had 
foreseen this tactic, and Coenus' orders were specifically designed to counter it. As the 
Indians began to transfer from their right to left, Coenus began his movement from the 
Macedonian right, encircling behind the Macedonian line and then following the Indian 
1643 Arrian 5.17.3. 
16" This is problematic, however; if the cavalry battle took place on the Macedonian right, how could the 
Indian cavalry have retreated through the Indian centre? I will try to explaim how this was possible below. 
1645 Arrian 5.18.3. 
146 Bosworth, 1995,299. 
1647 Arrian 5.16.4; cf. Arrian 3.14.6 for similar language. 
1648 Similar to the strategy used at the battle of Paraetacene where Peithon's horse archers held Eumenes' 
cavalry in position (Diodorus 19.29.1,30.2), Bosworth, 1995,299. 
1649 Devine, 1987,106-7. 
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cavalry behind the Indian line. 1650 The Indian transfer would have been all but complete 
when they realised Coenus' cavalry were making a move to follow them. This was a 
disaster for Porus' strategy; if he continued to reinforce his right, then he would be 
attacked in the rear by Coenus' cavalry, if he turned his cavalry around to meet this 
threat, then gaps would inevitably open up in his left wing as it continued to extend. 165' 
Porus' only solution was to divide the reinforcing cavalry into two; the strongest elements 
would move to the left wing, the weaker troops would wheel around and face the new 
threat posed by Coenus. Arrian notes that this division of forces by Porus was a disaster, 
both in terms of the confusion it created and for Porus' strategy as a whole. 1652 
In typical fashion, Alexander saw his moment to strike; As the Indians were 
extending their line on the one hand, and dividing their forces on the other, Alexander 
launched his flanking attack against the Indian cavalry. The Indians had, evidently, not 
been able to extend their line far enough to prevent Alexander from flanking it, largely 
because of a numerical inferiority. This was a critical moment in the battle, and 
Alexander was victorious without bloodshed to the Companions. Arrian tells us that: 1653 
the Indians did not even wait to receive his charge, 
but fell back into confusion on the elephants, their 
impregnable fortress - or so they hoped. 
The vulgate1654 tradition only records the bare fact of the successful charge by the 
Companions, before moving to the more sensationalist material of the battle with the 
elephants. 1655 
Porus' carefully laid defensive strategy was in tatters; he was forced to move his 
elephants against the Companion Cavalry in order to prevent a flanking attack and the 
total destruction of his cavalry. 1656 The movement away from the centre gave the 
Macedonian centre the opportunity it was waiting for to take the offensive and finally 
join the battle: although Curtius strongly implies that they were already engaged by this 
point, this seems unlikely as the timing would have been poor: the tactical situation 
would not yet have been right. 1657 The confusion in the Indian ranks was rife at this point; 
all tactical cohesion had been lost. Curtius tells us that a small number of elephants led by 
Porus moved against the Macedonian centre in an effort to break the Greek infantry. 16The 
Macedonians were initially successful in the centre, but the reappearance of the 
elephants changed things: "Victors moments before, the Macedonians were now casting 
around for places to flee". 1659 
1650 That the movement of cavalry occurred behind the Indian line is argued for above. 
1651 Polyaenus Strat. 4.3.22. 
1652 Arrian 5.17.2. 
1653 Arrian 5.17.2. 
1654 Diodorus 17.88.1; Curtius 8.14.17; Plutarch Alex. 70.10-11. 
1655 Bosworth, 1995,300. cf. Diodorus 17.88.1; Curtius 8.14.17; Plutarch Alex. 70.10-11. 
1656 Arrian 5.17.3; Curtius 8.14.18. 
1657 Curtius 8.14.18. 
1658 Curtius 8.14.22. 
1659 Curtius 8.14.24. 
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Alexander, realising that his heavy infantry were singularly ill-equipped to deal 
with the elephants, moved his Agrianians and Thracian light-armed troops against the 
elephants and their mahouts. These skirmishers used javelins against the elephants and 
drivers, as well as the pressure exerted from the heavy infantry who had evidently 
regained some composure after the initial elephant charge. 166 Curtius graphically 
described Macedonians being trampled by enraged elephants, as well as elephants 
picking up fully armed men and passing them over their heads to their drivers to be 
despatched. 166' Arrian describes the battle as like no other Alexander ever fought; the 
success of the elephants filled the Indian cavalry with renewed courage and the recovered 
enough to make a coherent attack upon the Companion Cavalry, 166 but ultimately they 
were no match for the Macedonians and they broke again. At some point during the 
confusion, Arrian tells us that Coenus reformed with Alexander's cavalry into a single 
body that made successive attacks on the Indian cavalry, and we can assume flanking 
attacks against the infantry given that this was one of Alexander's favoured strategies. 166 
The pressure exerted by the skirmishers and heavy infantry from the front, and the 
Companion Cavalry from the right1664 forced the elephants back onto their own troops in 
confusion; many of the mahouts who might have been able to maintain a semblance of 
control by now having been killed. Arrian graphically tells us: 1665 
they trampled to death as many of their friends as 
enemies. The result was that the Indian cavalry, 
jammed in around the elephants and with no more space 
to manoeuvre than they had, suffered severely;... many 
of the animals had been wounded, while others, 
riderless and bewildered, ceased altogether to play their 
expected part, and, maddened by pain and fear, set 
indiscriminately upon friend and foe, thrusting, 
trampling, and spreading death before them. 
The Macedonian infantry were in a better position to deal with the maddened 
elephants, having more space to manoeuvre and escape, but the Indians, trapped as they 
were, suffered badly. 
"60 Curtius 8.14.25. 
"' Curtius 8.14.26-7. 
1662 Arrian 5.17.3. 
'663 Arrian 5.17.4; cf. Bosworth, 1995.300. 
164 We can assume the involvement of the Dahae horse archers too, although they are not specifically 
mentioned. 
1165 Arrian 5.17.5. 
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The battle wore on into the evening1666 and, the elephants gradually became 
exhausted, their charges became ever feebler. Alexander again seized his chance and 
surrounded what remained of the entire Indian army, signalling for his infantry to lock 
shields and advance upon the enemy in a solid mass. 166 The expression "lock shields" 
used in Arrian is curious; if the heavy infantry were equipped as we might expect them to 
have been, with sarissa and pelta, then it would quite simply have been impossible to 
"lock shields": the pelta was too small. I have argued earlier 668 that on occasion, as in 
the Shipka Pass, the Macedonians were occasionally equipped as regular hoplites having 
first commandeered the shields of the mercenaries and allies (who were not employed 
then and probably not here either). I'm not convinced that Alexander would have 
equipped his heavy infantry with the hoplite shield here as the night crossing of a river in 
spate would be difficult enough with the small shield, doubly so with a larger one. If the 
infantry were still equipped with the pelta then the order reported by Arrian is simply a 
reference to forming in the most compact formation available, not literally to "lock 
shields". Following the same argument as used with the shield, I am not convinced that 
the sarissa was used at the Hydaspes for much the same reason. The sarissa is not 
specifically mentioned at the Hydaspes by any source, and indeed it is not mentioned at 
all after Gaugamela. For the Hydaspes I believe the infantry were equipped with the pelta 
and hoplite spear which I argued earlier would have been carried with the army in great 
numbers for just such an occasion. 
There is some evidence that the sarissa was used at the Hydaspes. Alexander 
produced decadrachms of the battle depicting Porus as mahout being attacked by a 
Macedonian infantryman wielding a spear of such length that it can only have been a 
sarissa; 1669 this was likely a stylised depiction showing the pezhetairoi wielding the 
iconic weapon of the Macedonian heavy infantry, rather than an actual representation of 
events. 
The Indian cavalry and Infantry suffered severe losses, and those that were able to 
flee through any small gap in the Macedonian cavalry line did so. These were hunted 
down mercilessly by Craterus' fresh troops that had been crossing the Hydaspes during 
the battle. 1670 Arrian tells us that Craterus began to cross when he saw Alexander's 
triumphant success; but this cannot be the case: if he was able to overcome the Indian 
troops still left at the main camp, and chase down fleeing Indians, he must have begun 
crossing as soon as the battle was joined to allow enough time to ferry across sufficient 
troops to be effective. Porus surrendered to Alexander only when there was obviously no 
chance of victory, and their exchange is well known, but not relevant here save to say that 
Porus was reinstated in his kingdom which was also subsequently expanded. If Porus' 
'6" Plutarch Alex. 60.11; tells us that the enemy was not overcome until the eighth hour. This only gives us 
a general picture that it must have been evening as the Macedonians had to march from the crossing point 
and defeat the Indian advance force before this battle was fought, we can reasonable assume it would not 
have started before mid day. 
166' Arrian 5.18.1. 
1668 See above p. 29 n. 126. 
" Bosworth, 1995,301. 
1670 Arrian 5.18.2. 
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enemies had been hoping to use Alexander to remove him from power, and thus increase 
the size of their own kingdom, they had spectacularly misjudged the new Great King. 
Losses 
Only Arrian and Diodorus provide us with casualty figures for the battle. 1671 
Arrian's figures are atrocious, yet expected, underestimates as far as Macedonian losses 
are concerned: 80 Infantry and 230 cavalry. 1672 Diodorus' figures are a little more 
realistic: 280 cavalry and over 700 infantry. Arrian's infantry figure, however, is specific 
only to the force "which had been 6,000 strong in the first attack". 1673 
This 6,000 is a reference to the two taxeis and the total of the hypaspists. If we 
can assume that there would have been losses amongst the light infantry, those that were 
in amongst the elephants most of the time, then Diodorus' figure looks the more 
1674 realistic. 
The recorded losses for the Indians are the converse of the Macedonian: 
unbelievably high. Arrian gives 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, Diodorus does not 
distinguish between troop type but gives 12,000 dead and 9,000 prisoners; 1675 almost the 
same total number. Both also note the capture of the surviving elephants and the 
destruction of all of the Indian chariots. 1676 The only thing that we can really learn from 
the figures for losses was that the fighting was hard, Macedonian losses were relatively 
high with the Indian losses being significantly higher; more than this we are not in a 
position to say. 
The Hydaspes campaign was intricately planned by Alexander; he again saw a 
means of recycling an earlier strategy with great success, that of crossing the river 
upstream and unopposed as I believe occurred at the Granicus seven years earlier. 
Alexander managed to effect a potentially extremely tricky crossing of a major river in 
spate and tricked Porus to allow him the time to do so unopposed. The main battle also 
shows tremendous tactical and strategic planning. He immediately determined Porus' 
strategy and the greatest strength of the enemy army and designed a strategy of his own 
to counter it. The orders to Coenus were a gamble, but one that was calculated against 
Porus' defensive strategy. Alexander gambled that, concentrating all of his cavalry 
initially on his own right (so I believe), he would force Porus to concentrate his cavalry in 
that same sector, and that Porus would not take the opportunity to launch a flanking 
attack on Alexander's infantry. The orders to Coenus were nothing short of brilliant when 
taken in conjunction with another recycled strategy, that of a movement to the right to 
extend the enemy's front and force gaps, first used of course at Gaugamela. The third 
brilliant use of an old strategy was to draw out the enemy cavalry onto terrain of his own 
choosing by the use of his Dahae horse-archers; some would have to be sacrificed for this 
1671 Arrian 5.18.3; Diodorus 17.89.3. Devine, 1987,108. 
1672 Broken down into 10 Dahae horse archers, 20 Companion Cavalry and 200 other cavalry. 
1673 Arrian 5.18.3. 
1674 Devine, 1987,108. 
1675 Arrian 5.18.3; Diodorus 17.89.1-2. 
1676 Diodorus 17.89.1-2, the only source to mention the loss of the Indian chariots. 
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to work, but they were not Macedonian and therefore Alexander would not have been 
bothered unduly by this. The sacrifice of a few non-Macedonian troops to achieve victory 
over Porus was a small price to pay, and one that had been paid previously during all of 
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The Journey to Babylon - The Final Campaign 
Following victory at the Hydaspes River, Alexander resumed his march east, after 
first leaving Craterus evidently to construct a further series of outposts in Porus' 
realm. 1677 Arrian tells us of a series of campaigns against some 37 cities in the area 
between the Hydaspes and Acesines, east of Porus' kingdom. 1678 The smallest of these 
cities apparently contained 5,000 people; the largest more than double this. That the 
numbers are exaggerated hardly seems worth mentioning, but the fact is the campaigning 
continued apace. 
Along with a number of minor campaigns, the only one deserving of mention is 
the siege of Sangala. Alexander's intelligence network had informed him that an 
independent Indian tribe called the Cathaei were preparing to resist him, Alexander 
immediately changed direction and two days later was in the vicinity of Sangala. 1679 The 
siege took essentially the same form as that of Massaga, first an engagement outside the 
city, secondly a siege of the city, thirdly the final assault once the siege engines had been 
constructed and deployed. 1680 
The initial engagement took place on a hill outside the city; around the hilltop the 
Cathaei placed three consecutive defensive rings of carts . 
1681 Their intention was to force 
the Macedonian infantry's formation to be broken as they passed through or over the 
carts, thus allowing the defenders to fall upon a disorganised enemy. 1682 Alexander did 
what I have tried to argue he always did: in the words of Arrian "Alexander modified his 
tactics to suit the circumstances". ' 83 
Instead of blindly attacking the defenders, Alexander used the same tactic that had 
been so successful only weeks earlier at the Hydaspes: he opened the battle with his 
Dahae horse archers firing upon the defenders from a distance; this time it was to prevent 
the defenders attacking Alexander's forces whilst they were still deploying. Arrian again 
now mentions Cleitus as a cavalry commander; his hipparchy had evidently performed 
well enough at the Hydaspes for him to be given its permanent command. I would argue 
one exception to this, however: Arrian also mentions the "special cavalry hipparchy" 684 
in conjunction with Cleitus' command. This special hipparchy I would argue was that 
which Cleitus had commanded at the Hydaspes, which is to say it consisted of cavalry 
recruited in Bactria and Sogdiana. Cleitus was evidently transferred from this hipparchy 
1677 Arrian 5.20.2. 
1678 Arrian 5.20.4; he later (6.2.1) refers to some 2,000 cities between the Hydaspes and Acesines Rivers. 
Strabo 15.1.3 (686), 33 (701) and Pliny NH. 6.59 both note 5,000 cities in the same region. 
1679 Arrian 5.22.2. 
1610 For siege of Massaga see Arrian 4.26.1-4. Bosworth, 1995,328. 
1681 Arrian 5.22.4; Curtius 9.1.17. 
1682 Ashley, 1998,330. 
1683 Arrian 5.22.6. 
1684 Arrian 5.22.6. 
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to another one, presumably one whose hipparch had been lost at the Hydaspes. 1685 The 
fact that the Persian cavalry were still closely linked to Cleitus is in recognition of his 
special bond with those troops having commanded them in the Bactria/Sogdiana region, 
as well as at the Hydaspes. This special cavalry hipparchy cannot have been the agema, 
as Arrian uses that term specifically of that unit; they were something different from the 
normal troops and can only have been the Persians formerly commanded by Cleitus. 
Bosworth interprets Arrian's text as locating the Agrianians in the centre of the 
line between two heavy infantry taxeis, although he also noted the improbability of this 
scenario, and that Arrian no doubt misinterpreted his source. It seems to me, however, 
that Arrian clearly places the Agrianians on the right, stating: 1686 
he brought Cleitus' mounted regiment and the special 
cavalry round to the right wing of his army, with the 
guards and Agrianians in close touch.. . 
before his 
dispositions were complete, the rear-guard, both horse 
and foot, arrived on the scene; the cavalry was used to 
strengthen the wings, and the additional infantry units 
to increase the solidity of the phalanx. 
The Macedonian order of battle, therefore, shows a traditional pattern: heavy 
infantry in the centre, the hypaspists and Agrianians to their right and cavalry on both 
wings. The only major difference was the strength of the rear guard: this was not a 
tactical requirement as the battle would not be against a foe likely to break through the 
Macedonian lines, but a large reserve was employed simply because the front line would 
have been very short, and there was not enough space to locate all of the front line troops 
in their usual positions. 
Alexander then launched his typical limited initial attack, hoping to draw the 
defenders out onto his own ground, but on this occasion they did not bite. Alexander was 
therefore forced to surround the wagons and attack from all sides. 1687 Curtius tells us that 
the unorthodox defensive tactics of the Cathaeans caused some disarray among the 
Macedonians, 1688 but he overplays the situation with the attack on the outer ring of 
wagons. Arrian focuses his attention on the inability of the cavalry to have any positive 
impact on the battle; the defenders on the outer ring would have soon been dislodged, 
however, when the infantry came within striking distance. The critical time of the battle 
was almost completely ignored by Curtius: this would have been the attack on the inner 
rings, as the infantry would be disorganised after scrambling over and through the outer 
ring of carts, to be met immediately by bands of defenders who were waiting to fall upon 
them. 1689 This fighting would have been more brutal and casualties would have been 
higher than in the attack on the outer ring. After the second ring of carts was breached, 
1685 Bosworth, 1995,330. 
1686 Arrian 5.22.6. 
1687 Arrian 5.23.1; Curtius 9.1.15. 
1688 Curtius 9.1.15. 
1689 Arrian 5.23.2. 
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the Cathaeans withdrew to the relative safety of the town, after suffering significant 
losses; 1690 Alexander rested his troops the remainder of the day. 1691 
Alexander evidently only had with him a part of the army, as Arrian tells us that 
there were not enough men to surround the city completely. There was also an evident 
breakout attempt by the Indians in the early morning that was repulsed with heavy Indian 
(probably civilian) losses. 1692 As part of the second phase of the battle, apparently while 
the siege engines were being constructed, Alexander built a double circumvallation 
around the town, 1693 similar to that at Gaza. This investment would have taken a number 
of days, and Alexander used this time to have his engineers construct siege engines for 
the final assault. Another similarity with the earlier siege of Massaga is evident in Arrian: 
he ignores this central portion of the siege, only concentrating on the two failed Cathaean 
sorties, both of which were repulsed with heavy Cathaean losses. 1694 
After an unspecified time, but it cannot have been shorter than a week or two, 
Porus arrived with his remaining army of "the rest of his elephants and 5,000 Indian 
troops". 1695 Given that we know that Alexander captured all of the elephants left alive 
after the Hydaspes, Porus must not have committed his entire reserve to that battle. 
Operations must have been ongoing by means of undermining and the use of scaling 
ladders, 1696 as well as presumably rams, as a breach appeared in the brick outer wall. The 
breach was forced and 17,000 Indians were killed, 70,000 captured. 1697 
After the capture of Sangala, Alexander marched ever forwards into India; the 
Hydaspes had been fought probably in May, 1698 and the further campaigning had taken 
another month; much of this time had been spent in monsoon rains and floods in an 
unknown land with no end in sight. It is no surprise at all that the army had finally had 
enough, and refused to go any further. The revolt was not the end of the campaign, 
however, as Alexander decided to take a circuitous route back to Babylon rather than 
travel through friendly (already conquered that is) territory, and to continue to expand the 
Empire in the process. 
Immediately after the revolt on the Hyphasis River, the army marched back to the 
Hydaspes and a fleet was quickly constructed to transport some of the army down river; 
1690 Curtius 9.1.17 notes 8,000 Indians dead; Bosworth, 1995,331, notes this as "not impossible", but I 
would suggest it is an unlikely high number; perhaps it would be more fitting for the entire campaign rather 
than only the opening skirmish. 
1691 Arrian 5.23.2. 
1692 Mlan 5.23.4. 
1693 Arrian 523.6, only notes losses during the second sortie, 500 in number. 
'69° Bosworth, 1995,332. 
1695 Arrian 4.24.4. 
1696 Undermining again as at Gaza: as there we would benefit from knowing far more about this technique 
of siegecraft in the ancient world. Arrian 5.24.7; Curtius 9.1.18. 
1697 Arrian 5.24.7; the numbers, of course, seem exaggerated to say the least. 
1698 Diodorus 17.89.6; the date is disputed (Brunt, 1976-83,2.456-7), but appears sound based upon Arrian 
mistakenly assuming that the battle took place when the river was in full spate (around the summer solstice) 
rather than at the beginning of the monsoon season. Cf. Bosworth, 1988,131; Anspach, 1903,40-1; 
Schachermeyr, 1973,423. 
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the remainder marched alongside on land. 1699 After three days sail, news reached 
Alexander of another tribe that was preparing to resist his advance, the Mallians. l'oo 
These people were numerous and Curtius1701 tells us that they could put over 100,000 
men in the field; this was resistance that to be overcome so he hastened into their territory 
with the intention of catching them unprepared for his advance. 1702 The location of the 
city of the Malli is unknown, partly because of the changing course over the centuries of 
the various rivers that feed into the Indus. It seems likely, however, that their territory lay 
either side of the Hydraotes River, and some distance from the confluence of the 
Acesines River; generally to the north-east of the modem city of Multan. 1703 
Alexander divided the army, as has now become very familiar. Nearchus sailed 
south with the fleet to the borders of Malli territory. Craterus and Philip1704 led a large 
column down the west bank of the river whilst Hephaestion and Ptolemy were to take 
separate columns down the east bank five days apart. 1705 The main striking column was, 
of course, led by Alexander himself; the hypaspists, Peitho's taxis, half of the Companion 
Cavalry and Alexander's new favourite unit, the Dahae horse archers. 1706 The small 
lightly-armed fast-moving columns that Alexander created during and after the Indian 
campaign were significantly different from those previous to it. The Agrianians and 
archers were a standard addition to any flying column; both are here ignored in favour of 
the Dahae horse archers. Alexander seems to be utterly enamoured of these new troops: 
they had more flexibility and firepower than the Cretan archers, and proved far more 
operationally useful to Alexander. 
This flying column marched directly towards the capital city of the Malli, across 
the Sandar-Bar desert, taking them utterly by surprise from the north. The campaign 
against the Malli on the Hydraotes was brutal and, by this time, very predictable. ' 07 
Civilians in the area that were caught in the open were slaughtered and no mercy was 
shown. This was a terror campaign like that conducted in Sogdiana a couple of years 
previously. It is difficult to see what Alexander hoped to achieve by these tactics, other 
than repression of the populace by a campaign of fear (which may have been goal enough 
for him). The first fortified position that Alexander encountered was treated the same way 
as Sangala. It was surrounded and the walls were sapped at the same time as scaling 
ladders were being used. The defenders retreated to an inner citadel, but this lasted no 
longer than the outer wall. There is a hint in Arrian of the lack of motivation felt by the 
rank and file that would soon almost cost him his life. Arrian tells US: 1708 
1699 Arrian 6.1.1ff. 
'700 Arrian 6.4.2. 
1701 Curtius 9.4.15: 90,000 Infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 900 chariots. Diodorus 17.98.1 notes 80,000 
infantry, 10,000 cavalry and 700 chariots; Arrian 6.8.5ff. notes 50,000 Mallians. Justin 12.9.3 has 80,000 
infantry and 60,000 cavalry. 
1702 Arrian 6.4.2. 
1703 Mughal, 1967,16-23; Bosworth, 1988,135. 
1704 Son of Machatas, the satrap of northern India. 
1705 Arrian 6.6.2. 
1706 Arrian 6.6.4. 
1707 It is known only from Arrian 6.6-10. 
1708 Arrian 6.8.2. 
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Alexander, ahead of his men, was up (the 
scaling ladder) in a moment, and stood there 
alone, a conspicuous figure, holding the breach. 
The sight of him struck shame into his troops, so 
up they went after him in scattered groups. 
Figure 46: Remains of the ancient fortress of Multan. 
Alexander quickly captured the city, despite the lack of enthusiasm from his men. 
The defenders that managed to escape fled to the Hydraotes River with the intention of 
opposing Alexander's crossing, 17()9 but upon his approach withdrew towards the capital 
city of the Malli people. 1710 Alexander immediately pursued them, but he had allowed his 
cavalry to advance beyond the heavy infantry by some distance; upon seeing this, the 
Indians, numbering some 50,000, turned to face the Macedonian cavalry. "'' Alexander 
evidently realised his mistake and kept the cavalry manoeuvring around and out of reach 
of the enemy. The light-aimed infantry, specifically the Agrianians and archers, quickly 
caught up to the cavalry, and the heavy infantry appeared in the distance; this was enough 
for the Mallians to retire to their capital city and await the inevitable siege. 
1712 
: Arrian 6.8.41. cf'. Bosworth, 1988,136. 
110 The city is never actually mentioned by name. 
Arrian 6.8.5f. 
ýI2 Arrian 6.9.1. 
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Alexander began siege operations in a relatively standard fashion: he surrounded 
the city with his cavalry to prevent anyone escaping, or help arriving. Once the infantry 
were in place, the assault began; scaling ladders were used and we can presume sapping 
operations also, given that they had occurred in recent siege operations with great 
success. The outer wall of the city was taken with ease, and the inner citadel was 
invested. At this point, the enthusiasm of the infantry evidently flagged; 1713 they had 
expected to be travelling home after their mutiny, but it was evident to them now that 
Alexander was continuing to campaign just as he did previously. Arrian tells us that the 
reason the assault flagged was that there was a shortage of scaling ladders and some 
reluctance among the hypaspists to mount the final assault. 1714 Alexander's response to 
their reluctance was what Bosworth called "one of his most heroic feats of arms". '71 
The feat was undoubtedly bold, but also remarkably foolhardy. Alexander scaled 
a ladder himself, and stood atop the battlements in an effort to inspire his men; the act 
worked as the hypaspists were evidently falling over themselves to join 1716 Their 
renewed vitality was their undoing, however, as the scaling ladders broke under their 
sheer weight of numbers and Alexander stood almost completely alone atop the 
battlements with thousands of Malli looking on. Alexander only had with him a mere 
handful of companions, including Peucestas who carried the shield of Achilles that had 
been looted from Troy in 334. "" 
In an act that was at best a calculated gamble, 17 '8 and at worst rank foolishness, 
Alexander leapt from the wall into the city to face the Malli in hand-to-hand combat. The 
fight within the city must have been brief; Alexander was shot through the lung by an 
arrow and for a time Peucestas, Abreas and Leonnatus took the brunt of the Mallian 
attack. fending them off the body of the injured Alexander. '719 The hypaspists quickly 
recovered their composure and forced a way through the main gates to come to the aid of 
Alexander; the carnage was terrible. Every living soul in the city was slaughtered in a 
massive act of revenge. '720 The incident of the siege, and of Alexander's wound, has 
subsequently become almost legend, but that hides a number of key issues. The army was 
clearly losing all enthusiasm for continued conquest, and it was only by increasingly rash 
acts that Alexander was able to keep it motivated. 
The siege of the capital city of the Mallians was to he Alexander's last major 
campaign, and it was one that almost cost him his life. From this point, until his death in 
323, the campaigns were minor affairs, and not conducted personally by Alexander, given 
Bosworth. 1988.136. 
" 
. \rrian 6.9.2-3: c_f. Curtius 9.4.30. 
Boswworth. 1988.136. 
x'16 Arrian 6.9.3. 
. Arrian 6.9.4. also notes Leonnatus, a hypaspists commander, and Abreas, "one of the chosen soldiers 
on double pay. " 
IS Arrian 6.9.5 tells us that Alexander was under fire from ranged weapons in nearby towers, and that 
Alexander reasoned he would have grater chance if he were not such an obvious target on the wall. 
1" Arrian 6.10.1: Curtius 9.5.9-10: Diodorus 1799.3: Plutarch Alex. 63.9. 
"'° 
. Arrian 6.11.1: Curtius 9.5.20: Diodorus 17.99.4. 
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his grave injury. As his final military act, the siege shows at once his bravery and 
recklessness. Alexander always led from the front, he was always the first to engage the 
enemy; be that as commander of the Companion Cavalry or the first over a wall during a 
siege operation. These were characteristics that have given him an enduring legacy but 
could so easily have cost him his life much earlier, perhaps at the Granicus during the 
famous incident where he was almost beheaded. We also see in this siege (and also 
earlier at Sangala) the Macedonians were utterly tired of constant conflict; they had been 
promised a journey home and they could only see endless warfare in front of them. 
Alexander would soon, if he had lived, have to increasingly rely on native Persian troops 
such as the 30,000 "successors" and Persian cavalry that he was using more and more; we 
can only imagine how his tactics would have changed to accommodate the changing 
army structure. 
The destruction of the city of the Malli was followed by a number of minor 
campaigns, as mentioned above, of which we have too little information to be of interest, 
followed by the march through the Gedrosian Desert which is not of significance to this 
study. Upon emerging from the desert, Alexander headed for Susa; summoning a number 
of satraps and troops that were ultimately executed for some quite heinous crimes; 1721 
Alexander was attempting to restore order and discipline and at the same time sending a 
message that he was still in charge. From Susa, the army was divided into several 
columns, all of which ultimately headed for Babylon; Alexander taking the more direct 
route through Opis. 




This thesis has partly been an attempt to reconstruct the major campaigns in 
Alexander's career, and frequently I have attempted some new explanation where I 
believe one is required, but it has also been an examination of tactics and strategy from 
which many conclusions about Alexander can be drawn. 
Alexander's achievements have stood the test of time as being amongst the most 
extraordinary and impressive in the entire annals of military history. Whilst it is possible, 
as I have done, to criticise some individual mistakes on the part of Alexander, he 
consistently showed himself capable of adapting to every new challenge and environment 
that presented itself. The set-piece battles of his early career gave way to vicious guerrilla 
campaigns in Bactria and Sogdiana, and he adapted his tactics and strategy, as well as the 
organisation of the army, in order to meet these emerging threats. He also showed himself 
capable of adjusting his strategies in order to capture a series of seemingly impregnable 
fortresses throughout his career, like Tyre and The Sogdian Rock, for example. 
The only field of battle in which Alexander did not show himself to be a master 
was naval warfare, but even here there were victories. Alexander tended to avoid naval 
warfare for a number of reasons, primarily because he had no experience or knowledge of 
it at all: we get hints during the discussions with Parmenio in 334 that if he had accepted 
a naval battle with the Persians, he would have attempted to make it essentially a land 
battle fought at sea. His use of his navy at the siege of Miletus to occupy a natural 
harbour and prevent the city from being re-supplied by sea showed tactical insight; he 
demonstrated that his fleet could be capable of assisting in a victory without forcing a 
battle with the superior Persian fleet. The siege of Tyre also showed Alexander using his 
fleet to assist in an essentially land-based victory. Although some naval engagements 
were fought, these were the only ones in Alexander's career, and it is worthy of note that 
the city fell by means of a ship-borne assault. Alexander's lack of ability as an admiral, or 
lack of confidence in his navy, led him to devise an ingenious strategy of defeating the 
Persian navy on land. This is a much-discussed strategy that led him to disband his 
fleet, '722 a decision that he evidently soon deemed a mistake as the fleet was essentially 
reformed shortly afterwards. Discussions and potential criticism of this decision should 
not detract from the ingenuity of the strategy: ancient warships had to put in at harbour 
every evening; they were not capable of remaining at sea from long periods, and starving 
them of their ports was a long-term strategy but one which Alexander could control, he 
fighting his naval battle on land, terrain that he understood. 
Alexander was evidently a man who was aware of certain limitations, be they lack 
of experience of naval warfare or lack of knowledge of enemy lands. To this end he 
frequently employed local guides to provide him with intelligence that he was lacking 
when in unknown territory. Alexander is, or course, not the first commander in history to 
1722 For issues surrounding the army see English, 2009. 
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do this: Xerxes famously used local guides to turn the pass of Thermopylae and defeat 
Leonidas and the 300 Spartans. 1723 Alexander used the same tactic to similar effect 
frequently, including the turning of the Persian gates. We also know of local guides in 
Bactria, India and in almost every one of Alexander's campaigns. He evidently was 
aware of the need for acquiring as much intelligence of the enemy and the terrain as 
possible. 
A division of forces was a strategy that Alexander used throughout his career, 1724 
from the very first campaign in the Balkans to the journey back to Babylon. There were a 
number of reasons why Alexander chose to utilise this strategy, depending on 
circumstance. This was a strategy frequently used to reduce the logistical problem as he 
travelled through new territory. We almost never hear of problems of food supply during 
the career of Alexander: 1725 he clearly paid a great deal of attention to this element of 
strategy. 1726 We have no direct evidence of secondary columns being used primarily for 
this purpose, but we do frequently hear of large foraging parties being despatched, such 
as during the Balkan campaign where they ran into considerable difficulties. Secondary 
columns were also used in order to conquer more territory than a single column would be 
capable of. There are good examples of this in Bactria and Sogdiana where the nature of 
the combat led to Alexander using smaller more mobile flying columns to subdue the 
enemy. This tactic could also be used to confuse the enemy: if Alexander's army 
appeared to be in several places at once, Darius' own tactics would be potentially 
compromised. We do not hear of this as a specific strategy of Alexander, but this is 
perhaps more of an indication of the lack of Persian sources than anything else. Along 
with this confusion in the enemy, this strategy allowed Alexander to approach from 
several directions at once; on a small scale we see this at the battle of the Hydaspes; 
Alexander divided his forces in order to cross the river and attack the enemy from an 
unexpected direction. 
Coupled with dividing the army into secondary columns, partly in order to 
confuse the enemy, were the famous lightning forced marches that Alexander frequently 
conducted so as to surprise an enemy before he could finalise preparations for resistance, 
such as the march from the Balkans to Thebes in only a few days. Time and again, 
Alexander achieved rates of march that were staggering, and so often caused such a great 
psychological impact upon the enemy as to make the subsequent battle or siege far less 
difficult. 
Alexander repeatedly shows himself capable of learning from his mistakes. 
Frequently, the first time Alexander attempted something new it was less than a stellar 
success: for example in the first field campaign at Pellium, Alexander allowed himself to 
be essentially trapped and boxed in on all sides by the enemy and had to execute a tactical 
withdrawal in order to extricate himself from an extremely difficult situation; subsequent 
campaigns were, of course, rather more successful. His first real siege at Halicarnassus 
1723 As well as the almost forgotten thousands of Thespians, Plataeans and others. 
1724 Lonsdale, 2007,148-9, calls these separate forces "centres of gravity". 
1725 With the obvious notable exception of the Gedrosian Desert disaster. 
1726 See Engels, 1976,11-25, for Alexander's logistical system. 
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was not a glowing success: he only actually managed to capture one of the towers before 
moving the army on further into Persian territory; the much more successful sieges of 
Tyre and Gaza came some time afterwards. Alexander failed to protect the mole and the 
siege towers at Tyre, something that he rectified during the later sieges of the seemingly 
impenetrable mountain fortresses in India. He also demonstrates a willingness to learn 
from his enemies, as soon as the Bactrian/Sogdian campaign was over; Alexander 
employed a group of Dahae horse archers that he employed with devastating effect in the 
final years of his life. 
In terms of the utilisation of the army, it has long been recognised that Alexander 
used the Companion Cavalry as his main strike weapon; in every set-piece battle they 
were the primary means of defeating the enemy. Their objective was to punch a hole 
through the enemy's defensive front (always from the right), stream through the newly 
formed gap and wheel upon the centre to coincide with an infantry attack from the front. 
This was Alexander's primary battle-winning tactic, and it never failed and so never 
required to be modified or amended. The hammer and anvil analogy is frequently used of 
Alexander's set-piece battles, but it is used entirely incorrectly. It is always assumes, with 
little discussion, that the infantry were the anvil against which the enemy were broken; 
this was not the case. The infantry were as much a strike weapon as the Companion 
Cavalry. They were not heavily armed hoplites, but were essentially peltasts armed with 
the sarissa. 1727 This lack of defensive equipment, coupled with the sarissa that gave them 
a significant advantage in firepower over the enemy, meant that they were essentially a 
shock weapon. There initial impact was when they were most effective; once the enemy 
got past the first few sarissas, the weapon was essentially useless in close quarters 
combat, and their lack of armour meant they were vulnerable to more heavily armoured 
opponents. If the infantry engagement drew on for any length of time, the Macedonians 
would be at a significant disadvantage. Timing was everything, therefore; Alexander had 
to time the infantry engagement to correspond with his breakthrough on the right so as to 
gain the biggest possible shock impact of the infantry and Companion Cavalry. 
The hammer and anvil analogy is still valid, however; just not with the infantry as 
the anvil. The defensive part of the army was always the Thessalian cavalry under 
Parmenio. In every set-piece battle up to the Hydaspes, the Thessalians were charged 
with fighting a defensive battle on the left. The Thessalian cavalry were an invaluable 
part of the army, and fundamental in every one of the early set-piece battles. They always 
fought against significant odds and were always able to hold off the enemy long enough 
for the strike arms to complete their task of routing the Persian centre. If they had failed, 
then the Persians could have conducted the same operation as Alexander was performing 
against them, rolling up the Macedonian infantry from the right. If this had occurred then 
the Macedonian infantry would surely have been routed as they would have found it 
extremely difficult defending themselves from a flanking attack with the sarissa as their 
primary weapon. Alexander did usually plan for this eventuality by having a second line 
of heavy infantry; we know of them at Gaugamela and can presume their presence at 
Issus. 
"Z' Assuming that the sarissa was used in each of the set-piece battles, that is; there is a possibility that the 
only time it was used was at Gaugamela. 
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Alexander created what was probably the first combined arms1728 force in world 
history: 1729 he developed a series of units that were specifically suited to individual tasks 
and utilised them to their fullest potential with devastating effect. Individual units were 
highly trained and some highly specialised: the hypaspists, for example, were employed 
to maintain a cohesive link with the Companion Cavalry during the set-piece battles; if 
they failed then a gap would have opened in Alexander's line that the Persians could have 
exploited. Light infantry, specifically the Agrianians, were assigned specialised tasks, and 
even fought alongside the cavalry unity at Gaugamela. Later the Dahae horse archers 
were deployed with devastating effect against the Indians at the Hydaspes. Each of the 
individual units of Alexander's army were dangerous if engaged independently, but when 
combined formed an army that was one of the finest the world had yet seen; when this 
was coupled with the tactical genius of an Alexander, the results are there to see. 
Along with some general conclusions we have made about Alexander, there are a 
number of signature strategies that Alexander employed at almost every opportunity: 
firstly it was always his strategy to fight a battle on ground of his choosing. This can be 
viewed both on the scale of grand strategy, such as enticing Darius into the narrows of the 
Issus plain, or on a much smaller tactical scale at Gaugamela with the movement to the 
right, or of drawing the defenders away from their city at Sangala. In almost every 
military encounter, Alexander sought to draw the enemy towards him, or away from 
ground that was favourable to themselves. 
Following from this previous point, another hallmark tactic of Alexander was the 
use of what Devine called a "pawn sacrifice". In order to draw the enemy out further, 
Alexander always opened his battles by using a small detachment of troops and not the 
whole army. At the Granicus, for example, Alexander used Socrates' He to attack the 
Persians; a similar attack was launched at Gaugamela. These initial attacks were not 
intended to cause a breakthrough, and Alexander was fully aware that he was sacrificing 
some of his men; the desired effect, however, was always to draw in a much larger body 
of the enemy, to take them out of their defensive positions. It also allowed for the 
possibility of a counter-attack against their flanks as they were falling upon the much 
smaller "pawn" unit. This sort of action enabled Alexander to engage, and keep engaged, 
a massive unit of Persian cavalry with very small numbers of his own allied cavalry, and 
to keep the Companions free to launch their usual attack against what remained of the 
Persian left at Gaugamela. If the Persians had not been engaged in this way, it is unlikely 
that the Companions could have effected their breakthrough and the entire battle would 
have been in the balance. It may seem callous on the part of Alexander to order a unit of 
troops forward when he knew they would be defeated with heavy losses, 1730 but 
Alexander was always the pragmatist; their efforts would be instrumental in assuring 
victory and the sacrifice was, therefore, worth it. 
1728 Lonsdale, 2007,150, makes a similar point when he notes that the creation of a successful combined 
arms force was a key element in Alexander's success. Cf. Sekunda, 2007,333. 1729 Although the contribution of Philip in the creation of the army should not be underestimated. 1730 Especially when they were Macedonians, as at the Granicus. 
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The third element that can be considered a hallmark of Alexander's strategic 
thinking was attacking the enemy in multiple directions simultaneously. This is again a 
strategy that was employed at every opportunity, and is one of the key reasons for 
Alexander's consistent success. Alexander realised that no matter how well trained his 
army was, it was always massively outnumbered, and that his infantry were not hoplites 
and thus not suited to a simple hoplite-style battle. If the enemy stood up to the initial 
shock of the sarissa attack, the tide would quickly turn against them if the battle was 
prolonged. We do indeed see the Macedonian infantry hard pressed at Issus and 
Gaugamela precisely because the battle lasted longer than Alexander would have liked. 
Alexander deployed the flanking attack strategy for a number of reasons: it shortened 
battles, and both reduced the possibility of the heavy infantry breaking and increased 
their shock potential as they knew they did not usually have to fight for long. Flanking 
attacks against the enemy also routed them far more rapidly then an unsophisticated 
frontal assault, thus ensuring a more rapid and guaranteed victory. Shortening the battle 
also led to fewer casualties; a vital consideration as Alexander moved further and further 
away from Macedonia and easy replacements. The supreme example of the flanking 
attack during the career of Alexander is at Issus; Alexander planned a whole series of 
brilliantly conceived and executed flanking movements that devastated the Persian host 
and gave Alexander a rapid and decisive victory with an apparently small loss of life on 
the side of the Macedonians. 
Alexander certainly demonstrated that he was capable of devising quite brilliant 
and original tactics when the situation presented itself, such as the mole at Tyre and the 
powerful flank guards at Gaugamela; but more then anything Alexander was a great 
recycler of strategies. The small number of key tactics that Alexander employed, as 
highlighted above, were used at every opportunity in every sphere of warfare. Flanking 
attacks were used, for example, at Tyre and Gaza to prevent the enemy from 
concentrating their defence against the sector where Alexander expected to break 
through. Even during sieges, Alexander was able to draw the enemy onto ground of his 
choosing, as at Sanagala: where the defenders chose initially to engage Alexander outside 
the city, Alexander retreated to a nearby hill to draw them away from their city ensuring 
more would be slaughtered as they fled after the inevitable defeat. Alexander's key 
strategies were so effective, and executed with such brilliance, that he seldom needed to 
innovate beyond them. The execution is, however, a fundamental issue. These were not 
simply strategies that were slavishly followed at the expense of any other considerations; 
they were adapted and evolved to different conditions, theatres and environments with 
equal success. Alexander's real creativity as a tactician was in developing and adapting 
his existing set of strategies to cope with every situation that presented itself throughout 
his career. 
Was there a development in strategy? This is a fundamental question, and not 
easy to answer without obfuscation. At the very start of his career, from the first 
campaign in the Balkans, Alexander appears to have a set of strategies that was fully 
developed and used repeatedly in every operational environment. This, however, is to 
mask the more complex issue that those same strategies that were employed at, say the 
Hydaspes, were rather different from those used at Issus. They were essentially the same 
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ideas, but were constantly being adapted and developed to cope with new enemies and 
new theatres of warfare. The answer, therefore, can only be both yes and no; the 
strategies employed were fundamentally the same throughout his career, but were 
constantly being adapted. 
Why was Alexander ultimately so successful? Firstly we have to consider his 
almost superhuman ability to inspire his men continuously to ever greater feats across the 
breadth of the known world. Secondly, the career of Alexander the Great represents a 
remarkable nexus of events that is virtually unparalleled in history. Alexander was also 
the finest strategist and tactician the world had yet seen. He repeatedly demonstrated an 
ability to fight in every theatre of war the ancient world had to offer and to continuously 
adapt his strategies and tactics to every emerging circumstance. These factors - genius 
and circumstance - combined to enable the Macedonians to create, in less than a decade, 
an empire that spanned the known world. Alexander's achievements are legendary, and 
always worthy of study. 
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